

HOLGER HJELHOLT

GREAT BRITAIN,
THE DANISH-GERMAN CONFLICT
AND THE DANISH SUCCESSION
1850-1852

From the London Protocol to the Treaty of London
(the 2nd of August 1850 and the 8th of May 1852)

Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab
Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser 45, 1



Kommissionær: Munksgaard
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Preface

At the end of Vol. II of my *British Mediation in the Danish-German Conflict 1848-50* there are some summary remarks about events (until the Treaty of London of the 8th of May 1852) which took place later than the events which were the subject of my research. The following account replaces those summary remarks.

The reason why I have not called this book Vol. III of the above-mentioned work is that I was originally in some doubt whether I would be able to carry through the studies necessary for this sequel on account of my age.

As the title indicates, the subject is Britain's attitude towards and influence on the Danish-German conflict and the arrangement for the Danish succession, but it has, naturally, been necessary to give a more or less detailed background. It is a well-known fact that Britain's real influence on the settlement of the conflict decreased rapidly after the end of 1850, when Prussia had to abandon her policy of German unity.

As to the utilized archival sources reference is made to Vol. I, p. 10 of my *British Mediation* and to Vol. II, p. 10. I have again to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to make use of material from the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, and the kind permission of Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, to examine Lord Palmerston's private papers. — Furthermore, I repeat my thanks to the institutions mentioned in Vol. I and to their officials for all the kindness and help I have received from them.

To the Directors of the Carlsberg Foundation I am very much obliged for their grants towards studies and travels, and to the Rask-Ørsted Foundation I am again highly indebted for a grant towards the translation of the work. The translation has been made by Mrs. HELEN FOGH and I thank her very much for her kind cooperation.

HOLGER HJELHOLT

Abbreviations Concerning Literature

- Ashley. I = Evelyn Ashley: *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston. 1846–1865.* I (1876).
- Bell = Herbert C. F. Bell: *Lord Palmerston. I–II* (1936).
- British Mediation. II = *British Mediation in the Danish-German Conflict 1848–1850.* II. By Holger Hjelholt. (= *Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser udgivet af Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Bind 42, nr. 1. København 1966.*)
- Bunsen. III = Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen. *Aus seinen Briefen und nach eigener Erinnerung geschildert von seiner Witwe.* Deutsche Ausgabe, durch neue Mittheilungen vermehrt von Fr. Nippold. III (Leipzig 1871).
- Connell = Brian Connell; Regina v. Palmerston. *The Correspondence between Queen Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister 1837–1865.* (London 1962).
- Correspondence = *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Denmark. 1850–53.* Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1864.
- Engberg = Jens Engberg: *Det slesvigske spørgsmål 1850–1853.* (København 1968). Cf. Poul Bagge's review in *Historisk Tidsskrift.* 12. r. IV, p. 595 ff. (1970).
- Ernst. I–II = *Aus meinem Leben und aus meiner Zeit. Von Ernst II, Herzog von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha.* I (1887). II (1888).
- Fitzmaurice = Edmond Fitzmaurice: *The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower 1815–1891.* I (1905).
- Guichen = Vicomte de Guichen: *Les Grandes Questions Européennes et la Diplomatie des Puissances sous la Seconde Republique Française.* I–II (1925, 1929).
- Gooch. II = *The later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840–1878.* Edited by G. P. Gooch. II. (1925).
- Greville = *The Greville Memoirs (Second Part). A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria. From 1837 to 1852.* By the late Charles C. F. Greville. Vol. III (1885).
- Hjelholt: Carl Moltke = Holger Hjelholt: *Carl Moltke og dannelsen af helstatsministeriet i januar 1852.* *Historisk Tidsskrift.* 11. r. V, p. 245 ff. (1957).
- Hoetzsch. II = Otto Hoetzsch: *Peter von Meyendorff. Ein russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien. Politischer und privater Briefwechsel 1826–1863.* II (Berlin und Leipzig 1923).
- Jagow = Kurt Jagow: *Prinzgemahl Albert. Ein Leben am Throne. Eigenhändige Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1831–1861.* (Berlin 1937).
- Krigen 1848–50 = *Den dansk-tyske Krig i Aarene 1848–50.* Udgivet af Generalstaben. (1867 ff.).
- Malmesbury = *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister. An Autobiography.* By ... Earl of Malmesbury. I (1884).
- Martin. II = Theodore Martin: *The Life of His Royal Highness The Prince Consort.* II (1876).
- Meinecke = Fr. Meinecke: *Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution.* (Berlin 1913).
- Nesselrode = *Lettres et papiers du chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1856.* Extraits de ses Archives publiés ... par le Comte A. de Nesselrode. IX–X (Paris).

- Osten = Aus den Briefen des Grafen Prokesch von Osten (1848–1855). (Wien 1896).
- Radowitz = Josef von Radowitz. Nachgelassene Briefe und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Jahre 1848–1853. Herausgegeben von Walter Möring. (Berlin 1922).
- Rantzau = I. A. von Rantzau: Europäische Quellen zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. I. Akten aus dem Wiener Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv 1818–1852. (1934).
- Alex. Scharff = Alexander Scharff: Schleswig-Holsteins Erhebung im Spiegel französischer Akten (pp. 173–194 in »Aus Schleswig-Holsteins Geschichte und Gegenwart. Eine Aufsatzsammlung als Festschrift für Volquart Pauls«). (Neumünster 1950).
- Statsrådets Forhandl. = Statsrådets Forhandling 1848–1863. Udgivet ved Harald Jørgensen. II (1956). III (1958). IV (1960).
- Stockmar = Denkwürdigkeiten aus den Papieren des Freiherrn Christian Friedrich v. Stockmar. Zusammengestellt von Ernst Freiherr v. Stockmar. (Braunschweig 1872).
- Thorsøe = Alex. Thorsøe: Kong Frederik den syvendes Regering. I (1884). II (1889).
- Walpole. II = Spencer Walpole: The Life of Lord John Russell. II (1889).
- The Letters of Queen Victoria = The Letters of Queen Victoria. Edited by Arthur Christopher Benson and Viscount Esher. II (London 1907).

Abbreviations Concerning Records

Reference is made to what was said in British Mediation, Vol. I, p. 10. – Dispatches (and letters) to and from Danish Ministers which are in the usual files in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Rigsarkiv are quoted with their dates (and numbers). As far as the correspondence of Bunsen, the Prussian Minister, is concerned, I have used the microfilms acquired by the Rigsarkiv partly from the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Abteilung Merseburg (East Germany) and partly from the Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem (dispatches to the King). I offer my best thanks to Professor Georg Nørregård for his help in acquiring the microfilms from the Deutsches Zentralarchiv. I utilized the dispatches to and from the French Ministers in the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris. Copies of dispatches sent to St. Petersburg from the Russian Legation in Copenhagen are in the Rigsarkiv.

- F.O. = The records of the Foreign Office in the Public Record Office, London.
- F.O. 356/29 = Bloomfield's Papers in the Public Record Office.
- F.O. 519/163–164 = Cowley's Papers in the Public Record Office.
- P.R.O. 30–29. 20 = Granville Papers.
- P.P. = Palmerston's Papers (pro tem in the National Register of Archives, Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London).
- R.A.W. = Royal Archives, Windsor.
- Westmorland. Letters from colleagues, of which the dates only are quoted, are to be found in Correspondence of the Affairs of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein relating to the Treaty of Peace, signed by Lord Westmorland in the Archives of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (British section) in the Rigsarkiv.
- U.Min. = Udenrigsministeriets arkiv i Rigsarkivet (i.e. The Archives of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Danish Public Record Office).
- Akter vedr. successionssagen = U.Min. Gesandtskabsarkivet. London. Akter vedr. successionssagen 1852.
- Arvefølgesagen. 2 = U.Min. Arvefølgesagen 2. Korrespondance mrk. nr. 9–14. 1851–53. 1 pk.
- Holstens pacifikation = U.Min. Krigen 1848–50. Holstens pacifikation. I–II. 1848–50. 1 pk.

1. The Ratification in Berlin and Frankfurt of the Peace of the 2nd of July 1850

By the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July 1850 between Denmark and Prussia (see *British Mediation*. II, p. 211) the work of the mixed Administrative Commission in Slesvig ceased. On the 13th of July F. F. Tillisch, the Danish member, took over the civil administration of the duchy as Government Commissioner Extraordinary, responsible only to the King. The Prussian troops which had been stationed in South Slesvig went home, as did the Swedish-Norwegian troops from North Slesvig.

On the 14th of July the King issued a manifesto, drawn up both in German and Danish, which, as A. W. Moltke informed Tillisch, was mainly intended for Holstein and Europe.¹ It is true, the manifesto stated, that the Peace Treaty had not yet been ratified by the German Confederation, but this was expected to take place. Thereafter no Federal country would be entitled to continue the war, least of all a war against its own sovereign. Any legal claims made by Holstein would have to be decided according to Federal Law. If Holstein submitted, the King would try to forgive and forget. German and Danish nationalities would enjoy equal protection in Slesvig, and Slesvig would not be incorporated in Denmark. Provided that Holstein did not start any hostilities to prevent it, the King would immediately call together men of high standing from Slesvig, Denmark and Holstein to hear their views on Slesvig's relations to Denmark and Holstein respectively. Denmark and

¹ H. Hjelholt: *Den danske Sprogordning og det danske Sprogstyre i Slesvig mellem Krigene (1850-64)*. 1923, p. 13. - The manifesto is published in *Departementstidende* for 16/7 1850. Cf. *Statsrådets Forhandl.* II, p. 537 ff.

Holstein would send an equal number of notables, while the number of those from Slesvig would be greater. The King would take into consideration the result of their deliberations, if it was in any way consistent with the welfare of the monarchy.

They had not been waiting for the King's manifesto in Holstein. The day before, detachments of the Slesvig-Holstein army had crossed the Eider and advanced into South Jutland. On the 24th and 25th of July a battle was fought at Isted between the Danish army and the Slesvig-Holsteiners. The Slesvig-Holsteiners were defeated and the Danes occupied the country as far south as Danevirke. The Danish army did not pursue the enemy into Holstein, which belong to the German Confederation.

While the Tsar sent Grand Duke Constantine to Copenhagen with a letter of congratulations on the occasion of the victory over the rebels and decorations for Danish officers,¹ the mood of the English Court was different. In British Mediation. II, p. 215 I mentioned Queen Victoria's letter of the 29th of July to Frederik VII regretting the renewal of the war with Slesvig[!] and expressing a wish for a reconciliation based on the recognition of the rights of both sides. Furthermore, she asked Frederik VII to return to the Duke of Augustenborg, a traitor in the eyes of the Danes, his estates in Slesvig. She would regard this as "*une preuve d'amitié de la part de Votre Majesté envers moi.*" Queen Victoria's letter was inspired by an application from the Duke, handed over by his private tutor, Dr. Karl Steffensen.² Prince Albert's German secretary and librarian, Dr. Meyer, informed Steffensen the same day, the 29th, of what the Court had done for the Duke; he ended his letter with "a thousand good wishes for the Duke's cause, which now more than ever has become the cause of the Duchies."³ Steffensen was unable to avail himself of the recommendation for a talk with John Russell, which Meyer had procured for him. I must leave, he wrote, I am itching to be off.⁴ This was, no doubt, due to news of the Battle of Isted.

Frederik VII did not answer Queen Victoria's letter for a

¹ Krigen 1848-50, III, p. 1395 f.

² Joh. H. Gebauer: Christian August, Herzog von Schleswig-Holstein (1910), p. 300.

³ R.A.W. I 20/155.

⁴ R.A.W. I 20/156.

long time.¹ It would appear that Palmerston had no knowledge of the letter, for when Sir Henry Wynn informed him in confidence that it had been received in Copenhagen, he is said to have replied that if the Queen thought she could go in for politics behind his back, she would find out that she would not succeed.²

The expectation that the German Confederation would as soon as possible ratify the Peace Treaty which had been concluded in its name was not fulfilled. The time-limit for the exchange of ratifications was fixed at three weeks. At that time there existed, in actual fact, no constituted organ for the German Confederation. It is true that the conference at Frankfurt to which Austria had invited all former members of the Confederation had opened on the 10th of May, but far from all the German Federal states were represented at it. While Austria demanded the re-establishment of the old Federal Diet, Prussia protested and pursued her union policy. During these months it looked as if a clash was going to take place between the two powers to decide who was going to dominate Germany.

When Austria and her German Confederates maintained that the ratification should be carried out by the still non-existent Federal Diet, Schleinitz requested Denmark on the 22nd of July to extend the time-limit for procuring the ratifications by two or three weeks.³ A few days later Prussia sent all the German states a circular with a detailed proposal explaining how she thought that the difficulties connected with the question of the ratification could be solved without the states in question having to abandon their various points-of-view concerning the question of the German Constitution.⁴

The Danish Government had no objection to granting Prussia's request for a certain extension of the time-limit, but maintained that she ought to obtain the ratification she had promised for all Germany.⁵ If this was not obtained, Holstein's resistance

¹ It is presumably this letter Drouyn de L'Huys refers to in his dispatch 12/12, No. 111, where he says that he has heard from a very confidential source that the Queen wrote to the King of Denmark six [!] weeks ago asking him to show friendliness to the Duke of Augustenborg, but that the King had not answered.

² Admiralinde Zahrtmanns dagbogsoptegnelser (23/2 1851). Schlesw. Holsteinische Landesbibliothek. Kiel.

³ Dispatch No. 31 (undated, confidential) to Reventlow.

⁴ See also F.O. 64/319: 29/7, No. 14.

⁵ Copy of Moltke's dispatch to Bielke with dispatch No. 31 (note 3).

would be prolonged and she would receive help from the "enemies of law and order", i.e., from friends of Slesvig-Holstein in various parts of Germany. This was given so freely – both as regards volunteers and money – that the rebels quickly rewon their fighting abilities after the Battle of Isted.

Although the Danish Government kept Prussia to her promise, they allowed Bielke, the Danish chargé d'affaires in Berlin, to use his own discretion to some extent after taking counsel with Britain's and Russia's representatives there. As Westmorland was on leave, Britain's representative was Henry Francis Howard, the chargé d'affaires, who was kindly disposed towards Denmark. Russia's representative was Baron A. F. Budberg, the chargé d'affaires.

The nominal leader of Danish Foreign Policy was the Prime Minister, A. W. Moltke, but with Christian Høyer Bille as Director of the Foreign Department (cf. *British Mediation*. II, p. 143). On the 15th of July Wynn was able to inform Palmerston that Bille was going on holiday to Norway on account of his health. He was to hand over his post to Reedtz, who would presumably become Foreign Minister in place of Moltke, "who is only nominally so – affairs being entirely transacted by the Director."¹ Reedtz was appointed on the 6th of August, and on the 10th Irminger succeeded Zahrtmann as Minister of War. A few days later Wynn wrote that it was believed that also Madvig and H. N. Clausen, "the two most ultra Danish Members of the Cabinet", would retire.² However they did not.

On the 25th of July when Howard mentioned Bavaria's resistance to the ratification of the Peace of Berlin,³ he was instructed to request Schleinitz "without further delay" to exchange both Prussia's own ratification and those of the states who had sent theirs to Berlin.⁴ In the draft dispatch some words have then been added, presumably by Palmerston himself, to the effect that such a procedure would not prevent the treaty's later ratification "by the general organ of the whole of the German Confederation whereas such a general organ shall have been again established."

¹ F.O. 22/183: 15/7, No. 77.

² F.O. 22/184: 15/8, No. 98.

³ F.O. 64/319: 25/7, No. 7.

⁴ F.O. 64/312: 31/7, No. 2.

Through the British Minister in Munich Palmerston heard again of Bavaria's dislike of the Peace Treaty, and Howard was therefore again instructed to represent to the Prussian Government how highly dangerous it would be for the Peace of the North of Europe, if Prussia let the matter of the ratification rest until "a Settlement can be arrived at of the complicated Questions connected with the Reestablishment of a Central Organ for the Germanic Confederation."¹ Prussia ought not to postpone the exchange of ratifications with Denmark.

A copy of these instructions was sent the same day to Wynn, who, in a note of the 19th, sent on the request to the Danish Government.² To this Reedtzt replied that "they would in this as well as in any other respect follow your Lordship's advice." Howard, as representative of the mediating power, was to take the initiative concerning the exchange, and it was Reedtzt's wish that the ratifications which had been obtained "should be deposited at the British Legation [in Berlin] till the others are obtained."³

Ratifications had been received from the great majority, though not from all, of the members of the Prussian Union. On the 19th of August when Reedtzt informed Bielke that Palmerston's advice would be followed and the exchange which Prussia wanted would take place, he pointed out at the same time that this did not mean that Denmark recognized the Union of the 26th of May 1849.⁴ The same day Pechlin was sent on a mission to Vienna – via Berlin – to obtain Austria's participation in the ratification and the pacification of Holstein.⁵ He was authorized to assure Schwarzenberg that the King of Denmark would adhere to the principles expressed in the Manifesto of the 14th of July and the *Résumé* of the 17th of March 1850:⁶ Slesvig would not be incorporated, but would, as previously, remain outside Germany's authority. A meeting of notables with this end in view would take place as soon as possible.

¹ F.O. 64/312: 13/8, No. 8.

² F.O. 22/181: 13/8, No. 112 – F.O. 22/184: 19/8, No. 101 – Wynn's note 19/8 in file Holsteins Pacification. Cf. Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 570 f.

³ F.O. 22/184: 22/8, No. 102.

⁴ Copy of dispatch to Bielke with dispatch 19/8 No. 36 to Reventlow.

⁵ See also Statsrådets Forhandl. II, p. 565 ff.

⁶ Concerning this cf. British Mediation. II, p. 184 and the source mentioned there.

As Reedtz rightly remarked in a dispatch to Reventlow, the fact that Denmark followed Palmerston's advice in the question of the ratification could have no other visible effect at the time being than that Denmark's real opponent, Prussia, would immediately be released from her obligations towards her.¹ Therefore Reventlow ought to stress to Palmerston that as Britain's advice was decisive for Denmark's line of action, Britain must also be responsible for the consequences. I do not think that Palmerston has taken this very seriously.

Before the partial exchange of ratifications took place, Schleinitz had left Berlin on leave. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was being run temporarily by Brandenburg, the Prime Minister, with the assistance of Rudolph v. Sydow until Joseph Maria von Radowitz, the advocate of the Prussian union policy, was appointed Foreign Minister on the 26th of September.²

On the evening of the 6th of September the exchange took place at Howard's home.³ The protocol of the meeting states that Bielke declared, in the name of the Danish Government, that the exchange took place on Britain's recommendation,⁴ but that it was hoped that this partial exchange would be made complete as soon as possible, so that the Treaty would be ratified by "la totalité des Etats formant cette Confédération." Oldenburg had made reservations concerning her ratification, reservations which Sydow had promised to have withdrawn. He also promised to induce Brunswick and Coburg to send in their ratifications, which had not been received so far. The exchange of ratifications with Brunswick⁵ did not take place until the 5th of October, and a few days later with Oldenburg.⁶ Oldenburg had, however, made certain reservations, and the Danish Foreign Minister was dissatisfied that Bielke had nevertheless exchanged the ratifications.⁷ But Howard reported that Sydow had said to Bielke that Oldenburg's "considerations could not well be

¹ Dispatch 29/8, No. 41.

² For this see Meinecke.

³ F.O. 64/320; 5/9, No. 67; 6/9, No. 69, and 7/9, No. 70. – Reedtz's dispatch to Reventlow 9/9, No. 44 – Rantzau, p. 227: Prokesch v. Osten's dispatch 7/9.

⁴ Palmerston's approval of the mention of Britain's recommendation was given on the 16th, that is ten days later. F.O. 64/312: 16/9, No. 25.

⁵ F.O. 64/320: 5/10, No. 117.

⁶ Ibid. 10/10, No. 129; F.O. 14/326: 17/10, No. 149.

⁷ See also Sternberg's dispatch 14/10, No. 137.



FREDERIK VII

(1808-1863)

Painted by David Monies. It was presented by the King to Lord Westmorland.
Bought in 1965 for the Museum of National History at Frederiksborg Castle.



HENRY WATKIN WILLIAMS WYNN

(1783–1856)

British Envoy to Denmark. Engraving by I. A. Vinter after F. R. Say.
National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth.

considered as reservations," and Howard himself "was not called upon for an opinion." Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was the last of all to ratify the Peace Treaty. His ratification was not exchanged until May 1851.

During the negotiations which led to the Peace of the 2nd of July, the question had been raised as to the ownership of the frigate "Gefion", which had been captured by the rebels and the Germans in the encounter at Egernförde. The frigate was lying in the harbour at Egernförde, but ran the risk, if she put to sea, of being seized by Danish warships. The Danish Government had declared that when the Peace was ratified by the German Confederation, the "Gefion" would become the property of the Confederation.¹ However, Prussia wanted her handed over after the partial exchange of ratifications, and the Prussian flag had been hoisted on the frigate. The Danish Government took no action against this, and made no resistance later to the frigate's leaving the harbour at Egernförde. As usual Palmerston had advised Denmark to be indulgent. Wynn had several talks with Reedtz on the matter, the last, supposedly, on the 16th of October, when Reedtz said that the Danish Government gave up all control over the "Gefion", adding "que le Diable l'emporte et que nous n'en entendions plus parler."

Austria's refusal of Prussia's proposal as to how the ratification could be carried out for all Germany was due to her wish to make use of the question for the re-establishment of the German Confederation as it was before 1848.² Austria's Minister in Copenhagen, Baron von Vrints, had, on returning to his post at the end of July, explained in a memoir to the Danish Government that, if the Holstein question were referred to the "Federal Assembly" at Frankfurt, it could be used, for one thing, to force Prussia to acknowledge it.³ In his dispatch of the 12th of August to Denmark's Minister in St. Petersburg Reedtz stated that

¹ Reedtz's dispatches 2/9, No. 43 and 30/9, No. 45. — F.O. 22/184: 12/8, No. 97; 15/8, No. 99; 16/9, No. 114; 20/9, No. 116; 30/9, No. 121; 17/10, No. 133. Statsrådets Forhandl. II and III (see subject index). Sternberg's dispatch 19/10, No. 139.

² Cf. Rantzau, p. 194 ff.

³ The memoir is found with dispatch No. 31 (undated) to Reventlow. — A dispatch (1/8) from the French Foreign Minister to the Minister in London states that Austria will use the question to create difficulties for the Cabinet in Berlin and bring it into discredit.

Austria would identify the solution of the question of the Duchies with the questions concerning the rivalry between Vienna and Berlin. The Minister was to request Russia's help and advice.¹

In a private letter of the same day to Palmerston Wynn gave an account of Denmark's critical situation and remarked about "Poor Reedtz": he is quite overwhelmed – hardly knows what way to turn.² Wynn wrote of a conversation he had with Reedtz at the end of August that he had never seen him so desponding, only looking to the distant prospect of European intervention and in default of this compelled to "throw themselves unconditionally into the arms of Russia."³

Even though this statement may be regarded as exaggerated, it is clear that Denmark was obliged to seek help from Russia, if she was to induce Austria to adopt a sympathetic attitude as regards the ratification of the Peace Treaty and the pacification of Holstein. This appears clearly from the letter of the 19th of August to Pechlin which stated the purpose of his mission to Vienna.⁴ He was there to state the King's intentions and wishes. However first he was to discuss the question of the ratification in Berlin with Howard and Budberg and possibly talk to Schleinitz. Then he was to plan his journey in such a way that he would be able to meet the Russian Chancellor, Nesselrode, and Meyendorff. In Vienna he was to influence Schwarzenberg to pursue a policy which was consistent with Austria's European call and Denmark's interests. He could state that Slesvig would not be incorporated in the Kingdom and refer to the promise in the Manifesto of the 14th of July. Intervention in Holstein ought to be carried out by Austrian, possibly also Hanoverian, troops. In addition he was to discuss with Nesselrode and Meyendorff the question of the abandonment of the candidature of the Duke of Oldenburg as the successor on account of his hostile attitude towards Denmark.

Pechlin had important tasks to carry out on his journey, which lasted nearly three months. I shall not go into details

¹ Holstens pacifikation.

² P.P.

³ F.O. 22/184: 26/8, No. 106.

⁴ Holstens pacifikation. – Already in dispatch 4/8, No. 91 Sternberg states that he has advised Reedtz to send Pechlin on a mission to Frankfurt (and Vienna) to have Article IV of the Peace Treaty carried into effect. – Rantzau, p. 219 f.

about his lengthy negotiations, particularly in Vienna with Schwarzenberg, and, generally speaking, mention only what is connected with the question of the ratification. I shall touch on other subjects later.

On his first visit Pechlin stayed in Berlin only from the 22nd to the 23rd of August.¹ He had a conversation at once on the first day with Budberg, who definitely advised the above-mentioned partial exchange with Prussia and her Confederates, and later with Howard, kindly disposed as always, and with Prokesch von Osten, Austria's Minister in Berlin. Pechlin said that both Budberg and Howard saw through the selfish motives which actuated Austria's obstinate attitude towards Denmark's cause. Next day Pechlin negotiated with Schleinitz and persuaded him to approve of the insertion of a reservation about a later supplement in the ratification (see above).

On the 23rd Pechlin went on to Dresden, from there to Teplice to meet Nesselrode, and finally to Vienna to the decisive negotiations with the Russian Minister there, Meyendorff, and with Schwarzenberg. Pechlin found that all the Russian diplomats were sympathetically inclined towards the plan for the candidature of Prince Christian of Glücksburg instead of for that of the Duke of Oldenburg.

Pechlin's discussions with Schwarzenberg were lengthy and difficult and, in one important respect, were without result. Actually it was quite natural that Austria, as the advocate of the pre-1848 situation, in the Slesvig-Holstein question chose to take up the attitude of the Federal Resolution of the 17th of September 1846. But after the insurrection Denmark at any rate had to try to uphold Slesvig's independence of the German Confederation, even if Reedtz went far in his statement about Slesvig's non-incorporation in the Kingdom – even though the term "incorporation" may be interpreted in various ways.

Pechlin reported Schwarzenberg's statement at the dinner party to which he had invited Pechlin: "Isn't it true that, if Denmark is comfortably off, you don't mind in the least what happens in Germany."² Schwarzenberg also stated that Austria's feelings towards Denmark had become much cooler because

¹ Dispatch 23/8. Holstens pacifikation.

² Pechlin's report. 9/9. Holstens pacifikation.

Denmark had associated herself with the partial exchange of ratifications in Berlin. Pechlin directed Schwarzenberg's attention to the reservation which had been made.

During his conversation at Teplice with Nesselrode, Pechlin had learnt that both Nesselrode and Meyendorff wanted an understanding between Austria and Prussia concerning the intervention in Holstein of the re-established Federal organ. During the talks mentioned above with Schwarzenberg, Pechlin also recommended an understanding with Prussia, which Schwarzenberg at least did not reject. The reflections which Baron Vrints, Austria's Minister in Copenhagen, made in a dispatch of the 5th of October¹ are very revealing as regards the Danish Government's attempt to keep their balance between the two contending German powers. According to this dispatch Reedtz is said to have expressed to him, and particularly to Wynn, his hope that Prussia's proposal for the establishment of a special Federal Commission to bring about peace would lead to the desired goal. Vrints wrote that during the three years of war Denmark had felt the effects of Prussia's predominance in North Germany, was, therefore, careful not to oppose her, and if this was not successful, she tried, with the support of her allies, to treat her with as much consideration as possible. The Danish Government seized every means to bring about an understanding and regarded Prussia as the power which – if only she would – could easily put an end to the insurrection in Holstein.

We return to Pechlin's negotiation in Vienna with Schwarzenberg. As a *quid pro quo* for agreeing to the ratification and measures for the pacification of Holstein, Schwarzenberg wanted Denmark to induce Russia, and preferably Palmerston as well, to acknowledge the Frankfurt Assembly as the constituted Federal Diet. On the 16th of September Pechlin informed Reedtz that Schwarzenberg insisted that "I in a direct letter to Nesselrode explain that Russia's official recognition of the Federal Diet is necessary for Austria's efforts in support of Denmark." After discussion with Meyendorff Pechlin stated that he was prepared to do this and also to communicate with Palmerston. Accordingly he optimistically assumed that Vienna would send instructions to Frankfurt both concerning the ratification of the Peace Treaty

¹ Rantzau, p. 248 ff.

and concerning an inhibitorium (with a possible threat of execution) to the Statthalterschaft to cease aggression. But for the time being Austria contented herself with the first step. On the 3rd of October the Peace was acknowledged at Frankfurt while the question of the inhibitorium was postponed.¹ On the other hand Russia postponed accrediting an official Minister to Frankfurt.

The question of Russia's attitude towards and terms for such an official Minister were mentioned in a Russian dispatch (2nd of September) to Count Medem, Russia's representative in Vienna. Brunnnow sent a copy of this dispatch on the 17th of September to Palmerston, who acknowledged receipt of it on the 30th.² Palmerston, presumably too strongly stressing agreement with Russia, wrote that the British Government "highly appreciate the principles and intentions expressed in it" and had acted on it. Although the British Government had a diplomatic agent at Frankfurt, he was not formally accredited "to any German Authority, because as yet it does not appear that any central authority exists which has been sanctioned and acknowledged as being permanently the organ of the German Confederation."

As far as the ratification of the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July was concerned, Palmerston continued by saying that Britain fully shared Russia's wish that the treaty should be ratified as soon as possible by a central organ for the whole German Confederation. But in the meantime Britain had urged Denmark to exchange ratifications with the German states which were willing to do so. For it seemed desirable to the British Government "to secure at all events, and without further delay, the formal completion of the transaction as far as the state of things rendered it possible to do so."

In a dispatch sent on the same day to Magenis in Vienna Palmerston stated in almost the same way why Britain could not comply with Schwarzenberg's wish to accredit a Minister to Frankfurt.³ Regarding Schwarzenberg's disapproval of Britain's participation in the ratification in Berlin, he explained that Britain "would gladly have counselled Denmark to wait till some Central Organ was established at Frankfurt which could

¹ Thorsoe. II. p. 85 - Krigen 1848-50. III, p. 1417 ff.

² F.O. 65/385. - Cf. Bloomfield's dispatch 3/9, No. 278. F.O. 65/379.

³ F.O. 7/378: 30/9, No. 80.

be duly authorized to ratify that Treaty on behalf of all Germany." But there did not seem to be any prospect of the speedy establishment of such an organ, and it seemed to Britain "that if those States in the Northern Part of Germany which were most likely to be drawn over to take part with the Holstein Government should not as soon as possible be firmly bound to the Peace" by the exchange of ratifications, the security which the above-mentioned treaty was calculated to bring about would be lost to some degree. Therefore Britain had urged the exchange of "separate Ratifications which would bind the different States individually, but which need not supersede a general Ratification hereafter by the Central Authority at Frankfort," when such an authority was re-established. But if Austria believed that this authority already existed, then the British Government were very desirous that Austria "would urge that Authority to proceed without further delay to an Exchange of Ratifications with Denmark."

There does not seem to exist any direct Danish application to Palmerston requesting him to recognize Frankfurt in order to help Denmark. But at least an indirect application is to be found in Reedtz's dispatch on the 30th of September to Reventlow.¹ Reedtz wrote that the King of Denmark in his capacity of a German prince [Duke of Holstein] considered it his duty to assist in the re-establishment of the Federal Diet, convinced that only in that way could Germany be reconstructed on the basis of the treaties acknowledged by Europe. By acceding to the London Protocol Austria had performed an act of justice and re-established the lawful order. It was therefore natural that Austria demanded support from Europe for the same order in Germany, i.e. acknowledgement of Frankfurt by the Great Powers. Koller, the Austrian chargé d'affaires in London, was also, of course, an advocate of that demand. But neither Britain nor France wanted to take sides in the internal German contention. Drouyn de Lhuys said to Palmerston that Austria's pretentiousness in wanting to insist on Russia's, France's and Britain's recognition of Frankfurt before the solution of the Slesvig-Holstein question seemed strange to him.²

¹ Cf. Vrints's statements in dispatch 10/10. Rantzau, p. 250 f.

² Dispatch 3/10, No. 67.

In his above-mentioned dispatch of the 30th of September Reedtze asked Reventlow to request Palmerston to instruct Cowley to support Bülow with his advice and, as the representative of the mediating power, participate in the expected exchange of ratifications at Frankfurt.

The advice which Cowley had until now given Bülow had more or less been to the effect that he should try to get Frankfurt to act in accordance with Berlin and that nothing could be done without Prussia.¹ However Bülow seemed to think it would be most advantageous – “and perhaps he is hardly to be blamed for so appearing” – Cowley wrote in one of his dispatches, if Frankfurt were to take measures “to restore the King Duke’s authority.”

After Frankfurt’s recognition of the Peace, Bülow approached Cowley with a request that the exchange of the ratifications should be carried out in his presence “as the Agent of the British Government.”² To this Cowley replied that it might give rise to difficulties, as he was not accredited to the Confederation, but that he expected to receive instructions from Palmerston on the matter. Incidentally, he had shortly before had a discussion with Count Thun, who maintained that a refusal to acknowledge Frankfurt was equal to taking the side of Prussia.³ Cowley challenged this statement on the ground that Palmerston had not either taken the side of the Prussian Union, and that there was a difference between “an attitude of caution and one of opposition.” Moreover Cowley’s unofficial position at Frankfurt was bound, naturally enough, to restrict his influence there and diminish the possibilities of his carrying out Palmerston’s urgent instructions to induce Frankfurt to put an end to the Holstein aggression.⁴

To Cowley’s enquiry about Denmark’s wishes regarding his presence at the exchange of ratifications, Palmerston replied on the 15th that there was “no substantial objection to this if both Parties wish it. In such case you would describe yourself as Her Ma. Minister Plenipotentiary residing at Frankfurt.”⁵

¹ F.O. 30/140: 2/9, No. 274; 9/9, No. 283; 15/9, No. 289 and 23/9, No. 299.

² F.O. 30/141: 7/10, No. 325.

³ F.O. 30/141: 7/10, No. 324.

⁴ Cf. Cowley’s letter 14/10 to P. (P.P.)

⁵ F.O. 30/135: 15/10, No. 199.

On the 20th of October Cowley recommended Bülow to carry out a speedy exchange of ratifications and stated that he was willing to be present on the understanding mentioned by Palmerston.¹ As this was the case the exchange then took place on the 26th.² When Cowley asked Count Thun if he would inform Berlin about this, Thun said he would not. Bülow then stated that he would inform his colleague in Berlin; and Cowley said that he would also inform his colleague, Mr. Howard. When Howard informed Sydow of the ratification, Sydow found occasion to protest against Frankfurt's being considered as "a real Plenary Assembly of the Diet."³ He also trusted that Cowley's presence was not to be regarded as Britain's recognition of the Diet.

Cowley himself informed Palmerston that his presence at the exchange was hailed by the Austrian party as Britain's "virtual recognition of the Diet," and that the Prussians were uneasy.⁴ In connection with this he had observed that he had "been nothing more than a witness to the fact, that certain ratifications were exchanged." Palmerston replied to Cowley that his comment was perfectly correct.⁵ On that occasion you acted "as Representative of the Mediating Power witnessing the exchange of certain ratifications of a Treaty which had been concluded under the mediation of Great Britain, and your signature to the Protocol was no acknowledgment of the Central Authority existing for the moment at Frankfort." Britain had neither denied nor confirmed "the Powers assumed by the Diet now assembled at Frankfort," but only stated that, as affairs are at present in Germany, she cannot formally accredit a Minister to "that Body."

¹ F.O. 30/141: 21/10, No. 346.

² Ibid. 27/10, Nos. 354 and 355.

³ F.O. 64/321: 31/10, No. 178.

⁴ F.O. 30/142: 4/11, No. 370.

⁵ F.O. 30/135: 12/11, No. 220. — Cf. Guichen. II, p. 106. The work of Vicomte de Guichen is valuable by his publishing much diplomatic material. However, there are many misprints (or misreadings) and a lot of incorrect statements.

2. Palmerston tries to induce Prussia to restrain the Statthalterschaft from continuing the fight. The sympathy of the English Court for Slesvig-Holstein and Prussia

By the Peace of the 2nd of July Prussia's direct support of the Slesvig-Holstein revolution ceased. But the Statthalterschaft refused to recognize the Peace. As mentioned above, its army advanced into Slesvig and not until the Battle of Isted was it forced back into Holstein and Slesvig south of Dannevirke.

Before Lord Westmorland, the representative of the mediating power on the conclusion of Peace, left Berlin for England on the 21st of July, news from Holstein had already embittered the joy caused by the Peace. On the 17th Westmorland informed Palmerston that, as the Holstein troops had already crossed the Eider, Schleinitz anticipated a fight between them and the Danes (cf. *British Mediation*. II, p. 214).¹ Westmorland wrote that Schleinitz proposed that Britain and Russia "should jointly interpose their good offices and authority and by Commissioners appointed for that purpose should call upon the Duchies to submit to the Authority of the King of Denmark and to accept the equitable terms he had proposed to them." The day before, the 16th, on account of information received from Hodges about the preparations for war being made by the Stadtholders, Palmerston had requested Westmorland to urge Prussia "to make such Representations as may be best calculated to prevent" such an invasion of Slesvig.² Schleinitz assured Westmorland of his efforts in that direction, but added that the Statthalterschaft had replied that "they could not restrain either the Army or the population;" it was impossible for them "to prevent the invasion of the Duchy of Sleswig."³ Schleinitz and Brandenburg regretted that this would result in bloodshed and no permanent settlement of the question. The possibility of an intervention by Britain and Russia was again referred to.

Palmerston drew up a new urgent appeal to Prussia requesting her to restrain the Holsteiners from invading Slesvig.⁴

¹ F.O. 64/318: 17/7, No. 254.

² F.O. 64/311: 16/7, No. 204.

³ F.O. 64/318: 20/7, No. 262.

⁴ As regards the following see R.A.W. I 20/159-161. - *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. II, p. 307 f.

The dispatch stated that "this is not a question of internal Insurrection in Sleswig, but of an Invasion of Sleswig by a German Force." Before he sent the dispatch for the Queen's approval Russell put a question mark beside this passage, a question mark which he must certainly have known would please the pro-Slesvig-Holstein Court.

When the Queen returned the dispatch to Russell she remarked that its obvious aim was "to lay the ground for future foreign armed intervention," which should be justified "by considering the assistance which the Stadthalterschaft of Holstein may be tempted to give to their Schleswig brethren as an Invasion of Schleswig by a German Force." When the Queen wrote that the whole war had been a question of whether Slesvig "was part of Holstein (though not of the German Confederation) or part of Denmark and not of Holstein" it was a summary explanation.

The controversial passage is not to be found in the dispatch as it was sent off on the 31st to Howard.¹ But its contents are a forcible request to Prussia to put an end to the Holstein aggression. It would, the dispatch stated, be disrespectful to the Prussian Government to suppose that the engagement Prussia had entered into in the name of the Confederation (the Peace) "was a Nullity, and that it was to have no practical result," and that Holstein, which was a member of the Confederation and as such had to abide by the above-mentioned engagement, in spite of this should be free "to commence Hostilities which had been suspended during the Armistice." "A due regard for the good faith of Diplomatic Engagements" seemed, therefore, to demand that Prussia prevailed upon Holstein to respect the Peace.

Howard communicated the dispatch to Schleinitz, but without result.² Schleinitz then said that as the Peace Treaty had not been ratified by "the Confederation", Prussia had no right to act in its name and the treaty did not mention that she should interfere singly. She would not employ force against the Stadthalterschaft and nothing else would have any effect. He regretted that his proposal for Britain's and Russia's intervention, "to which France might have been associated," had not been taken

¹ F.O. 64/312: 31/7, No. 3.

² F.O. 64/319: 10/8, No. 30; see also 6/8, No. 24.

up. In that case the Statthalterschaft might even have agreed to an arrangement on the basis of the peace preliminaries.

Schleinitz's statement that Prussia could not "interfere singly" seems to underlie Palmerston's dispatch of the 13th of August to Magenis in Vienna (as well as to Britain's representatives in other German states).¹ Magenis was requested to prevail upon Austria to use her influence "to prevent the Holstein Troops from again invading Sleswig." For whatever the differences of opinion were between the Stadtholders and the King, differences which did not seem "very clear", they could not be solved in a satisfactory way by force of arms. If the Stadtholders lost, they would not obtain so favourable an arrangement as they had prospects of obtaining through peaceful negotiations. On the other hand, if the Danes were driven out of Slesvig, it was possible that "some of the Allies of the King of Denmark might throw their weight into his scale and thus render null the successes obtained by the Holsteiners."

Two days later Palmerston refused Schwarzenberg's request to accredit Cowley formally as envoy to "the Confederation" at Frankfurt.² Britain would not take sides in the internal German struggle, but was "a watchful though anxious Observer of Events." As Magenis understood that Austria intended to prevail upon "the Central Power at Frankfurt" to let a force occupy Holstein, Palmerston wrote that, if the object in view was to put an end to the Holstein aggression against Denmark, the British Government would "rejoice to hear that such Occupation was about immediately to be carried into effect."

In her letter of the 28th of July to Russell, Queen Victoria put into words her impression, mentioned above, that Palmerston would defend "foreign armed intervention" in Slesvig.³ She was, she wrote, personally convinced that Palmerston "at this moment is secretly planning an armed Russian intervention in Schleswig, which may produce a renewal of revolutions in Germany, and possibly a general war." She considered it her duty, both to the country and herself, not to let Palmerston,

¹ F.O. 7/378: 13/8, No. 42. – F.O. 64/312: 13/8, No. 10. – F.O. 30/135: 14/8, No. 172.

² F.O. 7/378: 15/8, No. 47.

³ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 306.

in whom she could place no confidence, continue as Foreign Secretary.

At the beginning of August there were negotiations between the Court and various politicians as well as John Russell as to how to get rid of Palmerston.¹ Prince Albert had a candidate ready, Lord Granville, with whom he cooperated in connection with the preparations for the Great Exhibition of 1851: "a man highly popular, pleasing, conciliatory, well versed in Foreign Affairs, and most industrious." John Russell did not seem unwilling to comply with the Court's wishes, but could the Cabinet do without Palmerston's political support and dare they dismiss him against his will? The plans broke down on this point. Palmerston would not leave of his own free will, and he could point to his recent triumph in the House of Commons over the Greek affair (*British Mediation*. II, p. 236).

Queen Victoria's statement that Palmerston was secretly planning an armed Russian intervention in Slesvig was unfounded in fact. It seems rather unlikely that he would have been pleased to see Russia establish herself at Kiel.² It was quite a different matter that he used Russia as a bogey-man to scare Prussia and the revolutionaries.

Fear of Russian intervention was the reason why the Statthaltschaft sent an envoy to London at the beginning of August to seek help there. It was known that Prince Albert, at least, was favourably disposed towards them.

On the 1st of August G. G. Gervinus, the Liberal German historian, wrote to Stockmar from Kiel that he intended to go to England.³ He urged Stockmar to work for the cause of the Statthaltschaft and asked what Palmerston contemplated in the event of Russian intervention. Stockmar sent on the letter to Prince Albert with the following remarks which do not exactly contradict his statement that illness prevented him from thinking coherently: "Wenn die Russen intervenieren, die Engländer es zulassen wollen in Gottes Namen! *Deutschland ist Pohlen geworden, und England und Frankreich haben sich 1849 und 50 gegen Deutschland betragen genau so, wie sich früher diese beiden*

¹ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 309 ff.

² Drouyn de L'Huys wrote in his dispatch 28/8, No. 41 that Palmerston found such a possibility "*fort désagréable*".

³ R.A.W.I. 21/9.

*Mächte während der pohnischen Theilung gegen Pohlen betragen haben . . . Ich halte alle Cabinette für toll und Palmerston für rasend.*¹

On the 6th of August Gervinus reached London and Dr. Meyer, Prince Albert's librarian, wrote to inform the Prince of his arrival.² The object of Gervinus' mission was, of course, to find out whether Britain would agree to a Russian intervention in Slesvig. Prince Albert would perhaps think, as he did himself, that such an intervention had become unnecessary, "durch die unglückliche Schlacht bei Idstedt!" But, continued Meyer, Gervinus maintained that the battle was, if anything, a victory for the Slesvig-Holsteiners, though the Cabinets had, unfortunately, received another impression.

Prince Albert received Gervinus on the day before Parliament adjourned (15th of August) and had, as he wrote to Stockmar ten days later, "a long conversation with him."³ Prince Albert stated that he was in full agreement with what Stockmar said about "the Protocol policy, but it is impossible to make any impression here upon that subject."

Gervinus was also received by Russell and Palmerston during his stay in London.⁴ He was without doubt kindly treated by Russell, and he was right in his opinion that Russell's views on the Slesvig-Holstein question were different from Palmerston's and approached those held by the Court.⁵ According to the account Palmerston gave Reventlow he is said to have told Gervinus⁶ that the Statthalterschaft and the Revolutionary Party could do nothing better than obey the commands of the German Confederation [?], withdraw their troops from Slesvig and reduce them to their peace establishment to prevent a Russian occupation of Kiel and a great part of Holstein: Any future bloodshed would be due to the pig-headedness of the revolutionaries! — In the description he gave Reventlow of the conversation, Palmerston poked fun at Gervinus' bad English which resulted in his not being able to understand a single word of his exposition of the

¹ R.A.W.I. 21/8.

² Ibid. I 21/20–21. — Cf. de L'Huys's dispatch 15/8, No. 32.

³ Martin, II, p. 314. — Jagow, p. 217.

⁴ R.A.W. I. 21/35. — F.O. 22/187: Gervinus' letter 15/8 to Palmerston and Palmerston's reply of the same date that he will receive him on the 17th.

⁵ R.A.W. I. 21/51.

⁶ Reventlow's dispatch 2/9, No. 74; cf. 24/8, No. 73.

Slesvig-Holstein theories of Constitutional law. Palmerston, for that matter, had heard enough about them from Bunsen.

In order to reassure the startled Court, Palmerston sent Prince Albert a letter on the 18th of August stating that the Government had no plans for intervening together with Russia.¹ He reminded Prince Albert that several weeks ago Russia's proposal for a joint British-Russian Naval demonstration had been turned down (see *British Mediation*. II, p. 210). That proposal, he wrote, had not since been put forward and "nothing has at present happened which can lead Her Majesty's Government to entertain any Intention of submitting to Her Majesty any proposal for an arrangement of that kind."

Two days later when Prince Albert replied to a letter from the Prince of Prussia, he expressed the hope that the Prussian union policy would be successful.² He continued by stating that he was sorry for "the poor Slesvig-Holsteiners" who now stood alone. But on the other hand he considered it an advantage that their "gerechter Widerstand" was not now falsified "durch den Schein Preussischen Ehrgeizes." He did not either believe that the question of the succession could be settled so easily by "European protocols", if the House of Augustenborg was determined not to give up "ihr gutes Recht."

The formal memorandum which Queen Victoria in a letter of the 12th of August to Russell demanded – and received – Palmerston's approval of, stated, among other things, that she wanted to have "the drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off."³ If the Queen's demands were to be complied with literally not only would an additional clerk or two be required, whose assistance Palmerston requested,⁴ but the administration of Foreign Affairs would have been much delayed. A week later there was an instance of the Queen's directions not being complied with.

On the 21st of August the Queen sent two dispatches, addressed to Wynn and Magenis, the British Secretary of Legation in Vienna, back to Palmerston with the remark that she did not

¹ R.A.W. I. 21/36.

² R.A.W. I 21/42. – Printed in Jagow, p. 214 ff.

³ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 315.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 315 f.

find them to her liking.¹ Her objections are indicated in the memorandum which she had asked Prince Albert to draw up. They were to the effect that Britain ought either to remain passive in the dispute between Denmark and the Duchies or she ought, if she considered it necessary, take part in the dispute by advice and diplomacy, be strictly impartial. But the drafts which were sent to the Queen for approval took "entirely the side of Denmark," a statement which Prince Albert then elaborated.

The same day Palmerston sent the Queen a detailed memorandum in reply to Prince Albert's.² He asserted, among other things, that the mediating power "does not cease to be impartial because on any particular question he may think one Party right and the other wrong and may declare his opinion in favor of the Party whom he may think right." However he had altered the dispatch to Wynn "so as to leave out those passages which were objected to." The Queen expressed her pleasure and suggested that the dispatch to Magenis be dropped.³ It is true, she wrote, that Prussia's policy was vacillating, but it was now a question of preventing Slesvig's incorporation in Denmark and of preserving the joint institutions of the Duchies. If that happened, there would be no need to ask the German Confederation to disarm Holstein. If Britain were to be impartial, she ought not to recommend the latter step without insisting on the former.

Palmerston abided by his statement that he had deleted the passages in the dispatch to Wynn which the Queen had criticized by sending Wynn a new version of the dispatch which he had already sent before the Queen's approval. Both the first, longer version and the new, abridged one exist with the same date and number (20/8, No. 117) in Wynn's Legation archives.⁴ At the beginning of the dispatch which the Court approved Denmark is advised in strong terms not "to order or allow the Danish army to enter Holstein, because such an advance into a German state would excite a great ferment in Germany and give a National

¹ R.A.W. I. 21/43-44.

² R.A.W. I 21/49-50.

³ *Ibid.* 21/55.

⁴ F.O. 211/53. - In F.O. 22/181 only the last dispatch, of course, is to be found. - A copy of the first dispatch was sent the same day to Magenis. F.O. 7/378: 20/8, No. 53. The Queen's remarks had, then, no influence on this.

Character to the Contest." The first dispatch then goes on to state (a passage which was deleted in the second) that in the opinion of the British Government the most sensible thing Denmark could do was to strengthen "the present, defensive position of the Danish Army in the extreme southern frontier of Sleswig" and content herself "with vigorously repelling any fresh attack of the Holsteiners who, however, are not likely for some time to come to be ready to renew their aggressive movement." Then both dispatches continued by stating that the King, as Duke of Holstein, should apply to the Prussian and Austrian Governments as well as to the Central Power at Frankfurt to obtain "the interference of the Confederation in pursuance of the federal Acts to reestablish his authority in Holstein." The first dispatch continued: "calling upon them as a preliminary measure to induce the Statthalters to withdraw their troops from their present threatening position and to reduce the Holstein Army to its Peace Establishment." This passage was left out. "The King Duke," both dispatches continued "is entitled to make this demand in virtue of the Federal Act, independently to the 4th Art. in the Treaty lately concluded at Berlin." The first dispatch ended: "It might not be without use moreover that a similar application should be made to the other German Governments." This passage is not found in the second dispatch.

After Wynn had received the first dispatch on the 25th he had a conversation with Reedt to whom he read the dispatch which warned Denmark against pursuing the insurgents into Holstein.¹

Wynn communicated the contents of the dispatch in a note to Reedt.² Reedt replied that Britain's advice had restrained Denmark from any act of aggression against Holstein which could be interpreted as an attack on Germany. But the information received by the Danish Government did not allow them to share Britain's views on Holstein non-aggression. The Danish army was in a difficult position and the insurgents received a great deal of help from Germany. With reference to Britain's advice to Denmark to apply to the German Powers to have the

¹ F.O. 22/184: 26/8, No. 106.

² F.O. 22/184: 2/9, No. 108 with enclosure. - See also Reedt's dispatches to Reventlow 26/8, No. 40 and 29/8, No. 41.

Peace carried into effect, Reedtz informed Wynn that Pechlin had just been sent to Germany on that mission. It was Reedtz's hope that the efforts of Pechlin and other Danish diplomats would receive the support of the signatory powers of the Protocol of the 2nd of August as Denmark's position was intolerable.

On the 1st of September Wynn received "the abridged Despatch" and, as he informed Palmerston, "nothing remained for me now but to read" it to Reedtz. Reedtz found it unnecessary, and rightly so one may say, "to make any alteration in his Note."

Reedtz informed Reventlow of Wynn's application and his note with Palmerston's first dispatch in dispatches of the 26th and 29th of August. The dispatch of the 26th stated that Reventlow should point out to Palmerston that if the London Protocol were to have true and practical significance, the signatory powers would have to take the necessary steps to carry its principles into effect: "Time which is not put to use, does definite damage ..."

On the 29th of August Palmerston sent Magenis (as well as the Queen's representatives at the other German Courts) a copy of Hodges' report on the efforts of the Statthalterschaft to reinforce the Holstein Army by means of help from Germany.¹ Magenis was to explain in Vienna that if this resulted in the Danes being driven out of Slesvig "the Emperor of Russia might probably ['probably' has been inserted later] deem himself bound by his Guarantee of Sleswig to Denmark, to give the Danes assistance to expel the Holstein Army from Sleswig," which would aggravate relations between Germany and Russia. All the German Governments ought to use their influence to prevail upon the Holstein Government to "withdraw its troops from Sleswig, and to reduce its Army to a Peace Establishment."

No doubt Russia's view of the matter was well-known in Vienna. As may be seen, Palmerston carefully omitted any mention of Britain's own guarantee given to Denmark in regard to Slesvig. He made no mention either of the guarantee when, two or three weeks later, he repeated his request to Austria to use her "great and legitimate influence" to put an end to the Holstein aggression.² "Any great Successes gained by the Holsteiners over the Danes might bring into practical operation

¹ F.O. 7/378: 29/8, No. 59.

² F.O. 7/378: 17/9, No. 67.

guarantees given to Denmark in the late Century in regard to the possession of Sleswig, and might lead to the introduction of foreign troops into the Duchies."

On the 13th of August, in reply to Howard's applications to Berlin requesting Prussia to intervene against the Statthalter-schaft, Schleinitz sent a lengthy defence of Prussia's passiveness.¹ The dispatch was handed to Palmerston by Count Wilhelm Perponcher, the Prussian Secretary of Legation, who was temporarily in charge of affairs at the Legation. Bunsen was on leave in August and was ill at any rate for part of September.² He was considering retiring and Berlin had not been too satisfied either with his latest diplomatic activities. In a letter of the 1st of September Dr. Meyer asked Prince Albert to use his influence in favour of Bunsen through the Prince of Prussia.³ Another Minister who was "a better diplomat and more reserved" might be appointed, he wrote, but no one who possessed such excellent qualities as Bunsen and no one who was more devoted to the Royal Family. Prince Albert complied quickly with the request and assured Prince Wilhelm that it would be greatly detrimental to Prussia's interests if Bunsen were removed from his post.⁴ The result was that Bunsen decided to continue to slave as Prussian Minister.

In the above-mentioned dispatch Schleinitz stated that Prussia, of course, like Britain wanted hostilities to cease; but she could only contribute to this with her advice. In consideration of the unsettled state of the constitution in Germany the following argumentation produces an effect which is more curious than convincing. Prussia had, he wrote, no authoritative rights as regards the Statthalter-schaft which had been installed by "the Confederation" [i.e. the dissolved German Central Power] and in particular no right, before "the Confederation" [whose character Austria and Prussia were arguing about] had ratified the Peace Treaty, to make the Statthalter-schaft responsible for a breach of that Peace. And even after a ratification it could only take place in the name of "the Confederation" and on its authority. The Peace Treaty imposed no duty on Prussia to intervene

¹ F.O. 64/325: Perponcher to Palmerston 21/8. – F.O. 64/319: 19/8, No. 44.

² Bunsen, II, p. 91 ff.

³ R.A.W. I 21/67–68.

⁴ Letter 7/9. Jagow, p. 217 f.

and Palmerston's reference to it had rather surprised Schleinitz. The treaty was only to the effect that events should be given a free rein, possibly a decision by force of arms. Denmark had not either given the slightest hint that she considered it Prussia's duty to prevent the Holstein army from resuming hostilities.

Earlier in the month Perponcher had sent Palmerston a copy of Schleinitz's dispatch of the 2nd of August to Werther, the Prussian envoy in Copenhagen, in which Denmark was urged after her victory to show "a beneficent and conciliatory feeling towards the Duchies."¹ On the 27th of August when Palmerston replied to Perponcher, he wrote that Britain had always advised and would continue to advise Denmark to follow such a course.² But the most pressing concern at the moment was to restore peace. This could only be done if the Holstein army withdrew "from its present forward threatening position, and by its reduction to its proper Peace Establishment." The Prussian Government had no doubt means of bringing this about. Britain did not doubt that the Prussian Government would exert themselves to the utmost to obtain from Holstein, a member of the German Confederation, a strict and faithful observance of the Peace Treaty which had been concluded by Prussia in the name of the whole Confederation. Prussia would no doubt, continued Palmerston on a reproachful note, feel her duty the more strongly because last year, after concluding the peace preliminaries on a basis which, if it had been put into effect, would have created a definitive peace, later abandoned that basis and proposed and pressed Denmark to a simple peace which left unsolved all the questions which had constituted the original causes of the conflict, and thereby left open the door for further conflict. Britain had immediately seen the doubtful aspects of the new proposal for peace, but as Prussia and Denmark seemed to be willing to accept it, Britain, as mediator, had merely tried through her representative in Berlin [Westmorland] to make the treaty with the new basis as well suited as possible for its purpose, the restoration of peace. Unfortunately peace between Denmark and the German Confederation had been followed by acts of aggression by one of its members against the Danish troops.

¹ F.O. 64/325.

² F.O. 64/325.

Holstein troops had advanced into Slesvig to dislodge the Danish troops who were authorized to occupy Slesvig under the terms of the Peace Treaty. Palmerston asked Perponcher to bring "these matters under the serious and early attention of Your Government."

Perponcher promised to do so and referred in addition to Schleinitz's above-mentioned dispatch.¹

On the 31st of August when Howard, who had received a copy of Palmerston's note to Perponcher, asked Schleinitz if Prussia would not work to secure the withdrawal of the Holstein army and its reduction to a peace establishment, Schleinitz replied that Prussia had done what she could to prevent a renewal of hostilities.² But the Statthalterschaft had answered that their pacific overtures had been rejected by Denmark. It was Schleinitz's opinion that Palmerston could hardly expect Prussia to use force against the Holstein authorities. Prussia's object in concluding the Peace had been "to detach Herself from all contact with the affair."

On the 1st of August Howard had reported that both Prokesch von Osten and Budberg had approached Schleinitz suggesting that Prussia ought to sign the London Protocol.³ But Schleinitz had rejected their application saying that enquiries would first have to be made to see what was most advantageous for Germany: the integrity of the Danish Monarchy or its dismemberment when the male line died out. Howard wrote that he had not entered into the question of the succession in his talks with Schleinitz, as he had no instructions on the matter.

Those were very important pieces of information, wrote Palmerston, on the 13th, with reference to Schleinitz's statements.⁴ For they showed what "the conduct of Prussia has long given strong reason to suspect, though it never has hitherto been openly avowed by the Prussian Government," that Prussia's object as regards the Slesvig-Holstein question had been "to

¹ F.O. 64/325: 28/8.

² F.O. 64/320: 1/9, No. 61.

³ F.O. 64/319: 1/8, No. 20. — In a dispatch of the 10th, No. 31, Howard stated that during a conversation about the signing of the Protocol Schleinitz had pointed out that they must first know what the arrangement was for the Duchies and next consider Prussia's "own interests".

⁴ F.O. 64/312: 13/8, No. 7 — Correspondence, p. 33 f. — F.O. 64/319: 19/8, No. 43.

dismember the Danish Monarchy by separating the States which are now united under the Sovereignty of the King Duke." Such a policy might perhaps harmonize with Prussia's "Separate and Special Views," but not with Europe's general interests or "to those of Great Britain in particular." Palmerston added the last phrase himself to the dispatch.

In another dispatch of the same date Howard had been urged to prevail upon Berlin to instruct its representative in London to sign the Protocol of the 2nd of August.¹ But Schleinitz said again that, in that matter, Prussia would have to consult her own interests; he did not think that these were identical with those of the other powers.² Furthermore, he would reply to Palmerston in detail. This he did in dispatches of the 29th and 31st where he stressed Prussia's obligations towards "Germany" and said that the reservation Austria made when signing the Protocol on the 23rd could not be regarded as adequate.³

On the 24th of September Palmerston, to whom Perponcher on the 5th had sent Schleinitz's dispatch of the 31st, regretted the disagreement between Prussia and the other powers.⁴ It still appeared to Britain that the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy "would be conducive to the Interests of Germany as well as to the general Advantage of Europe." On the 30th Palmerston wrote to Howard that as Prussia had therefore decided not to sign the Protocol, Britain would not press her "further on this subject."⁵ He thought, moreover, that Schleinitz had to some extent misunderstood the Protocol. Although he desisted from answering Schleinitz's dispatch in detail, he however pointed out Schleinitz's quite incorrect comparison of Holstein's relation to Denmark with Hanover's former relation to Britain.

On the 27th of August Palmerston had sent Howard two new dispatches about the question of the succession.⁶ In one of them he pointed out that he thought that Prussia had "much altered of late Her Views and opinions on this Danish Question." Ac-

¹ F.O. 64/312: 13/8, No. 10 – Cf. dispatch to Magenis. F.O. 7/378: 13/8, No. 44.

² F.O. 64/319: 19/8, No. 42.

³ F.O. 64/325. – Correspondence, p. 43 ff.

⁴ F.O. 64/325. – Correspondence, p. 50.

⁵ F.O. 64/312: 30/9, No. 35. – Correspondence, p. 50 f.

⁶ F.O. 64/312: 27/8, Nos. 17 and 19. – Correspondence, p. 40 ff.

ording to Bunsen's statements to him last year it was within the power of the King of Denmark "to arrange all Matters by repealing the *Lex Regia* of Denmark and by settling the Succession to Denmark, Sleswig and Holstein upon a Prince of Oldenburg . . ." As a German he would be acceptable to Germany and thus inherit "the three States without further dispute."

Before it was sent off Prince Albert must have shown the dispatch to – or discussed it with – his librarian, Dr. Meyer, at Osborne. For on the 31st of August Dr. Meyer wrote from Buckingham Palace to Prince Albert that he was now able to confirm – presumably after a talk with Bunsen – what he had expressed as a conjecture at Osborne: Bunsen's (and Prussia's) consent to the candidature of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg was dependent on two conditions: the introduction of personal union and a settlement with the Duke of Augustenborg.¹ Dr. Meyer enclosed a number of Slesvig-Holstein publications in his letter.

Palmerston's second dispatch of the 27th instructed Howard to ask Schleinitz if the British Government were mistaken in their view that, when the present male line died out, Holstein would be sub-divided. Denmark would lay claim to one part, the Tsar to Kiel and its neighbourhood, and the rest would be shared among other claimants. Palmerston thought that this would not be advantageous to Germany. But when Schleinitz had the question put to him by Howard, he said that such a sub-division might perhaps not be more injurious to German and Prussian interests than the maintenance of the integrity of the Monarchy.² The matter had moreover been submitted to the Prussian law officers of the Crown for consideration, and they were of the opinion that the largest part of Holstein and a part of Slesvig would fall to the Duke of Augustenborg. They had made no mention of Russia's claim. Schleinitz admitted that European interests might speak in favour of the maintenance of the Danish Monarchy, but there were others "connected with German and Prussian interests which did not render an arrangement based upon it desirable." It was, said Schleinitz, the connection of the German Duchy of Holstein with the King of Denmark's non-German countries that was the cause of the

¹ R.A.W. I 21/67.

² F.O. 64/320: 1/9, No. 61. – Correspondence, p. 41 f.

serious disputes during the last few years.¹ Prussia would not therefore accede to the Protocol of the 2nd (23rd) of August; but the integrity of the Danish Monarchy might possibly result from negotiations on the question of the succession, negotiations in which Prussia was willing to participate in pursuance of the secret Article in the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July (see British Mediation. II, p. 211). Schleinitz insisted on a union between Slesvig and Holstein and these in a personal union with Denmark, as well as a satisfactory settlement of the relation of the Duchies to Germany. However Howard believed that these demands should not be regarded as "the final decision of the Prussian Government."

Before Palmerston sent off his question on the 27th of August asking what would happen to Holstein when the male line became extinct, he had, on the 15th, asked the Foreign Office to reply to the following questions:² What will happen to Slesvig and Holstein on the extinction of the male line, if a new arrangement is not made concerning the Kingdom and the Duchies? Will Slesvig go with Denmark, or who will inherit it? Which sides will lay claim to the various parts of Holstein and to Lauenborg? Will Russia not lay claim to Kiel and its neighbourhood? Will Denmark not claim a part of Holstein? Will the Duke of Augustenborg's claim not be restricted to "a small Portion of Holstein?" Will the Duke of Glücksburg not have "a claim to some Part?"

There is no doubt that the "answer" which the Foreign Office drew up on the 17th was not worth much, and I am reluctant to believe that it came from Mellish. Was he perhaps on holiday? The answer ended by saying that an investigation of the question would be "a work of time; unless it be undertaken by some one well acquainted with Danish or German, or both, and to whom the subject is already familiar; — as the Laws and Compacts go back to a remote Period, and much difference of opinion seems to prevail with regard to them."

Bloomfield informed Séniavine,³ Nesselrode's deputy, of Palmerston's note of the 27th of August to Perponcher concerning

¹ In dispatch 30/9, No. 31 (F.O. 64/312), Howard was instructed to tell Schleinitz that "some of the arguments used by him do not seem to tally with the conclusions at which he would arrive." But at that time Schleinitz was no longer Foreign Minister.

² F.O. 22/187.

³ F.O. 65/379: 10/9, No. 286.

Prussia's duty to put an end to the Holstein aggression. Séniavine expressed his pleasure at the information as he was on the point of sending Budberg in Berlin instructions "recommending the adoption of measures similar to those suggested by Your Lordship for carrying out the spirit" of the Treaty of the 2nd of July. Brunnov was instructed to give Palmerston a copy of this dispatch to Budberg (of the 9th of September) and at the same time to express the Tsar's great satisfaction at seeing "une si heureuse conformité de vues et de langage régner entre les deux Cabinets, dans une affaire à laquelle ils ont voué, chacun pour sa part une égale et bien légitime sollicitude."¹ The dispatch to Brunnov commented on Palmerston's advice to Denmark to be conciliatory and stated that neither did Russia neglect any opportunity of making the Danish Government stick to the path of moderation as the Manifesto of the 14th of July had indicated.

Palmerston thanked Brunnov for the information by stating that "it affords very sincere pleasure to Her Majesty's Government to find that such an agreement of views and opinions exists between" the two Governments "upon matters so important in their bearing to the general interests of Europe."²

There was, however, a certain difference of views and opinions on account of Britain's unwillingness to follow up her strong words by action. It is true that Bloomfield reported in a dispatch of the 10th of September that Britain shared entirely Russia's view on "the inexpediency of any armed interference on the part of England, France or Russia in the hostilities" in Slesvig.³ But a week later he wrote that the Tsar had told him during a conversation that it was chiefly Britain's attitude that was decisive for Russia's above-mentioned opinion.⁴ For the Tsar regretted that "the Great Powers friendly to Denmark had not agreed on taking some military measures which would have prevented this event," – the war in Slesvig.

On the 18th of September Brunnov had sent Palmerston a proposal from Séniavine suggesting that a new application might be made to Prussia to accede to the London Protocol with

¹ F.O. 65/385: 21/9 with enclosure. – Regarding the reception of the Russian dispatch in Berlin see F.O. 64/320: 16/9, No. 81.

² F.O. 65/385: 27/9.

³ F.O. 65/379: 10/9, No. 284.

⁴ Ibid. 18/9, No. 295.

the same reservation as Austria.¹ Palmerston replied that Britain had already done this, but that Prussia had rejected the proposal.² The main reason for this was, wrote Palmerston, that Berlin "objects to assent formally to any instrument which might be construed as restraining its free action in regard to the question of the Danish Succession."

As mentioned above, Schleinitz was absent on leave from the Foreign Ministry from the 1st of September. Brandenburg did not answer Palmerston's letter of the 27th of August until the 16th of September.³ Brandenburg asserted in his reply that it was not Prussia who had abandoned the basis of the peace preliminaries (10th of July 1849) and referred to Schleinitz's previous argumentation. He had read with pleasure in Palmerston's letter that Britain urged Denmark to be conciliatory towards the Duchies. Prussia still wanted to work for peace, but, as Schleinitz had pointed out in his dispatch of the 13th of August, she had no means of inducing Holstein to respect the Peace. And she had not, either according to the spirit or the letter of the Treaty, any other duty to intervene "als die ihr aus einer wirklichen bundesmässigen Behandlung der Angelegenheit eventuell erwachsen konnte."

Such a "wirkliche bundesmässige Behandlung" might not happen for a long time to come. At the beginning of September Perponcher had informed Britain of Prussia's rejection of Austria's request to re-establish the old Federal Diet.⁴ At the end of the month Palmerston expressed Britain's regrets at the discord between Prussia and the other powers, but added that it seemed to the British Government that the Prussian Union "would be conducive to the Interests of Germany as well as to the general Advantage of Europe."⁵

As I have mentioned once or twice before, the Prussian Government asserted that they had no means to influence the Statthalterschaft in a peaceful direction. Lloyd Hodges, the British Consul-General at Hamburg, had grave doubts that they had any wish to do so either. A great many volunteers from

¹ Correspondence, p. 48 ff. — Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 24/9, No. 62.

² F.O. 65/385: 27/9.

³ F.O. 64/325.

⁴ F.O. 64/325: 5/9. Cf. F.O. 64/320: 5/9, No. 64.

⁵ F.O. 64/325: 24/9.

Prussia and other German states flocked to join the Holstein army, especially after the Battle of Isted. Heinrich von Gagern, the President of the dissolved German National Assembly, went to Kiel to help, as did Prussia's Foreign Minister in 1848, Baron Arnim.¹ At the end of August Sieveking arrived at Rendsborg as Prussian agent and Hodges characterized him as "a warm partisan for the Sleswig-Holstein cause."² At the beginning of September Hodges wrote that the majority of the soldiers who had joined Willisen after the Battle of Isted were officers and men who "either with or without leave have left the Prussian Service", and that Liliencron in Berlin kept up the connection between the Statthalterschaft and the Prussian Government.³

On the 22nd of September Hodges reported information he had received during a conversation with Baron Blome, who was married to a sister of the Stadtholder, Reventlou-Preetz, but an opponent of the insurrection.⁴ Hodges wrote that Blome maintained that Prussia was "now as much as ever a supporter and adviser of the Revolutionary party in the Duchies," and that Bunsen, with whom the Statthalterschaft was said to be in constant touch, was "quite as much interested in the success of the Slesvig-Holstein cause as the Statthalterschaft."

At the end of September when Howard broached the subject of Prussia's relations with the Statthalterschaft, the new Prussian Foreign Minister, Radowitz, replied that there were none.⁵ Liliencron "was not recognized in any official capacity" and Sieveking was not either sent to Rendsborg "with any official character, but merely as an observer and to make reports." The last 'official' in Howard's dispatch is underlined, presumably at the Foreign Office. At the beginning of October, Bielke, the Danish chargé d'affaires, lodged a protest against the recruiting office for soldiers for the Holstein army of which Liliencron was in charge in Berlin.⁶

In September Palmerston had again had a controversy with the Queen and Russell about a proposed dispatch to Howard

¹ F.O. 33/125: 2/8, No. 92; 9/8, No. 96; 13/8, No. 97. — F.O. 33/126: 24/9, No. 124.

² F.O. 33/125: 27/8, No. 106.

³ F.O. 33/126: 3/9, No. 110.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 22/9, No. 121.

⁵ F.O. 64/320: 28/9, No. 105.

⁶ F.O. 64/320: 3/10, No. 114.

renewing Britain's request that Prussia ought to put an end to the Holstein aggression. The matter ended by Palmerston's withdrawing the dispatch. The controversy is characteristic in indicating how Russell had come closer and closer – or given way to – the views of the Court on the Slesvig-Holstein question.

In his dispatch of the 19th of August, Howard mentioned his talk with Schleinitz about the war in Slesvig.¹ Schleinitz had suggested that an authoritative appeal and even without the use of force on the part of Britain, France and Russia to the Holstein Statthalterschaft might be met.² Palmerston wrote in his draft reply that he was also of this opinion, especially if the request were accompanied by a statement that it might be backed by force.³ But Prussia could surely not be blind to the fact, continued Palmerston, "that such a measure on the part of the three Powers . . . would be such an interference with the conduct and action of a member of the German Confederation as the rest of the German Body might well reasonably object to." Peace had been concluded between Denmark and Prussia in the name of Germany. Holstein was a member of the Confederation and therefore under an obligation to respect the Peace Treaty. It was incumbent on the Confederation to force its refractory member to do this. Only if the Confederation lacked either the will or the power to do this, other powers might "have to consider whether a due regard to the general interests of Europe might not call for some active interference on their part."

On the 5th of September Russell pleased Queen Victoria by telling her that he had returned Palmerston's draft as he did not think that Holstein could be required to stop the war on the basis of the Peace Treaty.⁴ But the Confederation, which was now at peace with Denmark, "may interfere to make an amicable arrangement between Denmark and Holstein." Russell's letter to Palmerston says, not very clearly, that Holstein, as a member

¹ F.O. 64/319: 19/8, No. 41.

² In this connection there is perhaps reason to mention that already in a dispatch of the 30th of July, No. 74, Persigny asserted that Schleinitz had expressed a wish that Commissioners from the three Great Powers mentioned ought to be sent to Rendsborg to mediate, and that "one" would see him sent with pleasure. He returns in several of his following dispatches to the plan, which, however, Paris found to be far too vague (see dispatch 5/8, No. 79, to Drouyn de L'Huys and his dispatch 7/8, No. 26, as well as dispatch 9/8, No. 19, to Persigny).

³ Draft (undated and unnumbered) is to be found in P.P. as well as in R.A.W. I 21/83.

⁴ R.A.W. I 21/82.

of the Confederation, was naturally bound by the Peace Treaty, "but the Holsteiners have another character from that of Subjects of the Duke of Holstein. And in that capacity they may have rights which they seek to enforce by arms."¹ Did Russell think that they should keep the peace, but were entitled to wage war? – Russell agreed with Palmerston that the question, first of all, was a matter concerning the Confederation, but it was not settled by the Treaty of Berlin, "which leaves the dispute as it found it." His unrealistic proposal was to the effect that "the German States which meet at Berlin, and those which meet at Frankfort, should be urged to find terms of arrangement between Denmark and Holstein, such as may be fair to both parties."

Palmerston replied from Broadlands to Russell: "I don't quite understand your objection to this draft," and we can agree that it is difficult to understand what Russell's objection was.² Palmerston first stated that they were both no doubt agreed on rejecting Schleinitz's proposal for an appeal from Britain, France and Russia to the Statthalterschaft. Then he dealt with Russell's statement "that Holstein may have rights of its own as against its Duke, which rights it may be entitled to assert by arms, and the Treaty of Berlin leaves the dispute as it found it."

Palmerston asserted that the Treaty certainly did not do that. Before the Treaty Denmark and Germany tried to carry "their respective rights, real or asserted", into effect by force of arms, but the Peace put a stop to that. Although by it "each party reserved its rights in theory," armed conflict ceased. Germany could not now arbitrarily "march beyond its Frontier to compel Denmark to submit to the German Doctrine as to rights." Neither was any part [Holstein] of Germany entitled "to invade Sleswig in order to compel the King of Denmark to govern Sleswig in conformity with German pretensions." The Peace Treaty had brought about an enormous difference as compared with the previous state of affairs as regards the continuation of the war in Slesvig by the Holsteiners.

Palmerston then went on to "the internal question between the Holsteiners and their Ducal Sovereign, which you say might justify their resistance to his Authority." But whatever these

¹ R.A.W. I 21/84.

² R.A.W. I 21/85.

questions, they could only justify resistance to the Duke's authority in Holstein, and to that extent the resistance would be insurrection, "which you may say is not precluded by the Treaty." But beyond the frontiers of Holstein it would be war, "and War is precluded by the Treaty." The only thing that Britain requested Prussia and the other German states to do now was to put an end to the war, which was "a Violation of the Treaty." Regarding the insurrection Britain advised the King of Denmark to apply to the Confederation "through its organ, as he is entitled to do, both by the Treaty, and by the federal Laws" to put an end to the insurrection and re-establish his authority in Holstein.

What lay at the root of the insurrection, Palmerston continued, was "not a matter of Speculation or uncertainty." The Holsteiners did not complain about "any illegal or arbitrary conduct of their Duke towards them," but "they assume a right to prescribe to Him, what He shall do, or shall not do in his Capacity of Duke of Sleswig; and they contend that Holstein has a right to determine how Sleswig shall be organized and governed." But Palmerston found that that pretension could neither be borne out by reason or by history. And it had formally been given up both by the German Parliament and the Prussian Government on behalf of Germany and Holstein. Both (Frankfurt and Berlin) had approved "that Sleswig should have a Constitution wholly separate from that of Holstein, and the Holsteiners are now making War to compel Denmark to a union of Sleswig with Holstein."

On the 10th Russell sent Palmerston's explanation as well as the draft to the Queen, who was on holiday at Balmoral in Scotland.¹ Russell found Palmerston's "reasoning far from being conclusive," (he did not state his reasons for this), but if the Queen approved the draft[!] Russell would no longer object. Russell did not go into the question of how the Holstein aggression should be regarded, but was, however, of the opinion that the question of Slesvig's union with Holstein "ought not to be fought for by German Volunteers, not belonging to either Duchy."

Of course the Queen did not approve the dispatch. She declared that she agreed with Russell that Palmerston's reasoning

¹ R.A.W. I 21/82.

was not conclusive.¹ At the end of the month Russell was able to please her by stating that Palmerston had decided not to send the dispatch "which has been objected to by Your Majesty and by Lord John Russell."²

These developments might be taken as evidence that it was holiday time in Britain – political activity was at a standstill, as Reventlow wrote in a dispatch of the 25th of September – but particularly as an example of how slowly foreign politics had to be conducted, if the procedure demanded by the Queen was to be strictly followed.

Although the matter has no connection with official British policy, I shall make brief mention of an attempt made during the summer and autumn by private British circles to bring about a conciliation between the conflicting parties – a well-meant attempt, but one that was doomed to failure from the start.

In Britain there was a Peace Society whose nucleus consisted of Quakers. Richard Cobden, the well-known advocate of Free Trade and Palmerston's political antagonist, was a lively agitator for peace.³ Thus he took part in the Peace Congresses in Paris in 1849 and at Frankfurt in August 1850 at which Elihu Burritt, the American philanthropist who had embarked on a lecture tour on behalf of peace, was present. At Frankfurt, where a special attraction was the presentation of a pipe of peace by a Red Indian to the President of the Congress, the Germans solicited support for the Slesvig-Holstein cause from the many Englishmen who were present. Thus Cobden wrote in a letter of the 5th of September (to John Cassell, the editor) that at Frankfurt he had a good opportunity of learning "the opinions of the people of Germany upon the conduct of our Government in the Slesvig-Holstein affair. There is but one feeling of indignation amongst the liberal constitutional party at the alliance which England has formed with Russia and France."⁴ What could Britain gain

¹ R.A.W. I 21/88.

² R.A.W. I 21/105.

³ See i.a. John Morley: *The Life of Richard Cobden*. II (1881), p. 46 ff. and p. 81 ff. as well as William Harbutt Dawson: *Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy* (1926), p. 131 ff.

⁴ Cobden Papers. Vol. XXII. British Museum, Add. MS. 43, 668. – Cobden's letters to Cassell are used in Shelton H. Short's unpublished thesis: *British Attitudes to the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848–50*. (Manuscript in the Royal Library, Copenhagen).

by her protocol policy as compensation for the loss of "the German *heart* which is the heart of Europe?"

After the Congress Burritt and two Englishmen, Joseph Sturge, a Quaker, and Frederick Wheeler, decided to act as mediators between Denmark and the Holstein Statthalterschaft.¹ At the beginning of September they arrived at Kiel where they were informed by the Statthalterschaft that a settlement must be reached on the basis of "the Treaty of Alliance between Denmark and the Duchies" of 1533,² renewed in 1623 and confirmed by the Peace of Travendal in 1700. From Kiel they went to Copenhagen where they had talks with Moltke and Reedtz.³ On the 25th of September they had a memorandum published at Hamburg, addressed "To the members of the late Peace Congress at Frankfort." In this they asserted, quite incorrectly, that Reedtz had accepted the principle of arbitration "at the same extent" as it was accepted by the Statthalterschaft. It was stated that Elihu Burritt would remain at Hamburg for some weeks to facilitate the negotiations.

In his dispatch of the 16th of September Wynn mentioned what Reedtz had told him about his discussion with the deputation.⁴ They wanted Reedtz to either accept or reject the mediation officially, which he refused to do. Burritt seemed to think that the most impartial method would be to refer the decision to the President of the United States.

On the 28th of September Joseph Sturge sent Palmerston a copy of the above-mentioned memorandum and expressed his conviction that the two parties wanted to end "the unnatural war between them, equitably and peaceably, by Arbitrators appointed by themselves."⁵ He hoped Palmerston would "use all his powerful influence to effect so great, so honorable, and so human an object."

"What are the Treaty stipulations to which this memorandum refers?" Palmerston asked the Foreign Office.⁶

¹ See "Fædrelandet" 4/9 and 7/10 1850; "Berlingske Tidende" 5/9, 7/9 and 9/10 1850; "Altonaer Mercur" 21/8 and ff.; 15/9 and 19/10 1850. - "Daily News" 2/9 and 7/10 50.

² For the "Union" 1533 see Sønderjyllands Historie. II, p. 254 ff.

³ R.A. Udenrigsmin. Dpt. Reg. 1850 11/9, No. 51.

⁴ F.O. 22/284; 16/9, No. 112.

⁵ F.O. 22/187.

⁶ Ibid.

It is rather doubtful whether Palmerston became much wiser by the answer received on the 8th of October. This stated that the first two documents mentioned – 1533 and 1622 (should be 1623!) – were not treaties but letters patent, issued by the then possessors of the several portions of the Duchies laying down the conditions of their Union under one head. If a dispute arose this was to be referred to “Councillors of the Sovereign chosen from each Territory.” These provisions were confirmed by the Peace of Travendal between Denmark and Holstein-Gottorp, “and the repeated attempts to come to a direct understanding by a conference of chosen men which have been made during the last two years are founded on these provisions.”

I shall not go into detail here about the use made by the Slesvig-Holstein agitators of the Treaty of Alliance of 1533. The provision in question was to the effect that every disagreement between the King of Denmark and the overlords (of which the King was one) of the Principalities (Slesvig and Holstein) should be appealed to a mixed commission of eight Royal and eight Ducal Councillors, who chose an umpire. During the course of the 18th century the Gottorp possessions in the Duchies had been united to the Royal possessions, and there had been no occasion to confirm the Treaty of Alliance after 1700. If one is to connect any logic with the Slesvig-Holstein propaganda, then one must imagine that the insurrectionary authorities at Kiel, on the thesis of “the dependent King” (King-Duke) in Copenhagen, seated themselves in his stead with the right to appoint eight members of the commission according to a treaty which time had long ago deprived of legal force.

It looks as if Bunsen really believed the Peace Committee’s incorrect statement that Denmark was willing to agree to the Slesvig-Holstein proposal for a decision by a commission in pursuance of the document of 1533. For in a letter of the 2nd of October to Cobden he spoke of “the wonderful success of the 3 messengers of peace.”¹ These ordinary people have found the same basis which I have upheld since 1848: “*arbitration, on the basis of the old and ever [!] renewed treaties* between Denmark and the Duchies which they so appropriately quote in their Report.” I would interpose the remark that they had had

¹ British Museum. Add. MSS. 43, 668, Cobden Papers.

no difficulty in finding that basis, as they had been handed it at Kiel! "I will," continued Bunsen, "frankly confess to you, that for the *first* time, I now in consequence of those proceedings feel a *hope*, that some way will be found out of this bloody labyrinth." Bunsen stated that Gervinus, the Stattholders' envoy, was said to have offered Lord John and Palmerston that he was willing to accept a decision made by British umpires, if Denmark was too. "But the best thing is, that *the two parties manage it all themselves.*" The work done by Cobden and his friends for peace should be continued with all energy. "My Government," asserted Bunsen, "takes entirely my view of the question, pacification by arbitration," and he was also of the opinion that the British Government would be willing to let arbitration take the place of their "misshapen and still born Protocol." Incidentally, in his letter Bunsen, in his capacity of "German and world citizen" and "German patriot and philanthropist," eulogized Cobden's conduct at Frankfurt.

In a letter two days later to Prince Albert, Bunsen mentioned the Slesvig-Holstein proposal for arbitration. He referred to the Treaties of 1533, 1660 and 1700 and mentioned once more that he had already made that proposal in 1848.¹ The Slesvig-Holsteiners' vain assault on Frederiksstad just at that time was no good accompaniment to the work of the Peace Committee. Gervinus tried to interest Cobden in a loan to the Statthalterschaft to enable them to continue hostilities, but Cobden, the pacifist, had, however, to refuse in spite of his strong German and Slesvig-Holstein sympathies.²

Burritt, one of the members of the Peace Committee, arrived in Copenhagen again in October with a letter from Francke about the proposal for arbitration in pursuance of the Treaty of 1533. The matter was discussed in the Danish Council of State on the 25th of October and it was agreed to carry out Reedtz's proposal of giving 'a polite answer, containing nothing, and which disposed of Elihu Burritt.'³ In the reply Reedtz thanked Burritt and his colleagues for their attempts at "promot-

¹ R.A.W. I 22/6: 4/10.

² Cobden to Gervinus 14/10. British Museum. Add. MSS. 43, 668. Cobden Papers Vol. XXII.

³ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 35. Burritt's name has been misread by the editor as Barritt (thus also Barritt in the index).

ing the sacred cause of humanity." Their attempt and other information would be taken into consideration and "be turned to effect under regular negotiations from which practical results only may be expected when they are [sic] in by proper authorities and responsible men of business."¹

As appears from the above Bunsen was again in full activity in London. On the 29th of September he informed Prince Albert that he had now fully recovered.² The appointment of Radowitz as Prussian Foreign Minister on the 26th of September presumably contributed in great measure to his psychic recovery. In his letter to Prince Albert he stated that Radowitz would adopt a firm attitude towards Austria and Russia "auch in der Sache der Herzogthümer: überhaupt gegen die protokollisierende Diplomatie."

3. Reedtz's appeal to France

It was not only Palmerston who advised the Danish Government not to let the army pursue the insurgents into Holstein. France gave the same advice. At the beginning of August the Foreign Minister, La Hitte, had a talk with Count E. Moltke, the Danish Minister in Paris, and said that Denmark should not advance into Holstein before the Confederation had declared that they would not interfere in the matter.³ But the army should be strengthened so that it could hold the insurgents in check and win time in order that the signatory powers could reach an agreement about the means they would use to intervene. When Moltke pointed out that the insurgent army was being strengthened by aid from all Germany, La Hitte exclaimed that Denmark would not be allowed to be crushed once more by Germany and that France, after all, had a fleet that could intervene. A French squadron had been moved to Cherbourg, which Britain, incidentally, can hardly have found to her liking.⁴ Moltke expressed his gratitude for La Hitte's statement, but remarked that Denmark had more use for soldiers than for ships. La Hitte

¹ R.A. Udenrigsmin. Dpt. Reg. 1850 29/10, No. 143; cf. No. 142.

² R.A.W. I 21/106.

³ Dispatch 6/8, No. 98. Holstens pacifikation.

⁴ Palmerston's dispatches 3/8, No. 407 and 15/9. F.O. 27/865-866.

gave an evasive reply; his statement was only an expression of his special interest in Denmark's cause.¹

Reedtz definitely read too much into La Hitte's statements, which were rather non-committal. This appears from the talk which took place between him and Ungern Sternberg and of which Ungern Sternberg gave a report in his dispatch of the 17th of August. C. F. Hansen, the Danish Minister for War, was present at the talk which concerned the exposed position of the Danish army, face to face with German-Slesvig-Holstein aggression. Only intervention on the part of the signatory powers could remedy that, and Britain, as the mediating power, was first and foremost called upon to demand the full restoration of peace. Reedtz said that he was willing to apply in that matter to London, but doubted if Britain would help. It would be a real help if the Tsar decided to let his navy land 5000 to 6000 men at Egernförde. When Sternberg stressed the disadvantages of an isolated Russian intervention, Reedtz mentioned that France might also be willing to send a squadron and a few thousand men to Husum.² Such a double intervention would prevent Willisen in taking the offensive. When Sternberg asked Reedtz why he believed that France would send such help, Reedtz showed him the above-mentioned dispatch from Moltke. Sternberg said that he did not know the Tsar's intentions, but promised to report the talk to St. Petersburg.

On the 19th of August Reedtz therefore sent a circular dispatch to the Ministers in Paris, Christiania (i.e. Sweden-Norway), St. Petersburg and London.³ This dispatch stated that the Friendly Powers hardly realized what a critical position Denmark was in. The Rebel army was today perhaps stronger than before the Battle of Isted, thanks to recruits from all Germany. To prevail upon Germany to adopt a really pacific attitude, the powers who in 1720 guaranteed Denmark the possession of Slesvig and in 1850 the integrity of the Danish Monarchy must intervene "promptement et efficacement."

But how was that to be done? Only the dispatch to Paris

¹ Engberg's account p. 104 of La Hitte's statements is inaccurate.

² Engberg, p. 102, gives this incorrectly as "that the French Navy was presumably making preparations to send off a force of the same size . . ."

³ Holstens pacifikation.

stated that.¹ It contained the following additional information: If La Hitte, the French Foreign Minister, again mentioned the possibility of co-operation with the French Fleet, say that the presence of neither the Russian nor Swedish squadrons has had the desired effect. It would doubtless give greater weight to the words and declarations of the Great Powers if a few thousand men were sent promptly to the mouth of the Eider in Slesvig.

The next day Reedtz sent a "few private lines" to accompany this dispatch.² It was, he wrote, highly desirable if France could be prevailed upon to adopt an energetic line of conduct and to carry out a concrete demonstration. Moltke was therefore to prevail upon the French Government to make a declaration both in London and in St. Petersburg stating that they were prepared to take military measures, particularly by posting a strong observation corps in South Slesvig. He was to discuss the matter with Russia's and Britain's representatives in Paris, especially with Count Kisselev. I am looking forward to the result of your efforts with eager hopes, Reedtz ended his letter.

In accordance with these instructions Moltke submitted the Danish appeal to La Hitte,³ who was, however, of the opinion that there was still hope of a peaceful diplomatic settlement, and that France would have to agree with the other signatory powers on the line of action. Kisselev, with whom Moltke had a confidential talk, found the proposal for guarding the frontier by Russian-French troops far too dangerous a suggestion on account of the ferment it would give rise to in Germany.

On the 26th of August, La Hitte communicated the Danish appeal to Drouyn de L'Huys, the French Minister in London, remarking that he assumed that similar appeals had been made to London and St. Petersburg.⁴ However in his dispatch La Hitte stressed the seriousness and the difficulties of the matter, for

¹ The divergencies between my description, which now follows, and Alex. Scharff, p. 186 ff. can easily be seen by a comparison, e.g., that one cannot, as Scharff, p. 190, call "the plan of intervention Drouyn de L'Huys's". I regret that it was not until after the publication of Vol. II of "British Mediation in the Danish-German Conflict 1848-1850" that I became aware of Scharff's very estimable treatise "Das erste Londoner Protokoll", published in 1952 in "Festschrift für Otto Scheel". Scharff used - as I did later - Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatches, which elucidate how the protocol came into being.

² Letter 20/8 to E. Moltke. Holstens pacifikation.

³ Moltke's dispatches 25/8, No. 106, and 29/8, No. 108. Holstens pacifikation.

⁴ 26/8, No. 87. - Cf. Normanby's dispatch 26/8, No. 62. F.O. 27/873.

although it was, of course, a European matter, it was, however, a matter of special interest to the German Confederation. Drouyn de L'Huys was to obtain information about the position from the representatives of the signatory powers.

Of these representatives Brunnow was absent, having left for St. Petersburg, and Reventlow was in the country. Drouyn de L'Huys spoke first to Palmerston about the application.¹ Palmerston went through his dispatches, but could find nothing about Denmark's appeal. Contrary to his previous remarks, he expressed his distaste at the thought that Russia might render direct material help to Denmark; once the Russians were installed at Kiel, they might be tempted to remain there! But he regarded the Russian threat as a good means of speeding up not only the ratification of the Peace Treaty but also the help given by the German Confederation to re-establish the King's authority in Holstein.

What Palmerston informed the British Minister in Paris of the conversation was that Britain "entirely concurred in the views of the French Government as to the inexpediency of any armed interference" on the part of Britain, France or Russia.² He thought that hostilities "might probably be put an end to by the action of moral means, and of diplomatic exertions" – scant comfort for Denmark.

After his discussion with Palmerston, Drouyn de L'Huys had a conversation with Koller. He pointed out Austria's dismal rôle, if Russia sent troops to Kiel. To this Koller replied that Denmark ought to apply to the German Confederation for help to restore order in Holstein. Only if this were refused, would Denmark be entitled to seek foreign help; Denmark had not made any application to the Confederation so far. But, wrote Drouyn de L'Huys in his dispatch, I asked Koller; "Where do you want her [Denmark] to seek 'ce corps introuvable'? Germany herself does not know. Don't you see how strange this pretension is: You want Denmark to demand that a non-ratified treaty is carried into effect by an authority which is not constituted and you let her die, waiting for this impossible remedy." Koller answered that he did not think that matters had reached such

¹ Dispatch 28/8, No. 41. – Cf. dispatch 2/9, No. 89, to Drouyn de L'Huys.

² F.O. 27/865: 27/8, No. 54.

extremes so far, and he again hinted that the Great Powers ought to recognize what Drouyn de L'Huys called "the fetus or corpse of the Confederation, which the Cabinet in Vienna is exerting itself to call to life at Frankfurt." Drouyn de L'Huys gave no definite answer to this.

The most desirable solution for the maintenance of peace in Europe, wrote Drouyn de L'Huys at the end of his dispatch, would be for Denmark to suppress the rebellion by her own strength. If this were impossible, the least compromising means would be assistance from a second-rate German state which did not belong to the Prussian Union. If one of the German Great Powers were to intervene, Austria should be preferred to Prussia, whose motives were justifiably suspect in the opinion of the Danish Government.

On the 3rd of September, Drouyn de L'Huys reported that Reventlow had returned and that he had talked to him.¹ Reventlow had found four dispatches from Copenhagen waiting for him, the first two of the 19th of August. One of these, wrote Drouyn de L'Huys, was identical with the copy of the dispatch to Moltke which La Hitte had sent him, though with the important difference that the passage about the foreign auxiliary corps was omitted. Reventlow had not either mentioned this in the conversation he had had [on the 1st] with Palmerston. Drouyn de L'Huys, however, told Reventlow that he had mentioned this proposal in his talks with Palmerston and Koller. But Reventlow said that the third dispatch, of the 20th, which he did not show him, dealt with that very proposal: to let a French auxiliary corps occupy the southwest part of Slesvig and a Russian corps the southeast part. Drouyn de L'Huys warned Reventlow in very strong terms against this step: It would inflame Germany and embarrass Britain and, in consequence, create great danger for Denmark herself. Reventlow "n'a point insisté."

When Denmark asked both Russia and France for assistance at the same time, she was obviously thinking more about Russian help, remarked Drouyn de L'Huys in a further comment to the proposal.

Reventlow did not show Drouyn de L'Huys "the third dispatch of the 20th" and he would have had difficulty in producing

¹ 3/9, No. 45.

it; for it did not exist. In a private letter of the 31st to Reedtz¹ Reventlow stated that he received the dispatch of the 22nd together with "your private lines of the same date."² If these are counted as two, it corresponds with Reventlow's statement that he found four dispatches waiting for him when he arrived back from the country. The possibility exists, or it is perhaps probable, that the "private lines" may have contained information about Reedtz's appeal to France for military aid.

During his conversation with Palmerston on the 1st of September, Reventlow had not touched on the question of the request for an auxiliary corps, but in pursuance of the instructions in the circular dispatch of the 19th represented in strong terms Denmark's serious situation, which demanded more than ever before the attention of the Great Powers, especially that of the mediating power.³ One of the results of the representation was, no doubt, the draft of the dispatch to Howard, mentioned above (p. 43), which the Court and Russell were successful in suppressing.

On account of Drouyn de L'Huys's and Palmerston's negative attitude – and as Brunnow was absent – the proposal for an auxiliary corps was abandoned for a time. It appears, incidentally, from Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatches that he began to seek the company of Denmark's opponent, Bunsen, and that he was not uninfluenced by it. Thus on the 20th of September he reported that he had paid a return visit to Bunsen, who had raged at the London Protocol (the greatest outrage against Germany since the Napoleonic Wars!) and at Palmerston personally.⁴ Drouyn de L'Huys emphasized to Bunsen that, if Prussia succeeded in restoring order in Holstein, the argument that Frankfurt was more willing than Prussia to do justice to Denmark for the possible recognition of Frankfurt by the Great Powers would lapse.

Reventlow made use of the holiday month of September, a comparatively inactive time from the political point of view, to take a trip to Paris.⁵ On his arrival back in London he wrote

¹ The letter is among the dispatches.

² These have not been found.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 2/9, No. 74.

⁴ Dispatch 20/9, No. 57. – Cf. dispatch 21/9, No. 58, and the extract of the dispatch 30/9. Guichen. II, p. 102 f.

⁵ Reventlow's private letter to Reedtz (24/9).

on the 24th to Reedtz that he was by chance present when Persigny paid Count Moltke a visit. Reventlow wrote sarcastically that Persigny "emphasized in a very modest manner his unbelievable services to Europe in general and to the salvation of Denmark in particular." He was in his own belief the instigator of both the Peace of Berlin and the London Protocol! "Thank God that I won't have to have anything to do with P[ersigny] and his like." Lord Malmesbury's characterization of Persigny is no more flattering: "the essence of vanity and a great pérora-teur."¹

But, as it appears from Moltke's dispatches from Paris, it was precisely Persigny who, in his desire to play a high political rôle, gave Moltke the false expectations of French military aid.² Moltke made several semi-official applications to La Hitte, and in a verbal note of the 19th of September he made a request that the signatory powers would agree to prevent Holstein aggression against Slesvig and to station a military cordon at the Eider consisting of troops from one or two of the Allied Powers. On the 23rd La Hitte gave Drouyn de L'Huys instructions to discuss the matter with Palmerston and Brunnow.³

On the 25th Drouyn de L'Huys communicated Moltke's verbal note of the 19th to Brunnow.⁴ Brunnow stated that he had received no instructions from his Court and received the application very coldly. He criticized the lack of precision in the note and found that its demands went beyond the intentions so far intimated by Denmark's allies. Such an application ought properly to be made to the London Conference and through Reventlow, if it were to be the subject of general deliberation. Brunnow did not believe, wrote Drouyn de L'Huys, that Britain would intervene materially, but on the other hand was of the opinion that Palmerston would have no objection to an isolated Russian action.

¹ Malmesbury. I, p. 315.

² Moltke's dispatch 16/9, No. 114, in the ordinary series. — Moltke's dispatches 17/9, No. 116; 18/9, No. 117 and 22/9, No. 118. Holstens pacifikation. — In a letter of 11/11 to Reedtz, Persigny avows France's great interest for Denmark and that the President, Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, had wanted to send an army corps to Slesvig. This was, however, "contraire à notre politique" [!] U.Min. Krigen 1848-50. Diverse sager (miscellaneous) 1849-(51).

³ 23/9, No. 97. — Cf. Normanby's dispatches 19/9, Nos. 299 and 300. F.O. 27/874.

⁴ Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 26/9, No. 63. — Cf. Guichen. II, p. 117.

Drouyn de L'Huys found that such an action was far from desirable. However, it was perhaps better for France than that she herself embarked on such a badly defined course of action. For Russia would thus worsen her position in Germany without increasing her influence in Denmark where it was already predominant. In spite of these remarks, Drouyn de L'Huys hinted to Brunnow that France would not be content with playing the rôle of an onlooker if Russia intervened.

Drouyn de L'Huys stated in his dispatch with a certain degree of surprise that Reventlow had not yet made direct mention of the matter to Palmerston and did not either seem to have any intention of doing so.

This was, however, not so strange, for Reventlow had heard nothing from his Government about Moltke's application. If he knew anything about it, it must have been through Moltke when he visited him in Paris. But shortly after his talk with Brunnow, Drouyn de L'Huys informed Reventlow of the subject matter of the conversation, Moltke's application, and Brunnow's views on the matter.¹ Brunnow had asked Drouyn de L'Huys if he believed that Reventlow intended to put such a proposal before the "Conference", and Drouyn de L'Huys had passed the question on to Reventlow. He replied that he was prepared to make every effort to support Moltke's exertions, but that he was not able to put a more precise proposal than Moltke's before the signatory powers until he had received orders from his Government.

On the 27th when Reventlow communicated to Reedtze the information he had been given by the French Minister and his answer, he was also able to tell him that Drouyn de L'Huys had just received information from Paris that, according to reports from Copenhagen, Russia had refused to participate in the "project" and send troops to Slesvig.² La Hitte also emphasized that great difficulties were involved, but found, however, that Denmark's position was untenable, that Germany would do nothing if she were not forced to, and that the Great Powers, if they could agree, must have means of being heard.³

¹ 27/9, No. 78.

² Dotezac's dispatch 20/9, No. 362.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 27/9. — Dispatch to Drouyn de L'Huys 26/9, No. 98. — Sternberg's dispatch 19/9, No. 118.

Drouyn de L'Huys discussed Russia's refusal with Brunnow, who found it very understandable.

Drouyn de L'Huys wrote to his Government that he considered it to be to the interest of France, if Moltke's proposal was not made the subject of collective negotiations.¹ He had advised both Reventlow and Brunnow against this, and both had stated that they agreed with him.

In a private letter of the 30th to Palmerston, Brunnow also expressed his criticism of Moltke's application.² As the Protocol powers, he wrote, had hitherto acted in concert, they ought to continue to do so and establish "une entente préalable" between them. None of them ought to act in isolation, "mais marchons ensemble, de bonne foi et de concert."

Drouyn de L'Huys was Palmerston's guest at Broadlands for the first two days of October.³ The Danish question was, naturally, discussed and Palmerston stated that Prussia's object was to unite Holstein and Slesvig and then one day absorb them and create a German Navy. Austria's request for the recognition of the Frankfurt Assembly was also discussed, but both Drouyn de L'Huys and Palmerston found that it was too early to do this. Later Drouyn de L'Huys told Reventlow that Palmerston was willing to consider the question of the proposal for a military cordon between Slesvig and Holstein.⁴ However, there is no trace of this possible willingness in Palmerston's dispatch of the 2nd of October to Britain's Minister in Paris.⁵ In dispatches of the 19th of September, Normanby gave an account of conversations he had had with the President and La Hitte about the question of intervention.⁶ He wrote that both of them were against intervention and he had expressed the same opinion. Palmerston's dispatch now agreed with his opinion and more or less repeated Normanby's views, stating, as it did, that "it may well be doubted whether the active military and naval Interference of England, France and Russia might not by its effect in Germany occasion a greater evil than that which it might put an end to." Of course

¹ 28/9, No. 64.

² P.P.

³ Dispatch 3/10, No. 67.

⁴ Dispatch 5/10, No. 79.

⁵ F.O. 27/866: 2/10, No. 473.

⁶ F.O. 27/874: 19/9, No. 299 and 300.

it was very desirable to put an end to Holstein's aggression against Denmark. But Palmerston put his trust in the diplomatic applications of the three powers, in the Peace Treaty which had been concluded, in the military disappointments of the Holstein army and the Statthalterschaft's lack of money.

On the 3rd of October La Hitte informed Drouyn de L'Huys that Denmark had sent an agent [General Schlegel] to Paris to request that French troops be sent to the Eider.¹ But, wrote La Hitte, you will understand that France could not embark on such an undertaking alone. The same day Moltke told Reventlow in a private letter that Schlegel was in Paris "in connection with some far too great expectations at home!" (expectations which he himself undoubtedly had aroused).² He had presented Schlegel that day to the President, to whom he had handed the letter from Frederik VII "about sending a few red trousers to Slesvig."³ As mentioned before, France refused to act alone. I do not understand that Denmark has had any illusions about that, La Hitte wrote in a dispatch to Dotezac.⁴

As Moltke informed Reventlow in the above-mentioned letter, Frankfurt had now finally agreed to ratify the Peace Treaty (cf. p. 21). "If only the ratification in Frankfurt," Reventlow wrote in his dispatch of the 5th, "shows as good fruits as its delay has been detrimental to us." Perhaps the ratification might be the starting point for a new action on the part of the signatory powers?

From the 4th to the 6th of October Drouyn de L'Huys and Reventlow racked their brains to devise something which might form the basis of a proposal to be put to Palmerston to further the Danish cause.⁵ On the 6th Reventlow conferred with Brunnow, who had returned from the country. According to Reventlow he was burning with zeal for the Danish cause to which he would devote "all his eminent talents."⁶ On the 7th all three diplomats

¹ 3/10, No. 103. — Cf. F.O. 27/875: 3/10, No. 320.

² The letter is with Reventlow's dispatch 5/10, No. 79.

³ Frederik VII's letter is dated 25/9 and was sent from Copenhagen on the 26th. Moltke handed it to the President on the 3rd of October.

⁴ Dispatch 11/10, No. 13.

⁵ Private letter from Reventlow to Reedtz 5/10; is to be found among the dispatches. — Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatches 4/10, No. 70 and 6/10, No. 71.

⁶ Dispatch 7/10, No. 80 (confidential); cf. letter from Reventlow to Reedtz of the same date.

conferred and the next day Brunnow was the first to leave for Broadlands to influence Palmerston.¹

Reventlow arrived the next day. Brunnow was then able to tell him of the negative result of his discussion with Palmerston.² Brunnow had taken with him a draft for a new protocol, "worded in rather vague terms," said Reventlow, who saw it later. However Brunnow did not show it to Palmerston, as he had immediately rejected the thought of calling together a "conference" or drawing up a new protocol. Palmerston found, and probably rightly so, that such a protocol would, if anything, weaken the impression of the former one, if it did not indicate what means were to be used to carry the object into effect. In order to resort to coercive measures, Palmerston would have to obtain the consent of his colleagues, just as Brunnow and Drouyn de L'Huys would presumably have to obtain authority from their respective Governments. It would, in fact, be impossible to induce Austria's representative to participate in such a step, which would be directed against both Austria's and Prussia's line of action, and information would first have to be obtained as to how Austria had thought of dealing with the question of the execution.

On the 10th "der dritte im Bunde", Drouyn de L'Huys, arrived at Broadlands. Before he left London he had received a message from La Hitte stating that, to put an end to the matter, it was necessary for France, Britain and Russia to unite their efforts as regards Germany, and that circumstances demanded energetic conduct on the part of the three powers for the benefit of Denmark.³

It is not strange that Drouyn de L'Huys asked for further information explaining what "the energetic conduct" was to be.⁴ Was the Conference (the representatives of the signatory powers), he first asked, to try to induce Prussia to accede to the London

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 9/10, No. 81. – Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 7/10, No. 72.

² Reventlow's dispatch 12/10, No. 82. – Engberg's description, p. 109 f., of what he calls the meeting at Broadlands on "the 12th of October" is strangely distorted. Bunsen's statement of the 26th of July, mentioned by Engberg, has, of course, no relation to these negotiations, but to the London Protocol of the 2nd of August.

³ Dispatches to Drouyn de L'Huys 7/10, No. 104 and 8/10, No. 105. – Guichen. II, p. 121.

⁴ Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 9/10, No. 74.

Protocol? He himself considered this to be out of the question after the appointment of Radowitz and the increasing unwillingness of the Berlin Cabinet. Brunnow, the originator of the plan, was also very willing to abandon it. A repetition in a new protocol of the friendly feelings of the powers towards Denmark would presumably only weaken the diplomatic authority of the powers and the value of the first declarations.

If a more resolute policy was preferred, continued Drouyn de L'Huys, a declaration might be made that Denmark was entitled to advance into Holstein and that Denmark's allies would intervene in the case of opposition from one or more German states. In that case one would have to be prepared for a war where France would be allied to Austria and Russia, Prussia and democratic Germany would be opponents and Britain an onlooker (*pour simple témoin*).

In order to prevail upon the Confederation to suppress the rebellion, it was perhaps possible to promise that France, Britain and Russia would accredit envoys to Frankfurt when Frankfurt had taken effective measures (cf. p. 20).¹ However Drouyn de L'Huys brought forward several objections to this proposal as far as France was concerned.

He preferred himself to take a middle course, he wrote, a sort of declaration which perhaps, nevertheless, might have some effect. But it would also have to be considered what means would be resorted to later. Before he left for Broadlands he was very anxious to receive a definite answer to the question of France's position if the more resolute policy were preferred. He did not receive a reply until some days later.

During his conversation with Palmerston, Drouyn de L'Huys let him read several passages in La Hitte's dispatches, one of them being the passage concerning energetic conduct.² But, asked Palmerston, what means did La Hitte suggest to help Denmark out of her painful situation. At the moment Britain could not recognize Frankfurt as representative of the German Confederation. When Palmerston asked whether France would send troops to Slesvig on her own, Drouyn de L'Huys had to reply that France would act only in conjunction with Britain

¹ Cf. Koiler's dispatch 12/10. Rantzau, p. 251 f.

² Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 11/10, No. 76.

and Russia. But he stated that Denmark's allies must be entitled to help her by force of arms. Drouyn de L'Huys ended by proposing that the three powers sent energetic, concordant notes to Berlin, Vienna and Frankfurt, and Palmerston accepted this idea. Drouyn de L'Huys hinted at the idea of sending a mixed corps to Holstein [? the Eider] and was of the opinion that Palmerston appreciated the suggestion, but thought it was doubtful if it would be accepted.

After his conversation with Palmerston, Drouyn de L'Huys discussed the matter with Brunnow and Reventlow. Brunnow, he wrote, was still anxious about the idea of any isolated French intervention, and in that connection mentioned Persigny's journey to London [this is alleged to have been a private visit]. He stressed the importance of acting in agreement. Drouyn de L'Huys agreed with him, but said that action was then necessary, as the French Government seemed "très résolu à faire quelque chose." Both Drouyn de L'Huys and Brunnow asked Reventlow to inform them of Denmark's intentions with reference to Article IV, but, naturally, received no precise answer. Incidentally Reventlow recommended, but with no result, the advantages of a new protocol as "a warning to our enemies, a sign, that the Conference had not fallen asleep." Drouyn de L'Huys thought that Reventlow was satisfied with the negotiations with Palmerston.

Drouyn de L'Huys was less satisfied. He found that Palmerston's feelings towards Denmark had become less cordial and that he was making use of Russia's and France's undecided way of expressing themselves to adopt a sort of neutrality himself and to spare Prussia. Drouyn de L'Huys warned his Government against venturing beyond diplomatic intervention, as France might otherwise easily find herself standing alone. Incidentally, he threw out the suggestion that advantage might be taken of Prussia's present precarious situation to prevail upon her to advise the Holsteiners to lay down arms in return for the maintenance of the Federal decision of 17th September 1846. If Austria's terms were harder for Denmark than Prussia's, he was of the opinion that the choice of a mediator must be a matter of indifference to Denmark. He had dropped a word on this subject to Bunsen some time ago.

On the 11th Brunnow and Drouyn de L'Huys left Broadlands, while Reventlow enjoyed Palmerston's hospitality for another day.

Although the three diplomats had travelled separately to Broadlands, and had returned in at least two parties, their journeys did not perhaps pass unnoticed by the suspicious Court. On the 13th Palmerston found it reasonable to inform the Queen about the meeting and about Brunnow's proposal for a new protocol with "opinions and wishes which might have a moral Influence on the German Powers."¹ However, he was pleased to inform the Queen that he had convinced the participants that it was best "to allow things for the present to take their natural and regular Course." Britain would not send troops to Slesvig. The Queen was no doubt glad to receive this information, but pointed out that Britain should urge Denmark to be conciliatory and to agree to a solution of the disputed right.²

After Frankfurt had decided on the 3rd of October to ratify the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July, it was Palmerston's intention to instruct Cowley to induce the Federal Diet to put an end to the Holstein aggression. On the 9th, Russell sent Queen Victoria an extract of Palmerston's dispatch, remarking that he had objected to the request to the Federal Diet to "procure Peace in Holstein on the ground of the Treaty of July, which according to Prussia is neither binding to that extent, nor within the competence of the Diet at Frankfurt to enforce."³ Therefore he thought that Britain's representations would be useless, if the co-operation of the whole of the Confederation could not be obtained, which will only be possible if Denmark were induced "to offer fair terms of Peace."

On the 12th the Queen wrote to Russell that she was "extremely glad" that he had immediately stopped the dispatch to Cowley, "which would have been entirely wrong."⁴ But she asked Russell to watch that the policy expressed in the dispatch: the policy of using the Austrian party in Germany to hand over Holstein to the King of Denmark as a means of solving the

¹ R.A.W. I 22/31. — Scharff, p. 189, is incorrect in stating that Palmerston sent this information on the 16th. ("Zwei Tage vorher" the 18th.). It was the 13th.

² R.A.W. I 22/37. — The letter is printed in *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. II, p. 322 f.

³ R.A.W. I 22/22.

⁴ R.A.W. I 22/29.

Slesvig question and one "to which both Lord John and the Queen have now formally objected" was not carried through by Palmerston in spite of them.

Although the Queen was extremely glad that the dispatch to Cowley had been stopped and, in spite of the fact that Russell had sent it back to Palmerston with his objections,¹ it was sent off, as far as can be seen, without regard to these.² It is true that Russell wrote in his letter to Palmerston that he had no objection to the Federal Diet's being "urged to use its influence to prevent the continuance of hostilities in Sleswig," if only the Peace Treaty were not put forward as the reason for this, and he thought that they had not promised France to do more. But the dispatch received by Cowley stated, on the contrary, that he should "cooperate with the French Minister [Tallenay] in urging the Diet to give effect to their recent ratifications . . . by urging the Holstein Government to observe and respect . . . that treaty." In reply, however, Cowley reported on the 14th that Tallenay had not yet received any instructions on the matter, but that both of them, as often as an opportunity presented itself, had urged on the individual members of the Diet the requests of their respective Governments for the ratification of the Treaty as well as the necessity of taking effective measures for the restoration of the King's authority in Holstein.³

In his letter to Palmerston, Russell had emphasized that whether his or Palmerston's interpretation of the engagements which the Treaty of Berlin laid on Prussia and Germany were correct, Prussia and her allies constituted a large part of the Confederation and that part that was nearest the scene of action. Prussia had now clearly stated that she would not use force against Holstein and would not allow Hanover or Austria to do so, either. If Frankfurt could persuade Holstein to give up the fight, Holstein must be given "some fair terms." If it were necessary for Frankfurt to use force, a war in Germany would result. Russell admitted that it was extremely difficult to solve the problem on account of "the bad faith of Prussia and the general state of Germany." But if Frankfurt left the matter to Austria

¹ P.P.

² F.O. 30/135: 9/10, No. 194; cf. 9/10, No. 195.

³ F.O. 30/141: 14/10, No. 337.

and the Union the matter to Prussia, a new treaty could decide the questions for which no solution had been found in Berlin. Russell found Denmark's present promises "very unsatisfactory. But her necessities are great and she might be brought to make concessions." It was a matter of taking the line of least resistance.

Drouyn de L'Huys's wish to receive more detailed information on the interpretation of the words "energetic conduct" before his meeting with Palmerston was not fulfilled, as mentioned above, until he returned from Broadlands. On the 12th La Hitte wrote to him that he was now able to give him more positive instructions after hearing the opinion of the Cabinet and receiving orders from the President.¹ France was prepared to cooperate with Britain and Russia, and possibly Sweden, on the following: if Denmark fulfilled the provisions in Article IV² without Germany's re-establishing the authority of the legitimate prince in Holstein, the above-named powers acknowledged Denmark's right to a military occupation of Holstein. If this led to aggression by one or more German Powers, they would defend Denmark, even by force. Drouyn de L'Huys was to communicate this to Palmerston and Brunnow and ask if they approved of it. La Hitte was of the opinion that Brunnow would be able to give his approval without asking his Government. Palmerston and Brunnow were to be given an extract of the dispatch. The next course of action, which ought to be as lenient as possible towards the German population, would have to be discussed.

Drouyn de L'Huys did not receive La Hitte's dispatch until the late afternoon of the 14th.³ Not to lose any time, he sent the original dispatch to Broadlands and informed Brunnow verbally of the contents, and also mentioned them to Reventlow.⁴ According to Drouyn de L'Huys, Brunnow treated the matter rather lightly; and Drouyn de L'Huys really thought that neither Brunnow nor Palmerston were in favour of armed intervention.

¹ 12/10, No. 107. — Guichen. II, p. 124 f. does not print the dispatch in extenso.

² Scharff, p. 186, and Engberg, p. 110 give this incorrectly, stating that Denmark "in accordance with Article IV ... must now be entitled to ..." Engberg incorrectly calls the dispatch to Drouyn "a note to Britain".

³ Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatches 14/10, No. 79, and 15/10, No. 81.

⁴ Reventlow's dispatch 15/10, No. 83.

But, he wrote, it was now necessary to learn their intentions, so that France would not be in danger of playing a sole part – a ridiculous one in Slesvig, a dangerous one in Holstein.

On the 16th Reventlow received a dispatch from Reedtzt instructing him to call together as soon as possible the representatives of the signatory powers and explain Denmark's critical situation.¹ Reventlow sought advice from Drouyn de L'Huys, who actually found the proposal useless, but advised Reventlow to describe the intolerable position of the Danish army in particular. The two diplomats drafted a note together on the 16th.


The same day Drouyn de L'Huys received a note from Palmerston thanking him for the important dispatch mentioned above.² However, he wrote that he dared not take the responsibility alone and the next Cabinet meeting was not until the 6th of November; but, as he was expecting a visit from Lord Lansdowne, he urged Drouyn de L'Huys to come to Broadlands where all three of them could discuss "les graves affaires." – Drouyn de L'Huys found the reply not very promising, and rightly so. Once again he emphasized to La Hitte that France ought not to involve herself in an undertaking without securing effective aid from Russia and Britain. And while material preparations were being made for the undertaking, efforts should be made to influence public opinion in a favourable direction. The Danish question ought to be separated from the struggle for power between Prussia and Austria, and Frankfurt ought not to be recognized officially. Furthermore, Denmark ought to be required to give some guarantee for the maintenance of local institutions in Slesvig.

Palmerston sent Russell a copy of La Hitte's dispatch and informed him on the 17th that he expected a visit from Drouyn de L'Huys and told him what he had written to him.³ He would, he wrote to Russell, tell Drouyn de L'Huys once again that, in his opinion, the Government would not be inclined to take part in a declaration "which would so plainly point to a General War in Europe," if the declaration was not successful in putting an end to hostilities in Slesvig. But at the same time, he continued,

¹ Reedtzt to Reventlow 7/10, No. 47. – Reventlow's dispatch 17–18/10, No. 84 with enclosure. – Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 16/10, No. 82.

² Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 17/10, No. 83.

³ R.A.W. I 22/38.



Broadlands, The Home of Lord Palmerston.
Drawing from 1914 as it was in 1850. Property of the Rt. Hon. the Lord Brabourne.



FREDERIK DITLEV REVENTLOW
(1791–1851)

Danish Envoy to Britain. Painted by Johannes Möller 1850. Frederiksborg Castle.

he thought it likely that, if the Holstein aggression did not cease, France and Russia would make threatening applications to Prussia, a French army would be concentrated opposite the Prussian Rhenish provinces, while the Russians had a strong army at the Polish frontier. "Austria would probably be too glad to assist in humbling her German Rival." Prussia's only resort would then be "to unite herself openly as she hitherto has done covertly with the Democratic Party in Germany," and what unhappy incidents might this not bring about. To avoid such a situation he had prepared these instructions "to which you have so often objected, and which have thus been stopped desiring Cowley and others to exhort the German Powers to use their influence to bring the Holsteiners to reason and to Peace." He could certainly not agree with Russell that the Treaty of Berlin "can by any fair Construction be interpreted as leaving any Member of the German Confederation at liberty to carry on hostilities against the Danish Army in Schleswig, which they are by that very Treaty authorized to occupy."

Russell wanted to stick to this strange interpretation as he told Palmerston in his reply of the 17th.¹ Germany would certainly secure peace in Holstein, but only after obtaining "certain fair conditions from the King of Denmark." Holstein ought to accept these terms. "But I fear this cannot easily be done without the consent of Prussia, and if attempted by Austria against Prussia would only lead to a German war." But if Austria, Prussia and the other German states did not secure peace, it must be obtained in the name of Austria, Britain, France and Russia.

Although Drouyn de L'Huys asserted that he used every argument to obtain an intervention on behalf of Denmark during his talks with Palmerston and Lansdowne, Palmerston would not budge.² The result was that Drouyn de L'Huys felt that Britain would not employ "heroic means": "Ce gouvernement sait, avec une égale audace, avancer ou reculer, suivant les intérêts de sa politique." No support could be expected from Britain, if France involved herself in an armed expedition against the Duchies.

In his dispatch of the 19th Drouyn de L'Huys expressed the

¹ P.P.

² Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 18/10, No. 84.

same sceptical view of Britain's attitude and it was his belief that Russia would urge France on, but hold back herself.¹ If there was talk of summoning a conference, he would, however, do his best that it did not end in "des prières et des actes de foi, d'espérance ou de charité."

After Drouyn de L'Huys's visit to Broadlands it was Reventlow's turn to be summoned there in connection with his note of the 16th (cf. above). He went to Broadlands on the evening of the 19th and returned on the 22nd.² Lansdowne was still with Palmerston.

Reventlow's talks with Palmerston gave no definite result, either. He was, Reventlow wrote, "very reserved in his statements, which he had, of course, a good pretext for before the meeting of the Cabinet." But "several interesting points" were discussed and Reventlow had an opportunity of letting Palmerston hear everything that spoke in Denmark's favour: "though I dare not congratulate myself on actually gaining much ground."

Palmerston was definitely against Denmark's desire to summon a conference. It was, he said, below the dignity of the Great Powers to hold more conferences when they had not agreed to carry their decision into effect by force; and this they had not. He was not either of the opinion that the Conference had authority to pass resolutions on German matters, as Prussia was not a participant. There were no grounds for the emphasis which Reventlow had placed on the critical position of the Danish army, said Palmerston, and referred to Hodges' reports, which were to the effect that the Slesvig-Holsteiners would not attack and, if they did so, would be defeated "worse than ever before." The final matter under discussion was the question whether the fortress of Rendsborg was Danish or German, and Palmerston asked what progress had been made in the question of the Succession.

Reventlow found Brunnow very reserved, too, at this time, just like Palmerston. Reventlow thought it was due to lack of instructions from home.

On the 21st Drouyn de L'Huys talked to John Russell and George Grey at Richmond and explained the reasons for France's

¹ Dispatch 19/10, No. 87.

² Reventlow's dispatches 9/10, No. 85, and 23/10, No. 86, as well as letters to Reedtzt of 23/10 and 24/10. — Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatches 19/10, No. 87, and 22/10, No. 89.

proposal.¹ Drouyn de L'Huys found, of course, that Russell was even less inclined than Palmerston to make a decision of vital importance. Russell referred to the forthcoming Cabinet meeting, which had been put forward to the 23rd, two days later.² Besides the Danish question the alarming news from Germany would give the Cabinet plenty to discuss.

On the 22nd Prince Albert wrote to Russell that the Western Powers ought not to countenance Russia's dictating to Germany.³ Russell had pointed out to Palmerston the day before that these German-Holstein affairs "must form the chief object of our deliberation . . ."⁴ We ought not to do anything that would appreciably weaken Prussia, said Russell; but it was "very difficult to protect a State whose conduct is so indefensible as that of Prussia." Could Austria and Prussia not be requested to appoint delegates, who, together with Denmark, could decide the future position of Slesvig. Then an armistice could presumably be obtained. If this proposal were not practicable, Prussia must be informed that the King of Denmark could not be prevented from invading Holstein "and making such terms as may be compatible with the maintenance of Holstein as a State of the German Confederation. — The aspect of affairs is very critical."

Palmerston had asked Reventlow if he might borrow the instructions which Reventlow had received on the 7th for use at the Cabinet meeting on the 23rd.⁵ Reventlow lent him them and urged him to "mettre un terme à cette horrible effusion du sang." However, Reventlow's expectations of the meeting were not greater than he wrote to Reedtz that he did not believe there would be any "energetic resolutions."

The Cabinet meeting did not either result in any such resolutions. As Palmerston informed the Queen, it was decided to reject La Hitte's proposal for participation in the above-mentioned declaration.⁶ On the other hand, the Cabinet was willing to co-operate with France and Russia to prevail upon Austria

¹ Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 21/10, No. 88. — Reventlow's letter to Reedtz 23/10.

² Engberg, p. 111, gives the date of the meeting incorrectly as the 22nd.

³ R.A.W. I 22/55. — Cf. Bunsen, III, p. 149.

⁴ 21/10. P.P.

⁵ Reventlow's dispatch 23/10, No. 86, as well as a copy of his letter 23/10 to Palmerston.

⁶ R.A.W. I 22/61. — Also on the 23rd of October Russell informed Prince Albert of the results of the meeting. R.A.W. I 22/58.

and Prussia through diplomatic channels to use the influence due to them as leading German Powers to induce the Holstein Statthalterschaft to abstain from further hostilities in Slesvig. Palmerston emphasized that there were two things which were of importance in judging these questions. One of them was that Britain's Minister, Westmorland, had signed the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July together with the representatives of the two parties and at their request "in order to give as it were an additional Sanction to the Engagements then taken." The other thing to be taken into consideration was that the Holstein army was not a purely Holstein one, but included numerous other German men and officers (e.g. Willisen, von der Tann.).

The Queen's proposal for an impartial tribunal to decide the controversial issues between Holstein and Denmark was, continued Palmerston, excellent, if it were only realizable. But it would, no doubt, be impossible to find an impartial and at the same time competent tribunal "upon questions so complicated in their details and which have roused so much angry passion and which have been made use of as means for forwarding views not necessarily connected with them." An impartial tribunal could not be found either in Denmark or Germany and it would be scarcely possible to find a competent one anywhere else. "The former History of Denmark and the two Duchies seems to be so confused and to be so full of irregular transactions, that some events may be quoted in support of almost any pretension." The only way of solving the conflict was, Palmerston believed, for the two parties to agree on an arrangement "which would be sufficiently suited to present and future circumstances without too rigidly standing out for those former conditions of things with regard to which conflicting assertions might be made and supported by plausible evidence of Events in bygone Times."

The negative results of the Cabinet meeting which Drouyn de L'Huys had expected were communicated to him the following day by Palmerston.¹ Drouyn de L'Huys wrote to La Hitte that, in his opinion, France ought now to abandon the proposal. Incidentally both Koller, the Austrian chargé d'affaires, as well

¹ Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 24/10, No. 92. - F.O. 27/866: 1/11, No. 528.

as Brunnow had at this time announced that within a fortnight or three weeks the matter would, no doubt, be solved¹ – not by decisions reached in London but in another way [in Warsaw].

On the 24th there appeared in *The Times*, otherwise a reliable source of information, a sensational article about the Cabinet meeting the day before and about the French proposal. The article stated that Russia and France had jointly proposed to Britain that the three powers should “peremptorily require Prussia to fulfil her recent engagements with Denmark, and withdraw the support she still continues to give to the Sleswig-Holstein army.” If Prussia did not do this, Russia and France would “back it, not by an unprofitable march to the territory under dispute, but in a way more congenial to their tastes – by an invasion of the Silesian provinces of Prussia on the one side, and the Rhenish on the other.” First, however, they insisted on Britain’s co-operation “in the remonstrance with Prussia, without which they are not prepared to move at present;” but Britain refuses, the article continued, to agree to the proposal put forward by the two powers and instead wants the three powers to “separately remonstrate with Prussia on her present breach of faith with the Danish Government. Whether their triple remonstrances will be of more avail than all the rest of diplomacy that has been lavished on this affair, is a question on which we will not venture to give an opinion.”

The *Times* took up arms against Russia’s and France’s “selfish” plans. It was true that Palmerston had thought of (threatened with?) (cf. above) such plans, but neither Russia nor France had made decisions in that direction. La Hitte contradicted the article immediately, though with the additional comment that, if Prussia and Germany did not effect the Treaty of Berlin “in time”, the London Conference would give Denmark a free hand and assist her if one or more of the German states intervened in the war.² This was, it is true, France’s proposal, but, as we have seen, not accepted by Palmerston.

I do not know where *The Times* had received its incorrect information. In his letter (26/10) to Reedtz, Reventlow refused to entertain the idea that it was Palmerston who had led The

¹ Drouyn de L’Huys’s dispatch 23/10, No. 90.

² Moltke’s dispatch from Paris 26/10, No. 135.

Times "astray". Incidentally, Palmerston's relations with The Times were marked by estrangement.

Bunsen was very alarmed by the article which he believed was based on authentic information. In several letters of the 24th and 25th he commented on the article and on the Cabinet meeting of the 23rd, and said how necessary it was to put an end to the struggle in the Duchies as quickly as possible.¹ In a confidential letter to Radowitz he advocated this in very urgent terms.

In spite of the refusal given to France, neither Queen Victoria nor Prince Albert was satisfied with the reports about the Cabinet decisions.⁴ The Queen found it unjust that Britain tried "to disarm the Holsteiners, who are fighting for distinct rights," instead of inducing Denmark to make concessions. If Russell agreed with her, she hoped that he would tell Palmerston. In his letter to Russell, Prince Albert called Hodges "a thorough Dane at heart." In his dispatches Hodges had reported that there were many German volunteers in the Holstein army.

For once Russell proved unwilling to communicate – and recommend – the Queen's remarks to Palmerston. He told the Queen of this on the 25th.³ In the present situation he regarded an announcement from the King of Denmark as useless, almost harmful, as the Holstein Assembly had clearly declared to Germany and Europe that they wanted Holstein and Slesvig to form one German state. As long as the Holsteiners and Prussians continued "to fire upon the Danes from German territory", he had no hope of any arrangement. "It is for Austria and Prussia and Germany rather than for England to say what that arrangement should be." In Berlin Britain had proposed "the separate institutions for Sleswig to which Denmark consented; we can hardly propose any other terms." That Germany and not Denmark was being pressed for a settlement was due to the fact that Germany was the aggressor. Referring to Prince Albert's doubt about the accuracy of Hodges' information, Russell stated that it had been confirmed by the Duke of Cambridge.

Thus while Russell realistically regarded a declaration at

¹ Cf. Bunsen. III, p. 145 ff.

² R.A.W. I 22/59 and 63.

³ R.A.W. I 22/64.

that moment from the King of Denmark as useless, if not harmful, Palmerston, curiously enough, strongly urged such an announcement when he answered (28/10) Reventlow's note of the 16th: "much good might possibly arise from some announcement by the King of Denmark of his intentions in regard to the two Duchies, if those intentions are, as no doubt they are, such as ought to satisfy the reasonable desires of His Majesty's subjects in the Duchies . . ."¹ Furthermore, the British Government still hoped – together with France and Russia – to induce the German Powers to put an end to Holstein aggression. Reventlow could, however, not provide Palmerston with more information than he had already given him concerning the "intentions" of the Danish Government.²

In his above-mentioned communication to Prince Albert, Russell had said that Palmerston would send the Queen the drafts of the dispatches to Austria and Prussia on whose contents the Cabinet had agreed on the 23rd. The dispatches did not appear. On the 2nd of November Prince Albert wrote to Russell in a very irritated tone and presumably suspicious: "What is the Meaning of Ld. Palmerston, not having written to this day, the 2nd November," the dispatches which it was decided at the Cabinet meeting "should be written immediately?"³ The reason was, as we shall see in the next chapter, the lead that Radowitz had taken in the Slesvig-Holstein question.

4. Radowitz's lead

With reference to the impression which the appointment of Radowitz as Foreign Minister on the 26th of September made at St. Petersburg, Bloomfield stated that Rochow, Prussia's Minister there, had told him that the Tsar would "consider it as a measure directed against Himself, as an insurmountable obstacle to an arrangement between Austria and Prussia, and as full of danger to the peace of Europe."⁴ In a dispatch of a slightly later date he mentioned Russia's anger at the appointment of Radowitz and her friendly feelings towards Austria on

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 29/10, No. 87.

² Reventlow's dispatch 1/11, No. 88; cf. his letter 14/11 to Reedtz.

³ R.A.W. I 22/82

⁴ F.O. 65/379; 8/10, No. 313.

account of her somewhat more sympathetic attitude towards the Danish question.¹

When Howard in Berlin learnt of the appointment, he thought that the Cabinet had broken up.² It had not, Manteuffel told him, "although he could not of course say how long it will remain united." You will, Howard wrote to Westmorland, be able to judge the consequences yourself of "such a nomination at such a moment when the utmost prudence and conciliation was requisite to prevent armed collisions." Radowitz had said that he would "push his policy to the limits of possibility. The King has gone farther and said to the limits which God may prescribe, but he hopes God will prescribe none!"

In the clash with Austria which was coming to a head, Prussia had to reckon with Russia's attitude. But Prussia's union policy had wide, popular support and she had the sympathy of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert both for it and for her help to the Slesvig-Holsteiners. But as regards the last question the contrast between the views of the Court and those of the responsible British Government was of vital importance. Here Radowitz's policy was called on to do the near impossible.

Shortly before Radowitz took over at the Foreign Ministry, Brandenburg had warned Copenhagen in strong terms against making any attempts to reach a solution of the Slesvig-Holstein question through Frankfurt.³ Prussia had not and would not recognize Frankfurt. She had so far closed her eyes to the presence there of Bülow, but Denmark was deceiving herself if she thought that a final solution of the Slesvig-Holstein question could be reached without Prussia's participation or in spite of her. Prussia would never allow such a thing "et que c'était s'éloigner de la seule route qui pût conduire à un achèvement en marchant sur d'autres traces que sur les siennes."

Such language was astonishing, Reedtz wrote to Reventlow. During the negotiations in Berlin Prussia had refused to enter into a fair, final settlement; she had obtained a simple peace and had said that she would withdraw from the matter. What was Prussia aiming at – always the opponent of any attempts to restore order and never stating her real views.

¹ F.O. 65/379: 15/10, No. 318.

² Howard to Westmorland 26/9.

³ F.O. 22/184: 30/9, No. 122. – Reedtz's dispatch 30/9, No. 45, to Reventlow.

When Howard approached Radowitz after his appointment to obtain his cooperation for the settlement of the conflict, Radowitz laid the blame on Austria who had "mixed up that Question with her German Policy."¹ Prussia, he said, did not recognize the Frankfurt Assembly and thus not either resolutions which it passed in the name of the Federal Diet. "They would not *tolerate* [underlined] the execution of any such acts, but would on the contrary oppose it." If Frankfurt sent troops to Holstein, they would hinder their passage. They could not, it was true, do this if they were Hanoverian troops, but they would not tolerate those either.

Radowitz thought there should be a special commission to settle the matter, a commission consisting of an Austrian and a Prussian member and a member for the other German states.

In the dispatch reporting Radowitz's statements Howard remarked that, under such conditions and as Denmark received only moral support from her allies, it was not to be wondered at that the Statthalterschaft continued their aggression, "protected as they are by their geographical position and the political considerations which prevent their opponents from following up any victory which the latter may gain." The Great Powers ought to use their influence for the benefit of the King's authority and put an end to the conflict.

The fact that Meyendorff left Berlin at the beginning of October and took over the post as Minister at Vienna must be taken as an expression of Russia's disapproval of Prussia's attitude towards the Slesvig-Holstein insurrection.² Russia was thereafter represented in Berlin by Budberg, the chargé d'affaires. Before his departure Meyendorff told Howard, among others, that he thought that Russia would accredit a Minister to the Federal Diet at Frankfurt when Frankfurt had ratified the Peace Treaty and issued an inhibitorium.³ There are, wrote Howard, thus prospects of a war between Prussia on the one side and Austria and Russia on the other, if in the meantime "the disastrous war which is waged by the Stadthalterschaft" is not terminated.

In a later, confidential dispatch Howard reported an idea

¹ F.O. 64/320: 28/9, No. 105. — Howard to Westmorland 28/9.

² Cf. Howard's dispatch 26/9, No. 96. F.O. 64/320.

³ F.O. 64/320: 6/10, No. 119.

which Meyendorff, though without official authority, had told him about.¹ Meyendorff thought that a conference to settle the Slesvig-Holstein question might be convened, possibly in Berlin, with authorized participants from Britain, France and Russia as well as participants from Austria and Prussia. He had mentioned the idea to Brandenburg, who had reacted favourably – which he also did later during a conversation with Howard. Meyendorff thought that if Austria consented then this would bring the two German powers together on this important question and might lead to a further understanding between them. – It was not, as Howard must be aware, Russia's political aim to humble Prussia, but to bring her back into the conservative Eastern bloc.²

During the critical situation between Prussia on the one side and Austria and Russia on the other, it was natural that the leader of the Prussian union policy looked westwards for allies. First of all he turned his eyes towards Britain. There was no doubt about the attitude of the English Court. They were in favour of union policy and Prussia's support of the Slesvig-Holsteiners. Palmerston's public statements of his sympathies for the liberal and national movements in Italy and Austria had, moreover, brought him in conflict with Vienna. In September an episode occurred which was a drastic indication of these views. Haynau, the Austrian general who had put down the revolts in Italy and Hungary with such ruthlessness, had – somewhat foolishly – gone on a visit to London. During a visit to Barclay's breweries he was insulted by the workers.³ Palmerston was willing to express his regrets to Austria, but at the same time wanted to say that he understood the assault. The Queen and John Russell forced him to leave out this passage in his note.

A considerable stumbling block in Prussia's relations to Britain's foreign policy was, however, their differing views on the Danish-German conflict. Not only had Prussia refused to take part in the London Protocol concerning the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, she had also refused

¹ F.O. 64/320: 14/10, No. 142.

² Cf. Meinecke, p. 474.

³ Connell, p. 126 ff. – R.A.W. I 22/38. – The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 319 ff.

help to put an end to the Holstein aggression. If Britain were to be approached, it would be necessary for Prussia to modify or moderate her previous point of view, whatever she really thought.

In dispatches of the 9th and the 12th of October Howard gave an account of conversations he had had with Radowitz in connection with Palmerston's dispatches of the 30th of September (see p. 37 and p. 39).¹ Prussia, said Radowitz, had no particular interest of her own in the matter and nothing special against the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, if the legitimate claims of the interested parties were satisfied [!]. There were several possibilities for settling the dispute: the union of the Duchies or the independence of Slesvig and a third and fourth solution could no doubt be found: "Why should not Your Lordship make a proposal? Should you do so — he should be happy to take it into consideration." Howard referred to the fact that Palmerston had, after all, suggested the basis for the peace preliminaries, which Prussia had abandoned. What more could Your Lordship do? But Radowitz thought, as just mentioned, that Palmerston should begin a new mediation and it would be crowned with success. He would be most happy to enter upon such a proposal of Your Lordship.

Radowitz could not share the wish that "the Holsteiners should lay down their arms as a preliminary step,": this could only take place as the result of negotiations. He repeated his wish that Palmerston should induce Austria to separate those questions from their general German Policy. Howard was of the opinion that Prussia, just like Austria, used the Holstein question as an instrument in her general German policy.

On the 15th of October Brandenburg left Berlin for Warsaw where he and Prince Karl of Prussia were to negotiate on the Prussian-Austrian conflict with Tsar Nicholas and Nesselrode as well as with the Emperor Francis Joseph and Schwarzenberg. At the Conference Russia insisted first of all that the Holstein revolt should be terminated.

Radowitz hardly entertained great hopes of any result from possible British influence on Austria or his very informal invitations to Palmerston. However, Bunsen had sent on from London

¹ F.O. 64/320: 9/10, No. 124, and 12/10, No. 133.

Drouyn de L'Huys's suggestion and advice that Prussia should take the initiative herself in solving the Slesvig-Holstein question and thus remove that weapon from the hand of her opponent Austria.¹ Bunsen and Drouyn de L'Huys seemed to be more intimate than Denmark might consider desirable. As far as can be seen, the French Minister was influenced to no small extent by Bunsen.

Radowitz expressed himself with great energy in a conversation he had on the 11th of October with Cintrat, the French chargé d'affaires in Berlin. Prussia would, he said, rather offer her last thaler and her last man than bow to a resolution passed at Frankfurt and in which she had taken no part.² What right had Russia, incidentally, to want to be the only one to decide on the matter of the Duchies? Had France not a powerful voice? It was not a matter of the Danish question which Prussia was prepared to solve in concert with others and which we could solve together in 24 hours, "si nous étions seuls," [?] but the question was to be used in general German policy. "Nous résisterions, fussions nous seuls contre tous." But it could not be in the interests of France to see Prussia succumb. The two countries ought to come closer to one another, and Radowitz was loud in his praise of the President who had restored law and order in France.

On the 14th La Hitte gave Persigny, who went to Berlin again, instructions to urge Prussia to solve the Danish question promptly in a way that was satisfactory for Europe.³ Neither France nor Britain wanted to interfere in the internal German conflict, the instructions said, but Prussia ought not to forget that her attitude in the Danish affair could bring the Great Powers closer to Frankfurt. Her support to Holstein was also in contravention of the Treaty of Berlin.

Persigny reached Berlin on the 15th, and on the 17th had a long conversation with Radowitz, who assured him that he would adhere to his policy in the German question.⁴ Persigny

¹ See especially Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 27/10, No. 95, where he said that, about a month ago, he had suggested this to Bunsen as his own idea. — Bunsen's dispatches 20/9, No. 96, and 5/10, No. 105.

² Cintrat's dispatch 12/10, No. 88.

³ 14/10, No. 24.

⁴ Persigny's dispatch 21/10, No. 89.

thought that it should have been possible for Prussia to put an end to the aggression against Denmark. Radowitz explained to him how he thought the unpleasant question might be solved and asked for France's support, which Persigny for his part readily gave. According to Persigny, Radowitz's proposal was to the effect that an Austrian and Prussian commissioner should induce the Holsteiners to lay down arms and then, together with a Danish commissioner, arrange the terms to which the Duchies should submit. Radowitz said that the Great Powers ought to prevail upon Austria to agree to this proposal. Persigny did in fact recommend it both to Prokesch and Bielke.

The same day the conversation took place between Radowitz and Persigny, Radowitz sent a dispatch with his proposal to Werther in Copenhagen. The dispatch stated first that if Frankfurt decided on military intervention in Holstein, Prussia would prevent this. But then it was suggested that Denmark should apply to Vienna and propose that Prussia and Austria set up a special commission at Hamburg or somewhere else to carry into effect Article IV, together with the King's delegate, and adopt measures "zu gerechter und dauernder Pacification der Herzogthümer."

In a conversation on the 20th with Howard, Radowitz informed him of the above-mentioned proposal. He thought one of its advantages was that it did not mix Britain up in German politics. And even if the proposed commission did not reach a decision on "the legal question" "as promptly as he was persuaded it would, a great object would be gained by putting an end to the war." In connection with the Danish complaints about the help that poured into Holstein from Prussia, complaints which both Howard and Persigny had supported, Radowitz reassured Howard and said that Prussia "had now no connexion whatever with the Holstein Authorities."

When Reedtz told Reventlow of Radowitz's proposal so that he might learn what the representatives of the signatory powers thought of it, he called it "cette ouverture remarquable." Pechlin, who arrived in Berlin on the 22nd of October from Vienna, also found the proposal quite new, as Prussia had hitherto refused all intervention.¹ And it must be admitted that Radowitz's

¹ F.O. 64/321: 23/10, No. 157.

statement to Bielke was remarkable: Prussia, he said, in this matter "had no underhand views; whatever might have been her Policy a year ago. She was now desirous of the maintenance of the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy."¹

On the 17th when Radowitz communicated his proposal to Bunsen, he remarked that it was the first time that he had mentioned the Slesvig-Holstein question to him, although he was aware of Bunsen's interest in it, and although, under the present circumstances, it had become of the utmost importance. Radowitz was justified in stating in his dispatch that Vienna did not seem to have taken the immediate need into consideration so much as it had reckoned on the fact that the lack of another Federal authority to whom Denmark could address the request mentioned in Article IV of the Peace Treaty would be of benefit to "the so-called Federal Diet." But as he had told Werther in his instructions, if Denmark wanted to secure the pacification of Holstein quickly, she would have to turn her eyes away from Frankfurt, make Prussia's proposal in Vienna her own, and contribute with "her own decisions concerning the Duchies." He requested Bunsen to induce Palmerston to support Prussia's proposal.

On the 23rd Bunsen sent Palmerston a translation of Radowitz's dispatch of the 17th to Werther.² Its contents may have already been known to Palmerston through Howard's dispatch; if so, he was acquainted with them before the Cabinet meeting on the 23rd.

A letter sent to Cowley on the 23rd of October by Mellish, the Foreign Office expert on the Slesvig-Holstein question, indicated his views on the conduct of the two German great powers.³ He first mentioned the French proposal which the Cabinet had not yet come to a decision about, but which he thought Persigny was gabbling about at Berlin. "Here then is a pretty choice of evils; but happen what may, I am for adhering to recognized engagements, and not taking part with a Government that has shown such contemptible duplicity and falsehood as Prussia. You see therefore we differ most materially in regard to German

¹ F.O. 64/321: 23/10, No. 156.

² F.O. 64/325.

³ F.O. 519/163.

politics. I think Austria blind almost beyond redemption, but I think Prussia a Scoundrel.”

Pechlin, as mentioned above, had gone from Vienna to Berlin. This was due mainly to Meyendorff's suggestion and his own doubts that Austria could render sufficient effective help by having the inhibitorium (with its possible execution) issued in Frankfurt to the Statthalterschaft. For Meyendorff had received the impression when discussing the matter with Brandenburg that Prussia would be willing to recommend the Statthalterschaft to submit to an inhibitorium from Frankfurt.¹ Meyendorff affirmed positively to Pechlin that it was Russia's view that Prussia would not be allowed to prevent an execution decided upon at Frankfurt.

The day after he reached Berlin Pechlin had a conversation with Radowitz which showed that Brandenburg's statements to Meyendorff at any rate did not coincide with Radowitz's views.² Radowitz passed over Pechlin's reference to them in silence. On the other hand he said that the same morning he had received the King's sanction for sending a Prussian general to the Statthalterschaft with a proposal for an armistice. Therefore he wanted Denmark to take back the proposal for an inhibitorium at Frankfurt and said that Prussia would not countenance an execution decided on at Frankfurt.

Pechlin did not feel authorized to meet Radowitz in the matter of the inhibitorium. Both Howard and Count Buol, the Austrian Minister in St. Petersburg, whom Pechlin met in Berlin, advised him incidentally to give Radowitz's proposal a kind reception. Persigny, who did not suffer from an inferiority complex, asserted that it was he who had persuaded Radowitz to put forward the proposal. On the 24th Howard wrote to Westmorland that Radowitz “has made an able Coup, the merit of which Persigny takes to himself . . .”³ Persigny himself wrote to Paris that Prussia's decision was entirely due to France or, expressed more concretely, to his own mission.⁴ He maintained that all the powers

¹ Pechlin to Reedtz 19–20/10. Holstens pacifikation.

² Pechlin to Meyendorff and to Bülow 23/10 and to Reedtz 25/10. Holstens pacifikation.

³ See also Howard's dispatches 23/10, No. 159, and 27/10, No. 171. F.O. 64/321.

⁴ Dispatch 25/10, No. 90; cf. dispatch 29/10, No. 91.

ought now to try to induce Austria to agree to Prussia's proposal. Radowitz had told him that if the Holsteiners opposed the arrangement, he would feel released from all moral considerations towards the Statthalterschaft. We are not told what that meant.

The right of calling himself the originator of the idea of sending an envoy to the Statthalterschaft does not presumably belong either to Persigny or to Radowitz himself. On the 20th of October King Friedrich Wilhelm put the proposal to Radowitz, giving as grounds considerations of statesmanship and the growing ill-will of the Tsar: something had to be done.¹ On the 22nd the King urged the proposal once more upon Radowitz in consideration of Russia's threatening attitude.² It was his wish that a general should be sent to the Statthalterschaft "lieber heut als Morgen" requesting them to cease hostilities. That would, he wrote, cheer up Tsar Nicholas at Warsaw. Presumably the King's views have not been uninfluenced by Leopold von Gerlach, who, in spite of the fact that he held different political opinions than Radowitz, had remained as the King's aide-de-camp. On the 22nd he wrote to Radowitz that if necessary the Statthalterschaft would be forced to stop the war.³

On the morning of the 24th General Hahn left with a letter to the Statthalterschaft urging them to stop the aggression.⁴ The letter stated that nearly all the German states had ratified the Peace Treaty. Prussia proposed the appointment of a commission and further bloodshed was to no purpose. The Statthalterschaft ought to declare themselves ready for a purely military armistice, and Prussia was willing to try to bring this about.

In his dispatch of the 24th to Werther, Radowitz remarked that Prussia was still waiting for an answer to her proposal for a joint commission and informed him of Hahn's mission. It was true that Hahn was objectionable to the Danes on account of his Slesvig-Holstein sympathies during the Administrative Commission (see *British Mediation*. II, p. 172). Radowitz has

¹ Radowitz, p. 327.

² *Ibid.*: p. 331.

³ *Ibid.* p. 333.

⁴ F.O. 64/325 - Radowitz, p. 334. - Radowitz's dispatch 24/10 to Bunsen. - See also Howard's letters to Cowley 28/10 and 29/10. F.O. 519/163.

no doubt known this, but, he wrote, he thought that "die entschiedene Sprache der Königlichen Regierung . . . aus seinem Munde die grösste Wirkung ausüben werde." Radowitz ended by saying that it was obvious that Prussia had only been able to take this step confidently, expecting that Denmark would meet her in the same spirit.

In Copenhagen Wynn and the Swedish and French Ministers strongly recommended Reedtz to give a conciliatory reply to Prussia's proposal.¹ At the meeting of the Council of State on the 28th it was decided to reply to Prussia's proposal for the appointment of a commission by saying that Denmark would like to see Prussia agree with Austria and the other German states in putting forward a proposal to Denmark for a final settlement.

The next day Reedtz sent Pechlin a dispatch and authorized him to give Radowitz a copy.² Reedtz expressed his appreciation of the sentiments which had given rise to the proposal, but remarked that a direct conclusion of an armistice with the Statthalterschaft might be regarded as a recognition of the Statthalterschaft and might, moreover, be used to strengthen the insurgent army. Denmark was, however, willing to agree to a short armistice (a fortnight) and General Krogh, the commander-in-chief, had been given orders to that effect. Reedtz was not able to comment on the Prussian proposal for a commission until he had heard the views of Austria and other friendly governments.

In a confidential letter written at the same time to Pechlin, Reedtz stated that Denmark dared not consider Prussia's last proposal as a sudden change in her policy in favour of Denmark.³ It was an attempt on Prussia's part to separate Frankfurt and the Holstein question and to refer it to a mixed ad hoc commission, an enforced course of conduct "by which Berlin hoped for the time being to satisfy in some measure the daily repeated demands of the Great Powers, especially those of Russia." Without rejecting the proposal we have made its ac-

¹ F.O. 22/184: 28/10, Nos. 138 and 139. – Wynn to Cowley 31/10. F.O. 519/163. – Dispatch to Persigny 1/11, No. 26. – Lagerheim's dispatches 28/10, No. 107, and 31/10, No. 108. – Sternberg's dispatch 30/10, No. 146. – Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 39 f.

² 29/10 (No. XLVI). Holstens pacifikation.

³ Holstens pacifikation.

ceptance dependent on conditions whose existence still seems uncertain. If Berlin and Vienna put forward a joint proposal, we should, of course, agree to it, though on the undertaking that the influence of the Friendly Powers on possible decisions is not precluded. We are not unwilling to let Prussia participate directly in the pacification, but we will not make sacrifices which our present position does not give us the least occasion for. Reedtz had not expressed himself so optimistically for a long time.

The attitude of the Danish Government to Radowitz's proposal came up to the expectations which Reventlow expressed on the 1st of November to Reedtz: "I hope that Radowitz's proposals have been appreciated at their 'juste valeur' by all concerned as well as by me." Drouyn de L'Huys mentioned Reventlow's (and Bielke's) scepticism in regard to Berlin's proposals once or twice in his dispatches.¹ He stated that he himself was very favourably disposed towards them and he had several conversations with Bunsen about them.² Bunsen's views on the Slesvig-Holstein question are reflected in several of Drouyn de L'Huys's statements, and he also repeated Bunsen's remark, made "with extreme violence," that Prussia would not give the Holsteiners over to "the executioner". "I would rather go myself and be killed together with them." – On the 30th Drouyn de L'Huys left London on the news of his father's death. Marescalchi, the chargé d'affaires, was left in charge at the French Legation.

It must remain undecided whether the choice of Hahn as an envoy to the Statthalterschaft was as excellent as Radowitz had asserted and as Persigny thought it was. In their reply of the 28th the Statthalterschaft definitely refused to consider a military armistice and drew up a number of quite impossible demands; for example, that during an armistice lasting a year the whole of South Slesvig should be governed jointly with Holstein by the Statthalterschaft.³ Obviously the Statthalterschaft had no idea of the trend of developments. On the 30th Radowitz therefore informed them that their answer was unsatisfactory;

¹ 28/10, No. 97, and 30/10, Nos. 98 and 99.

² See also dispatches 25/10, No. 93; 27/10, No. 95; 28/10, No. 96.

³ See e.g., "Deutsche Reform" 8/11 (Abendausgabe).

and if they did not listen to Prussia's advice, then Prussia would have to refrain from all further mediation.¹

Persigny, who talked to Radowitz the same day and was informed of the Statthalterschaft's negative attitude, expected that news would soon be received of the conclusion of an armistice; it was impossible that the Statthalterschaft would seriously oppose Prussia's advice.² At least there was no doubt, wrote Persigny, that Radowitz was extremely desirous of settling the matter.

Before I mention how the matter was ended by the decisions made at that very time by the royal participants at the meeting in Warsaw where Russia's views were decisive, we shall see what attitude London adopted to Radowitz's lead.

When Bunsen received news from Berlin that Radowitz had approached the Statthalterschaft, he was requested to inform Palmerston and ask him to induce Denmark to suspend hostilities. He wrote to Palmerston on the 28th.³ The same day he went to Broadlands and had a discussion with Palmerston in the evening or during the night. He gave a report of Palmerston's attitude to the Prussian proposal in a dispatch to Radowitz the next day.⁴ Palmerston found that the proposal was in a way commendable as it testified to Prussia's serious intention to put an end to "the present completely lawless state of affairs." But an armistice was not sufficient. By the Peace Treaty Denmark had received the right to occupy Slesvig, and Germany, thus also Holstein, should cease hostilities. Only when the whole of Slesvig had been evacuated, could there be any question of an armistice and negotiations. But Prussia had not insisted that the Statthalterschaft should do this, and before this was done, Britain could not advise Denmark to agree to the proposal. Palmerston stuck to his opinion that according to the Peace Treaty Holstein had no right to wage war on Denmark, and this was also Britain's opinion, wrote Bunsen.

The day after his late-night talks, Bunsen made another

¹ F.O. 64/325: Bunsen to Palmerston 8/11 with enclosure. – F.O.64/321: 31/10, No. 181, and 5/11, No. 187. – Radowitz, p. 338.

² Persigny's dispatch 30/10, No. 92.

³ F.O. 64/325.

⁴ Broadlands 29/10.

attempt to influence Palmerston. He was still at Broadlands and sent Palmerston a letter requesting another short talk ("a quarter of an hour") with him.¹

In his letter Bunsen emphasized the fact that Prussia's first step was the application of the 17th of October, the next that of the 23rd. The last one ought "(you said last night) to have been accompanied by a summons of the Statthaltschaft to evacuate Slesvig by withdrawing the troops behind the Eyder." But Bunsen thought that he could say to this that the proposal for the armistice and negotiations for a peaceful arrangement "does not exclude the taking into consideration of the Danish proposals for the conditions of the military armistice." Therefore he found that even you, [P.], who consider the advance of the Holstein troops into Slesvig to be in contravention of the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July, can have no objection to Prussia's proposal.

But, continued Bunsen, in disregard of logic, "is it equitable to demand *everything from Germany*, the federal action of which is now labouring under great difficulties, and *nothing from Denmark?*" By Article IV Denmark had to communicate to Germany certain plans and information, but she had communicated none. This partiality for Denmark seemed so much the more unfair as recent "most unjustifiable and *impolitic threats* of eventual violation of territory, independence and honour [article in The Times of the 24th. See above] render the task of Prussia already a very difficult one." Fortunately Prussia had acted before she knew of these threats, Bunsen explained. That remark one may dare to call a truth that had to be taken "cum grano salis."

On the 29th Russell wrote to Palmerston that Radowitz's new proposal would now have to be discussed.² It was "exactly that which I made to you a good while ago, but I suppose it will not be accepted." The same day Palmerston informed Russell that the Prussian mission to Rendsborg and Frankfurt's possible application to the Statthaltschaft seemed "to supersede the necessity of the joint and urgent representation," which had

¹ Bunsen's letter 29/10. P.P. — Copy with Bunsen's dispatch 29/10 to Radowitz. Concerning Bunsen's visit to Broadlands see also Reventlow's letter 1/11 to Reedtzt.

² P.P.

been decided upon at the Cabinet meeting on the 23rd "to induce Austria and Prussia to do these very things."¹

On the 30th Russell returned to Palmerston two new dispatches which the latter had sent him.² One of them dealt with the Prussian proposal for "a mixed commission for Holstein affairs." As this was exactly what Russell had suggested to Palmerston, he returned it to him "for your reconsideration." Russell thought that Austria ought to be requested to approve it, but Palmerston had treated it "as illusory." In the other dispatch Palmerston had repeated his "old statement that by the treaty of July 2nd the Holsteiners ought to lay down their arms." Russell wanted Palmerston to leave out this passage. But, Palmerston remarked, if this argument was left out "you leave us no ground to stand upon . . . I cannot indeed for the life of me understand how the contrary can be maintained . . . the Holsteiners and their German auxiliaries, in invading Sleswig and trying to drive the Danes out of it, are guilty of a double violation of the Treaty . . ."³

In his letter to Palmerston, Russell had in addition emphasized the fact that, when an armistice was established, Denmark ought to put forward as soon as possible "its terms for Sleswig. They must be such as Austria at least can support. — No one can depend on the King of Prussia, Radowitz or Bunsen."

On the 3rd of November when he replied to Prince Albert's enquiry (see p. 73) asking what had happened to the dispatches decided on at the Cabinet meeting on the 23rd of October, Russell said that he supposed that Palmerston "prefers suppressing the drafts." In a postscript he did, however, mention that he had just received two new drafts [those mentioned above?] from Palmerston one of which he had approved and the other he had returned.

Prince Albert was "sorry to hear that you have again difficulties with Palmerston respecting the Drafts for Germany."⁴ He trusted that Russell did not allow any communication to be sent to Vienna "which might be construed into an invitation to, or even an approval of active interference in Holstein by the

¹ Gooch. II, p. 29.

² P.P. — R.A.W. I 22/83: Russell 3/11 to Albert.

³ Gooch. II, p. 29 f.

⁴ R.A.W. I. 22/84.

Frankfurt Confederacy . . .” At the same time Prince Albert sent the translation of a letter he had received from his brother, Duke Ernst, a faithful support of Prussia.

This time Prince Albert’s views were not obligingly re-echoed.¹ Russell replied that it was not very reasonable of Prussia “to pretend to interfere by force to prevent the execution of the Treaty of July 2. Europe has a right to see it executed, and if Germany is so distracted that she cannot execute it, then England, Russia and France must see it done. Prussia ought therefore rather to agree with Austria on this subject than to thwart her.”

Russell remarked, presumably when he returned one of the drafts mentioned above to Palmerston: “I do not think I differ much from Cowley, but I am afraid I differ from you.² Cowley’s views, which Russell said that he shared on the whole, were almost certainly those contained in his dispatch of the 27th of October.³ Cowley was, of course, the British diplomat in Germany whose views agreed most closely with those of the Court. He was, moreover, a diplomat who did not hesitate to act on his own initiative.

After the exchange of ratifications at Frankfurt at which he was present (see p. 24), Cowley said during talks with Thun and Bülow that, as the representative of the mediating power, he hoped an understanding would be reached with Prussia “as to the measures to be employed for putting the provisions of the Treaty into effect.” He would not interfere in internal German matters, but this question might almost be regarded as a European one. The European powers interested in solving the question were definitely not interested in seeing the conflict between Denmark and Holstein change into a struggle between rival German powers. This might easily happen if the Federal Diet took decisive steps without previous consultation with Prussia. Cowley maintained that Radowitz definitely wanted to co-operate with the rest of Germany in order to come to an arrangement with regard to the Holstein question.

Cowley had, he wrote, a plan for concerted action ready,

¹ R.A.W. I 22/86: Russell to Albert 4/11.

² 3/11. P.P.

³ F.O. 30/141: 27/10, No. 355.

but, unfortunately neither Thun nor Bülow "shewed much consideration for what I said. They complained, with too much justice, of the previous conduct of Prussia and they evinced no inclination to consult or to act in concert with her now." Then Cowley tried another way of preventing a clash between Austria and Prussia on the question. He approached General Peucker, the Prussian Commissioner on the Federal Commission at Frankfurt, requesting him to act as an intermediary in inducing Prussia "to change its tone on the Holstein question." A serious warning from Prussia "would at once bring the Duchy to its senses," and at the moment Prussia could do this spontaneously. And was she really prepared to oppose the inhibitorium? It might force the European powers "to side with that part which shewed at least the intention of respecting and fulfilling contracted engagements."

When Peucker asked what Germany would say if Prussia surrendered Holstein, Cowley said that if Prussia took steps to restore order in Holstein, she would forestall the Federal Diet, who would then have no reason to send a federal force. Prussia ought not to consider the Revolutionary Party and, moreover, his (Cowley's) proposal only implied a cessation of hostilities. "The question of the future settlement of Sleswig still remained open for discussion."

Immediately after this Peucker received information from Berlin about the steps taken by Radowitz on the 17th and the 23rd.¹ Cowley's objections to these were that the Statthalter-schaft would continue its hostile career, if Prussia was not determined to use force. With reference to the proposal for a mixed commission he said to Bülow that it was natural that Denmark distrusted Prussia, but she ought to consider "that from the geographical position of Prussia, her future friendship must be quite as valuable to Denmark as that of Austria."

When Cowley sent off this information on the 4th of November, the decision made at the Warsaw meeting by the royal participants to the detriment of Prussia was several days old.

On the 31st Brandenburg returned to Berlin, convinced that it was necessary to give in to Russia's wishes on the Holstein question. The same day Howard wrote to Palmerston that

¹ F.O. 30/142: 4/11, No. 372.

Brandenburg had promised Meyendorff that he "would support the Inhibitorium to be issued by the Diet to the Statthalter-schaft."¹ On the 3rd of November Radowitz was dismissed. While Brandenburg was ill (he died on the 6th) Manteuffel acted as Foreign Minister and he informed St. Petersburg that Prussia would no longer prevent the execution of Article IV of the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July if Hahn's mission to Rendsborg proved unavailing.² As Berlin had still heard nothing on the 4th from Kiel, telegraphic instructions were sent the same day to Hahn to the effect that the Statthalter-schaft were to give a declaration immediately about the Prussian proposal.³ They were to give Hahn such authority that he would be able to go to the Danish headquarters and conclude an armistice. Otherwise Prussia would have to give up every attempt at mediation and Hahn was to return at once to Berlin. The instructions stated that the Holstein army was to withdraw behind the Eider. This appeal, too, proved fruitless.

Although Prussia had mobilized on the 6th, hopes were still entertained that war between Prussia and Austria could be avoided. On the 7th Howard informed Westmorland that Westmorland's friend, Le Coq, had succeeded Sydow as Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry: "He will do his utmost for Pacification." Pechlin called him a man "with strong royalist sympathies."⁴

On the 6th, complying with his promise, Brunnow informed John Russell of the result of the Warsaw Conference.⁵ Russia was, he wrote, on the Slesvig-Holstein question "prepared to acknowledge the validity of the federal measures to be adopted by the Diet of Francfort. As soon as the inhibitorium shall be published our diplomatic relations with the Diet are to be re-established. We expect that the federal measures, announced by the Inhibitorium, shall be carried into effect without resistance on the part of Prussia . . ." Otherwise Russia would have to declare

¹ F.O. 64/321: 31/10, No. 179.

² F.O. 64/321: 4/11, No. 186; cf. 10/11, Nos. 197 and 198. — Pechlin to Reedtztz 5/11. Holstens pacifikation. — Howard to Westmorland 4/11.

³ F.O. 64/325: Bunsen to P. 8/11 with enclosure.

⁴ Pechlin to Reedtztz 8/11. Holstens pacifikation.

⁵ R.A.W. I. 22/97. — Printed in Gooch, II, p. 30 f.

herself against Prussia, but he did not think that things would go so far. "Prussia will stop short." He would discuss the matter with Palmerston and emphasized the fact that Russia had done her best to induce Austria and Prussia "*to keep the peace.*" He was sure that Britain would also assist.

As Frankfurt had issued the inhibitorium to Holstein on the 25th of October with a threat of possible execution, Russia's demands for the recognition of the Federal Diet had been satisfied. On the 10th of November Gortschakoff arrived at Frankfurt "furnished with credentials as Russian Envoy to the Diet . . ."¹

While the Court, with Russell's assistance, interfered with Palmerston's dispatches demanding a cessation of the Holstein aggression, things were different when it was a question of requesting Denmark to be conciliatory towards and to grant concessions to the Slesvig-Holsteiners. In his dispatch of the 21st of October Wynn mentioned that, after the attack on Frederikstad had been beaten off, Sweden had urged Denmark to adopt conciliatory measures.² The Swedish Minister had asked him to co-operate, which, wrote Wynn, was unnecessary, as he seized every opportunity "of so expressing myself to Reedtz." As mentioned above, he also recommended – together with Lagerheim-Radowitz's proposal for an armistice.

On the 28th Palmerston answered Reventlow's note of the 16th of October in which he had put forward a request that a meeting of representatives of the signatory powers should be convened so that he might have an opportunity of explaining Denmark's critical situation. As I have already mentioned in connection with the opinions of Lord Russell (see p. 73). Palmerston still hoped that Britain's, France's and Russia's efforts to induce the German powers to put an end to Holstein aggression would be successful. But meanwhile he would be grateful for information about the plans of the Danish Government.

Reventlow could not derive pleasure from this suggestion in consideration of the split in the Danish Government regarding intentions. He gave Palmerston evasive answers, both written

¹ F.O. 30/142: 11/11, No. 388.

² F.O. 22/184: 21/10, No. 136. – Lagerheim's dispatch 11/10, No. 101.

and oral, but referred, however, to the fact that Pechlin must have given Austria satisfactory information while he was on his mission in Vienna.¹

And neither could Wynn, of course, coax any definite information out of Reedtz concerning the intentions of the Government when he approached him in compliance with the instructions in Palmerston's dispatch of the 29th of October with which was enclosed a copy of his (Palmerston's) answer to Reventlow.² Reedtz thought it would be best to wait and see if the ratifications and inhibitorium at Frankfurt had any effect before the King made another declaration; "offers of concession only emboldened their opponents." Reedtz added that his colleagues would not either agree to concessions if such concessions were not sure or likely to secure peace.

5. Prussia seeks an alliance with Britain

In a dispatch from the first half of November Cowley stated that "the struggle in Germany is one between the two great Powers alone."³ To them the questions of Holstein and Hesse-Kassel were "of very secondary importance." The real question was: Who is to govern Germany?

The dispute about the Electorate of Hesse arose from a violation of the constitution on the part of the Elector and his chief minister. Although Hesse was a member of the Prussian Union, she had sent a representative to Frankfurt. The Elector now called on Frankfurt for protection and this was promised. Prussia, who did not recognize Frankfurt, let troops advance into Kassel and made as though she would use force to prevent an intervention by the Confederation. She had taken up the same attitude in Holstein.

Owing to the attitude of the Tsar at the Warsaw meeting, Prussia promised to recognize Frankfurt's decisions concerning Holstein and Hesse, but, for the time being, she retained her

¹ Reventlow's dispatch 1/11, No. 88, and letter to Reedtz 14/11.

² F.O. 22/181: 29/10, No. 139, and F.O. 22/184: 4/11, No. 143.

³ F.O. 30/142: 11/11, No. 391.

union policy. As mentioned above, Radowitz resigned office on the 3rd of November, but retained, as we shall see, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV's confidence. When Radowitz resigned, Edward von Manteuffel, the King's aide-de-camp and a cousin to Otto von Manteuffel, wrote: "Dass der Radowitz fort ist, ist ein Glück für den König, für Preussen und für Österreich und Russland auch."¹

The adherents of union policy did not view the outcome of the Prussian Cabinet crisis in the same way. Prince Albert's brother, Ernst, wrote to him on the 4th: "Die Würfel sind gefallen. Es giebt kein Deutschland mehr und nur ein kleines gedemüthigtes Preussen . . ."² The former Prussian Prime minister, Ludolf von Camphausen, wrote to Bunsen from Cologne, also on the 4th: "Der Schlag ist gefallen. Ein grosser Staat, wehrkräftig wie keiner in Europa . . . leckt den Staub von den Füßen seiner Gegner . . ."³ Who but Palmerston was to blame for Prussia's misfortunes? continued Camphausen. He was to blame for the London Protocol, "the most deadly stab at Prussia;" he was to blame for the request to pacify Holstein, "the greatest insult to Prussia;" and the recognition of the Federal Diet [!], "Prussia's ruin," came from Palmerston. Palmerston's policy was not a peaceful, but a warlike one. Britain tolerated Russia's absolute mastery of Europe! — It was "gefundenes Fressen" for the English Court to receive, through Bunsen, such remarks about "the immoral one."

On the 2nd of November Prince Albert informed Russell that Stockmar, the adviser of the House of Coburg, had arrived in England.⁴ Russell expressed the pleasure he would have in meeting Stockmar if he came to London. Russell would return to London himself on the 6th.⁵

However, Russell cannot have derived much pleasure from the letter Stockmar sent him on the 8th in which he took over, word for word, Camphausen's statements, mentioned above, about the misfortunes for which Palmerston was to blame.⁶

¹ Meinecke, p. 496.

² R.A.W. I 22/88.

³ R.A.W. I 22/87. — Bunsen. III, p. 166.

⁴ R.A.W. I 22/82.

⁵ Ibid. I 22/83: 3/11.

⁶ Gooch. II, p. 31 f.

He realized, he wrote, that "the unfortunate Sleswig-Holstein affair has prejudiced the English mind to such a degree, that it has become totally incapable of seeing anything German or Prussian but through that medium." But he predicted that even the greatest success for the British "one-sided policy" on this question would prove to be of no significance compared with great European dangers[?]. Of all the enemies who had helped to humiliate Prussia, Britain had been the deciding influence. She ought to have taken action against Russia and Austria and at least seen to it that France remained neutral. "But our only natural friend has acted as an enemy bent upon our destruction." Britain's conduct had given all the other powers courage "to trample upon Germany."

Palmerston commented to Russell on Stockmar's letter – unheeding of the personal attacks on himself.¹ "He seems to write," remarked Palmerston, "in a towering passion because we have not followed Prussia in her thread-my-needle maze of obliquities. If she had acted justly, straightforwardly and honourably, she would not now have been exposed to the humiliation of which Stockmar complains." But Prussia had forgotten "that unscrupulous ambition can succeed only when it is accompanied by superior strength, and that Prussia has been in a minority . . ."

Russell did not answer Stockmar's letter until the 22nd.² The Germans had themselves to thank for the way things had turned out. Had they wholeheartedly advocated discarding Metternich's old system they would, no doubt, have succeeded. "But they set their wits to work and their courage to fight for a bit of conquest – to deprive the King of Denmark of Sleswig, which neither justice nor England could tolerate . . ."

In his letter Stockmar adduced Cowley's presence at the exchange of ratifications on the 26th of October as the reason for Camphausen's assertion that Britain had recognized the Frankfurt Assembly. As Cowley reported on the 4th of November, his presence was "hailed by the Austrian party as a virtual recognition of the Diet by Her Majesty's Government."³ And the Prussians were annoyed at the conclusions drawn from it. But

¹ Gooch, II, p. 33.

² Gooch, II, p. 34. – Radowitz, p. 363 f. – Copy of Russell's letter with Bunsen's dispatch 28–29/11.

³ F.O. 30/142: 4/11, No. 370.

in that connection Cowley stated that he had actually only acted as a witness to the exchange of certain ratifications (cf. p. 24).

In the draft reply to Cowley, Palmerston completely approved of Cowley's own interpretation of his presence.¹ Your signature on the protocol "was no greater acknowledgment of the Central Authority existing for the moment at Francfort" than his connection during the past two years with the successive authorities had been an acknowledgment of those authorities. "The British Government has neither denied, nor affirmed the Powers assumed by the Diet now assembled at Francfort, but has only said that in the present state of that Body with relation to the Confederation at large Her Majesty's Government cannot advise Her Majesty formally to accredit a Minister to that body."

The draft was not allowed to pass without Prince Albert's seizing the opportunity to define his views on German politics. The Queen's letter of the 11th of November to Russell² said that when the drafts stated that Cowley's relations to the new Diet were the same as those he had had since 1848 it was "a virtual recognition of that assembly. For although we did not *formally* accredit Cowley at the Court of the Vicar General" on account of its provisional character, Cowley did hand over a personal letter from the Queen to the Archduke (cf. British Mediation. I, p. 30 f). The Archduke was recognized by all Germany, as was the Federal Commission. But the present Assembly was "illegally constituted," only acknowledged by a few states, while others protested. Therefore the passage in question in the draft would have to be altered "so as not to lead to misconstruction on this point."

It must have surprised the Court, when we bear in mind its preconceived opinion of Palmerston, that he left out the passage in question without more ado and stated that the Queen's objection was certainly well founded: he had overlooked the difference between the general recognition of the Regent and the partial recognition of the present Diet.³

¹ R.A.W. I 22/109. – While The Times 2/11 asserted that Cowley's presence meant recognition, the Morning Post, which had connections with the Foreign Office, denied this (4/11). Cf. also Marescalchi's dispatch 2/11, No. 1, concerning Palmerston's statement to Koller.

² R.A.W. I 22/108.

³ R.A.W. I 22/118–119. – F.O. 30/135: 12/11, No. 220.

For the time being both Britain and France refrained from accrediting Ministers to Frankfurt and thereby taking sides in the Prussian-Austrian dispute.¹

In spite of Prussia's concessions at the Warsaw meeting concerning Holstein, and in spite of Radowitz's resignation from office, the tension between Prussia and Austria continued: tension about Hesse through which the Prussian lines of communication passed to the Rhenish provinces and about union policy. As mentioned above, Prussia mobilized on the 6th of November. While Brunnow regarded this as new evidence of Berlin's inconsistent policy,² Bunsen wrote to Stockmar: "Gottlob! Der Löwe ist erwacht!"³ He intended to approach Lord John immediately so that he could see the matter "vom richtigen Gesichtspunkte," before Palmerston spoke to him. "The right point of view," was that which Prince Albert and his brother Ernst adopted: a struggle between despotism and constitutional liberty.⁴

In her letter of the 18th to Palmerston the Queen tried to assert this point of view.⁵ She referred to the fact that Palmerston had always encouraged constitutional developments in other countries. In consequence we ought now, when "*despotism* is to be *reimposed* by Austrian arms upon Germany, to throw *our weight* into the scale of *Constitutional* Prussia and Germany." But the Queen was afraid that all the British envoys in the German states (with the exception of Cowley) were in favour of the old Federal Diet under Austrian and Russian influence. "Ought not Lord Palmerston to make his agents understand that their sentiments are at variance with those of the English Government?"

Palmerston replied by first questioning whether "rational and sound Constitutional Government is at present in danger in Germany." The danger was rather that far too democratic constitutions with universal suffrage had been introduced in

¹ Cf. Cowley's dispatch 27/10, No. 356. F.O. 30/141; 24/11, No. 409. F.O. 30/142. R.A.W. I 22/129.

² Marescalchi's dispatch 9/11, No. 6.

³ R.A.W. I 22/98.

⁴ *Ibid.*: I 22/103 and 107. — Albert's letter 10/11 printed in Jagow, p. 219 f.

⁵ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 328 f.

1848–1849.¹ Then he pointed out, and rightly so, that the conflict between Austria and Prussia could hardly be said “to have turned upon principles of Government so much as upon a struggle for political ascendancy in Germany.” In Berlin, Dresden, and Baden, Prussia had used the army to restore law and order, and as regards Hesse “the ground taken by Prussia was not so much a constitutional as a military one.” Prussia’s objection to Federal troops entering Hesse was that they might possibly become hostile, and therefore they could not be allowed to occupy a central position “in the line of military defence of Prussia.”

At the beginning of her letter to Palmerston the Queen expressed her deep regret at not having spoken to Westmorland before he returned to Berlin by way of Paris. She would like to have known: “What is the object of his seeing the President at Paris? and what are his instructions with regard to Germany?” She would have liked to have given him her own private opinion of the situation. Prince Albert had already done this to some extent in his letter to Westmorland of the previous day. In this he also regretted that he had not been informed about Westmorland’s departure.² For he had intended to give him “many Messages for the King and Prince of Prussia, and to have some conversation with you on the unhappy State of Germany.” Westmorland was to tell the King and Prince that the fact that he had not written was not due to a decrease of friendship, but ignorance as to how the cards were to be played.³

Westmorland arrived in Berlin on the 30th of November and took over his ministerial duties again.

The Queen’s question concerning the object of Westmorland’s visit to Paris can be answered by saying that the British Government naturally wanted to learn France’s attitude to the German crisis or to communicate her own. On the 18th of November Russell wrote to Palmerston: We ought to “concert our measures from time to time with the Government of France.”⁴ A few days

¹ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 329 f.

² R.A.W. I 22/132.

³ In a letter 21/11 from Paris Westmorland said that he was willing to do this and also to return to London. However, he heard from Palmerston the same day that the Queen did not want him to return. R.A.W. I 23/21.

⁴ P.P.

previously Marescalchi had asked Palmerston whether Britain had offered her services as mediator in the Prussian-Austrian dispute.¹ Palmerston replied that she had not and called it a purely German affair. Referring to Russia's rôle, he remarked jokingly: "We are pariahs whose opinion is not asked."

Already on the 5th of November Palmerston had pointed out in a dispatch to Howard that it was "out of deference towards Germany" that Britain desisted from offering to mediate between Austria and Prussia.² However, she took a keen interest in Germany's welfare and would deeply regret an armed conflict between German states: "any reasonable concessions made by either party in the spirit of peace on points on which concession is possible would be highly honourable to the Party by which such concessions were made."

In his message to the Legislative Assembly on the 12th of November the President of France also stated that France had adopted "*la plus stricte neutralité.*" The message stressed France's keen interest in the affairs of her old ally Denmark, but stated, however, that France urged the King of Denmark to ensure "the rights of the Duchies," by institutions. On the other hand France would give the King all the support he was entitled to demand by virtue of treaties and the old-established friendship between the two countries.

As late as the 18th of November Normanby stated in a dispatch from Paris that the President had given assurances of France's strict neutrality in the German dispute.³ But from the middle of October until after the middle of November Persigny had been active in Berlin devising a plan for a Three-Power intervention (Russia, Britain and France) in the German dispute. On the 19th of November he wrote to Paris about the plan, stating that the King of Prussia had requested him to bring about such an intervention.⁴ On the 25th of November Normanby stated that he had discussed Persigny's plan with La Hitte and Westmorland (the latter was still in Paris) and they found that Persigny's statements, as he did not seem to have talked to the

¹ Dispatch 14/11, No. 10.

² F.O. 64/312: 5/11, No. 56.

³ F.O. 27/876: 18/11, No. 373.

⁴ Dispatch 19/11, No. 103. — The King denied this in a conversation with Lefebvre, the French Minister, in January 1851. Dispatch 6/1, No. 6.

Prussian Cabinet, could not be regarded as constituting an invitation to intervene.¹ "Subsequent events have shewn," wrote Normanby, "that there was no settled purpose conveyed in the King of Prussia's words."

Nevertheless Drouyn de L'Huys, who had arrived back in London about the 1st of December, received instructions to suggest the above-mentioned Three-Power intervention to Palmerston.² Drouyn de L'Huys, who retained a lively recollection of the abortive French plan for intervention in the Danish-German conflict, did not, however, want to insist on his Government's plan in the face of Palmerston's cold or unresponsive attitude. The Olmütz agreements (see below) did in fact make the plan unnecessary. Palmerston contented himself with the fact that Russia had taken charge of the decision when Brunnow assured him that his country had not the slightest intention of dismembering Prussia.³

In spite of his rejection of the Court's attempt to present the Prussian-Austrian struggle for power as an ideological conflict, Palmerston used Austria's intervention in Hesse and the possibility of an overthrow of its constitution as a further argument for not accrediting a Minister to the Frankfurt Assembly.⁴ About the middle of the month Koller had informed Palmerston of the "reestablishment" of the Federal Diet and had at the same time renewed "in a very earnest manner the request which he had on several previous occasions made by order of his Government:" that Britain should accredit a Minister. But, as Palmerston wrote to Magenis on the 18th, he told Koller that, apart from the fact that the same reasons as before still existed for not accrediting a Minister, a new reason had been added: uncertainty as to the course Frankfurt intended to follow in regard to "constitutional Government in Hesse." As Palmerston assured Russell, that statement in no way bound Britain "to acknowledge the Diet,

¹ F.O. 27/876: 25/11, No. 379; cf. 28/11, No. 389.

² Dispatches 2/12, No. 101, and 7/12, No. 107.

³ Dispatch 1/12, No. 100, fra Drouyn de L'Huys. — In dispatch 16/12, No. 457, F.O. 97/348, Palmerston mentioned his conversations with Brunnow about the crisis and emphasized that he had never said anything "which would imply that the British Government could look upon a dismemberment of the Prussian Monarchy with indifference." This agrees with Otto von Plessen's account in dispatch 26/11, No. 67, of the dispatch from Brunnow to Nesselrode.

⁴ F.O. 7/378: 18/11, No. 110, and 19/11, No. 111. — R.A.W. I 22/129–130 and I 23/4–6.

upon the Diet's announcing proper intentions in regard to Hesse; it only says that the silence of the Diet on that point" would be a further hindrance.

After Prussia had mobilized, King Friedrich Wilhelm decided to send Radowitz to Britain to secure an alliance in the event of war.¹ The King's most important reason for expecting that such an alliance could be made was, of course, his knowledge of the Court's pro-Prussian sympathies.

On the 24th of November Radowitz arrived in London.² How misinterpreted his mission was is evident, for instance, from Lagerheim's statement in his dispatch of the 2nd of December. He declared that Radowitz's journey to London must be regarded as a sure sign of Prussia's "pacific feelings."³ Radowitz brought with him the letter from the King proposing the alliance. On the 26th Prince Albert sent it to Russell and wrote that he could show it to Palmerston, which he assumed Russell would want to do.⁴ The Queen and he had invited Radowitz to Windsor. "My advice is rendered easy," he wrote, "by the last dispatch to Mr. Howard, which the Queen has sanctioned this morning . . ."

The dispatch was provoked by rumours in German democratic circles that Britain would support Prussia in the event of war with Austria.⁵ Howard was instructed to deny such rumours in very definite terms: England had "held out to no Party in Germany any hopes and expectations of support against any other Party in the event of war. To have done so would have been to have encouraged and excited war." Britain only endeavoured to preserve peace and if war, nevertheless, broke out, "no Party in Germany has the slightest authority for predicting" the course Britain would adopt.

When Russell sent Palmerston the letter from King Friedrich Wilhelm, he remarked that he had told Prince Albert "that he cannot be too cautious in his reply, and that the only sage course

¹ Meinecke, p. 504. — Radowitz, p. 354 ff.

² Bunsen's dispatch 25/11, No. 46, to the King.

³ Dispatch 2/12, No. 118.

⁴ R.A.W. I 23/33.

⁵ F.O. 64/312: 26/11, No. 68. — R.A.W. I 23/42–43. — In his dispatch 1/12, No. 111, Cintrat informed Paris of the contents of the dispatch.

is to say that questions of Politic alliance can only be treated between the two Governments.”¹ Palmerston was also of this opinion and, moreover, found that the Slesvig question was now referred to settlement by “Pen and Paper instead of Powder and Ball.”² Furthermore, he made some remarks on the circumstances which might cause Britain to take part in a war, if the occasion should arise.

For once Palmerston’s remarks found relative favour in the eyes of Prince Albert. They were, he wrote to Russell, “better than what I have seen of his of late.”³ He would, of course, give Friedrich Wilhelm “the answer now advised by you and Lord Palmerston.” Furthermore, he would advise the King “to avoid exposing himself to an official refusal of a demand, which under present circumstances would have so little chance of being acceded to.” Considering the zeal he displayed in interfering in foreign politics, his next remarks in the letter are almost self-effacing: “Great Alliances now a day are not made according to the mere wishes of particular Cabinets with regard to mere eventualities, but result from political facts and the bearing of these upon the interests of the different Nations. This is in fact the ruling idea of Lord Palmerston’s letter also.”

On the 26th Russell had long talks with Bunsen and Radowitz, whose conversations he found “very interesting.”⁴ Radowitz suggested that Britain should “transfer a proposal” to Vienna. But Russell thought that Prussia ought not to prevent the Austrians from restoring law and order in Holstein.

He gave detailed reasons for this statement in a letter the next day to Bunsen.⁵ He did not touch on “the general concerns of Germany,” but kept to the matter in which Britain was especially interested: the Slesvig-Holstein question. Britain was especially interested “not only on account of our old relations with Denmark, and our desire for the Welfare of Germany,” but because both parties had asked Britain to mediate and Britain’s Minister in Berlin had signed the Peace Treaty of the 2nd of July. By Article

¹ 26/11. P.P.

² R.A.W. I 23/46-47.

³ Ibid.: I 23/41.

⁴ Ibid.: I 23/39: Russell to Albert 27/11. – Bunsen’s dispatch 27/11, No. 47 to the King and 28/11.

⁵ R.A.W. I 23/40.

IV of the Treaty, the King of Denmark had applied to "the Diet at Frankfort professing to represent the German Confederation, to reestablish the exercise of his legitimate authority in Holstein." Frankfurt had then decided to send troops to Holstein to carry this into effect.

Russell did not think that the question whether the Frankfurt Assembly represented the Federal Diet or not was all-important. The Assembly consisted of German states, had ratified the Treaty which Prussia had concluded, and declared that it was prepared to meet its engagements. It would not be fair to the King of Denmark if it was prevented in doing this, because it did not represent all Germany, who had bound herself to re-establish his legitimate authority. "Nearly five Months have now elapsed since the Treaty was signed. The King of Denmark has with difficulty maintained his position in his own Dominions at great Cost, and with much bloodshed against attacks directed from Holstein." How could it be fair or humane to pretend "that more time must elapse, that fresh expences must be incurred, that more blood must flow," because the German Confederation had not yet found the form for its future organ?

Whoever deserved most blame: Prussia or Austria, it was certain that, according to the Treaty, Germany had certain engagements and that eleven German states were willing to meet these. Who had the right to prevent them? It was true that the King of Denmark was bound by the Treaty to announce "his intentions with respect to the pacification of the Country," but he might possibly have done that already to Frankfurt – or would doubtless do so if that were the only hindrance.

Referring to the objection that it would be dangerous for Prussia – in case war broke out with Austria – to allow an Austrian army to march through Germany to Holstein, Russell remarked that, as Prussia herself would not put an end to the Holstein aggression, she would have to allow other German powers to do so. "If she has bound herself to the end, she is bound to allow the means which are conducive to that end."

Then Russell referred to the statement made by the Tsar at the meeting in Warsaw where he had declared that, even if he would desist from intervening in respect to Hesse, "he felt no doubt or difficulty in respect to Holstein." If Prussia opposed

the march of Federal troops to Holstein, he would consider it as a *casus belli* between Russia and Prussia. To run the risk of "such hostility on the part of a Russian Army – prepared – warlike – numerous – in order to avoid the danger of the march of 30,000 Austrians to fulfil a Prussian treaty, would be an act of madness." Russell could not imagine a Berlin Cabinet which would be guilty of an "Act of extreme folly, in order to maintain a policy of doubtful morality." And as Prussia ought not to act in such a way herself, she ought far less to "support Brunswick or any other small state in such a course of conduct."

Finally Russell said that an application had been made to Britain "to interpose in this matter as Mediators and as Friends." Therefore he had not hesitated to make a statement. As regards other questions which Prussia was negotiating about with Austria, he refrained from giving his opinion. It was his earnest hope "that they may terminate honourably for all Parties, and without interruption of the Peace in Europe."

Bunsen did not refrain from writing another long letter to Russell in defence of Prussia's policy.¹ That would have been asking too much of him. There is no reason to go into detail here about his sophistic exposition. Palmerston called Russell's letter "multum in parvo," but Bunsen's "parvum in multo, unless indeed with reference to sophistry and misrepresentation in which it abounds."²

I shall mention only two things in Bunsen's letter. Thus he remarked that he had said both to Russell and Palmerston that the very most he could think of agreeing to was that, during the present state of the Federal constitution in Germany, Denmark might be allowed "to take the offensive, and enter into Holstein without thereby committing a breach of the Peace with Germany." In consideration of the fact that since the Battle of Isted Germany had supported the rearmament of the Holstein army, this concession could hardly be called a very valuable one.

Bunsen definitely rejected the proposal of allowing the Federal troops to march through to Holstein. He referred to the fact that Prussia suggested "free conferences" to discuss the future con-

¹ R.A.W. I. 23/50: 29/11. The date (29/11) on the copy is a mistake for 28/11. This is evident both from the letter itself and from the fact that 28/11 corresponds with the date on the copy enclosed with Bunsen's dispatch 28/11.

² Gooch. II, p. 37 f.

stitution of Germany. It should be possible to open these conferences on the 1st of December, and before the 8th a decision could be made respecting "the mode of a regular joint execution of the 4th Art." If Britain would ensure in an effective way that the Peace Treaty was carried into effect, she only needed to suggest "such a peremptory term for the opening of the Conferences, and for the resolution respecting Schleswig, as she thinks required by the threatening complications of European Politics." But if Austria rejected Prussia's proposal for free conferences, it would be "suicidal madness" on the part of the Prussian Government to allow troops to march through. Britain, as a just and impartial mediator, would never require Prussia to do that, "when an unobjectionable or rather, *the* legal mode is awaiting only your proposal to be adopted and executed, as far at least as Prussia is concerned."

The Queen received Russell in audience on the 28th.¹ On the 30th he wrote to Palmerston that she was "evidently anxious that we should make some fair propositions of accommodation to the two Parties."² He was, however, afraid that Austria would not listen to Britain, and Prussia "has put herself out of count by her concessions." As a new instance of the old truth that it is best to follow the line of least resistance, he was of the opinion that Denmark ought to be pressed to give a declaration of her intentions: "She has not complied with the Terms of the Treaty, and has shewn great discourtesy to us."

Acting on Russell's and Palmerston's statements, Prince Albert answered King Friedrich Wilhelm by stating that discussion of a possible alliance would have to take place through the respective Governments.³ Prince Albert sent Russell and Palmerston an English translation of his letter, and there were one or two phrases which they would have liked changed.⁴ Thus they were anxious that the word "assistance" in the letter might arouse expectations "that might not be realized." Prince Albert told them that the words in the German original were "Hülffreiche Sympathien," i.e. "sympathies which will assist

¹ R.A.W. I 23/39. Queen Victoria's Journal.

² P.P.

³ R.A.W. I 23/55: 1/12. — Printed in Radowitz, p. 368 ff. and Jagow, p. 220 ff.

⁴ Ibid.: I 23/59–61. — Russell to P. 2/12. P.P.

you as far as they go." It is a matter of doubt whether that made the meaning clearer.

Radowitz's own report to his King was to the effect that, in the event of war between Austria and Prussia, Britain wanted to see Prussia as the victor, but that she would adopt strict neutrality.¹ If Russia took part in the war, Britain would intervene actively on behalf of Prussia, but would not enter into binding engagements beforehand. Radowitz believed that Britain would support Prussia at any European congress that might be held, provided that a solution had been found to the Slesvig question.

In his dispatch of the 29th of November Bunsen made it clear that, during the present crisis, Britain would remain neutral; the thought of an alliance with Prussia was foreign to her nature. Bunsen was of the opinion that, even if she had wanted to, the Queen could not have found a Cabinet more in favour of such an alliance than the present one. As long as the Slesvig problem was not solved, no change in Britain's policy could be expected.

When confronted with an Austrian ultimatum at the end of November with regard to the march of Federal troops to Kassel, Prussia yielded and, by negotiations between Manteuffel and Schwarzenberg at Olmütz, the agreement of the 29th of November was reached. On the 2nd of December Russell was able to write and tell Prince Albert that everything pointed to peace.² He would leave Bunsen's letter unanswered. "A very little goodwill between Austria and Prussia will settle the Holstein question better than any argument." The next day Palmerston communicated to Bunsen the arrangement made between Manteuffel and Schwarzenberg, in case he had not heard from Berlin. "You will be glad to hear [!]," wrote Palmerston.³

Article I of the Olmütz Punctuations stated that the final arrangement of the Holstein question was to be made by the joint decision of all German Governments. Article 3 b stated further that, without prejudice for this final arrangement, Austria and Prussia jointly and in agreement with their allies would

¹ Meinecke, p. 507; cf. p. 506. – Radowitz, p. 364 ff. and 371 f.

² R.A.W. I 23/62.

³ The letter is to be found among Bunsen's Papers at Merseburg.

send commissioners to Holstein. These commissioners were to demand, in the name of the Confederation and under threat of execution, that the Statthalterschaft should cease hostilities, withdraw their troops behind the Eider and reduce their army to a third. The commissioners would try to get Denmark not to keep more troops in Slesvig than were necessary to maintain law and order. Regarding the question of the German Constitution, it was decided that a Conference of Ministers would be opened in December at Dresden on the invitation of both states.

Drouyn de L'Huys thought that it seemed that the Convention of Olmütz was partly entered into at the expense of Denmark.¹ He found it doubtful whether the declarations made by France, Russia, and Britain that the Slesvig question was of special interest for them would be able to keep Germany's "mauvaise volonté" in check. In a memoir from December, presumably written by Pechlin, it was pointed out that the decisions now made by Austria and Prussia were much less favourable for Denmark than Radowitz's proposal in October.²

While Westmorland was able to report from Berlin that King Friedrich Wilhelm was overjoyed at the arrangement made at Olmütz,³ Radowitz, Bunsen, Stockmar and the English Court were greatly disappointed and embittered. On the 3rd Radowitz wrote to Prince Albert: God grant that, in order to avoid momentary dangers, we have not created much greater ones in a perhaps near future."⁴ And in a letter of the 8th to Stockmar, Prince Albert commented on the Convention of Olmütz: "Bitte, theilen Sie diese Zeilen Bunsen mit und rathen Sie ihm sackcloth anzuziehen und sein Haupt mit Asche zu bestreuen, dass er einem *solchen* Herrn dient . . ."⁵ And on the 14th he wrote to his Uncle Leopold: Nicholas is now the ruler of Germany, and both at Dresden and at Olmütz Germany is to be executed as in 1815.⁶ In a long letter of the 29th to Prince Wilhelm, Prince Albert expressed similar sentiments.⁷

¹ Dispatch 12/12, No. 111.

² Memoir 20/12. Holstens pacifikation.

³ F.O. 64/322: 3/12, No. 267. — R.A.W. I 23/72: Westmorland to Albert 3/12.

⁴ R.A.W. I 23/68.

⁵ Ibid.: I 23/83.

⁶ Ibid.: I 23/94.

⁷ Jagow, p. 225 ff.

When King Leopold of the Belgians in letters to Russell and Queen Victoria expressed his satisfaction that the crisis was over, the Queen deplored such a point of view.¹ She explained to her uncle that Palmerston was to blame for things not going the way she wanted.² Fortunately Stockmar was "well, and always of the greatest comfort and use to us. His judgment is so sound, so unbiassed and so dispassionate." This was another way of characterizing Stockmar, very unlike Palmerston's "towering passion."

Not many days passed before the Queen had another opportunity of venting her anger on Palmerston. The opportunity came when the question arose as to whether Britain should send an observer to the Dresden Conferences, which were to open on the 23rd of December. Britain had a Minister at the Court of Saxony, F. Reginald Forbes, but it would be reasonable enough to send an additional observer, a specialist in the Danish-German conflict.

Cowley seems to have offered his services, but to have had them declined by Palmerston. On the 11th of December Mellish, who was on friendly terms with Cowley, sent a letter from Palmerston on to Cowley.³ Mellish had been shown the letter and he remarked that he entirely agree with Palmerston's view of conditions in Germany: "I am not one of those that expect any good result from the Dresden Conferences. The question is one of supremacy and a fight there will be." Forbes had been instructed to report "what he hears but not to express an opinion one way or the other."

If an extra observer were to be sent to Dresden, it would be reasonable to think of Westmorland. Palmerston put forward his name and Russell approved of the suggestion on the 9th of December.⁴ However, he would have to be given instructions, wrote Russell, as he was "so very Austrian." As regards Holstein the instructions were to state that Article IV was to be carried into effect: a declaration from Denmark, the country's subjection and pacification.

On the 12th the Queen protested in strong terms against

¹ R.A.W. I 23/79. — Gooch. II, p. 38 ff.

² The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, pp. 333 and 335.

³ F.O. 519/163.

⁴ P.P.

Westmorland's being sent.¹ He was not only, as Russell had admitted to her, "very hostile to Prussia, he is acknowledged by everybody who knows him to be perfectly incapable of understanding any complicated question [the Slesvig-Holstein one?] and open to be imposed upon." On the other hand Cowley's impartiality [pro-Prussian sympathies?] and good sense were generally acknowledged. She was very much against sending Westmorland: it would be better to send no one than a person who was "calculated to do so much harm there and to do us so little credit" and prevent our receiving accurate and unbiased information.

Two days later the Queen suggested sending John Ward, the British Consul in Leipzig, whose dispatches in her opinion showed "cleverness, impartiality and application."² Ward had, as mentioned in *British Mediation*. II. p. 134, strong Slesvig-Holstein sympathies. The Queen did not understand Russell's seeming indifference in the matter, for she was, except for Lord Cowley's reports, "miserably informed about German Affairs."

Russell then wanted to know whether Palmerston had any objections to sending Ward.³ In his reply Palmerston first remarked that Britain would not be able to exert any influence at the Dresden Conferences.⁴ Then, naturally enough, he defended Westmorland: who had, he said, at the very difficult Danish-German negotiations "conducted himself with ability, judgement and success. I say this with the more confidence, because the Mediation began here, and I had some experience, by my own negotiations with Bunsen and Reventlow, of the extreme difficulty of bringing two unreasonable parties to a common agreement upon anything." Palmerston stated, however, that he was prepared to send Ward to Dresden to assist Forbes when the Conferences began, but, he said, Ward's rank would not give him much access to the participants at the Conferences.

Russell tried once again to put in a good word for Westmorland with the Queen, but to no avail.⁵ She was "very angry"

¹ R.A.W. I 23/91.

² R.A.W. I 23/93.

³ 16/12. P.P.

⁴ R.A.W. I 23/100; cf. I 23/99.

⁵ Russell to P. 20/12. P.P.

that Cowley had not been sent and finally Russell had to inform Palmerston that he could not approve of sending Westmorland. But, he added, if he is not to be sent and Forbes "does not meddle, our hands will be quite free, and that is far the best, as the twilight is very obscure." A few days later he wrote to Palmerston that it was very natural that the Queen "should take a great interest in Germany, and be more solicitous for its welfare than any other person who is not entirely German."¹

Already on the 17th of December Palmerston had informed Forbes that he had the same day instructed Ward to go from Leipzig to Dresden to assist him at the Conferences there in obtaining information "as to what passes and as to the prevalent opinion on matters that will be there discussed."² At the beginning of the month Palmerston had sent Westmorland and Magenis a dispatch pointing out that Austria's desire to have her non-German possessions admitted to the Confederation had to be regarded as a European affair. Forbes communicated this dispatch to Beust, the Prime Minister of Saxony, who expressed his pleasure that Britain would keep a check on Austria and Prussia, a view which Forbes in his report of the matter obviously shared.³ But Palmerston told him that the dispatch was to the effect that he was "to ask for information without expressing intentions, and you should be careful never to overstate the purport of a Despatch from Your Government."⁴

In his book "Experiences of a Diplomatist . . ." (1872), p. 104 f., John Ward says that "Britain merely desired to know what was passing, and did not seek to exercise any influence over the proceedings." Ward's dispatches on the Dresden Conferences do not show any signs of this, either. As is well known, the Conferences ended unsuccessfully on the 15th of May with the re-establishment of the old Federal Diet to which the states previously unrepresented would now send representatives. At the end of April, Schwarzenberg wrote to Prokesch von Osten, the Austrian Minister in Berlin, that he certainly was not an admirer of the old Federal Constitution, either.⁵ But if the negotia-

¹ 24/12. P.P.

² F.O. 68/75: 17/12. - F.O. 68/77: 17/12.

³ F.O. 67/76: 16/12, No. 79.

⁴ F.O. 68/75: 31/12, No. 36.

⁵ Osten, p. 209.

tions did not lead to anything, "so bleibt es beim alten, weil ein fadenscheiniger, zerrissener Rock immer noch besser ist, als gar keiner."

As mentioned above, it was also Russell's opinion that Britain ought not to meddle in the German disputes – and particularly not after the Convention of Olmütz. In a dispatch of the 4th of January 1851 Bunsen wrote that Britain pursued a policy of wait-and-see, especially with regard to German affairs. Prussia had not, Bunsen pointed out, abandoned her plans, but she now had Austria, Russia and France against her, and on account of Britain's complete apathy she had become absolutely isolated.

Although Radowitz "has been doing his best at Windsor," as Mellish remarked in his letter to Cowley of the 11th December mentioned above, the political results of his mission were of no importance. Mellish thought that his "reception generally has . . . been of the coolest." However, when Radowitz left London (the 12th of January) Bunsen stated that he had been received in the most appreciative and flattering way during the whole of his visit.¹ Thus the Queen had singled him out for special distinction and asked Bunsen to tell the King what a pleasure it had been for her to meet Radowitz. Bunsen stated that he himself had been singled out for distinction by being invited to stay at Windsor for a longer time at New Year than any of the other foreign envoys.²

Radowitz does not appear to have conducted political negotiations with Palmerston. Palmerston invited him once to dinner together with Bunsen and Drouyn de L'Huys.³ I shall not investigate here how much benefit Radowitz derived from his inspection of the British Artillery – the official reason for his visit.

In a conversation with Ward later, in March 1852, Radowitz gave his own impression of his visit to England.⁴ He "lamented that neither the English government nor the people had shewn any sympathy with the German cause, and that we did not seem

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 11/1, No. 2.

² Dispatch 4/1, No. 1.

³ Drouyn de L'Huys's dispatch 5/12, No. 105. – A. H. Johnson; *The Letters of Charles Greville and Henry Reeve 1836–1865*, p. 199.

⁴ Ward: *Experiences of a Diplomatist*, p. 119.

to set much value upon an alliance with a free and united Germany . . ." He had been very disappointed that Britain had not supported his policy "by declaring against any intervention of Russia in German affairs." He did not understand why Palmerston was so biased in favour of a French "alliance." But, he added; "The consort of your Queen . . . is a man of great sagacity; there is no one upon whose political judgment she may more safely rely."

6. Federal Execution in Holstein. British Pressure on Denmark. Sponeck's draft for the organization of the Danish Monarchy

As provided in the Convention of Olmütz, Prussia and Austria had each to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of carrying out the pacification of Holstein. On the 19th of December Westmorland was able to state from Berlin that the Prussian Government had already appointed their representative, General Wilhelm Hermann Heinrich von Thümen, but that the Austrian Commissioner had not yet been appointed.¹ He hoped that the delay would not give the Holstein army an opportunity of attacking the Danish lines, which it continually threatened to do. Manteuffel had told him that the Statthalterschaft still refused to listen to his warnings about resuming hostilities.

The order issued on the 9th of November in connection with the Prussian mobilization on the 6th was of greater significance than these warnings. In accordance with this order, those living abroad and liable for service in the reserve and the militia were to report before the 15th of December to their respective detachments. Berlin did not send the Statthalterschaft a letter drawing special attention to this until the 27th of November. On the 4th of December Berlin could inform its Minister in Copenhagen that a considerable number of Prussians who had been called up had already left Holstein.²

¹ F.O. 64/322: 19/12, No. 289. — In his dispatch 18/12, No. 117, Cintrat calls him "un homme d'un caractère ferme, droit et décidé. Il convient très bien à la commission dont il est chargé."

² Copy in the file Holstens pacifikation. Cf. F.O. 64/322: 3/12, No. 268.

Although Willisen, who was opposed to a Holstein offensive, had been succeeded as Commander-in-Chief on the 7th of November by von der Horst, no fresh attacks took place against the Danish positions. The mild, damp weather during the last few weeks of the year was not suitable for offensive action.¹ Thus on the 28th of December Hodges stated in a letter to Westmorland: "I think it totally impossible for the Holsteiners to venture an attack until a frost sets in, although I fully admit their anxiety to cause as much confusion and mischief as they can." He found their threat of seizing Hamburg ridiculous. At the beginning of January, H. Sieveking, Prussia's confidential agent in Holstein, wrote to Bunsen: "Aus den grossen Siegen, die ich Ihnen von hier aus zu beschreiben hoffte, ist nichts geworden."²

Count Alexander Mensdorff-Pouilly, who was nearly forty years old, was appointed Austrian Commissioner. He was related to the British royal family, his mother being an aunt of Queen Victoria's. Sieveking described him as "ein schmucker Cavalier, blutjung."³

The instructions for both Commissioners were dated the 30th of December and were, as Schwarzenberg wrote on the 1st of January to Vrints, the result of discussions in Berlin with Mantuffel.⁴ He sent Vrints a copy of Mensdorff's instructions stating that he assumed that Thümen's were identical. This was in fact the case.⁵ The Commissioners' task was, of course, stated in the Frankfurt Resolution of the 25th of October and in Article 3 b of the Olmütz Punctuations.

The instructions were to the effect that, in order to make it easier for the Statthalterschaft to meet their wishes, the Commissioners were authorized to state that Denmark, out of consideration for the two German great powers, was willing to withdraw her troops from South Slesvig at the same time as the Holstein army was reduced, so that only the troops necessary

¹ Aktenstücke zur neuesten Schleswig-Holsteinischen Geschichte. Erstes Heft (1851), p. 8. — Otto Fock: Schleswig-Holsteinische Erinnerungen (1863), p. 349.

² R.A.W. I 24/8 4/1.

³ Ibid.: I 24/13: 7/1.

⁴ Copy of dispatch in Holstens pacifikation. — F.O. 97/120: 2/1, No. 5.

⁵ Copies of both sets of instructions are to be found in Holstens pacifikation. In Westmorland's dispatch 2/1 (see previous note) there is a translation of Thümen's instructions.

for maintaining order were to be left behind. This Danish "promise" is repeated in a somewhat extended form in the proclamation to the Holsteiners sent to the Commissioners.

The administration of the country was to consist of the two Commissioners, together with a Danish Commissioner. It was a question of restoring a state of law and order "which permits the Confederation to maintain the Rights of the Duchy, and the authorized relations, established by ancient usage, between Holstein and Sleswig." The proclamation stated that only if they submitted to their Sovereign would the Confederation be enabled "to secure and inviolably to maintain your rights and Interests." These would be the subject matter of negotiations between the Confederation and the Sovereign.

In his first dispatch in the New Year, written on the 3rd of January, Hodges stated that, in his opinion, the Statthalterschaft would yield to the Commissioners' demands.¹ But, taking the long view, he added that it would take years "to restore order and tranquillity, and allay the deep-rooted animosities that have been excited amongst the different parties in the Duchies." He drew attention to the fact that, when he was in Copenhagen the previous summer, he had tried to influence both the King and the Cabinet to abandon the plan for total separation between Slesvig and Holstein. Considering the very definite hostile attitude towards a Danish administration existing among a considerable number of the inhabitants, "it can only be by a forgiving and mild policy, that Denmark can ever hope to establish authority over them, with any prospect of their happiness or national benefit, or credit to herself."

At the beginning of January the Commissioners arrived at Hamburg, left on the 6th for Kiel and handed over their demands to the Statthalterschaft with a request for an answer within three days.² The time-limit was extended to the 11th and the Holsteiners yielded. Beseler left the Statthalterschaft and, for the time being, Reventlou-Preetz continued the administration until a new Government was formed on the 2nd of February under the leadership of Adolf Blome to carry on the administration

¹ F.O. 97/120: 3/1, No. 1.

² Cf. regarding this and the following see Krigen 1848-50, III, p. 1446 ff., Thorsoe. II, p. 99 f. and Aktenstücke. I, p. 9 ff.

under the supervision of the King's Commissioner and the Federal Commissioners. On the 11th of January Reventlou had issued two proclamations (to the population and to the army) which sugared over the Statthalterschaft's compliant attitude by a partial misinterpretation of the Commissioners' instructions and by professed Danish concessions. "... more injudicious documents could not have been issued than these two Proclamations with no allusion whatever to their legitimate Sovereign" Hodges wrote to Westmorland.¹ The Danish Government were not satisfied with the Commissioners' proclamation, either. Wynn thought that they could thank themselves for that, as a Danish Plenipotentiary had not been sent in time to the Dresden Conferences.²

Count Reventlow-Criminil was appointed Danish Commissioner, an appointment which must have pleased the German powers and loyal Slesvig-Holsteiners. Hodges had a long conversation with Criminil after he arrived and asked him what impression he had received of his two fellow Commissioners.³ He said that Mensdorff was "exceedingly well-disposed although not well versed in the pending question," while Thümen seemed "quite *au fait* at the question, by no means pliable, or disposed to yield, as I had reason to expect that he would be." Reventlow-Criminil was afraid that the Prussian double-dealing would continue and that Thümen received instructions "from a Higher Power, differing from those which he may have received from Manteuffel." A few days later Hodges reported again that Criminil was dissatisfied with his fellow Commissioners and that Mensdorff complied completely with the Prussian Commissioner's wishes and endeavoured to please the Slesvig-Holsteiners.⁴

On the 29th of January Austrian troops entered Hamburg. At the beginning of February they occupied Altona and – together with Prussian troops – the fortress of Rendsborg, whose northern part, the Kronværk, which lay on Slesvig soil, was placed in the hands of Danish troops. Frederiksort, which was also in Slesvig, but which had been occupied by the Rebels, was handed over

¹ Letter after 11/1. Date indistinct.

² F.O. 97/110: 8/1, No. 3. – Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 112.

³ F.O. 97/110: 13/1, No. 8. – Hodges to Westmorland after 11/1 and 14/1.

⁴ F.O. 97/120: 15/1, No. 12.

to the Danish army. As Bligh, the British Minister in Hanover, pointed out, it was the first time since the Thirty Years' War that Austrian troops had been seen so far north.¹

In his dispatch of the 19th of December, mentioned above, Westmorland stated that he had said to Bielke, the Danish chargé d'affaires, that Denmark could trust Manteuffel's Government and so "every concession his Government was able to make should be now announced." Manteuffel had admitted to Bielke that there were several things in the policy pursued so far by Prussia towards Denmark that he might have wished undone.²

The concessions which Britain tried to persuade Denmark should, of course (cf. Hodges's above-mentioned statement), be concessions to the Slesvig-Holstein point of view.

While the great majority of the Danish Government was unwilling to agree to these concessions, Reedtz and his friends took up a favourable attitude, which may have been due to a conviction that such concessions were justified or to the view that they were necessary before the conflict could be solved. Towards the end of 1850 views were so conflicting in the Cabinet that it was on the point of splitting up.

In a dispatch from the middle of November Wynn stated that both Pechlin and Criminil – neither of them members of the Government, but both considered to be indispensable in the conduct of Foreign Affairs – were of the opinion that conditions in the Duchies would have to be "as nearly as possible to the *status quo ante*."³ Wynn wrote that Criminil suggested that the various authorities in the Duchies should "separately refer to a joint Holstein and Sleswig administration or board at Copenhagen."

After the Convention of Olmütz Wynn stated on the 11th of December that he had taken the opportunity of "expressing in still stronger terms, if possible, than I have hitherto done, the necessity of being prepared with a distinct and conciliatory Declaration" regarding the King's intentions concerning Holstein

¹ F.O. 97/120: 19/1, No. 7.

² Bielke's letter 21/12 50 to Quaade filed (incorrectly) with Reventlow's letter to Reedtz 18/12.

³ F.O. 22/184: 18/11, No. 148.

and *Sleswig* (underlined by Wynn).¹ It was the only means which could bring about a quick and lasting settlement of the affair. He had told Reedtz that such a declaration ought to be drawn up in such a way "as rather to establish, than put in doubt the Independence of Sleswig." Otherwise those who wanted to "stand up for the supposed rights of Sleswig" would be strengthened.

The next day Wynn mentioned that Pechlin was the obvious person to be sent as negotiator to the forthcoming Dresden Conferences.² But Pechlin was, Wynn wrote, very dissatisfied with the majority of the Cabinet and was not prepared to undertake any negotiations "with his hands as much tied up as they were at Berlin." Wynn thought that Pechlin and Reedtz were in agreement and that Reedtz's chief opponent was Sponneck. With the present composition of the Cabinet, Pechlin did not believe in any lasting arrangement. And a reconstruction of the Cabinet, wrote Wynn, was difficult "with a Sovereign who is a complete Cypher – and a President, who tho' endowed with many good qualities and patriotic feelings, is not much more efficient." It was no wonder that Wynn marked his dispatch "confidential."

On the 17th (a Tuesday) Wynn stated that the Austrian and Prussian Ministers had requested the King, as Duke of Holstein, to send a representative to the Dresden Conferences.³ Pechlin was here last week, he wrote, and took part in a long discussion, but returned to Roskilde, where he had taken up residence. Unwillingness to make a declaration at Dresden regarding Slesvig, continued Wynn, was increased by information received from Bülow to the effect that Gortschakoff had been authorized by the Tsar to inform Count Thun that the Tsar could not advise the King of Denmark to consider himself bound by the Federal Resolution of 1846 "or to allow any *German* Interference with Sleswig."⁴ Wynn was sorry about this information as it interfered with his plan mentioned in his dispatch of the 18th of November, a plan "which I am sure

¹ F.O. 22/184: 11/12, No. 158.

² F.O. 22/184: 12/12, No. 159.

³ F.O. 22/184: 17/12, No. 160. – Cf. Wynn to Westmorland 15/12.

⁴ Bülow's dispatch 5/12. – Cf. Lagerheim's dispatch 15/12, No. 123. – As it appears from Sternberg's dispatches 16/2, No. 28, and 6/5, No. 77, 1851, Nesselrode asserted later that he had been misunderstood and that his view of the Federal Resolution of 17/9 1846 approached that of Austria.

Your Lordship will agree with me in regarding as the only one likely to lead to a permanent Reconciliation.”

On the 21st a meeting of the Council of State was held. A lengthy discussion took place concerning Pechlin's proposal for instructions for the authorized participant to be sent to Dresden and concerning Danish communications in pursuance of Article IV of the Peace Treaty.¹ Wynn wrote the same day that Pechlin “is now here, and daily conferences and councils take place.”² Wynn and his colleagues had pointed out to Reedtz the unfortunate consequences of not being represented at the Dresden Conferences. Referring to a letter from Westmorland, Wynn had said that confidence could be placed in the assurances of the present Prussian Government. However, Reedtz considered them to be “so many words.” In his letter written at the same time to Westmorland, Wynn mentioned his vain attempts “to bring about a better line of Policy than exists in the majority of the Cabinet by which poor Reedtz is so clogged.”

On the afternoon of the 21st Pechlin spoke to Wynn and said that he hoped “that all was now in the right way.” However, instructions were not drawn up, and the next day Pechlin returned to Roskilde.³ On Christmas Day Wynn reported that Reedtz had gone to Roskilde to confer with Pechlin and hoped “that the Instructions tho' not perhaps quite according to his Wishes, will still be such as he can consent to act upon.”⁴ But on the 28th Wynn had to report that Reedtz had not succeeded in removing Pechlin's objections to “the terms on which the Mission to Dresden was offered to him.”⁵ The general opinion was, wrote Wynn, that the only concession not made to Pechlin was the concession concerning a common High Court of Appeal for the Duchies. Bülow was sent to Dresden instead of Pechlin, but without instructions as to the Government's views on the organization of the Monarchy.⁶

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 92 ff.

² F.O. 22/184: 21/12, No. 161. – Wynn to Westmorland 21/12.

³ F.O. 22/184: 23/12, No. 162.

⁴ F.O. 22/184: 25/12, No. 166. – Tegoborski's report 25/12, No. 178.

⁵ F.O. 22/184: 28/12, No. 167.

⁶ Engberg, p. 97 f., does not mention at all that the debate at the meeting of the Council of State on the 21st of December concerned instructions for the delegate to be sent to Dresden. On p. 98 he writes that “Pechlin was in Vienna to negotiate about the Federal execution in Holstein and therefore Criminil had to be sum-

Wynn's report to Palmerston about the controversial question "a common High Court of Appeal" provoked the expected reaction. On the 7th of January Palmerston informed him that he was to "strongly advise the Danish Government to agree to this arrangement."¹

Also in his talks with Reventlow Palmerston advocated the common High Court of Appeal championed by Wynn. Reventlow strongly advised Palmerston against this concession.² On the 11th of February, however, Reventlow was able to report that, according to Brunnov, Palmerston was no longer so much in favour of the idea.

The change he made in a dispatch from Palmerston when he communicated it to Reedtz is also evidence that Wynn supported the views held by Criminil and Pechlin. Palmerston's dispatch of the 24th of December stated that Wynn should remind the Danish Government that they had not yet, as far as Britain was aware, given the Federal Diet the communications, promised in Article IV of the Peace Treaty, concerning the arrangement by which the King would make Holstein's pacification lasting.³ In this connection Wynn wrote on the 1st of January to Palmerston that the only change he had made in the dispatch was that instead of Holstein he had written "Dutchies."⁴ Wynn wrote that this change was necessary, as would be seen from the reply where "Details Ultérieurs respecting Sleswig being avoided and those being required supposed to allude to Holstein and Lauenburg."⁵ Wynn wrote that the end of Reedtz's note was "quite foreign to the subject of the explanation required." No one had denied the King's right to advance into Holstein, but the question was "how far it was politic during a Negotiation to revive a National Cry in Germany."

moned to help to try to bring the two proposals more into line with one another. Pechlin was, as mentioned above, at Roskilde, not in Vienna, and Criminil was summoned because he was to be sent as Commissioner to Holstein.

¹ F.O. 97/120: 7/1, No. 1. — The same day Palmerston sent a copy of Wynn's dispatch and his (Palmerston's) answer to Cowley, Westmorland and Magenis.

² Reventlow to Reedtz 20/1 and 28/1, No. 2.

³ F.O. 22/181: 24/12, No. 164.

⁴ F.O. 97/120: 1/1, No. 1. — Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 103 f.

⁵ The reply of 31st stated that it was impossible to go into details at the present moment regarding a definition of the connections between Holstein and Lauenburg and the other parts of the Danish Monarchy, as Holstein and Lauenburg were members of the German Confederation whose future was still undecided. Lagerheim and Tegoborski, among others, were informed of the reply. See their dispatches 2/1.

Wynn went on to say that Reedtz had "scarcely been visible to any one" recently. He had not either gone to see him so as not to look as if he wanted to drag out of him what he declared "to be a *Secret*, and what perhaps he was not in fact *able* to tell." Neither did he expect that his words would have greater weight than Palmerston's "in bringing the Government to a wiser Policy."

When Wynn wrote his dispatch Reedtz was not in possession of any secret which could be coaxed out of him. The Council of State continued their discussions about Government policy at several subsequent meetings.¹ The great majority was in favour of the draft drawn up by Sponneck, the Minister of Finance, for the future organization of the Monarchy with a closer connection between the Kingdom and Slesvig than between these and Holstein. In pursuance of the proclamation of the 14th of July, this was, however, to be the subject of discussions by Notables from the three above-mentioned parts of the Kingdom, and so might well result in a new and different proposal.

At the meeting of the Council of State on the 7th of January Reedtz suggested that Sponneck should go to Vienna himself to advocate before Schwarzenberg the proposal of the majority of the Cabinet. As Wynn informed Palmerston, Reedtz suggested that Sponneck should be sent so that he and his party could realize what could be achieved.² On the 11th Sponneck left to conduct negotiations first in Vienna with Schwarzenberg and then in Berlin with Manteuffel.

When he informed Reventlow of Sponneck's mission, Reedtz emphasized that the difficulties involved in finding a final solution of the question of the Duchies were far from overcome.³ Although it was recognized that Germany had no authority with regard to Slesvig, she had always wanted to exert a greater or lesser degree of influence on it. Both Prussia and Austria were German Powers. If relations between Slesvig and Holstein were not laid down in a perfectly clear way, it was to be feared

¹ Cf. Engberg, p. 98 f., whose account of the protocol of the Council of State does not, however, appear to cover the facts fully. His statement that it was decided "to communicate both plans to the Great Powers" is, of course, incorrect.

² F.O. 97/120: 13/1, No. 4. — Engberg, p. 99, regarding Sponneck's memoirs. In his dispatch 11/1, No. 192, Tegoborski mentioned the surprise of the foreign envoys at Sponneck's departure, of which none of them had been informed. He thought that his mission might change the views of Sponneck and his supporters.

³ 11/1, No. 1.

that Germany would take advantage of Holstein's position as a member of the Confederation to extend her influence in an unlawful manner and to the detriment of the Danish Crown. The support of the Friendly Powers was, therefore, eminently necessary for Denmark. Reventlow was to explain to Palmerston that a return to the *status quo ante* was impossible after the sacrifices Denmark had made.

Sponneck returned to Copenhagen on the 15th of February. According to information given to Reventlow on the 22nd by Reedtz, Sponneck's mission had been highly successful. All difficulties seemed to be overcome; there were hopes that Vienna, Berlin and Copenhagen had reached an understanding concerning the future organization of the Monarchy, i.e. approval of Sponneck's draft. But a meeting of the Notables would have to be convened as soon as possible so that this draft could be put before them. Reedtz enclosed copies both of Sponneck's memoir and proposal communicated to Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel and of their replies. Schwarzenberg's official reply contained many friendly statements, but there was the snag about it that he "in eine nähere Prüfung der ihm gütigst mitgetheilten Schriftstücke nicht eingeht."¹ When Sponneck reported the results of his mission to the Council of State on the 18th of February, he said that he thought he could have "concluded" immediately, if he had been authorized to do so by his Government.² This was rather too optimistic a view.

Sponneck's most important source of support at the negotiations in Vienna and Berlin was, naturally enough, Meyendorff, who was now in Vienna. In a letter of the 8th of February to Reedtz, Meyendorff commended the choice of Sponneck who, he wrote, had been referred to as *Scandinavian*, but proved to be *Danish*.³ In his report Sponneck did not mention Magenis, the British chargé d'affaires in Vienna, but, on the other hand,

¹ In dispatch 1/2, No. 16, Cintrat mentioned Sponneck's great satisfaction with Schwarzenberg, but remarked that Vienna seemed to have avoided making any decision about Sponneck's proposal.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 165. — In his dispatch 20/2, No. 16a, Lagerheim said that Sponneck's result "fait le plus grand honneur à sa sagacité et aux talents de ce Ministre . . ." The main result was said to be that Sponneck obtained the "concession" that Austria would not interpret the Resolution of 17/9 46 so that it was detrimental to Denmark's interests. — Sponneck's mission may be said to have been completely successful, wrote Dotezac in a dispatch of 18/2, No. 405.

³ Udenrigsmin. Krigen 1848–50. Miscellaneous matters 1849–(51).

the active assistance he had received in Berlin both from Baron Budberg and Lord Westmorland.¹

In his dispatches Magenis mentioned that he had told Sponneck that he knew that Palmerston had recommended a common High Court of Appeal.² However, Magenis did not believe that the Danish Government would meet this request. According to Magenis, Schwarzenberg had found Sponneck "reasonable and moderate," but he had "a general distrust of the moderation of the Cabinet of Copenhagen." Magenis wrote that it appeared from Sponneck's proposal, which Sponneck had read to him without being willing to give copies of it, that the Danish Government "proposes a complete political separation between the Duchies of Sleswig and Holstein." Schwarzenberg stated to Magenis that he had not approved Sponneck's proposal and refused to go into details, but found Sponneck's suggestion reasonable. However, Magenis held the view that, as relations were at present between Vienna and Berlin, Schwarzenberg was more likely to side with Manteuffel than with Sponneck. These views of Schwarzenberg were given in a dispatch of the 28th of January, but agree, as will be seen, with his official reply later to Sponneck.

In Berlin Sponneck sought Westmorland's "advice and direction" and was advised by him, among other things, to grant the concessions he was authorized to.³ Sponneck told Westmorland that he was very satisfied with Manteuffel who, for his part, said that he was well satisfied with the general character of the proposals and with Sponneck's conciliatory words.⁴ He had, however, among other things, made reservations with regard to the proposal for a convention of Slesvig's and Denmark's representatives to deal with matters of common interest. When King Friedrich Wilhelm received Sponneck in audience before he left, he expressed a desire for a joint stadtholder for the Duchies.⁵

Although Sponneck had not received such definite assurances from Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel as he obviously believed he had, his mission was not without significance. He acquired

¹ The French Minister also promised his support. Dispatch 1/2, No. 16.

² F.O. 97/120: 20/1, No. 10; 21/1, No. 14; 27/1, No. 16, and 28/1, No. 17.

³ F.O. 97/120: 30/1, No. 32.

⁴ F.O. 97/121: 2/2, No. 38.

⁵ F.O. 97/121: 4/2, No. 39.

for himself a reputation as a reasonable and conciliatory politician and he had previously been regarded by the Eastern Powers as the leader of the Ultra-Danish party. According to Bloomfield's dispatch of the 19th of February, Nesselrode was now more satisfied with the Danish Government.¹

7. Mensdorff and Hodges report on conditions in Holstein during the first few months of the Commissioners' Administration

Of the two German Commissioners who went to Holstein to re-establish the authority of the Sovereign, Denmark had in advance reason to expect that the Austrian Commissioner would show more consideration for Denmark's views on the insurrection. However, as mentioned above, in the middle of January Reventlow-Criminil complained that Count Mensdorff was completely guided by his Prussian colleague.

There are several letters from Mensdorff to his relations Queen Victoria and Prince Albert which illustrate his views on the task set him.

In a letter of the 4th of January 1851² from Hamburg he wrote to his cousin Victoria that his forthcoming task was by no means an easy one. It goes without saying that the Commissioners would not be able to satisfy either the Holsteiners or the Danes: "wenn wir es nur wenigstens unseren betreffenden Regierungen recht machen." He did not expect a friendly reception at Kiel, but hoped that the good people there would be sensible. "Die Holsteiner sind ein gutes, ruhiges Volk, zwar mit gehörigem Eigensinn begabt." But recently many Radicals, riff-raff, strangers in the country and not interested in sparing it, had congregated there. At the moment, he remarked, the entente between Prussia and Austria was fairly sincere. If only it would last!

As evidence of the "fairly sincere" relations which had been re-established between the two German Powers, it may be mentioned that, in the middle of January, Reventlow was able to report that Koller had told him that Bunsen had paid him his

¹ F.O. 97/121: 19/2, No. 37.

² R.A.W. I 24/11.

first visit and expressed his pleasure at the re-establishment of good relations.¹

Mensdorff had promised to write a long letter to his cousin Prince Albert. Without waiting for it, Prince Albert wrote to him on the 20th of January and, in not very diplomatic phrases, expressed his anger at the political developments and gave his well-known views on the Slesvig-Holstein question.² Mensdorff's mission to Holstein and a contemplated mission to St. Petersburg were, wrote Prince Albert, a great honour for him, but he understood Mensdorff's mixed feelings: "Die Aufgabe, den Schleswig-Holsteinischen Streit zu schlichten, an dessen Schlichtung schon alle Politiker und Diplomaten bis jetzt gescheitert sind, ist eine der schwersten und undankbarsten, die sich auf dem ganzen Erdboden finden lässt."

The reason for this was to be found, he continued (and he underlined many words), "in dem sich Gegenüberstehen von *Rechtsverhältnissen*, *Nationalgefühlen* und *Europäischen Interessen*. Was die Grossmächte wünschen, ist meines Erachtens nach *Rechtswidrig*, und hierin liegt die Schwierigkeit für sie, es durchzusetzen und der Wunsch, Deutschland als Katzenpfote zu benutzen, *gegen* sein eigenes Nationalgefühl und Interesse die Kastanien aus dem Feuer zu holen. Da Oestreich nicht viel mit *deutschem* Nationalgefühl beschwert ist, so wird von Ld. P. (deinem alten Freunde) und Kaiser N. (deinem zukünftigen) auf dieses besonders viel Hoffnung gesetzt, denn Preussen traut man nicht, trotz dessen, dass Manteuffel die Niederträchtigkeit bis aufs Aeusserste getrieben hat." But yet Austria could hardly begin her supremacy in Germany by violating and selling "deutsches Recht." "Da wird es denn allershand Plackerei geben."

The poor Danes, continued Prince Albert, were in very great need of Slesvig and Holstein, but were unable to win them and would not conciliate them; for in Copenhagen the Revolutionary Party from 1848 held sway "in kaltem, kahlem Radicalismus!" He himself had always upheld the Peace Society's proposal that a competent court should decide the legal dispute. Hereby a moral basis would be obtained for the following negotiations

¹ Dispatch 17/1, No. 1. — Cf. Marescalchi's dispatch 17/1, No. 35.

² R.A.W. I 24/43.

according to "political conventions." He ended by denouncing the extreme self-interest of the London Protocol which only declared: "Les Puissances trouvent dans *leur* intérêt . . ." This sentence is not to be found in the London Protocol, but is presumably meant to cover the statement that the integrity of the Danish Monarchy is "lié aux intérêts généraux de l'équilibre Européen . . ."

Prince Albert's letter was written the same day the Queen expressed to Russell her great dissatisfaction with the information which Hodges sent from Hamburg about the state of affairs in Holstein (dispatches of the 13th and 15th. See above p. 114) and the drafts for dispatches to Westmorland and Magenis, which Palmerston had submitted to her.¹

The Queen called attention to the fact that the Holstein question had entered on a new phase. We can either leave Austria and Prussia to settle the matter with Denmark or we can continue to regard ourselves as mediators. In the latter case, we ought to observe "that impartiality of which the Queen has hitherto had to regret the absence." Hodges's dispatches, she said, "are written in the most violent Danish feeling and are almost painful to read, from their containing nothing but gossip and insinuations intended to create mischief and suspicion." She doubted whether it would be wise to make them the basis for "remonstrances to Austria and Prussia and does not think that we can demand an entire abandonment of Sleswig and the disarming of Holstein without making it contingent on the part of Denmark, on the simultaneous reduction of forces and the declaration to be made of her future intentions, as provided by the Treaty [Article IV]."

In his reply to the Queen, Russell stated that he, too, found that Hodges's dispatches were not written in "a very fair and impartial spirit."² But as Westmorland had signed the Peace Treaty, he ought to use Britain's influence "to have it fully executed althou' our formal Mediation is over." As Britain had recommended conciliation to Denmark, and had been successful [for instance, Reventlow-Criminil's appointment as Commissioner], it was reasonable that she conversely urged Austria

¹ R.A.W. I 24/44.

² R.A.W. I 24/48.

and Prussia to a "strict fulfilment of their part of the Treaty." Russell mentioned, incidentally, that Brunnow was of the opinion that Prussia had given Austria a free hand in Hesse, and Austria, on the other hand, had given up Denmark to please Prussia.

Palmerston's dispatches which the Queen had criticized were sent off on the 22nd and indeed drew attention to the fact that, according to the Peace Treaty, the Holstein troops were to evacuate the whole of Slesvig.¹

On the 26th Mensdorff answered Prince Albert's letter of the 20th. He wrote that the Commissioners were to "auf eine sanfte Weise die Autorität des Königs-Herzogs in Holstein herstellen" and that the legal question did not concern them.² In his opinion, the imperfect way in which Germany had helped the Duchies of recent years was, if anything, a misfortune for them; it had made them overestimate their own strength. He wrote of his task: "Hier sitze ich in der schwierigsten und unangenehmsten Lage meines Lebens als sogenannter Pacificator." Reventlow-Criminil represented conciliation, but he had to fight against the Cabinet. Mensdorff obviously did not make a secret of the fact that he did not share Prince Albert's political views.³

A few days later (the 2nd of February) the efforts to establish the Civil Administration for Holstein finally proved successful. Baron Adolf Blome was appointed President and Ernst Heintze one of the members. Heintze had been a member of the so-called Joint Government during the Rebellion. Hodges said that his appointment was due entirely to the Prussian Commissioner.⁴ Blome had a long conversation with Hodges and maintained that Mensdorff had hardly any influence and complied with Thümen's proposals. "You may depend upon it," said Blome, "that Prussia has not yet loosened her hold on the unfortunate Holstein." Hodges's remarks that the Duke of Augustenborg continued to concoct all sorts of intrigues and that Thümen appeared to keep up confidential communications with the Duke might perhaps be reckoned as gossip by Queen Victoria.

¹ F.O. 97/120: 22/1.

² R.A.W. I 24/56.

³ On 11/2 Prince Albert thanked Mensdorff for his letter. R.A.W. I 24/81.

⁴ F.O. 97/120: 31/1, No. 19; cf. 28/1, No. 17, and 4/2, No. 21.

The installation of the Civil Administration in Holstein justified to some degree the statement on the Danish-German question which the Queen made in her speech from the throne when she opened Parliament on the 4th of February. According to Reventlow, the speech was delivered "avec cette dignité et cette voix que possède la Reine à un si haut degré."¹ The statement was as follows: "It has been My Endeavour to induce the States of Germany to carry into full Effect the Provisions of the Treaty with Denmark, which was concluded at Berlin in the Month of July of last year. I am much gratified in being able to inform you that the German Confederation and the Government of Denmark are now engaged in fulfilling the Stipulations of that Treaty, and thereby putting an end to Hostilities which at one Time appeared full of Dangers to the Peace of Europe."

Reventlow felt called upon to thank Palmerston for the "place of honour" he had given the Danish question in the Queen's speech.² Incidentally, Lord Stanley, the British Conservative politician, was right in remarking that the results reached so far in Denmark ought rather to be ascribed to the Tsar of Russia and to Austria than to Britain's intervention.³ And the "results reached so far" were to prove far removed from "fulfilling the Stipulations."

If Reventlow was satisfied with the Queen's speech, Bunsen, his contrast, was seemingly no less pleased. In his dispatch of the same date to the King he stressed the reason for his satisfaction: there had been no mention of the London Protocol and the "so-called integrity of the Danish Monarchy." He believed that this had been the subject of lively discussions in the Cabinet. He took the opportunity of pointing out what a humiliation it would be for Prussia if she let herself be persuaded to sign the shameful Protocol. He had, however, he wrote, no reason to believe that the King's Government would do so, either now or later.

Although Reventlow had been satisfied recently with Palmerston, as he remarked at the beginning of February to Lord Aberdeen,⁴ the Foreign Secretary continued to exert friendly

¹ Dispatch No. 3 (undated).

² Reventlow to Reedtz 5/2 and 7/2, No. 4.

³ Cf. Marescalchi's dispatch 6/2, No. 45.

⁴ Reventlow to Reedtz 7/2.

pressure on Denmark. On account of a rumour that officers in the Holstein army would be excluded from the amnesty and court-martialled, Palmerston directed Wynn on the 31st of January to impress conciliation on the Danish Government.¹ His dispatch stated that, as the King's authority was re-established by German Federal troops, it would be "highly impolitic to have recourse to vindictive measures against any persons, civil or military in Holstein; and that a general oblivion of the past would not only be the most honourable, but also the wisest, course which His Danish Majesty could pursue." Reedtz informed Wynn that the British Government had been ill informed, as no such measures were contemplated; but it was impossible to let officers who had broken their oath of allegiance remain in service.² To this Palmerston remarked that it had not been his intention to interfere as to the re-appointment of such persons to the Danish service.³ That was a matter for the Danish Government.

Hodges continued to send reports about the unsatisfactory conditions in Holstein. They were due, Hodges repeated on the 28th of February, mainly to Thümen, "eagerly supported by Heintze," "an eager supporter of the old Sleswig-Holstein principles."⁴ Hodges mentioned Heintze's active intrigues with the leaders of the Slesvig-Holstein insurrection, who were still living at Kiel. He remarked that General Frederik Bardenfleth, who had been sent by the Danish Government to Kiel to take over command of a reorganized Holstein army corps, was unemployed and without authority.⁵ Hodges wrote that, under the terms of the Warsaw Protocol, the Commissioners ought to have ended their task long ago. He still held the same view of Mensdorff: he "takes but little part, or interest in what is going on, but leaves all to his Prussian Colleague, who gladly avails himself of the field thus left open for his Policy." My Russian colleague, Struve, Hodges ended his dispatch, shares my views completely.

¹ F.O. 97/120: 31/1, No. 11.

² F.O. 97/121: 8/2, No. 16.

³ *Ibid.*: 14/2, No. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 28/2. No. 28. — Hodges to Westmorland 28/2. — According to Reventlow's dispatch 7/3, No. 12, Palmerston adopted Hodges's views.

⁵ Bardenfleth was not able to take over the command of the Holstein Federal contingent until the 1st of December. *Krigen 1848-50*. III, p. 1479 f.

In a private letter written at the same time to Westmorland, Hodges gave the same description of the unfortunate state of affairs and Westmorland informed Manteuffel.¹ Budberg, too, made representations to Manteuffel, who promised to write to Thümen immediately and order him to have the King's authority re-established by every means in his power. When Magenis in Vienna informed Schwarzenberg of Hodges's reports, Schwarzenberg referred to the part Prussia had played in the fight against Denmark, which, of course, made her present position difficult.² Schwarzenberg only smiled when Magenis told him of Hodges's description of Mensdorff's inactivity. He stated that only Austria "had no bias in this question, having never taken any part against Denmark and never interrupted her diplomatic relations with that country."

At the beginning of March Wynn informed Palmerston that the King had invited the German Commissioners in Holstein to accompany Criminil to Copenhagen to a conference on various matters, one of them being the Customs boundary.³ Ten days later he had to state that the Commissioners had excused themselves⁴ on the grotesque plea that the pacification had to be carried out "in möglichst kurzer Zeit." He wrote that there was no change [for the better] to be detected in Thümen's "sentiments, resulting from his last personal Communication with Manteuffel." If the whole administration of Holstein were to remain in the hands of the Commissioners, "which it was never intended should be the case," said Wynn, "it is difficult to assign the Period, when they will be at liberty."

It is not my intention here to give an account of the government of Holstein during the prolonged period of the Commissioners' Administration before the King's sovereignty was re-established a year later. As the Rebellion had met with a considerable amount of support, it was difficult to fill all the posts in the Civil Administration with loyal Holsteiners, even if Thümen had been prepared to do that. The reduction of the Slesvig-Holstein army and the appointment of officers had created

¹ F.O. 97/122: 6/3, No. 73.

² Ibid.: 15/3, No. 47 (?).

³ Ibid.: 7/3, No. 26.

⁴ Ibid.: 18/3, No. 33. — See copies of Manteuffel's dispatch 15/3 to Werther and Schwarzenberg's 17/3 to Vrints. Holstens pacifikation.

difficulties, and Thümen was accused of appointing former Prussian officers.¹ He was also reproached for his conduct in selecting members to serve on the Frontier Commission which, in pursuance of the Peace Treaty of Berlin, was to draw the exact frontier between Slesvig and Holstein. (Cf. *British Mediation. II*, p. 211).²

The fortress of Rendsborg, which the execution troops had occupied on the 8th of February, was an important political question. The idea had been discussed of trying to turn it into a German Federal fortress. Nesselrode said in a conversation with Bloomfield in April, that he did not believe that the Confederation's pretensions were serious, but Russia would, if the occasion arose, oppose them and with regard to the Kronværk, Denmark's right was incontestable.³

I think it appears from Mensdorff's letter of the 31st of March to Prince Albert that Hodges's remarks have not been entirely without influence on him.⁴ For he mentioned in his letter Prussia's "contemptible duplicity" during the period of the Administrative Commission when the Prussian general supported the opposition against the orders of the Prussian Commissioner (cf. *British Mediation. II*, p. 150 f.). It is understandable that Mensdorff did not share Prince Albert's wish that war had been declared the previous autumn between Austria and Prussia. He assured his cousin that he certainly was not prejudiced in favour of the Danes. "But was anything more unjust than the invasion of Jutland. Prussia ought to have advanced into Holstein and in a secure position at Rendsborg have given the Danes firm orders. Then they would have been on legal ground and the rights of the Duchies would really have been safeguarded. But instead, without a declaration of war, they invaded the country of a friendly Sovereign and, after compromising everyone sufficiently, withdrew again."

In his letter Mensdorff commended Reventlow-Criminil whose views, of course, were the exact opposite of the National Liberals.

¹ See i.a. Wynn's dispatch 11/3, No. 30, (F.O. 97/122) and Westmorland's dispatches 13/3, No. 81, and 10/4, No. 112 (*Ibid.*)—Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 193 f.

² F.O. 27/122: Wynn's dispatch 3/3 and 22/3, No. 35; Magenis's dispatch 8/4, No. 71.

³ F.O. 97/122: 19/3, No. 62.

⁴ R.A.W. I 25/37.

He said that Beseler was a thorough Republican, but that he found no real response in Holstein.

At the beginning of April, Hodges stressed the great dissatisfaction which both Danes and Germans felt with the present state of affairs.¹ It was true that the pretensions of the Ultra-Danish Party in the Cabinet were extravagant, wrote Hodges, but the conduct of the German Commissioners did in fact give "just grounds for dissatisfaction on the part of Denmark." Kiel and Altona as well as Hamburg were the scene of intrigues on the part of the Slesvig-Holstein Party, and the most important leaders of the Insurrection were still living at Kiel. The House of Augustenborg was also still continuing its machinations.

About the middle of the month Hodges was far-sighted enough to mention in a letter to Westmorland that no conciliation could be expected to result from the forthcoming Assembly of the Notables: "for the assembly can only lead to acrimonious bickerings and waste of time."² In his letter Hodges described Reventlow-Criminil as "a man of the highest character and amiable disposition" and Carl Plessen as "a man of talent and character." At the beginning of April, Magenis again made representations to Schwarzenberg in connection with Thümen's conduct, which, he said, openly was opposed to the re-establishment of the King's authority.³ He thought that "the whole management of affairs in Holstein appeared to devolve on the Prussian Commissioner." This time, contrary to his previous statements, Schwarzenberg asserted that Mensdorff had his part of the management of affairs and understood the question. Incidentally, he interrupted Magenis with bitter complaints against the policy of the Danish Government, "not fulfilling the promises made by Sponneck."

At least Mensdorff understood the question so well that, as he wrote on the 21st of May to Prince Albert, he did not find that it was only the Danes who were in the wrong, "wie es deutsche Publicisten eben gar zu gerne schildern."⁴ He had read a great number of pamphlets without arriving at an understanding of the problem. "Verworrenere Zustände giebt es nicht

¹ F.O. 97/122: 4/4, No. 35.

² Hodges to Westmorland 17/4.

³ F.O. 97/122: 8/4, No. 71.

⁴ R.A.W. I 25/99.

leichter . . .” He described conditions in his letter: “Die hiesigen Angelegenheiten bieten im Ganzen sehr wenig Erfreuliches und unendlich viel Wiederwärtiges.” The Commissioners had received instructions which were too incomplete and they themselves were not sufficiently acquainted with conditions. He had not either been able to persuade his colleague that they ought to have begun with carrying out the unpleasant things. In his letter he criticized the Duke of Augustenborg, which has hardly pleased Prince Albert: “Er besitzt übrigens im Ganzen wenig Liebe und Achtung.”

8. Hodges's assessment of Tillisch's Administration in Slesvig

At the beginning of April when Magenis, as mentioned above, stated the Danish complaints about conditions in Holstein to Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Prime Minister answered by making bitter attacks on the Danish policy in Slesvig, i.e. the Administration of Tillisch, the Government Commissioner. This Administration necessarily presented many points of attack for heated, unscrupulous, Slesvig-Holstein agitation, which found such good response in German public Liberal views. In South Slesvig a state of siege continued to be maintained and, in the opinion of foreign Governments, the Danish Government was too reluctant in granting an amnesty to the Insurrectionists. A number of dismissals had been necessary in order to secure a loyal Civil Service. Several of these dismissals had, furthermore, taken place during the time of the Administrative Commission, and all three members were responsible for them.

The most problematic measure adopted under Tillisch was the one concerning the official language to be used in Central Slesvig.¹ It introduced Danish instead of German as the language of instruction in schools in the area in question and required church services to be held alternately in Danish and German. Although the popular idiom in the area was predominantly Danish (South Jutlandish), the arrangement was not based on the wishes of the population. On the contrary it gave rise to bitter

¹ Hjelholt: Den danske sprogordning etc.

opposition. The measure mentioned above arose from a national desire to regain what had been lost through centuries of neglect and to put a stop to advancing Germanization.

Sharply worded dispatches from Austria and Prussia of the 13th and 18th of April respectively arrived in Copenhagen criticizing the system of government in Slesvig.¹ In the middle of April, Tillisch, who had been appointed Minister for Slesvig on the 5th of March, gave the Government a lengthy report about the measures he had adopted and later, on the 7th of May, a similar account in a letter to the Foreign Minister.² In the middle of May, Reventlow spoke to Palmerston, who remarked that Austria and Prussia had given us "a good lecture."³ Reventlow thought they would have been better to lecture their own Commissioners and keep them to their task: the work of conciliation. It was wisest not to attach too much importance to their completely unfounded gravamina. "You are right, Count, you are perfectly right, let it blow over," said Palmerston, who agreed with Reventlow that Austria's step was aimed at winning popularity with the minor German states at the expense of Denmark.

It turned out that it was not quite so easy for the Danish Government to let it blow over. In repeated conversations with Reedtz at the end of April and in May, Sternberg stressed the fact that Russia was in complete agreement with the German Powers in demanding a change of system in Slesvig.⁴ The Swedish representative in Copenhagen also subscribed on the whole to what he called the sermon which the Friendly Powers continued to preach to Denmark: moderation; forgetting the past [the Rebellion] and a certain consideration for public opinion in Germany.⁵ We receive constant complaints about Tillisch's Administration, he wrote on the 22nd of May, without our knowing which are true and which are exaggerated.

Hodges had cooperated with Tillisch on the Administrative Commission and had received a good impression of his sense

¹ Thorsoe. II, p. 135 f. — Neergaard. I, p. 537 ff.

² Hjelholt: Den danske sprogordning, p. 44 f.

³ Reventlow to Reedtz 16/5.

⁴ Sternberg's dispatches 21/4, No. 69; 24/4, No. 71; 1/5, No. 76; 6/5, No. 77; 14/5, No. 79; and 18/5, No. 80. — Cf. Rantzau, p. 318 f.; von Lebzeltern's dispatch 19/5.

⁵ Dispatch 27/4, No. 37.

of justice. Therefore he was very sceptical about the violent criticism directed at the government measures in Slesvig. Adolf Blome requested a conversation with him and on the 28th of March he sent Palmerston an account of their talk.¹ Blome was, he wrote, "loud in his condemnation and censure of the administrative acts of M. Tillisch in his Government of Slesvig. He states that his Administration is based neither upon law nor justice." Hodges remarked that he himself was not competent to judge the matter, but emphasized that during the eleven months he had worked together with Tillisch on the Administrative Commission "I always found him quite impartial and devoid of all factious or vindictive feelings, and incapable of doing an injustice to any person whatever." The honour conferred on Tillisch recently by the King² had, thought Hodges, aroused jealousy and "contributed in some degree to the angry feeling prevalent against him."

Hodges also defended Tillisch's conduct when Mensdorff attacked it. In his letter of the 31st of March mentioned above (see p. 129), Mensdorff wrote, rather sarcastically: Hodges "protegiert sehr den charmanten Herrn Tillisch in Schleswig und versicherte mich neulich er wäre ein recht braver Mann." To this Mensdorff said, according to his own assertion, that he (Tillisch) must then be stupid, for he pursued a wrong political line of conduct.

At the end of April, Wynn wrote to Palmerston about the Austrian and Prussian dispatches which complained about the Administration in Slesvig.³ He referred to the fact that he had previously mentioned "the unsatisfactory state of the Dutchy and of the arbitrary Character of some of Tillisch's acts." General Krogh, who was now in Copenhagen, disapproved of them just as much as Criminil, wrote Wynn. He suggested to Palmerston that perhaps "a mild remonstrance and true Representation of facts" would be more effective than Schwarzenberg's violent language based on "exaggerated reports."

In his dispatch of the 1st of May, Hodges stated that Austria's present attitude appeared to be "more directed to the Courting

¹ F.O. 97/122: 28/3, No. 33.

² On the 5th of March he was appointed Minister for Slesvig and created a Knight of the Order of the Elephant.

³ F.O. 97/123: 26/4, No. 46.

of Public opinion in this part of Germany, than to bringing to a final close the existing differences.”¹ Mensdorff also wanted to be freed “from the irksome duties imposed upon him.” Hodges mentioned a recent visit from Heintze, who complained about expulsions from Slesvig, but, wrote Hodges, “he was forced to admit to me, that it was impossible that order could be maintained in Slesvig without the expulsion of several of those persons –.” He warned Heintze against believing that the connection between Slesvig and Holstein as it was before 1848 could be re-established.

Westmorland had sent Palmerston a translation of Manteuffel’s dispatch to Werther of the 18th of April. Palmerston replied that Denmark would no doubt assert that Prussia had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Denmark and Slesvig.² What right had she, for instance, to complain about the abolition of the Customs boundary between Denmark and Slesvig? – It was true that the Russian Government maintained in their instructions to their Ministers that Austria and Prussia could not act on behalf of Germany with regard to Slesvig.³ But they could act there as “allies of the Crown of Denmark” and Denmark ought to endeavour to reach “a cordial understanding” with them and accept a system of real conciliation.

According to Westmorland’s dispatches of the 13th of May, Friedrich Wilhelm IV found the conduct of the Danes in Slesvig quite abominable and would not listen to the Danish refutation of the complaints.⁴ Manteuffel, on the other hand, was satisfied with the Danish refutation, wrote Westmorland.

Reedtz suggested to Wynn that Hodges should visit Flensburg to make a personal inspection and undertake an assessment of Tillisch’s Administration.⁵ Reedtz had not mentioned this suggestion to the Council of State, and this was later criticized.⁶ Wynn wrote to Hodges, presumably on the 12th or 13th of May: “As I cannot foresee any objection on the part of L.P. you might

¹ F.O. 97/123: 1/5, No. 39.

² F.O. 97/123: 28/4, No. 128; 6/5 (P. to West.) and 11/5, No. 146.

³ F.O. 97/123: 11/5, No. 144. – Cf. Ungern Sternberg’s dispatches, 6/5, No. 77, 14/5, No. 79, and 18/5, No. 80.

⁴ F.O. 97/123: 13/5, Nos. 148 and 149.

⁵ F.O. 97/123: 14/5, No. 43.

⁶ Statsrådets Forhandl. III. p. 305.

(if so inclined), as far as my opinion goes, act on it immediately, though perhaps it would be as well to let the Notables be well at work, and you would still have time to make your friendly visit and report of it before you go to England." Hodges intended to go to England on leave.

However, on the 14th Hodges sent a lengthy dispatch to Palmerston asking for instructions about the proposal. He could, he wrote, not really see how a visit to Flensburg would make it easier for him to judge whether Tillisch's Administration deserved the harsh accusations levelled against it or not. He did, admittedly, believe that Tillisch's Administration had been to blame for "arbitrary acts of administration; but I also believe that, in the peculiar position, in which he is placed, surrounded and menaced by a powerful party, he has been compelled to adopt the political line of Conduct he has pursued; and that the only alternative for him would have been to resign the trust confided to him by his Sovereign."

In connection with complaints against Tillisch for dismissing clergymen in the County of Haderslev, Hodges pointed out in his dispatch what a great influence the clergy exerted, and he was of the opinion that not even in Ireland had they abused their influence as much as in Slesvig and Holstein to the detriment of "order and good Government." For instance a Holstein nobleman [Blome?] had told him how he had been prevented during the last few months from attending his parish church on account of the clergyman's hysterical political tirades, which served as a sermon. On the other hand, Hodges found that the introduction of Danish church services "in some parishes in Angel" was "a very injudicious measure."

Hodges ended his dispatch by describing conditions in Holstein where "in fact no Government exists . . . , and the German Commissioners being at variance with the phantom of authority under . . . Criminil, both are obliged to court the will of the people." As an instance of the prevailing lack of order and authority he stated that, the previous Saturday, the Danish steamer, the "Eider," had been attacked by a mob at Kiel. "Every difficulty and delay is raised by Gen. Thümen --- in the most trifling matters." When the Assembly of Notables opened, it was generally expected, wrote Hodges, that strict measures

would be adopted in continuation of Germany's policy after 1848 [against Denmark].

On the 16th Palmerston wrote to Hodges telling him that he consented to his proposal to "pay an inofficial visit to your former colleague Mr. Tillisch at Flensburg, in order that Her M.s Government may be enabled to obtain a more correct knowledge of the system and acts of the present Government of Sleswig than is to be derived from the reports which reach Her M.'s Government through Germany."¹ If Hodges had not already set out on leave, he was "in the first instance to repair to Flensburg for the above purpose."

The Assembly of Notables, which Wynn referred to in his letter mentioned above, opened at Flensburg on the 15th of May.² In pursuance of the manifesto of the 14th of July 1850, the Notables – 9 from Slesvig and 6 from the Kingdom and Holstein respectively – were to express their views on the forthcoming arrangement for the constitutional organization of the Monarchy. A plan for this arrangement was submitted by the Government for consideration. An important point in the plan – and one which was objectionable to the Slesvig-Holsteiners – was that the Diet for Slesvig and the Danish Rigsdag were to meet to discuss matters of common interest. All the Notables were appointed by the Council of State and the appointments had involved considerable delay –. In a dispatch of the 10th of May Wynn asserted, rather exaggeratedly, that, apart from Prehn, all the other Notables appointed for Slesvig were "Eyder Danes."³ The Holstein nobleman, Count Baudissin's, description of the Slesvig notables as "a Class of men bigoted in their views, and suited neither by education nor experience to the task allotted to them" is evidence of class pride.⁴

In April, Bille's brother-in-law, Count Henrik Bille-Brahe, the Minister at Vienna, was appointed as Commissioner to the Assembly of Notables. The description of him given by Wynn and others was not flattering.⁵ It was extremely unlikely, Wynn

¹ F.O. 33/129.

² Regarding this see Knud Fabricius: *Sonderjyllands Historie*. IV, p. 419 ff.

³ F.O. 97/123: 10/5, No. 52.

⁴ F.O. 97/123: 27/5, No. 48.

⁵ F.O. 97/122: 16/4, No. 43. – See also Magen's dispatch 8/4, No. 71 (*Ibid.*) and Cowley's dispatch 28/4, No. 124 (F.O. 97/123) with Thun's remarks about "such an individual."

thought, that he would show "the talent, information or firmness, necessary for such a situation under such critical circumstances." When the Assembly opened, he exceeded his powers by holding out prospects that the decision reached by the Notables would be submitted to the Danish Rigsdag and the Assembly of the Estates in the Duchies for approval.

Five days before the opening of the Assembly, the Government had issued a proclamation granting an amnesty to many of those who had taken part in the Rebellion in Slesvig. Hodges informed Palmerston that, in his opinion, the amnesty was, nevertheless, not far-reaching enough.¹ He referred to the fact that Holstein's present Government even contained people who were just as much to blame as those excluded in Slesvig. "I am," he wrote, "fully aware of the difficulties which the Crown of Denmark is placed in respecting them; yet even in their aggravated case, I venture to assert that Clemency would be the wisest Policy." Palmerston sent Hodges's his comments with a recommendation to Wynn, who submitted them to A. W. Moltke.² Moltke thought that the list of those excluded was reduced to the smallest possible scale, consistent with any consideration for the King's Authority; but perhaps the list might be further reduced later.

On the 20th Hodges informed Palmerston that, in connection with this forthcoming investigation, he had asked Westmorland to request Berlin to instruct Thümen "to speak openly to me and to give me the accusations and the grounds for them against Tillisch."³ For although he had heard many complaints, he had never received any real facts about them, except that church services in Danish had been introduced in some part of the Duchy. "I have never given the slightest credence" to most of the innumerable, exaggerated, German complaints.

Hodges ended his dispatch by giving the following assurance: "However averse I do feel, although even at the instigation of the Danish Government, to enter into an investigation implying censure of the official acts of a Gentleman with whom I formerly acted as Colleague, and with whom I lived during nearly a year

¹ F.O. 97/123: 17/5, No. 45.

² *Ibid.*: 20/5, No. 41, and 28/5, No. 59.

³ *Ibid.*: 20/5, No. 47.

in perfectly good understanding, and from whom I parted with friendly feelings, nevertheless I shall use every effort in my power to execute the trust confided to me by Your Lordship to the best of my judgment and abilities."

In another dispatch of the same date he stated that he would leave Hamburg on the 22nd, but travel to Flensburg by way of Kiel to have an opportunity of talking there first with Thümen.¹

In the above-mentioned letter of the 19th to Westmorland, Hodges also emphasized that it was no pleasant task to be sent *unofficially* "to spy into the official conduct of a former colleague . . ."² However, he had decided to go to Kiel first, inform Thümen about the object of his mission and ask him *confidentially* to give him "the grounds of the accusations against Mr. Tillisch's Government." For he thought that it was only from him that he could obtain "such information with any accuracy." He did not think that he could approach Reventlow-Criminil, as he doubtless would be "reluctant to become an accuser of one of his Colleagues" (in the Government), and the persons who asserted that they were wronged would presumably give strongly subjective explanations. Therefore he asked Westmorland to see that Thümen was instructed "without delay to converse with me freely on the subject and to furnish me in writing with the information which I require."

As soon as he had received Hodges's letter, Westmorland approached Le Coq, who promised to write the same evening to Thümen "to request him to facilitate your object and to supply you with the details you would ask of him."³

On the 22nd Hodges went to Kiel to confer with Thümen. On the evening of the 23rd he reached Flensburg and the next day he sent from there a private and confidential letter to Sir Henry Wynn giving an account of his views on the state of affairs.⁴ At Kiel he had had "long interviews with Thümen, Mensdorff and several impartial and sober-minded persons,

¹ F.O. 33/130: 20/5, No. 46.

² Engberg's statement, p. 158 that Hodges considered Thümen to be "neutral" is incorrect, as is his description which follows.

³ Westmorland to Hodges 20/5 (copy). - Westmorland's dispatch 21/5, No. 160. F.O. 97/123.

⁴ Copy of letter in H.C. Reedtz's private archives. G. III. 1850-52. It is not quite correct of Engberg, p. 161, to call the letter Hodges's report.

fully capable of confirming the truth, or contradicting the accusations brought against" the Administration of the King of Denmark in Slesvig.

Hodges wrote that the information he received before his arrival at Flensburg showed "many of the rumours and statements to be true that had been brought against the Government, that I had previously considered entitled to no belief." The state of siege in South Slesvig and the tyrannical manner in which it was enforced were, maintained Hodges, extremely dangerous for Danish interests. He made special mention of the ordinance concerning compulsory saluting of Danish officers in Angel.¹

On the morning of the 24th when Hodges spoke to Tillisch, he was told "to his surprise" that Tillisch had no control over the military; he understood as well that Tillisch "was aware of the injurious effects arising from two superior Authorities, acting in this Duchy." The state of siege ought to be raised and Hodges thought that it could easily be done, although he understood that Tillisch did not hold this view.

That Hodges's complaints were only directed against military measures tallies, for that matter, with the fact that Tillisch later told the Council of State that, apart from these, he had been able to refute all Hodges's written complaints.²

On the 27th Hodges informed Palmerston that he was back in Hamburg.³ The same day he wrote to Westmorland and told him that on his journey back he had "passed through Kiel, Eckernförde and other Places where I had opportunities of conversing with well informed and impartial people." The system of Government in Slesvig was, he found, untenable, and the methods used in carrying the state of siege into effect unnecessarily tyrannical. His remonstrances on this head had already borne fruit, he remarked. For instance, du Plat, the originator of the ordinance imposing compulsory saluting had been removed from his command in Angel and Svansö, and

¹ See my paper "Hilsepåbudet i Angel" in "Festskrift til H. P. Hanssen" (1932) – Wynn showed the letter he had received from Hodges to Sternberg, who stated in dispatch 26/5, No. 85, that it "fully" confirmed the complaints which had been made.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 306 ff.

³ F.O. 97/123: 27/5, No. 48.

many of the other complaints "have been or will be I trust soon removed." He was now drawing up a report for Palmerston, and Westmorland would no doubt receive a copy. Incidentally, he was "so unwell that I can scarcely hold up my head."

When Westmorland thanked Hodges for his letter, he expressed his regrets that Hodges was going on leave to England while negotiations were still going on about Danish affairs.¹ Westmorland wrote that he had received a visit from Thümen, who had mentioned his discussions with Hodges at Kiel and "stated his belief in your unfavourable opinion of him." Westmorland did not think that Thümen was justified in attributing such an opinion to Hodges, but said, on the other hand, that "he must be well aware certain parts of his administration had been criticised as too favorable to those persons, who had been engaged in uncompromising hostility to their Sovereign."

Although Westmorland assumed that he would receive a copy of Hodges's report from the Foreign Office, he asked Hodges, however, to send him a copy direct, if that were possible. He would then make use of the contents during the discussions "which may shortly take place here when Reedt passes thro', from Warsaw and Olmütz." He was pleased that Hodges had been able to correct "some of the uncalled for severities" of the Danish Administration in Slesvig. "It really is a great shame of that Government (after all the pains we have taken to serve them) that they should not take care" that both their military and civil officers are guided by right principles and avoid arbitrary acts which can never be defended.

On the 29th Hodges had his detailed report ready for Palmerston.² First, he gave a description of his talks at Kiel with Thümen and Mensdorff and several others [unnamed]. Then, as mentioned above, he strongly criticized the maintenance of the state of siege, which he had said to Tillisch it must be possible to raise.³ But Tillisch had asserted that it was necessary; it was his duty to protect the loyal subjects of the King from the 5000-7000 discharged Slesvig-Holstein soldiers in Slesvig, "ready

¹ 29/5 (copy). Westmorland's archives.

² F.O. 97/124: 29/5, No. 49.

³ Engberg (p. 158 f.) is incorrect in stating that it was embarrassing for Hodges to question Tillisch himself, but that he was, nevertheless, obliged to pay him a visit.

to avail themselves of any opportunity for outbreak." Hodges thought that the police force ought to be able to control the trouble-makers and Tillisch remarked that he hoped to form a gendarmerie.

Another important complaint was levelled against the ordinance concerning the official language for Central Slesvig and against the Government's systematic favouring of the Danish language. Hodges found that this complaint, too, was justified. With the exception of Tillisch himself and one or two of his confidential colleagues, "I have found no one of the Danish party who defended such proceedings," wrote Hodges. It was Hodges's opinion that the language reforms in Angel were "by no means justifiable." The Danish language there was a patois; High German had become the prevailing language, written or printed.

On the other hand, Hodges definitely rejected the fantastic German complaints against the newly appointed clergymen in South Slesvig: they were "as to character and capacity well suited to the Cures to which they have been named." And there were no complaints from North Slesvig, apart from those from the party doctrinaires in the towns.

Finally, Hodges stated that "the system now acted upon in the South of Slesvig I have ventured to combat with every Individual connected with the Danish Government with whom I have conversed respecting it." He referred to the policy he had recommended to the King of Denmark in July 1850.¹ At first he had believed that the Administration in Slesvig was decided by the Danish Government until Tillisch "told me that it emanated from him; and further that he would withdraw from the Duchy should any alteration in this system take place." It was, Hodges ended by saying, "high time that conciliation should be sincerely employed by Denmark," if she wanted to obtain support from the propertied classes.

In spite of Hodges's friendly attitude towards Tillisch personally, and in spite of the fact that his report definitely rejected important things in the German propaganda, it was conclusive that he disapproved of the Danish Administration in Slesvig.

Immediately after his semi-official tour of inspection, Hodges went to London where Reventlow had a long conversation with

¹ Cf. Hjelholt: Sønderjylland under Treårskrigen. II, p. 293.

him.¹ There was no doubt, wrote Reventlow, that Hodges was favourably disposed towards Denmark, but his ideas and views on conditions in the Duchies seemed to be rather vague. He thought this was due to Hodges's long term of residence at Hamburg or his increasing age. For instance, Hodges believed that the only means of securing law and order in Holstein was for the King to travel there immediately and unescorted and to stay for some time at Kiel or Plön. Incidentally, Reventlow did not believe that Hodges's report had influenced Palmerston particularly to the detriment of Denmark.²

Mellish also discussed the Danish question with Hodges and wrote to Cowley that they both believed it would, nevertheless, cause a general war: "The obstinacy, duplicity and bad faith of all parties is most deplorable."³

Hodges's critical assessment of the Danish Administration must have carried special weight with the Court, who regarded him as extremely pro-Danish. But it is evident, among other things from a letter of the 21st of May from the Queen to John Russell,⁴ that they did not regard Hodges's criticism as sufficiently thorough.

The Queen wrote that she had thought of sending Russell Bloomfield's last dispatch,⁵ which mentioned the views of the Russian Cabinet on the "oppressive and provoking conduct" of the Danish Government in Slesvig. For when even Russia recognized that the Ultra-Danish Party "was breaking all engagements and continuing the conduct which led to the last revolution," she thought that Palmerston "could not but be a little impartial also." But she had given up the idea again for fear that it would serve no purpose.

However, she now saw from Westmorland's dispatch, which she enclosed,⁶ that he had made "himself even the complete advocate of Denmark," and that Palmerston in the draft dispatch, which she also enclosed, "highly approves of his conduct."

¹ Reventlow to Reedtz 1/7 as well as dispatch 10/6, No. 19.

² On 2/7 Palmerston received Hodges at the Foreign Office. F.O. 33/129: 28/6.

³ F.O. 519/164: 9/6.

⁴ R.A.W. I 25/97.

⁵ Presumably that of 29/4 (received 12/5). Correspondence, p. 60.

⁶ Probably dispatch 15/5, No. 154 (F.O. 97/123) which mentions Tillisch's refutation of the complaints made against his administration or his dispatch of 13/5, No. 149.

She would, therefore, draw Russell's attention to the matter, the more so as her brother-in-law [Duke Ernst] and her brother [half-brother Karl von Leiningen], who had both recently visited Holstein, "entirely confirm the reports of the cruelties practised upon these unfortunate Sleswigers." As evidence of these "cruelties," it was reported that an old clergyman, over seventy years of age, had been expelled from "his living and property and lives now begging in Germany" merely because, with no knowledge of Danish, he was unable to preach in Danish for his German congregation.¹ The Danish Government's old threat that "the Danish character should be written with the sword upon the back of every Sleswiger" seemed to be being fully carried out with our "approval, advice and assistance!!" Where then were "*the interests of Humanity*," which Palmerston stressed so ostentatiously on other occasions.

As can be seen, Orla Lehmann's famous (or in Germany notorious) words (cf. *British Mediation*. I, p. 90 and *Historisk Tidsskrift*. 11th Series VI, p. 602 f.) were not only even more corrupted in the Queen's letter, but also attributed to the Danish Government!

Russell's reaction to the letter was hardly what the Queen had hoped for, even though he wrote that, in deference to her wishes, he would return to Palmerston the draft of the dispatch to Westmorland.² But at the same time he had to admit, he said, that he "does not see any sufficient remedy to the present state of things." Even if Tillisch's Administration had been "harsh and violent," the Danes had to deal with people who quite openly wore rebels' cockades and who "look to Germany for support in some fresh struggle." "We cannot daily interfere in the administration of the Duchies, and we can still less admit the right of the German Diet to treat Sleswig as part of Germany." He did not really believe the story of the old clergyman who had to beg in Germany; there were doubtless other reasons than the one adduced for dismissing him. Finally he remarked that the

¹ If this assertion is correct, it must concern a clergyman who was dismissed after the promulgation of the language ordinance. But there does not seem to be anyone to whom it applies.

² R.A.W. I 25/100: 22/5. — Engberg's account of Russell's letter (p. 152) does not seem to me to cover the facts. Orla Lehmann's words are assigned to 1849 instead of 1842. This must be a misprint.

Notables were about to begin their discussions about an arrangement and that Austria, in return for being allowed to have her own way with Hesse, was willing to give "Prussia her own way in Holstein and Sleswig." The last assurance, at any rate, must have pleased the Court.

The same day Russell informed Palmerston of the Queen's letter and of his reply.¹ He commented on Palmerston's draft: "I do not see any particular advantage in your draft and I think you may as well withdraw it." But, he added, "while we inculcate on the Danes the advantages of human Government I think we are bound to watch that the King of Denmark should not again be overturned by a German invasion."

9. The Question of the Danish Succession until the summer of 1851

By the London Protocol the powers had expressed their interest in maintaining the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. As mentioned before (British Mediation. II, p. 239), Palmerston had the word "guarantee" omitted from the Protocol.

On the 3rd of February 1851 Bloomfield had a conversation with Nesselrode about Denmark's policy with regard to the Duchies, and Nesselrode touched on the question of the Danish Succession.² Nesselrode said that the London Protocol guaranteed the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. With regard to a possible successor, he remarked that the behaviour of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg (he had taken the side of the Slesvig-Holsteiners) had made him impossible, and that he had not the least objection to Prince Christian as successor. The Duke of Augustenborg had, in his opinion, "forfeited all his claims." However, Bloomfield added, his German colleagues did not share his views, but thought that the Duke of Augustenborg had "unquestionable Rights in this matter."

Nesselrode's views were certainly not shared by the English Court, either. How can Nesselrode's statement about the London

¹ 22/5. P.P.

² F.O. 97/121: 4/2, No. 27. — Extract in Correspondence, p. 54.

Protocol, Queen Victoria wrote on the 21st to Palmerston, "tally with Lord Palmerston's repeated assertions in defence of that protocol" that it contained *no* guarantee and merely expressed "*le désire unanime des puissances*" with regard to the integrity.¹ Can Palmerston let this pass unnoticed? And what was to be said about "the new axioms of public law laid down by Nesselrode that the House of Augustenburg has forfeited all its rights to the succession in Holstein by the present Duke having ventured to defend it against the King of Denmark, and the House of Oldenburg equally by the Grand Duke having taken a different view on the German question from that which would be pleasing to the Emperor of Russia?" The Queen hoped that Palmerston "will take care that it is not supposed that England coincides in these Doctrines."

Of course Palmerston refrained from complying with the last request. But on the 22nd he was able to inform the Queen that he had already written a dispatch to Bloomfield to correct Nesselrode's misrepresentation of the London Protocol.² The Protocol, the dispatch stated, expressed merely opinions and wishes.³ Palmerston stated in his letter to the Queen that he had not mentioned the question of the Duke of Augustenburg's possible right to a part of Holstein "because it seemed to him to relate to matters with which Your Majesty's Government can scarcely be considered called upon or competent to interfere."

By Article 2 of the London Protocol, it rested with the King of Denmark to take the initiative in the question of the succession. British Mediation. II, p. 216 ff. gives an idea of the great aversion with which Denmark regarded the candidate favoured by Russia and Britain, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. I also mentioned in Vol. II the words used by Peter Browne on the last day of April in connection with the question of the succession: "It goes on like everything here, as slowly as possible."

Summer and autumn 1850 passed without a decision. As mentioned above (p. 19), Pechlin tried during conversations with

¹ R.A.W. I 24/92.

² R.A.W. I 24/93.

³ Correspondence, p. 54: 18/2. — In his dispatch of 2/3, No. 20, Lagerheim remarked of this dispatch, which had been communicated to Wynn, that it was fortunate for Denmark that the other powers did not interpret the Protocol in the same way as Palmerston.

Russian statesmen on his mission to Vienna to smooth the path for the candidature of Prince Christian. If only the Tsar would give us Prince Christian with his excellent wife and flourishing family as the new dynasty, wrote Pechlin in a letter of the 25th of October to Wulf von Plessen, who had accompanied Prince Christian to Warsaw.¹ In October, when Reventlow was asked by Palmerston how the question of the succession was progressing, he replied that he had received no official information of any kind about it for a long time.² But, he added, the news of the conduct of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg in Slesvig-Holstein affairs was not of a very encouraging nature. Palmerston said that was a pity, and "I dropped the matter."

In the letter to Reedtz, "my noble-minded friend and faithful ally," Reventlow stated his opinion in the following words: He had until now been in favour of the Heir Presumptive of Oldenburg, but, if the news about his views was correct, Prince Christian and his two sons would be best qualified as heirs to the throne. Now he had spoken his mind. He left it to Reedtz to use the information – for instance to tell "dem dritten im Bunde", i.e. Pechlin.

A good month later Reventlow gave an account of another talk he had had with Palmerston about the question of the succession.³ Palmerston did indeed admit that the Duke of Augustenborg could not claim Slesvig, but Holstein or his quota thereof. To this Reventlow replied that the Duke of Augustenborg had taken part in the Rebellion against his Sovereign, the King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein. Palmerston agreed that this was so, but if the Duke's consent to the arrangement of the succession was not obtained, he might render the integrity of the Danish Monarchy insecure. He could say that as long as the King lived he would take no action, but after his death he would take possession of the whole of Holstein or that part to which he was entitled. Palmerston was also of the opinion that the Danish Government could not forbid the Duke to live on his estates in Holstein. Reventlow explained that the Duke owned estates only in Slesvig.

¹ Holstens pacifikation.

² Reventlow to Reedtz 24/10.

³ Reventlow to Reedtz 2/12.

Reventlow mentioned, furthermore, that his own opinions of the claims of the Duke of Augustenborg almost coincided with those Palmerston had expressed in a dispatch to Westmorland and of which he had received a copy. Reventlow was presumably referring to the dispatch of the 27th of August to Howard.¹ The dispatch instructed, as already mentioned (p. 38), Howard to ask Schleinitz if it were not correct that Holstein would be subdivided, if the male line became extinct: Denmark would receive one part, the Tsar would obtain Kiel and its neighbourhood, and the remainder would go to other claimants. Palmerston found that this could not be in the interests of Germany. Schleinitz' answer I have also mentioned before.²

In February 1851 Reventlow mentioned that, in addition to the Court, Lord Bruce was very active on behalf of the Duke of Augustenborg.³ However, he did not think that Lord Bruce would be able to influence Palmerston to any great extent.

If the Danish Government succeeded in substituting Prince Christian of Glücksburg for the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, it would be essential to obtain Russia's approval – not only on account of the Tsar's possible claims with regard to Holstein, but on account of Russia's dominating position at the present moment. As mentioned above, Nesselrode had told Bloomfield on the 3rd of February that he had not the slightest objection to Prince Christian.

At the end of February Wynn had a discussion with Reedtze about the question of the succession, and in the course of conversation withdrew his predilection for the Duke of Oldenburg (British Mediation. II, p. 218 ff.).⁴ As he wrote, Britain had not "any predilections to consult" and would be prepared "to acquiesce in, and support any selection" which the King of Denmark considered "most likely to ensure the Integrity and future welfare of the Country." Wynn stated that Palmerston had previously expressed himself thus and only mentioned

¹ Correspondence, p. 40 f.

² Correspondence, 41 f.

³ Reventlow to Reedtze 24/2. – Lord Bruce is presumably the eldest son of Charles Brudenell Bruce, Marquis of Aylesbury (died 1856), whose daughter had been married to Landgrave Christian Conrad Sophus Dannebergkjold-Samsøe, a brother to the wives of the Duke of Augustenborg and the Prince of Noer.

⁴ F.O. 97/121: 24/2, No. 22. – Correspondence, p. 55 f. – Lagerheim's dispatch 26/2, No. 18.

“the Family of Oldenburg as then appearing the most likely to be agreeable.” On the 8th of March Wynn received Palmerston’s approval of the statements mentioned here. Palmerston added that Britain did not want to take an active part in the debate about the most suitable heir to the throne.¹ Russia was also informed of this attitude.²

On the 20th of March when David Urquhart asked a question about the matter of the Danish succession, Palmerston formed his reply in keeping with this attitude.³

Urquhart had first asked when “the papers connected with the affairs of the Duchies and Denmark would be laid on the table of the house.” To this Palmerston replied that he did not intend to lay more papers on the table in connection with a matter which was no longer of any interest. The correspondence would fill more than 2,000 pages, “which probably no member would read, and which, if any member did read, it would be throwing away his time.” Then Urquhart asked if any arrangement had been made “respecting the succession to the crown of Denmark and the succession to the principality” [Holstein]. Palmerston replied that several negotiations had been conducted on the matter, but that the British Government “studiously and systematically held aloof, and strictly confined themselves to endeavouring to secure the restoration of peace between Denmark and the German Confederation.” Later, when Reventlow in a conversation ventured to interpret Palmerston’s statement as a Parliamentary manner of speaking to avoid discussion of the matter while negotiations were going on, Palmerston said: You are quite right, it only meant that we have avoided to take the initiative.⁴ Britain would, no doubt, contribute to the final arrangement and see that the stipulation contained in the London Protocol was carried into effect.

Far from contributing to it, Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and his brother, Prince Albert, would have done all they could to hinder it, if they had had it their way. Duke Ernst collaborated with some persons whom he asserted were “experts on Denmark’s

¹ Correspondence, p. 56.

² *Ibid.*: p. 58 f.

³ *The Times* 21/3 1851. – Reventlow’s dispatch 21/3, No. 14.

⁴ Reventlow to Reedtz 23/4.

Constitutional Law and Law of Succession," and drew up, or had drawn up, a memorandum to show that the Duke of Augustenborg would inherit the Crown of Denmark on the death of Landgravine Charlotte of Hesse.¹ He sent this memorandum to both King Friedrich Wilhelm and Schwarzenberg.² In his letter to the King of Prussia he wrote that he hoped that he had not yet signed "the unfortunate London Protocol." He flattered Schwarzenberg by stating that Germany's fate lay more or less alone in the hands of Austria.³

In his reply of the 15th of April, Schwarzenberg, of course, dissociated himself from Duke Ernst's characterization of the London Protocol.⁴ He wrote that the signatory powers regarded the continued connection of the constituent parts of the Danish Monarchy as desirable, and Austria had only signed while reserving the rights of the Confederation. He was convinced that it would be "eine sehr unsichere und herben Enttäuschungen ausgesetzte Bahn, – wollte man auf eine durch streitigen Erbgang zufällig in Aussicht gestellte, aber schwerlich ohne einen nordischen Krieg zu verwirklichende Lösung des uralten Verbandes zwischen Dänemark und den Herzogthümern hinwirken, statt die grossen Vortheile zu verfolgen, welche dieser Verband nach den bestehenden Verhältnissen Dänemarks und des deutschen Bundes diesem zu gewähren verspricht."

Friedrich Wilhelm did not answer until the 23rd of May. He challenged the Duke's rash assertion that the Duke of Augustenborg was heir to the Crown of Denmark. Furthermore, it appeared from the King's reply that now he, too, regarded the integrity of the Danish Monarchy to be in the interests of Europe.

On the 1st of April, in spite of grave misgivings on the part of the Danish-National members, the Danish Government decided to entrust Pechlin, as the most suitable person, with the task of going to Russia to obtain the Tsar's support for Denmark's

¹ Ernst. I, p. 461 ff.

² R.A.W. I 25/42: 31/3.

³ Ernst made no mention of this in his book. He mentions no date for his letter to Friedrich Wilhelm.

⁴ R.A.W. I 25/60. – Ernst. I, p. 464 ff. On p. 465 Abgang is a misprint for Erb-gang.

candidate for the throne, Prince Christian of Glücksburg.¹ Pechlin was directed to keep entirely to the question of the succession and not embark on discussions about the ordinary policy of the Cabinet.

On the 5th of April, Ungern Sternberg wrote that, by their choice, the Cabinet had given Pechlin striking proof of their confidence in his loyalty, as it was generally known that his views on conditions in the Duchies were materially different from those of the Government. He could, continued Sternberg, do much harm by declaring how little developments in the matter harmonized with the advice given by Russia, Austria, Prussia and Britain.

But even if Pechlin kept off the subject, how could the Tsar or Nesselrode, the Chancellor, be prevented from telling Pechlin that they strongly denounced Denmark's Democratic-National policy.² Pechlin brought home very satisfactory results with regard to the question of the succession. The Tsar assented to the proposal of letting the succession pass to the Glücksburg line, and would renounce on behalf of himself and his descendants any rights of succession in Holstein, if it were thereby possible to keep the Kingdom of Denmark intact.³ The Tsar also wrote to the Grand Duke of Oldenburg and told him that the question of the succession of his line must now be regarded as having been dropped.

On the 29th of April, Bloomfield gave an account of Pechlin's mission and stated that the previous day the Danish envoy had been received in audience by the Tsar, who was very friendly and had no objections to Prince Christian's candidature.⁴ In another dispatch of the same date, he mentioned Nesselrode's strong disapproval of the intentions of the Danish Government "to destroy every link that bound Sleswig to Holstein . . ."⁵ At the beginning of May, Bloomfield reported that Nesselrode thought that, if the representatives of the London Protocol "were to reassemble in Conference for the discussion of the question . . .," it would be a help in coming to an arrangement

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 227 ff.

² See Nesselrode. X, p. 45; 1/5 to Meyendorff.

³ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 299.

⁴ F.O. 97/123: 29/4, No. 94. - Correspondence, p. 59 f.

⁵ F.O. 97/123: 29/4, No. 95. - Correspondence, p. 60.

respecting the question of the succession.¹ However, on the 24th Palmerston replied to this suggestion by saying that he did not think that a conference should be held on the matter: It was an internal affair for Denmark "with due regard to all the interests concerned in it."²

However, Palmerston expressed himself somewhat differently in a conversation on the 29th of May with Reventlow.³ Reventlow pointed out what an honour it would be for Queen Victoria if such an intricate matter as the question of the Danish succession could be solved during her reign and at her Court. Reventlow said that Russia had informed Brunnow of the Tsar's wish that negotiations should take place in London. But at St. Petersburg it was feared that Palmerston would not agree to this. However, Palmerston assured Reventlow that he was willing, together with representatives of the other Great Powers, to consider Danish proposals, offer advice and, if desired, mediate. He did not seem to share Reventlow's doubt as to whether Bunsen was a suitable representative for Prussia at such negotiations, as Bunsen, of course, would have to abide by his instructions. When Reventlow mentioned King Friedrich Wilhelm's "wrong views" of the question of the succession, Palmerston said: Yes, he is aiming at a division of the Monarchy, so he supports the Duke of Augustenborg. But that solution does not agree with European politics and the views of the Great Powers.

About the middle of April Austria and Prussia had made strong protests about conditions in Slesvig in dispatches to their respective Ministers in Copenhagen.⁴ The German powers had requested Russia to support these applications. Nesselrode did this in a dispatch of the 1st of May to Ungern Sternberg. The dispatch contained a violent denunciation of the policy pursued by the Danish Government.⁵ At the meeting of the Council of State on the 14th of May, Reedtz called the dispatch "perhaps the most regrettable step taken by Russia from the point of view

¹ Correspondence, p. 60 f. (5/5).

² *Ibid.*: p. 61; cf. p. 66: Palmerston to Magenis 25/6: You have correctly understood my supposed unwillingness to refer the question of the succession to a conference in London.

³ Reventlow to Reedtz 29/5.

⁴ Thorsoe. II, p. 135 ff.

⁵ Ungern Sternberg's dispatch 14/5, No. 79; cf. 18/5, No. 80. — Westmorland's dispatch 11/5, No. 144. F.O. 97/123.

of the Danish Government.”¹ As it was known that the Tsar was going to have a meeting very soon in Warsaw with the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, Reedtz suggested that Denmark sent an envoy to Warsaw to explain and defend her policy. He proposed Carl Moltke, who he knew from a recent conversation agreed on the whole with the Government’s policy.

However, when it came to the point, Carl Moltke excused himself from being sent on the mission. In spite of the fact that various voices were raised against such a mission, Reedtz maintained that it also on account of the question of succession was necessary to send a personal envoy to endeavour to regain Russia’s confidence. The result was that Reedtz, at Sponneck’s suggestion, undertook to go to Warsaw himself. On the 22nd of May, A. W. Moltke informed Reventlow that he was taking over the Foreign Ministry as Reedtz was going to Warsaw to give the powers whose “coopération est nécessaire pour l’œuvre de la pacification, une idée juste de Ses [the King’s] intentions à cet égard.”²

About the middle of May, Westmorland spoke both to Friedrich Wilhelm IV and to Manteuffel about the question of the succession.³ Westmorland was invited to dinner with the King, who asked him about Britain’s views on the succession. Westmorland answered diplomatically that it was up to the Danish Government to take the initiative. The King then remarked that he was definitely in favour of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, but that the Duke of Augustenborg would have to be indemnified (possibly with the Duchy of Lauenburg). He did not consider Prince Christian to be a good choice. When Westmorland mentioned that Tsar Nicholas wanted the matter brought before the London Conference, the King said that he was pleased that he was no party to that conference. He demanded the maintenance of the “union” between Slesvig and Holstein as promised in 1846. Westmorland’s reference to the peace preliminaries made no impression on him. He was, as mentioned above, extremely dissatisfied with the Danish Administration in Slesvig.

Whereas Friedrich Wilhelm was opposed to Prince Christian, Manteuffel said that he had not yet decided what advice he

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 284 f.

² Moltke to Reventlow 22/5, No. 8.

³ F.O. 97/123: 13/5, Nos. 148 and 149.

would give the King on the matter. But, in pursuance of the provision in the Peace Treaty, he would be willing, together with the other powers, to discuss a proposal from the King of Denmark. He realized the difficulties that existed both with regard to the Grand Duke of Oldenburg and the Duke of Augustenborg.

When Pechlin reached Berlin on the 17th of May on his way back from Russia, Westmorland persuaded him to request an audience of Manteuffel.¹ According to Westmorland, Pechlin received only the message that the King and Manteuffel maintained that "the existing Rights of all Parties concerned could not be set aside but in a legal manner."

On the 23rd of May, Reedtz arrived in Berlin and had a talk with Westmorland.² On the 25th he reached Warsaw, where the Tsar, accompanied by Nesselrode and Meyendorff, had negotiated with the King of Prussia and Manteuffel. But Nesselrode and Meyendorff had left Warsaw the day Reedtz arrived.³ It is true that the Tsar did not leave until the 27th for Olmütz, where negotiations were conducted with the Emperor of Austria and Schwarzenberg, but he informed Reedtz that he could not receive him until he returned to Warsaw. In the meantime Reedtz enjoyed the Tsar's palatial hospitality and was waited on by innumerable servants.

On the 1st of June the Tsar, Nesselrode and Meyendorff returned to Warsaw. The next day Reedtz had his first conference with Nesselrode, and on the 3rd he was received in audience by the Tsar and invited to dinner. Several conferences followed with the Russian statesmen, and a considerable number of discussions took place about the question of the succession. Mention will be made later of the results.

On the other hand, Reedtz did not achieve the main object of his mission: to give Russia a different view of the Danish Cabinet and its policy. Nesselrode said flatly that if men such as Madvig and Clausen were not removed, Russia would no longer be able to support the Danish cause. The letter which Reedtz brought home to Frederik VII from the Tsar urged him to change his advisers.

¹ F.O. 97/123: 18/5, No. 157, and 20/5, No. 159. — Bielke's dispatch 22/5.

² F.O. 97/123: 23/5, No. 164.

³ For the following see Reedtz's report 10/6 from Vienna. Arvefølgesagen I. — Neergaard. I, p. 546 ff. and Thorsøe. II, p. 149 ff.

After conferring with the Russian statesmen, Reedtz went from Warsaw to Vienna, where he negotiated on the 10th with Schwarzenberg. He travelled home by way of Berlin, Kiel and Flensburg. A few days after he reached Copenhagen he gave an account of the unsuccessful result of his mission at the meeting of the Council of State on the 27th.¹ He handed in his resignation in order to bring about the changes demanded by Russia and the German powers.

These demands were only partly met in the new Cabinet, which has also been called the "Half-way Cabinet." It is true that H. N. Clausen was no longer a member, but Madvig remained in office. The foreign powers, however, must have been pleased that Carl Moltke, a Conservative, was appointed, but as a Minister without portfolio, and that Tillisch, who had been Minister for Slesvig, became Minister for Home Affairs.

Reedtz said to Lagerheim that the previous Cabinet had been "eccentric," the present was more homogeneous.² And he told Tegoborski that the result still perhaps left something to be desired, but the retention of Madvig was the only concession he had made, and that had been done at the last moment.³

Although Britain did not take a direct part in the attack on the free Danish constitution, her criticism of the administration in Slesvig and her continual requests to Denmark to be conciliatory towards the Slesvig-Holsteiners had more or less the same effect as the pressure exerted by Prussia, Austria and Russia. Hodges's report, which had been made at Reedtz's suggestion, was another effective weapon in the hands of Denmark's opponents.

As mentioned above, Westmorland had asked for a copy of Hodges's final report. While Reedtz was staying in Berlin on his way home, Westmorland showed him the report.⁴ According to Westmorland, Reedtz was "much struck with it as it contained information of which he was ignorant." When Westmorland previously informed Manteuffel in confidence "the substance of this report,"⁵ Manteuffel expressed the hope that Palmerston

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 320 ff.

² Lagerheim's dispatch 17/7, No. 66.

³ Tegoborski's dispatch 13/7, No. 109.

⁴ F.O. 97/124: 19/6, No. 195.

⁵ *Ibid.*: 5/6, No. 176.

would advise the Danish Government "to modify some of the regulations both Military and Civil which have been established there."

I mention here that already on the 6th of June the Danish Government had issued a decree concerning the modification of the state of siege in South Slesvig.¹ Moltke asked Reventlow to inform the British Government and stated that the King was considering new modifications.² Wynn congratulated Palmerston on the first result of Hodges's mission, "and I trust it is only the Forerunner of a more conciliatory spirit in the Government of Slesvig." Palmerston expressed his satisfaction with the decree of the 6th, but requested Wynn to urge the Danish Government to abolish the state of siege completely as soon as possible.³ If new unrest broke out, wrote Palmerston, a "renewal of Martial Law [would] be justified and would relieve the Danish Government from the charge to which it is now liable of suspending the ordinary and established Rule of the Law without an adequate necessity." However, the state of siege was not completely lifted until the beginning of February 1852 after important changes had taken place in the Danish Government.

In his above-mentioned dispatch of the 5th of June, Westmorland mentioned that he had received a visit from Thümen, who was satisfied with Hodges's report. Westmorland wrote that Thümen had now left for Warsaw together with the Prince of Prussia, who wanted him to give his views to the Tsar on the Danish Administration in Slesvig.

The Prince was accompanied on his journey to Warsaw by his son, Friedrich Wilhelm, whom he wished to present to the Tsar.⁴ In a letter of the 2nd of June, Prince Albert had assured the Prince that all his stock of "political experience and knowledge" was at his disposal.⁵ But even if he had received some of this, it would hardly have been of much use to him. As he wrote on the 26th to Prince Albert: "Meine kurze Apparition in War-

¹ Cf. Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 314.

² Dispatch 12/6, No. 11. – Wynn to Palmerston 9/6, No. 65, and 16/6, No. 67. F.O. 97/124.

³ F.O. 97/124: 24/6, No. 52.

⁴ Cf. Victoria's letter of the 5th of June to Princess Augusta whose fears she allayed regarding the Tsar's bad influence. Bolitho: Further Letters of Queen Victoria (1938), p. 24.

⁵ R.A.W. I 26/3.

schau [which the Tsar left between the 9th and 10th] war ohne alles politisches Interesse, indem ich mich nicht auszusprechen hatte da, wo der König und sein Premier gesprochen hatten'' [at the meeting with the Tsar at the end of May].¹

Thümen was well known to the Tsar, who is said to have been informed of Hodges's report on conditions in Slesvig.² But no doubt the Tsar also expressed very clearly to Thümen how much he disapproved of developments in Holstein.³

It was presumably Cowley's letter of the 2nd of June to Palmerston, which gave an account of his conversation with Rochow about the negotiations at Warsaw,⁴ which provoked another attack on the London Protocol in a letter from Prince Albert to Russell. The Protocol was of much the same importance for Prince Albert as King Charles the First's head was for Mr Dick in "David Copperfield."

On the 7th [?] of June, Prince Albert advised Russell to read a dispatch from Colonel Gustav du Plat, the British Consul-General at Warsaw, as well as Cowley's letter.⁵ They showed, wrote Prince Albert, that Germany was in the hands of the Tsar and that there was a split between the sovereigns and their subjects: "This end I feared when I lamented the signature of the London Protocol. This Protocol isolated Prussia, made the King fly to Manteuffel for aid and has delivered him and his Minister (hand and foot) to the Emperor of Russia."

In his answer of the 8th Russell was not quite able to follow Prince Albert's logic.⁶ Thus he did not think that the London Protocol could be the cause of Friedrich Wilhelm's attack on the Prussian Constitution when the old Prussian Provincial Diets were re-established pursuant to the ordinance of the 28th of May: "his own erroneous policy had already separated him from all the great Powers of Europe, and when he wished to

¹ R.A.W. I 26/26.

² Altonaer Mercur 22/6.

³ Altonaer Mercur 17/6. – Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 327: Reedtz's statement.

⁴ Correspondence, p. 63.

⁵ R.A.W. I 26/14: 7[?]/6. Cf. Prince Albert's letter 18/6 to Prince Wilhelm. Jagow, p. 234 f. – Regarding Gustav du Plat's pro-Prussian attitude see his letter to Bidwell, a clerk at the Foreign Office. F.O. 65/398.

⁶ R.A.W. I 26/15.

make war he had no cause, and no allies." Russell was of the opinion that Manteuffel had "procured him some advantages at the sacrifice of a position which could not long be maintained."

Reedtz's mission to Warsaw had one important, positive result. As mentioned above, on his mission to St. Petersburg Pechlin had secured the Tsar's support for the settlement of the question of the succession which Denmark wanted carried through. This was now officially expressed in the Warsaw Protocol of the 5th of June signed by Nesselrode, Meyendorff and Reedtz.¹ Baron Sacken was responsible for the draft, which was amended slightly during the negotiations with Reedtz.² Its introduction referred to the former treaties between Russia and Denmark of 1767 and 1773 when Catherine the Great renounced the rights of her son (the later Tsar Paul) concerning the Duchies. Then four Articles followed. Article 1 laid down that the integrity of the Danish Monarchy could only be upheld by introducing male succession in all its parts and by excluding women. Article 2 mentioned the rights of succession which Prince Christian's and Princess Louise's male descendants would have when the Princess's mother, Landgravine Charlotte of Hesse, and her (Princess Louise's) brother and sister, Prince Frederik and Princess Marie of Anhalt-Dessau, renounced their rights (cf. below p. 173). In Article 3 the Tsar, as head of the eldest branch of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, renounced any rights he might have in favour of Prince Christian and his male descendants. However, certain reservations were made, one of them, of course, being that, if the contemplated settlement of the question of the succession was not carried through, the renunciation was not to take effect. Article 4 stated that, in consequence of the statements made in Articles 2 and 3, Prince Christian and Princess Louise and thereafter their male descendants had a greater title than any other line to succeed to the whole Monarchy. Finally, it was stated that the two Courts had agreed that the King of Denmark was to inform the Friendly Powers of his decision with regard to the question of the suc-

¹ Correspondence, p. 103 ff.

² Arvefølgesagen 1.

cession. If further renunciations were deemed to be useful and desirable, the King would pledge himself to pay indemnity if necessary. To give the arrangement European recognition, the necessary negotiations were to take place in London.

For the time being, the Warsaw Protocol was kept secret. Thus it was not until the 31st of July that Reventlow received a copy of it with a dispatch which also enclosed other documents showing how the question of the succession was progressing.¹ However, as early as the 1st of July he was able to give Reedtztz "his share of the thanks which every Dane owes you for your loyal endeavours for the future welfare of your country, endeavours, which according to information I have received from Brunnow, have led to the desired result."

While the Danish Government had no reason to expect that Austria would raise objections to the contemplated solution of the problem of the succession,² things were different as regards Prussia. Presumably Friedrich Wilhelm felt himself bound to a high degree by his declaration of the 24th of March 1848 to the Duke of Augustenborg in which he had expressed his approval of the Slesvig-Holstein programme. But Prussia was under strong pressure from Russia, who was still trying – but as yet to no avail – to persuade Prussia to sign the London Protocol.³

At the beginning of June, Westmorland reported what Manteuffel had told him about Friedrich Wilhelm's views on the question of the succession.⁴ The King was still "in favour of the Prince of Oldenburg but he wished the King of Denmark to negotiate with all the Princes having claims to that succession." Afterwards he could submit the result to the Sovereigns who were interested in the question for their sanction. As can be seen, this necessitated negotiations with the Duke of Augustenborg, which the King of Denmark and the Government would never agree to. Furthermore, Manteuffel was of the opinion that the Duke's sons would not be able to ascend the throne of Denmark on account of the fact that their mother was not of princely birth.

¹ 31/7, No. 14.

² Cf. Magen's dispatch 7/6. Correspondence, p. 63 f.

³ Thus Lefebvre wrote 7/6, No. 54, that Budberg had told him of the efforts being made to induce Prussia to accede to the London Protocol—efforts, which so far had been unavailing.

⁴ F.O. 97/124: 4/6, No. 174.

On the 18th of June, while he was in Berlin on his way back to Copenhagen, Reedtz had a conversation of about two hours with the King in the presence of Manteuffel.¹ Friedrich Wilhelm was aware of Russia's wishes, but did not know that the Warsaw Protocol had been signed.

According to the report of the conversation given by Reedtz to Westmorland, the King began by saying that he would uphold the Resolution of the Diet of 1846. He denounced the National Liberal Ministers, H. N. Clausen and Madvig, who wanted Slesvig to be incorporated in Denmark. With regard to the succession, he said first that he would maintain the legal Rights of all Parties. Reedtz replied by saying that, at the moment, he could only give an outline of Denmark's plan for the succession, but he would give further information after his return to Copenhagen. Reedtz said that the Danish Government rejected all claims on the part of the Duke of Augustenborg to the Succession in the Duchies, and gave reasons for this (marriages with wives of unequal birth, omitted asking for the investiture of the fief). Reedtz told Manteuffel, but not the King, that if the Duke of Augustenborg applied to the Federal Diet, the Government would accuse him of high treason in the Danish Supreme Court. Friedrich Wilhelm offered to act as mediator between Denmark and the Duke of Augustenborg and to "endeavour to get the Duke . . . to renounce his claim, provided he was offered an indemnity." Reedtz said that the Danish Government was indifferent to the Duke's renunciation, but was prepared "to offer an indemnity which they would willingly submit to His Majesty that He might recommend it to the Duke."

According to a report from Howard on the 28th of June, Friedrich Wilhelm had, in fact, when the Duke applied to him to protect his rights recommended him "to arrange those rights by way of a compromise with the King of Denmark."² The Duke's reply was, however, couched in very vague phrases.

On the 22nd the Duke had made an application to the Federal Diet requesting its help in regaining possession of his estates in Slesvig and also protesting against his exclusion from the amnesty

¹ F.O. 97/124: 19/6, No. 195. – Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 320 f. – For Friedrich Wilhelm's views on the question of the succession see also Osten, p. 224 (5/6).

² Correspondence, p. 67.

pursuant to the royal proclamation of the 10th of May.¹ Bülow requested the Diet to reject the case, as it concerned the King of Denmark's prerogatives and the Duke's estates were in Slesvig, not in Holstein.

Manteuffel also told the French Minister that the Duke of Augustenborg should be offered "des indemnités" to overcome his opposition.² For it could not either be denied that innumerable objections could be raised to his pretensions.

During Reedtz's absence the Assembly of Notables at Flensburg had continued to discuss the plan for the organization of the Monarchy. But, as Wynn informed Palmerston, the Holstein Notables, with Wiese, a judge of the High Court of Appeal as spokesman, had insisted, on the 31st of May, that relations between Slesvig and Holstein should again be as they were in 1848 [before the Rebellion].³ Wynn thought that this unbending attitude was due to news from Berlin through A. F. W. Forchhammer, the lawyer, and referred to Westmorland's dispatch of the 13th of May in which he reported the King's correspondingly severe demands. When Westmorland subsequently informed Manteuffel of Copenhagen's suspicions that the Holsteiners' conduct was due to Berlin, Manteuffel said that he had never seen Forchhammer.⁴ But "he was well aware that he had constantly been in close relation with d'Usedom, who had been a great protector of the Sleswig-Holstein Stattholders . . . and that he had no doubt he had carried to Flensburg the feelings by which that party in Berlin were animated." Manteuffel said that the King, however, had never had any connection with Forchhammer.

The declaration of the Holstein members provoked a counter declaration (of the 3rd) on the part of all the members from Slesvig and the Kingdom.⁵ When the Assembly of Notables closed in the middle of July, there were three recommendations: that of the Holsteiners; a recommendation from eight members from Slesvig and six from the Kingdom, which went slightly

¹ Correspondence, p. 68 and 70 ff. — F.O. 97/124: 30/6, No. 193.

² Lefebvre's dispatch 7/7, No. 59.

³ F.O. 97/124: 4/6, No. 64.

⁴ *Ibid.*: 14/6, No. 189.

⁵ Dispatch to Reventlow 6/6, No. 9; cf. 10/6, No. 10.

further in a Danish-Slesvig direction than the Government's proposal; and a separate recommendation from Prehn, one of the members from Slesvig. Hodges commended this last proposal.¹ On his way home from Berlin Reedtz had surprised both Blome and Reventlow-Criminil by telling them that the programme put before the Notables would inevitably be the starting point for the settlement of the constitutional question.² As mentioned above, Reedtz's resignation on his return to Copenhagen involved Cabinet changes. Moltke's Third Ministry inherited both the question of the constitution and the question of the succession.

10. Austria's and Prussia's pressure on Denmark supported by Russia and Britain (July–October)

At the end of June, Westmorland left Berlin without seeing the end of the Danish-German conflict, which had occupied him since it broke out in the spring of 1848. His departure, wrote the French Minister, caused general regret.³ For the first two months, Howard, the British chargé d'affaires, who had also followed the course of the conflict since its beginning, was in charge of the Legation.

At the end of November, 1850, Bloomfield had learnt that Palmerston intended to move him from St. Petersburg to a post which was not so injurious to his wife's health.⁴ In April, 1851, he was appointed Westmorland's successor in Berlin. About the middle of July, 1851, he handed over his credentials there to the King,⁵ and Manteuffel was present on the occasion. He is described by Lady Bloomfield as "a small man, nervous and embarrassed in society, but shrewd and intelligent."

Bloomfield's successor in St. Petersburg was Lord Hamilton Seymour. Until his arrival in the middle of September, Buchanan, the British chargé d'affaires, officiated. Nesselrode received me,

¹ F.O. 97/124: 19/7, No. 52, and 22/7, No. 53.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 326.

³ Lefebvre's dispatch 28/6, No. 58. — See also Palmerston's letter 12/7 to Bunsen concerning the letters from the King and Queen of Prussia on the occasion of Westmorland's departure. F.O. 64/336.

⁴ Georgiana, Baroness Bloomfield: *Reminiscences of Court and Diplomatic Life*. I (1883), p. 313 f. — F.O. 356/29: 26/11 and 8/12. — F.O. 356/31: 19/4 51.

⁵ Georgiana Bloomfield: *Op. cit.* II, p. 5.

wrote Seymour, "with great cordiality of manner."¹ Nesselrode expressed his great satisfaction with Seymour, even if he did not have "le sourire toujours sur les lèvres comme notre ami Bloomfield, mais cela ne l'empêche pas d'avoir de l'esprit et une conversation agréable. Sa femme, idem."²

Judging by Mellish's letters to Cowley, it looks as if the latter would have liked Westmorland's post in Berlin.³ However, he had to remain at Frankfurt, but after the re-establishment of the Federal Diet, he was accredited to it as Minister.

The decision to send Westmorland to Vienna had obviously been made in the autumn of 1850.⁴ He was appointed Minister there at the end of January, 1851, but in a letter of the 28th of February he informed Cowley that he was "in no hurry about going to Vienna."⁵ Palmerston had, he remarked, always been "most kind and friendly towards me on every occasion," and had, on the whole, left it to me, "expressing a wish I should see the end of the Danish affair." As mentioned above, he did not, after all, get a chance of doing that in Berlin. After a long stay in London, he arrived in Vienna in October.

Mention must be made of several important changes which took place in the diplomatic corps in London in the course of the summer. From the end of June, France was represented by Count Walewski, the son of Napoleon I and a Polish countess, and, therefore, a cousin of the President of France. In the middle of July, Count Buol von Schauenstein was accredited as Austria's Minister in London. He succeeded Schwarzenberg on the latter's sudden death in April, 1852. Although he was sharply opposed to Manteuffel's Ministry, Bunsen retained his post as Prussian Minister in London and, as he once wrote, King Friedrich Wilhelm held on to him with "the loyalty of a King and a friend."⁶ His private remarks made it clear that he considered Manteuffel and the Devil to be one and the same; but he believed that for those who feared God, all things worked together for good.⁷ Bunsen found strong support in the English Court.

¹ F.O. 97/125: 18/9, No. 3.

² Nesselrode. X, p. 57 f.

³ F.O. 519/163: 27/11 50 and F.O. 519/164: 29/1 51.

⁴ F.O. 519/163: 27/11. — See also Georgiana Bloomfield: Op. cit. I, p. 314.

⁵ F.O. 519/164.

⁶ Bunsen. III, p. 107 (letter 15/5 51).

⁷ Ibid., p. 111.

Brunnow, Russia's Minister, had leave from sometime in August and did not return to London until November.¹ Denmark's representative, Count Reventlow, had leave in September and went to Scotland, where he died suddenly on the 6th of October. Bielke, who was in Berlin, but had formerly served in London, was sent back there by the Government.

From the 1st of July until the beginning of October, while Ungern Sternberg was at Ems on account of his health, Tegoborski, the Russian Secretary of Legation, officiated in Copenhagen.

The changes in the Danish Cabinet on the 13th of July, when N. H. Clausen left and Carl Moltke was appointed, were considered by the foreign conservative Governments to be insufficient. When Lefebvre asked him if he was satisfied with the Cabinet changes, Manteuffel deplored the fact that Madvig had remained in the Cabinet.² He said of Tillisch that it was true that he had committed "des actes de rigueur déplorable" in Slesvig, but he was an energetic Conservative and he was not displeased to see him as Minister for Home Affairs. Bloomfield discussed the Cabinet changes with Le Coq, who found them "very insignificant and not calculated to restore a good feeling in Holstein."³

Russia's attitude was of especial importance for Denmark. On the 22nd of July, Buchanan wrote that a person who was in Nesselrode's confidence had described the Cabinet changes as "a mere illusory concession to those who disapproved of the Ultra Danish and Democratic tendency" in the last Cabinet.⁴ Nesselrode himself expressed to Buchanan "the worst possible opinion" of the Danish Constitution, but "evaded making any distinct avowal as to how far and by what means he thought it may be revised." Buchanan, in stating his views, emphasized "the impolicy and danger of modifying by illegal means a Constitution once granted by a Sovereign to his Subjects." In connection with this it must be mentioned that, in a letter written in September to Meyendorff, Nesselrode remarked that it was more important for the Danish Government to think

¹ Reventlow's dispatch. 7/8, No. 24.

² Lefebvre's dispatch 21/8, No. 65.

³ F.O. 97/125: 31/7, No. 16. - Correspondence, p. 74.

⁴ Ibid.: 22/7, No. 12.

seriously of getting rid of "une détestable constitution, avec laquelle il est impossible de gouverner un pays quelconque" than of how close the administrative ties should be between Slesvig and Holstein.¹

However, it was hardly possible to repeal the Danish Constitution. Neither the King "nor any administration He could form, have the Power of overturning" it, wrote Wynn, about the middle of August.² He pointed out that the real difficulty was whether Slesvig was to have a constitution with Provincial Estates or one similar to the Danish Constitution.

The latter arrangement would be an advantage for those with Danish sympathies, the former for Germanism, which was predominant in the upper classes. Moreover, the introduction of the Provincial Estates harmonized with the Conservative forces in Prussia and Austria, and Denmark could by no means expect support from Russia in transferring the principles of the Danish Constitution to Slesvig. Neither was such support to be expected from Britain or France. Only in the event of a direct attack on the Danish Constitution was there presumably a chance that Palmerston, the champion of the Constitutional system, would make a stand against Russia.³

The re-formation of the Danish Cabinet had not given it a homogeneous character. This was apparent, for instance, from the differing views as to whether, in spite of the Revolution, the Provincial Estates in the Duchies could still be regarded as being in existence. It was mentioned above (p. 137) that when Bille-Brahe opened the Assembly of Notables he answered this question in the affirmative, but the Council of State discounted his statement to some extent. Carl Moltke, who had become a member of the new Cabinet, firmly maintained during a discussion in the Council of State on the 8th of August that the Provincial Estates were part of the "legally existing laws" for Holstein.⁴ Reedtz was of the same opinion.

¹ Nesselrode, X, p. 53.

² F.O. 97/125: 18/8, No. 86.

³ Walewski expressed this opinion in a dispatch of 21/11, No. 44; cf. Lefebvre's dispatch 20/10, No. 73, where he stated that agreement between the 5 powers did not extend to constitutional matters as far as France, and presumably Britain, was concerned.

⁴ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 358 ff.

The discussion mentioned above concerned the question of what answer was to be given to Austria's and Prussia's dispatches of the 30th of July and the 4th of August respectively. These dispatches insisted on a definite declaration from the Danish Government as to the arrangements to be made with regard to Holstein's affairs. The authority given by the Federal Diet to the two powers had been extended in June, but only by six weeks. At the end of this period the authority continued, presumably tacitly.¹

The Danish reply was not given until the 26th of August.² It stressed the misgivings which had arisen in connection with the continued German occupation of Holstein. This might easily give rise to the false impression that the troops were not there for the object of re-establishing the King's authority, but to safeguard the country's presumed rights against him. The Government would have to adhere to the plan submitted to the Assembly of Notables as their organization plan, but "die endlichen Entschliessungen – die übrigens für den Bund nur insofern von Interesse sein können, als sie die bundesrechtlichen Beziehungen der Herzogthümer Holstein und Lauenburg berühren –" could only be made after the most mature consideration, and when the King's authority had been fully re-established in Holstein as well. However, as the German Powers, before they handed back their authority, wanted a guarantee that the rights of the Confederation with regard to Holstein would be respected, the Danish envoys in Berlin and Vienna, who were to hand over the replies, were authorized to declare that the King, when his full sovereign powers had been returned to him, was fully determined to govern according to the legally existing laws and only to make amendments to the constitution of Holstein in a constitutional manner, always keeping in mind its relations to the Confederation and the rights resulting from those relations. Finally, reference was made to the possibility of Lauenburg serving as a model. The old constitution had been re-introduced there and preparations were being made for necessary changes "unter conservativen Formen."

Reventlow received a copy of this reply by a dispatch of the 3rd

¹ Rantzau, p. 331.

² F.O. 97/125: 25/8, No. 90, and 7/9, No. 92.

of September and it was stressed that the Government still adhered to the Notables' plan as the starting-point for the final settlement.¹ The dispatch said that the success of the steps which had been taken would depend on the amount of support given by the Friendly Powers.

Perhaps it may be said that Palmerston had already given a certain amount of support as, on the 8th of September, he had sent copies of a dispatch from Wynn containing Reedtz's complaints about the Commissioners to Bloomfield and Mageniz respectively and directed them to find out when the Commissioners "will be withdrawn from Holstein, and when the Duchy will be restored to the King Duke."²

But on the 7th of September Wynn wrote to Palmerston saying that he would presumably find the reply of the 26th of August "still more vague and inconclusive" than Reedtz's dispatch to Plessen at St. Petersburg. Wynn had mentioned this dispatch previously as one with which the Tsar and Nesselrode had been very dissatisfied. Wynn asserted that it would be necessary for Denmark to make "concessions" [i.e. respecting the connection of the Duchies with one another]. Tegoborski, the Russian chargé d'affaires, had had little success in obtaining such concessions from Reedtz and had, therefore, asked Wynn for support.³ Wynn wrote that he would gladly support Tegoborski, but that his requests would carry greater weight if Palmerston gave him instructions in that direction. Palmerston complied with Wynn's wishes – though in vague terms – and wrote that he approved of his "intentions of urging the Danish Government to settle the relations between Sleswig and Holstein in a reasonable way and with as little delay as possible."⁴

When Bloomfield put the questions contained in Palmerston's dispatch of the 8th to Manteuffel, the latter replied that he would send Copenhagen a communication almost identical with that which Austria had already sent [on the 9th of September; see below].⁵ It would demand a convocation of the Holstein and

¹ Dispatch 3/9, No. 18.

² F.O. 97/125: 8/9, No. 23.

³ Tegoborski's report 25/9, No. 156.

⁴ F.O. 97/125: 19/9, No. 84.

⁵ F.O. 97/125: 14/9, No. 60.

Slesvig Estates. He admitted that Germany could not demand a definite right of control with regard to Slesvig, but he was of the opinion that Holstein and Slesvig "were so closely allied that, as an European Power, they felt they had some claim to have their opinions listened to on this point." Manteuffel's dispatch in question to Werther is dated the 14th of September.¹

Before Magenis received Palmerston's dispatch of the 8th, he had learnt Schwarzenberg's views in a conversation he had had with him on the 9th. These views were expressed in the sharply worded Austrian dispatches of the 9th.² The form and content of one was such that Reedtz refused to submit it to the King, as Schwarzenberg had asked him to do. Reedtz said to Count Piper that Austria's "advice" was given in a form which had never been used in communications from one independent state to another since the days of Napoleon.³

In later dispatches Austria tried to alleviate the very unfortunate impression made by the dispatches on the Danish Cabinet, also on Carl Moltke.

According to Magenis, Schwarzenberg's irritation was due to information that the Ultra-Danish Party with Sponneck and Madvig would probably get the upper hand of Reedtz and Moltke in the Danish Cabinet. He was satisfied with the Danish promises regarding the administration in Holstein, but far from pleased with the administration in Slesvig, whose intention was to incorporate Slesvig. This would "sever the link which bound Holstein" and Austria was in favour of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. Schwarzenberg definitely denied that he had ever lent his support to Sponneck's proposal. For the first time, wrote Magenis, Schwarzenberg "put forward the personal opinion of the Emperor on this subject:" from being a firm friend of the Danish cause the Emperor had now modified his views considerably. If Austria withdrew her troops from Holstein, said Schwarzenberg, she would never send them there again –

¹ Neergaard. I, p. 558 f. – Thorsøe. II, p. 159 has the 14th of December due to a printer's error.

² F.O. 97/125: 9/9, No. 169. – Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 438 f. – The Austrian dispatches are printed in Rantzau, p. 332 ff.

³ Piper's dispatches 25/9, No. 90, and 26/9, No. 91¹/₂. – Cf. Tegoborski's dispatch 21/9, No. 154.

a statement which Magenis regarded, and rightly so, as a threat that Denmark would then have to deal with German Powers who were far less friendly than Austria.

Later when Magenis showed Schwarzenberg Palmerston's dispatch of the 8th, Schwarzenberg made almost the same remarks as he did on the 9th (see above).¹ The Danish Administration in Slesvig made the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy impossible. Magenis asked if there were any special measures which Austria wished to be taken in Slesvig before the troops were recalled. Schwarzenberg replied: a convocation of the Provincial Estates of Holstein and Slesvig. Magenis remarked in his dispatch that the Danish Minister, Plessen, did not think that the Government could at present agree to convene the Estates in Slesvig and so "no speedy solution to this question" could be expected.

About the middle of September, when the French Minister in Berlin, Lefebvre, asked Prokesch von Osten if Sponneck's proposal, made the previous winter, could not be accepted, he was told that it could not: "nous insisterons pour obtenir d'autres conditions, des conditions meilleures."² One of the most important demands was the convocation of the Estates in Holstein and Slesvig.³

Wynn informed Reedtz that Palmerston's above-mentioned dispatch of the 8th was "a fresh proof of the interest taken by Her Majesty's Government in the reestablishment of the King's Authority."⁴ But at the same time he did not omit to stress the necessity of making some concessions. He would not assert that the Danes had no right to maintain that they would not enter into definite engagements regarding the future administration of Slesvig before the departure of the Commissioners, but he "did not approve the Policy of driving this to the utmost and of rendering the Task of their friends more difficult." At least there should be a distinct declaration of the King's intentions. But, continued Wynn, Reedtz refrained from making any comments on this and it was evident "that it was still an unsettled question in the Cabinet." Full evidence of this is to be

¹ F.O. 97/125: 16/9, No. 171.

² Lefebvre's letter 15/9.

³ Cf. Lefebvre's dispatch 1/10, No. 70.

⁴ F.O. 97/125: 18/9, No. 96.

found in the minutes of the meetings of the Danish Council of State in the second half of September. Reedtz and Moltke handed in their resignations as a result of the discussions.

On the 24th of September Wynn wrote that he had received a private letter from Bloomfield mentioning the demands made by Berlin and Vienna.¹ But Reedtz had told him that if Schwarzenberg's "views were adopted they would, in fact, entail a revision of the Constitution of the whole Danish Monarchy, not likely to be more acceptable to those concerned when effected by German Dictation." Wynn had then pointed out that the King "must sooner or later, concede some degree of connexion between the two Duchies," and the longer both this concession and a declaration about the forthcoming constitution were postponed "the more [they] would lose the appearance of being voluntary."

When Wynn had received Palmerston's halfhearted support of his attempts to put pressure on the Danish Government, he expressed his pleasure that Palmerston approved his "efforts, however unsuccessful, to convince Reedtz of the necessity of a conciliatory settlement of the Relations between the two Dutchies."² He also stated that Tegoborski had allowed him to read parts of a report [of the 15th of September] from Meyendorff, who said that the Danish reply of the 26th of August was "of too vague a nature." Meyendorff urged a modification of Sponneck's plan "so as to make some concession towards the Union of the two Dutchies, no longer dangerous, when the Integrity and Succession are guaranteed."

Three days later Wynn informed Palmerston that he had not been able to get copies from Reedtz of the Danish replies to Austria and Prussia.³ In his conversation with Wynn, Reedtz had, moreover, complained in strong terms of the tone of Schwarzenberg's dispatch and its attack on the institutions of "democratized Denmark." Reedtz thought that Schwarzenberg would do better to remember the revolutionary conditions in Austria and Prussia during the past few years. Far from Denmark "having been ever shaken or *democratisé*, it was the only Country

¹ F.O. 97/125: 24/9, No. 99. — Wynn's line of conduct mentioned in this dispatch was approved by Palmerston in dispatch 7/10, No. 94. F.O. 97/126.

² F.O. 97/125: 26/9, No. 100.

³ F.O. 97/126: 29/9, No. 101.

during the late universal continental commotions, where a new Constitution had been quietly established, with the consent and cooperation of the Sovereign and the Representatives of the People."

On the 3rd of October Carl Moltke gave in his resignation on account of differences of opinion in the Danish Cabinet regarding the future constitutional organization of the Monarchy.¹ On the 6th, when Wynn gave an account of the Danish Cabinet crisis, he reported what Bille thought ought to be done in connection with the demands made by Austria and Prussia.² Bille was "much in Reedtz' confidence," and Wynn had several conversations with him. The King ought to make a proclamation declaring "proprio motu, without any allusion to the present occupation of Holstein, His intention to order a new Election of the Provincial States and to summon them as soon as circumstances permitted." To this Wynn had replied that he thought that Austria and Prussia would be satisfied with this and not insist that the Estates ought to be summoned before the withdrawal of the occupation troops, "which is here considered so derogatory to the King's Dignity."

On the whole, Reedtz's opinions coincided with those of Bille and also with those of Bülow, Denmark's envoy at Frankfurt. According to Cowley, Bülow had urged Reedtz "to use his influence with his Colleagues to obtain all reasonable concessions to the wishes of the Duchies. He urged the immediate convocation of the States of Sleswig and Holstein."³

Bille's brother-in-law, Count Bille-Brahe, was of the same opinion. Prokesch von Osten wrote on the 4th of October that Count Bille-Brahe was said to have received a letter from Reedtz saying that, whatever the cost, he was determined to carry through a convocation of the Provincial Estates in Slesvig.⁴ "Man müsse die Partei ausser das Spiel bringen, die all den Unsinn in Schleswig verschuldet und das Reich mit Spaltung bedrohe."

On the 2nd of October Howard also stressed how necessary it was for Denmark to comply with the German demands.⁵ It was true that Manteuffel had admitted to him that Germany

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 506.

² F.O. 97/126; 6/10, No. 105.

³ F.O. 97/126; 30/9, No. 275.

⁴ Osten, p. 228 f.

⁵ F.O. 97/126; 2/10, No. 47.

had no right to demand a convocation of the Slesvig Estates, as Slesvig did not belong to her. But Manteuffel "considered that such a measure would be the best means of maintaining the Nexus socialis between the two Duchies, and of procuring for Slesvig, which was so intimately connected with Holstein, a fair chance of Government." If Denmark did not agree to this "suggestion" of Manteuffel's or gave "some corresponding guarantee against the incorporation of Slesvig with Denmark by which the connexion of that Duchy with Holstein would be severed," Howard believed that she had no chance "of being relieved for a long time to come of the Federal occupation of the latter Duchy." But if the Danish Government complied with Manteuffel's wish for a convocation of the Provincial Estates in Slesvig, Howard wrote in a dispatch the same day, it was his opinion that Manteuffel would do his utmost to re-establish the King's authority in Holstein.¹

The plans of the majority of the Danish Cabinet could not expect support from St. Petersburg, either. On the 30th of September Seymour reported that Nesselrode had told him that "we are on the same line with the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin – we are of opinion that the principal part of the Demands made by the Duchies are so reasonable that they ought to be complied with . . ."²

At the meeting of the Danish Council of State on the 3rd of October, Reedtz summed up the situation correctly by stating that Denmark could not "without showing a spirit of compliance expect the assistance of Russia and Britain, and France would have enough to do in the near future in settling her own affairs."³ The French Minister, Lefebvre, thought that he could infer from his conversation with Howard that Britain's views with regard to the political organization of the Duchies were not very different from those of Russia.⁴

The Danish Cabinet crisis did not end in the way that Reedtz and those who shared his views would have liked. In view of the opening of the Danish Rigsdag, the split was postponed for

¹ F.O. 97/126: 2/10, No. 48.

² F.O. 97/126: 30/9, No. 19. – According to his dispatch 9/10, No. 170, Sternberg said to Tillisch that Denmark ought to comply with the German demands.

³ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 500.

⁴ Lefebvre's dispatch 20/10, No. 73.

a couple of weeks. On the 18th of October, Reedtz and Carl Moltke were granted their resignations. C. A. Bluhme was appointed temporary Foreign Minister. A new Minister of War was also appointed. Bluhme had been a member of the March Cabinet and his appointment was received with the greatest distrust by the conservative Eastern Powers and their representatives in Copenhagen as proof of the victory of the Ultra-Danish Party. Ungern Sternberg wrote that when he was told by Tillisch that Bluhme had accepted the post of Foreign Minister, he received the information "avec une froideur marquée."¹

11. The Danish Government takes the initiative in the question of the succession

At the meeting of the Council of State on the 27th of June, Reedtz had given an account of the Warsaw Protocol and of the negotiations he had had on the question of the succession with Schwarzenberg and Friedrich Wilhelm and Manteuffel respectively.² During the negotiations the King of Prussia had promised to try to urge the Duke of Augustenborg "to be obliging concerning the question of the succession"; if so, he would try to secure him an "indemnity". Reedtz had then told Manteuffel that if the Duke did not cause trouble, the Danish Government was willing to give him "the value of his estates and something over and above."

Reedtz rightly considered the Warsaw Protocol as "an important step forward" in the question of the succession. Although he had had no instructions to do so, he had, in fact, signed the Protocol. At the meeting of the Council of State he suggested that the King approved the Protocol by sending a letter to the Tsar stating that he sanctioned the Protocol in its entirety.

However, the Council of State decided that before this was done C. F. Wegener, the Keeper of the State Archives, and Professor I. E. Larsen should examine the Protocol in detail and submit a report. Both gentlemen had previously taken part in discussions about the succession.

¹ Dispatch 17/10, No. 177.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 320 ff.

On the 15th of July, after the reconstruction of the Cabinet, Reedtz submitted to the Council of State the results of his discussions with the two experts.¹ It was agreed that a certain passage in Article 2, as it was signed on the 5th of June at Warsaw, must be considered as inadvisable. This passage referred to the titles Prince Christian enjoyed as a descendant "en ligne directe du Roi Chretien I fondateur de La dynastie Royale d'Oldenbourg." Russia proved very willing to meet the Danish wish to cancel this inadvisable reference.² Nesselrode suggested that the passage in question should be omitted in its entirety and that new copies without the passage should be issued and the old copies cancelled (burned). This was done. The two new copies were dated the 5th of June, the original date, and were provided successively with the names of the three persons who had signed the Protocol at Warsaw, but who were now in St. Petersburg, Copenhagen, and Vienna. Only when this was done did Russia communicate the Protocol officially to the Courts of Europe.

At the meeting of the Council of State on the 15th of July Reedtz also submitted the drafts which the experts had drawn up for the acts of renunciation found to be necessary and for a declaration from Prince Christian. It was decided at the meeting that at the same time as Landgravine Charlotte renounced her claims in favour of her daughter, Princess Louise, the latter was to execute a document stating that, when she was called to the throne of Denmark on the strength of the acts of renunciation in question, she would hand over the powers she inherited under *Lex Regia* to her consort, Prince Christian, and their male descendants.

This document was signed on the 18th of July, the same day Landgravine Charlotte signed her act of renunciation.³ Acts of renunciation were also executed by Princess Louise's brother and sister, Prince Frederik of Hesse and Princess Marie of Anhalt, and by the latter's daughters.

As mentioned above (p. 158), Reventlow received information from Brunnow about the Warsaw Protocol and the progress in the question of the succession which had resulted from it.

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 337 ff.

² Arvefølgesagen. 1. File "Forhandl. vedr. Warschau-prtk. af 1851 5/6".

³ Arvefølgesagen. 1.

In a letter of the 1st of July to Reedtze he maintained that he had succeeded in convincing Palmerston that, instead of supporting the Duke of Augustenborg in his obstinate pretensions, endeavours should be made to break his spirit, so that he became financially embarrassed and would be easy to deal with regarding the question of a settlement.

A week later Reventlow reported that he had seen the Prince of Noer, accompanied by Lord Bruce, in Lady Palmerston's drawing-room, which had made a painful impression on him.¹ The Prince was on rather a lengthy visit to England. Palmerston told Reventlow that the Prince had expressed a hope that Britain would not agree to a violation of the rights of the House of Augustenborg without premeditation.² Palmerston is said to have replied that these rights were disputed and to have recommended an amicable settlement and a possible money payment by way of compensation. In his dispatch Reventlow referred to a statement made by Bunsen that the House of Augustenborg never would or ought to agree to a money settlement.

It is understandable that, after the signing of the Warsaw Protocol, Brunnow believed that "the time had come for a solution of Denmark's great problem." The words are Reventlow's. On the 19th of July, at a gathering in Lady Palmerston's drawing-room, Brunnow strongly urged Palmerston to join him in hastening on "the final settlement of Denmark's affairs."³ Palmerston promised his support. However, shortly afterwards Brunnow was recalled to St. Petersburg and did not return to London until November.

As Walewski, the new French Minister in London, informed Paris about the middle of July, Reventlow had also discussed the question of the succession with him and mentioned Prince Christian as a possible heir to the throne.⁴ Walewski, therefore, asked his Government for instructions and was told immediately that the Government had no objections; the Danish Government, it was added, already knew this.⁵

¹ Dispatch 7/7, No. 21.

² Reventlow's dispatch 7/8, No. 24.

³ Reventlow's dispatch 22/7, No. 23.

⁴ Walewski's dispatch 14/7, No. 5. — Walewski calls him "le Duc de Glucksbourg."

⁵ Dispatch 18/7, No. 138.

Towards the end of the month, when Palmerston was informed by Lyons, the British Minister in Stockholm, that the King of Sweden would support the Danish candidate (Prince Christian or his elder son), he replied that, "although the British Government do not interfere in this matter, yet they are of opinion that the choice . . . would be a good one."¹

In one of his two dispatches from the latter half of July, in which he mentioned the question of the succession, Wynn stated that the King wanted to make it a condition of Prince Christian's candidature that Landgravine Charlotte and Princess Louise were to receive Countess Danner.² However, Reedtzt had told Prince Christian that he did not need to pay any attention to that. On the 28th of July Wynn informed Palmerston that Reedtzt was still unable to give the official declaration about the question of the succession which had been promised.³ He was still waiting for a couple of documents concerned with the matter to be signed. In his dispatch Wynn stressed the condition laid down by Prince Frederik of Hesse for his renunciation: "that it should conduce to preserve the integrity of Denmark to the Elbe."

On the 31st of July a leading article in *The Times* dealt with the question of the Danish succession and gave its wholehearted approval to the choice of Prince Christian. The article referred first to Articles 2 and 4 of the London Protocol and observed that the Danish Government had now done its part in bringing "this delicate and important question to a conclusion; and we must observe that the statesmen of that small but intrepid nation have shown not less skill and resolution in effacing the painful recollections and healing the wounds of the late unnatural contest than they had done in carrying on the war."

The *Times* had only words of praise for the members of the reconstructed Danish Cabinet. Madvig, the National Liberal, who had remained in the Cabinet in spite of the wishes of the Eastern Powers, was, *The Times* said, an additional pledge of the liberality and independence of the Cabinet. The most im-

¹ Correspondence, p. 69 f. and 73 f.

² Wynn's dispatch 21/7, No. 78; part of it is reproduced in Correspondence, p. 73.

³ Correspondence, p. 74.

portant task of the Cabinet was to bring negotiations on the question of the succession to a close, and, continued the article, "as we stated some weeks ago," Prince Christian had been chosen "as the fittest and nearest representative of the Royal family upon the extinction of the reigning branch of it." The Hesse branch had renounced their claims, and the House of Augustenborg had, by their acts of high treason, forfeited the limited rights they might have "to a small portion of the Duchy of Holstein."

It was the opinion of *The Times* that no serious attempts – or at least only in Berlin – would be made to contest the right of the Danish Government and representatives of the Danish nation "under these circumstances of doubt and danger as to the succession . . . to pass an Act of Settlement, especially when they are approved and supported by all the great Powers of Europe." The Tsar had declared his support and willingness to renounce any rights he had to parts of Holstein in favour of Prince Christian. But even now, the article continued, "after the severe lessons which the King of Prussia has received for his imprudent interference in these affairs, and the complete isolation in which he was placed by the refusal of his Minister to join in the protocol of London, it is by no means improbable that the final arrangement must be concluded by the other great Powers without the concurrence of Prussia, if, as is suspected, she is still giving a clandestine support to the cause she was compelled to abandon."

Finally, *The Times* pointed out how important it was to settle the question of the succession definitely before new disturbances interrupted the state of calm then existing in European politics, "and the conclusion of this diplomatic formality would remove all pretence for the continued occupation of the mouth of the Elbe by Austrian troops, whose presence there is, even now, uncalled for by the state of the country, and an unwise infliction on the inhabitants." The North German statesmen who had been unsuccessful in their efforts to crush or disrupt Denmark ought now to try to deserve her confidence and win her friendship.

The article in *The Times* provoked one of Bunsen's not unusual outbursts of rage. In a letter of the 3rd of August to Albert he asserted – naturally with no proof of any kind – that

Palmerston had dictated the article.¹ He continued by saying that Palmerston conferred and discussed publicly in his wife's drawing-room with *The Times'* political correspondent, Henry Reeve, who was now "liebes Kind" there. But, Bunsen stated, in his dispatch of the previous day to Berlin, he had made an urgent appeal to the King's conscience and sense of honour, "nicht in Palmerstons [!] gewissenlosen Vorschlag wegen der Erbfolge in den Herzogthümern einzugehen, sondern die Rechte des Bundes zu wahren, von welchen die Erbrechte deutscher Fürsten in deutschen Landen doch ein integraler Theil seien."

On the 31st of July² Reedtz sent Reventlow, "for his own information," copies of the Warsaw Protocol, of Frederik VII's letter of the 17th of July to the Tsar, as well as a copy of a dispatch of the 25th of July to the Danish Minister at St. Petersburg. The dispatch dealt with the amendment which the Danish Government wished made to Article 2 of the Warsaw Protocol (see above).³ The King's letter stated that it was his intention, when the renunciation acts of the cognates and other necessary documents were signed, to transfer the rights of succession in Denmark and Slesvig and in the other possessions and colonies as well as Lauenburg and the Crown's allodial possessions in Holstein to Prince Christian's consort, Princess Louise, and her descendants pursuant to the Danish Act of Succession. Reedtz wrote that the documents he enclosed would make Reventlow thoroughly acquainted with the question of the succession as it stood at the moment.

In a dispatch of the 15th of August⁴, Reedtz pointed out in connection with Reventlow's above-mentioned reference to the House of Augustenborg (see p. 174) that the Government did not recognize any right of succession to any part of the Monarchy on the part of the Sönderborg lines. Thus when the question of the succession was settled there could never be any question of compensation to the Duke of Augustenborg for the loss of his rights of succession, but on the other hand a consideration for his estates in Slesvig.

¹ R.A.W. I 26/55.

² 31/7, No. 14.

³ In his dispatch of the 25th of September, No. 19, Reedtz stated that Russia had given her consent to the desired modification.

⁴ 15/8, No. 15.

Shortly afterwards, on the 24th of August, Frederik VII sent letters through his private secretary to the following heads of states informing them of the decision he had arrived at respecting the succession: King Oscar, the President of France, Queen Victoria, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia.¹ To preserve the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, which was so important for the European system, he had decided on a combination which made it possible to unite in one and the same person the various rights and titles to succession in all the parts of the present Danish Monarchy. The person concerned was Prince Christian and thereafter the issue of his marriage to Princess Louise of Hesse. The King hoped that this arrangement would meet with the approval of the Great Powers, and he would give his Ministers in the various countries orders to communicate all necessary details to the Cabinets in question. He would be everlastingly grateful to the heads of states who agreed with his choice of Prince Christian. The successful solution of the question of the succession would, apart from its general interest, guarantee Denmark and his people a new era of prosperity after their long and painful trials.

The King's letter was sent to the respective Ministers, who were to hand it over to the heads of states. The letter was accompanied by a Foreign Ministry circular of the 26th of August.² The circular stated that, as the question of the Duchies now seemed to have entered upon a more satisfactory phase, the King's thoughts now naturally turned once more to a settlement of the question of the succession. As it had been necessary to give up the candidature of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, interest for Prince Christian had again been roused. Mention was made of the renunciation acts of the cognates, and three memoranda were enclosed to elucidate the contemplated arrangement. The memoranda dealt with the supposed rights of the Sönderborg line, the rights of the Tsar to parts of Holstein which took precedence of the rights of the Wasa and Oldenburg lines, and Landgravine

¹ Arvefølgesagen. 2.

² As it appears from Piper's dispatch 28/8, No. 80, the "succession documents" were sent off on the 27th and 28th and in various ways so that they would reach the Danish Ministers in the countries of the signatory powers at the same time. Copies of the circular were sent ten days later to Brussels, Frankfurt and St. Petersburg.

Charlotte of Hesse's right of succession according to *Lex Regia*. A draft for a note which the Minister was to hand over to the Government concerned was also enclosed.

In a confidential letter of the same date, Reedtz informed Reventlow that, for the time being, the Warsaw Protocol was to be regarded as "highly confidential."¹ The reason for this has been mentioned above (p. 173). Reventlow was to place the greatest confidence in Brunnow and act in agreement with him – instructions which were presumably unnecessary. Reedtz remarked that the Government was willing to give the Duke of Augustenborg "something over and above" the value of his estates, if he gave a guarantee that he and his nearest relatives would remain passive respecting the succession. As the estate of Noer was not sequestrated, it would be easy for Prince Frederik to sell it. A postscript stated that Reventlow was only to enclose the memorandum dealing with the Sönderborg's line's supposed right of succession to the Duchy of Holstein with his note. The two other memoranda were for his personal information.

The draft for a note enclosed with the circular of the 26th was, of course, undated. Its date depended on when it was received by the Ministers in question and when they sent it off.² The note began by stating that the King believed that the moment had now come for his Government and his allies to join together to find a solution to the question of the succession and thereby consolidate the peace of Northern Europe. As the question was of special importance for the House of Oldenburg, he had first approached the Tsar, as head of one of the two lines, and he had proved very willing to meet the King's wishes. However, the King was eager to secure the approval and support of his allies, so that the contemplated arrangement received the general sanction of Europe.

¹ 26/8, No. 17.

² Printed without a date in *Act-Stykker betr. Arvefølge-Sagen*, trykte som Manuscript for Rigsdagen Oct. 1852. – Also printed in *Correspondence*, p. 81 ff., here with the date 8th of September, i.e. the date on which Reventlow sent off his note. Thorsøe, p. 246 ff., dates the 'note' the 26th of September. This is probably due to the fact that Denmark's Minister in Berlin, Bille-Brahe, for special reasons did not send off his note until that date. This date is mentioned in Manteuffel's reply of the 30th of September (see *Correspondence* p. 99 f.) Moreover, Thorsøe calls the note a dispatch from Reedtz to the Ministers of the 26th of Sept. Neergaard. I, p. 735, gives the same date as Thorsøe (26th Sept.) and gives a somewhat inaccurate version of Frederik VII's letter.

The reasons for the proposal were then elaborated in three sections in the note. The first section dealt with Holstein (with the exception of Plön) where the possible claims of the House of Augustenborg were rejected with a reference to the fact that they had omitted to ask for the investiture of the fief, the marriages of the Duke and the Prince of Noer with wives of unequal birth, and finally acts of high treason against their present sovereign. Either the Tsar or the King of Denmark was then to succeed; they were therefore entitled to settle the matter between themselves. The Tsar had declared that he was willing to renounce his claims in favour of Prince Christian and his male descendants.

Section 2 says that the succession to the rest of the Monarchy, Denmark and Slesvig, Lauenburg, and the Schauenburg allodial possessions and Plön in Holstein is determined by *Lex Regia*, i.e. cognate. Landgravine Louise Charlotte of Hesse was the nearest heir here, and after her her children and their lines. Her three children were Frederik of Hesse, Princess Marie, who was married to Frederik of Anhalt-Dessau, and Princess Louise, who was married to Prince Christian of Glücksburg. As mentioned above, the Tsar had renounced any rights he had in Holstein in favour of Prince Christian, and Landgravine Louise Charlotte and her two eldest children, Prince Frederik of Hesse and Princess Marie, had renounced their rights in favour of the youngest child, Princess Louise.

Finally, it was stated in Section 3 that the succession to the whole Monarchy could thus be transferred to Prince Christian and Princess Louise and their descendants. But as it was considered to be a disadvantage to have two sovereigns, Louise would renounce her own rights and those of her children in favour of her husband and their children. By this combination the integrity of the Danish Monarchy would be guaranteed as long as the Tsar's line and Prince Christian had male heirs.

After a recapitulation of the arrangement, the note expressed a wish that the signatory powers of the London Protocol and Prussia authorized their representatives in London, so that the arrangement could receive European recognition. The conference for this could, of course, take place as a continuation of the negotiations which had previously taken place in London.

When the dispatch of the 26th of August reached London,

everyone was on holiday. Parliament had prorogued on the 8th, when the Queen had delivered a speech. With regard to foreign politics the Queen had stated: "I continue to maintain the most friendly Relations with Foreign Powers." Parliament did not meet again until the 3rd of February. On the day Parliament prorogued, the 8th of August, the French Minister wrote: Everyone is leaving London. Even most of the Cabinet Ministers are preparing to go to the country on holiday.¹ However, Palmerston did not leave for Broadlands until the end of the month. As it was only a journey of three hours by rail, and two couriers a day brought him his correspondence and took his replies back to London, he was, on the whole, able to perform his official duties during the holidays.²

About the same time as Palmerston left London, the Queen and Prince Albert left for Scotland after a visit to Osborne. As mentioned above, Brunnow was away for most of August and did not return to London until November. About the 1st of September Reventlow travelled to Lewis Lodge, Isle of Lewis, as the guest of Sir James Matheson, MP.

It was on the 8th of September from Stornoway on Lewis that Reventlow sent Palmerston the note from the Danish Government dealing with the question of the succession.³ He had, he wrote, been a witness to Palmerston's tireless zeal and great efforts to bring about a peaceful issue of Denmark's dispute. He was profoundly convinced that Palmerston would not rest before he had found a happy solution to "our important affair" on which the peace of Northern Europe would largely depend. He enclosed the King's letter to Queen Victoria and asked Palmerston to hand it to her. He asked to be sent for as soon as his presence appeared to be *of some use* in London or at Broadlands. He did not think that much progress would be made before Brunnow's return, but a few lines from Palmerston would reassure him.

Palmerston sent these few lines from Broadlands on the 18th.⁴ He told Reventlow that he would forward the King's letter to

¹ Dispatch 8/8, No. 12.

² Walewski's dispatch 29/8, No. 17. – Reventlow's dispatch 22/8, No. 26.

³ F.O. 97/125. – Copy of the letter in Arvefølgesagen. 2.

⁴ Copy in Arvefølgesagen. 2.

the Queen, but he agreed with him that they should wait to discuss the matter until Brunnow returned.

On the 22nd the Queen sent back to Palmerston the papers she had received from him concerning the question of the succession.¹ The Danish Government's memorandum dealing with the various claims to the throne "can only be taken as an 'ex parte' statement," she wrote. If Slesvig were disregarded, the question of the succession concerned partly the succession to the Kingdom, where the King, according to *Lex Regia*, might choose his successor without foreign interference, and partly the succession in Holstein where the German law of succession applied. If the King wished to change this, he would have to come to an agreement with the German Confederation. While negotiations on this matter were being carried on, she would never accept the King's candidate and "recognize him as lawful heir by an European Protocol." It is to be noted that the Queen made no mention at all of the London Protocol.

It was Russell, not Palmerston, who answered the Queen: on the one hand the Queen was right; on the other it was clear that "much future evil might be prevented if the Crown of Denmark and the Duchy of Holstein were to devolve on the same Prince."² He referred to a dispatch which had recently been received from Bloomfield and which stated that the King of Prussia had told the Danish Minister that he wished to co-operate in the question of the succession with the object of securing the integrity of the Danish Monarchy.³

It is uncertain whether Palmerston enclosed a draft reply when he sent the Queen the letter from Frederik VII. There does not seem to have been any direct reaction on Palmerston's part to the Queen's statements to Russell. Several months were to pass before the King of Denmark received a reply from his "good Sister Victoria." When he did eventually receive it, its contents were not of a sisterly nature.

In a letter of the 28th of September,⁴ Count A. Reventlow-Criminil, who was in London with the Danish Legation, presum-

¹ R.A.W. I 26/78.

² R.A.W. I 26/80: 25/9.

³ Correspondence, p. 91.

⁴ Arvefølgesagen. 2.

ably on a voluntary basis, wrote that Brunnow had not yet returned, that the note had been handed over a long time ago, but that a reply had not yet been received. But before Brunnow's return, "we can hardly get down to the matter." The Count remarked, incidentally, that London was "quite empty. One sees only strangers."

On the 3rd of October Reventlow arrived in Glasgow from Lewis and the next day wrote a long letter to Reedtz.¹ He enclosed copies of his above-mentioned correspondence with Palmerston, as it would, he remarked, presumably be some time before the British Government gave an official reply to the note. Reventlow believed that Palmerston's short reply was favourable for Denmark, as, by considering it desirable to wait for Brunnow to return, he "admits in a way that Russia ought to have the decisive word [in the question of the succession] and that it is important, on Brunnow's return, to be informed as to the Tsar's opinion or last word on the matter." Reventlow wrote that he had never doubted that Palmerston would do all he could to bring about a settlement of the matter "as far as it lies in his power and his *position* permits him to do so."

Reventlow mentioned in his letter that the autumn gales had been the cause of several mishaps to the steamer which plied between Lewis and the mainland. He thanked God that he had reached Glasgow safely. He got no further, for he died suddenly there on the 6th of October. There is no doubt that his death was a considerable loss for the Danish diplomatic corps at the time. Denmark had lost a loyal son.

Reventlow was certainly right in believing that Palmerston was willing to assist Denmark in the question of the succession and follow the course taken by Russia. But in his efforts to do this he had to struggle against the pro-German and pro-Augustenburg sympathies held by the Court and Bunsen. John Russell, who, as Prime Minister, had to show some consideration for other people's views, did not always agree with Palmerston, either. During the second half of August the opposing views gave rise to a clash.

On the 14th of August Bloomfield reported talks he had had that day first with Manteuffel and then with Budberg about the

¹ Arvefølgesagen. 2.

question of the Danish succession.¹ Manteuffel had told him that Budberg had informed him of a dispatch from Nesselrode stating that the claims of the Duke of Augustenborg were worthless. But Friedrich Wilhelm – to whose “conscience and sense of honour” Bunsen had recently made a strongly worded appeal (see p. 177) – could not share this view: “his opinions would be guided by those of the German Diet, which was alone competent to settle the question.” He could not either “admit that the question was an European one,” and as far as the succession in Holstein was concerned “he must consider it a purely German one.” Bloomfield told Manteuffel that he regretted that Prussia and Austria held different opinions and he hoped that negotiations on this important question could be “continued in the same spirit in which they had been commenced.”

He was presumably referring to the negotiations at Warsaw but, as it appeared from Bloomfield’s conversation later in the day with Budberg, the King maintained that “an unfair interpretation had been put on his words” there. He asserted that he had offered his services as a negotiator with the Duke of Augustenborg solely with regard to a future indemnification; the settlement of the Duke’s rights of succession was a matter for the Confederation alone to decide. Budberg was unable to see how any progress could be made. He told Bloomfield that the Tsar would never consider the question as a purely German one, much less would he allow his title to a portion of the Danish Succession [in Holstein] to be submitted to the ordeal of the Diet. It was Budberg’s opinion that hopes of a satisfactory settlement were only to be found in “the opinions of the London Protocol, and in the favourable disposition of Austria . . .”

Palmerston’s draft in reply to Bloomfield aroused the Court’s great displeasure. The reasons for this seem to appear from the critical remarks in the Queen’s letter of the 25th of August to Russell.² I shall return to the contents of the dispatch later.

The Queen wrote: “We argued in innumerable Despatches that *the choice of the Successor* to the Danish Crown was entirely an internal question for Denmark in which foreign Powers

¹ Correspondence, p. 75 f. Bloomfield’s dispatch was received in London on the 18th. – Cf. with Bloomfield’s dispatch those of Buchanan of the 23rd and the 26th of August. Correspondence, p. 77 ff.

² R.A.W. I 26/69.

could not interfere – here, however, it is laid down, that the German Diet has no right to treat the succession in Holstein (a German state) as an *internal* question as it ought to be decided on, not according to the *German law of Succession*, but according to the *interests* of Europe?” The Queen added that it was not correct, either, to say that the Duke of Augustenborg had no right to succeed to the Danish throne, as his mother was a daughter of Christian VII and Caroline Mathilde.

The Queen had to wait until the 7th of September to receive from Russell a draft which had been amended by Palmerston.¹ Russell stated at the same time that he had received a letter from Palmerston saying that the Queen must have misunderstood him. The dispatch did not state that the Diet had no right to “treat the succession in Holstein as an internal question.” It only stated that “in dealing with that question they ought to remember that it is not merely a German question, but that it also involves important European Interests.” Russell added that if the Diet claimed Holstein for the Duke of Augustenborg, the Tsar would, no doubt, put in a claim for Kiel on his own or Prince Christian’s behalf “and oppose them by force of arms.” The remark that the London Protocol had treated the Danish succession as a European question must have jarred unpleasantly on the ears of the Court.

In his draft dispatch to Bloomfield, Palmerston made the amendments mentioned below and thus showed some consideration for the Queen’s critical remarks.²

The dispatch directed Bloomfield to inform Manteuffel that the British Government were unable to regard the arrangements for the Danish succession “as a purely German question,” as it was “a matter deeply affecting the general interests of Europe.” This was an important change, for the original draft had stated that Britain could not regard “any Part of” the arrangements as “otherwise than an European Concern.” The dispatch went on to say that the British Government was convinced that the Diet, when dealing with questions which might come “under its consideration in connection with that matter,” would bear in

¹ R.A.W. I 26/71.

² The dispatch is printed in Correspondence, p. 92 f. – For the amendments see F.O. 97/125: 25/9, No. 40.

mind that they were "parts of a greater matter, which involves important European interests." The last four words were substituted for: "is in the strictest Sense of the Expression an European Concern," which had been used in the draft.

The dispatch then mentioned Europe's interest in the continued union, under the same sovereign, of Denmark, Slesvig and Holstein, "which form together an aggregate Body." The word "together" has been added to the draft. But "for many reasons" it was impossible that these countries could remain united under a sovereign who was a member of the House of Augustenburg. "For many reasons" is an addition, and after "sovereign" in the original draft was written "because whatever Right of Succession that Family may claim to have in Holstein they have no such Rights in Denmark or in Sleswig."

The dispatch continued by saying that the British Government did not feel competent to judge "the alleged [in the draft "the asserted"] rights of the Augustenburg family in . . . Holstein," but it was well known that these rights were "by many persons denied" [in the draft "entirely denied"] and "even many of those persons who assert the validity of those Rights" do not maintain that they include "the whole of Holstein." The draft had "that even those persons, who assert those Rights the most firmly" etc.

Finally, there was a purely formal alteration. The dispatch stressed that if no arrangement was made – there was added here "in regard to the Danish Succession" – and if the question of the "alleged rights" of the House of Augustenburg really arose, it was unlikely that the matter would be settled without a struggle in which states that were greater and more powerful than Denmark and Holstein would take part. It therefore appeared to the British Government that all true friends of the House of Augustenburg ought to advise them "to accept an equitable compensation for their eventual claims." A possible danger to the peace of Europe would also be removed.

The dispatch ended by saying that the British Government realized that Prussia, who had refused to accede to the London Protocol, regarded the dismemberment of the Danish Monarchy as being in the interests of Prussia. But it was Palmerston's hope that Prussia "will, on reflection, see, that even viewing

the matter solely with reference to Prussian interests the real interests of Prussia cannot be opposed to the general interests of Europe . . .”

Although the Queen can hardly have been satisfied with the “amended draft,” Palmerston wrote on it with his own hand – but as late as the 21st of September: “This may go as amended. It has been to the Queen and Lord John Russell.” As mentioned above, the dispatch was then sent off on the 25th. A copy of it was sent the same day to Mr. Buchanan at St. Petersburg.¹ Seymour communicated parts of it to Nesselrode, who received the information “with great satisfaction.”² Plessen, the Danish Minister in St. Petersburg, whom Seymour allowed to read the dispatch in confidence, also found it “satisfactory for Denmark.”³ However, as mentioned above, several months were to pass – and a new British Foreign Secretary was appointed in the meantime – before Frederik VII received a reply from Queen Victoria and the Danish Government a reply from the British Government. We shall see later whether these replies could be regarded as satisfactory.

As might have been expected, it was King Oscar and the Swedish-Norwegian Government who replied first to the letters from Denmark. They promised their unqualified support at the forthcoming negotiations in London.⁴ And Denmark did not either have to wait long to receive promises of support from Napoleon and the French Government. On the 12th of September the Emperor Francis Joseph answered that he entirely approved of the choice of successor, but he had to refer the advice given by [demand made by] his Government to Denmark. Schwarzenberg had given details of this in his dispatch of the 9th of September (cf. p. 167).

While Austria made her support of Denmark’s candidate dependent on an organisation of the Danish Monarchy which was satisfactory for Germany, Prussia – especially Friedrich Wilhelm – wanted to show extra consideration for the Duke of

¹ Correspondence, p. 93.

² Correspondence, p. 106.

³ Plessen to Reedtz 7/10. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

⁴ Arvefølgesagen. 2. – If only we had five other such letters to hand, exclaimed Reedtz on reading King Oscar’s letter. Dotezac’s dispatch 14/9. No. 453.

Augustenborg. Furthermore, Prussia had, as we know, unlike Austria, refused to take part in the London Protocol which ensured the integrity of the Danish Monarchy.

Denmark was represented in Berlin by Bielke. But it was Denmark's Minister in Vienna, Baron Bille-Brahe, who was on leave at the time, who was sent off at the end of August on a special mission to Berlin to submit Denmark's plan for the Danish succession to Friedrich Wilhelm and to hand him the King's letter. On the 30th of August Bloomfield informed Palmerston that Bille-Brahe had arrived the previous day. He asked for instructions in case Bille-Brahe approached him "for advice and assistance during his stay here."¹ However no instructions were sent to him, unless the above-mentioned dispatch of the 25th of September can be counted as such. But it was a reply to Bloomfield's dispatch of the 14th of August, and did not reach Berlin until Bille-Brahe had concluded most of his negotiations. On the 29th Manteuffel was informed of it by Howard, the chargé d'affaires, who was representing Britain, as Bloomfield had left for a long leave.²

Bille-Brahe was, no doubt, in touch with Bloomfield during his stay in Berlin, but naturally it was Budberg's "advice and assistance" he was dependent on during his negotiations with Manteuffel and the King. King Friedrich Wilhelm was not in Berlin when Bille-Brahe arrived there, and it was not until the 8th of September that the Danish envoy was received in audience and handed over the letter from Frederik VII.

About the same time Bloomfield sent Palmerston a copy of Nesselrode's dispatch of the 6th of September to Budberg. Budberg had communicated the dispatch to him.³ Together with the dispatch Budberg had received a copy of Russia's circular letter to her Ministers in Paris, London, Vienna, and Stockholm directing them to support Denmark's effort to obtain European recognition for her contemplated settlement of the question of the succession. As Prussia had refused to accede to the London Protocol, the circular letter had not been sent to Berlin, but Budberg was authorized to inform Manteuffel of it in confidence

¹ Correspondence, p. 78.

² Correspondence, p. 95 f.

³ Correspondence, p. 87 f.

and to inform him officially of the Warsaw Protocol. Budberg was to co-operate with Bille-Brahe and make every effort to induce Berlin not to refuse its consent to a work "qui aura reçu l'approbation de toutes les autres Grandes Puissances de l'Europe, et dont dépend le bonheur et la paix du Nord de l'Allemagne." Finally the dispatch expressed the hope that Berlin would give its representative in London full powers and instructions analogous to those received by the representatives of Russia, Britain, France, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden-Norway. When Budberg told Bloomfield that he had given Manteuffel the information he had been directed to, he added that he had found Manteuffel "much better disposed to entertain the proposals than he could have expected from his late conversations with him." He still hoped "in some shape or other" to persuade Berlin to accede to the London Protocol.

Manteuffel's dispatch of the 14th of September to Werther, in which he asked him to thank the Danish Government provisionally for the information which he had received, was written in a friendly tone.¹ The King, it stated, would make every endeavour that the pretensions of the Duke of Augustenborg – which, it was true, were denied by some – "durch eine Verzichtleistung den Forderungen eines anerkannten Europäischen Bedürfnisses untergeordnet werden. Dieser . . . Weg ist bereits in geeigneter Weise betreten . . ." [by negotiations with the Duke of Augustenborg]. However Berlin, like Vienna, maintained in a dispatch of the same date that Holstein's relations to the other parts of the Monarchy were also to be settled in a way that would satisfy Germany. "As far as the evacuation of Holstein is concerned," wrote Bille-Brahe on the 29th of September, "it is said here, almost unreservedly, that Prussia will co-operate in effecting it, conditional upon our Sovereign deciding to summon the Provincial Estates in Slesvig."²

While Bille-Brahe had handed over the letter from Frederik VII, he had, for the meantime, omitted to submit the note inviting the Prussian Government to take part in the contemplated

¹ Arvefølgesagen. 2. – In a letter 14/9 to Reedtz, Bille-Brahe wrote: "Manteuffel, whom I have just seen, has almost, or as good as, promised me a declaration like the one we want." [Concerning the integrity of the Danish Monarchy]. Dispatches from Berlin.

² Dispatches from Berlin.

conference in London. It was a question of first persuading Prussia to accede, "in some shape or other," to the principle of the London Protocol. Difficult negotiations took place between Bille-Brahe, Budberg, Manteuffel, and Le Coq – and especially between Manteuffel, aided by General Gerlach, and Friedrich Wilhelm. The reply of the 24th of September to Frederik VII, which Manteuffel finally persuaded King Friedrich Wilhelm to sign, did not quite satisfy Denmark.¹

It is not surprising that Bunsen had tried from London to delay a settlement. On the 23rd, Bille-Brahe informed Reedtz that Bunsen had reported that Palmerston intended to draw up a memorandum on the subject and that it would be better to wait until this was ready.² Bloomfield remarked to Bille-Brahe that God only knew when such a memorandum would be ready, if it ever would be!

At the beginning of his reply Friedrich Wilhelm stated that he had always appreciated the important political reasons that prescribed the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. However, he hoped that the suggested settlement of the question of the succession, which was, of course, to include the German Duchies, would be brought about in a manner which "d'après les principes du droit des Maisons souveraines d'Allemagne" were necessary to remove even doubtful pretensions. The letter then referred to the negotiations which had commenced between the Duke of Augustenborg and the King, and to Denmark's willingness to grant the Duke a generous indemnity whereby the approval which the King had already given to the plan for the succession could take the form of a formal guarantee.

The next day Bille-Brahe informed Reedtz that the King had signed "the letter to our Sovereign" and that he had now been urged to hand over his note [the end of the plan of which he had been informed] requesting Prussia's approval of the unity of the Monarchy and the settlement of the succession question. He did this on the 26th and Manteuffel's official reply is dated the 30th.³

¹ Concerning this see Arvefølgesagen. 2.

² Arvefølgesagen. 2. In his dispatch 28/9, No. 20, to Reventlow, Reedtz asked for information about this memorandum. He never received it.

³ No. V in Act-Stykker betr. Arvefølge-Sagen, trykte som Manuscript for Rigsdagen. Oct. 1852. – Correspondence, p. 99 f.

The reply stated that Frederik VII's letter had been handed over to the King, who had always recognized the importance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, and he therefore sincerely hoped that the endeavours made by the King of Denmark to uphold it would be completely successful with the co-operation of the Great Powers. He acknowledged the magnanimity behind the voluntary acts of renunciation which aimed at transferring all titles and claims to the various parts of the Monarchy to Prince Christian and his consort. Therefore he did not hesitate to approve the principle of the maintenance of the integrity of the Monarchy and the arrangements which had been made whereby Prince Christian and his consort and their male descendants were recognized as heirs presumptive to the throne of Denmark. Manteuffel ended his note by saying that he only repeated statements which Friedrich Wilhelm had made in his reply to Frederik VII.

A comparison shows that this is hardly quite correct. Manteuffel's reply did not contain, as the King's did, a direct reference to an arrangement with the Duke of Augustenborg, although his choice of words can be interpreted to imply this.

On the 2nd of October Bille-Brahe informed Reedtz that it was "with great satisfaction" he sent him Manteuffel's note. He would send copies of it to the Danish Ministers accredited to the Great Powers.¹ The note was exactly as he had been promised, and contained no reference to "Fürstenrecht." "It is this declaration that matters. That the King's reply contained a sort of reservation was to be expected, was not to be prevented." Bille-Brahe wrote in an earlier letter that Budberg had been of great assistance in this matter, "but the King's dispositions do not date from yesterday, they have been in existence for a long time."²

During Bille-Brahe's stay in Berlin, Bloomfield had been able to follow developments through conversations with the persons concerned. Thus on the 11th of September he sent to Palmerston a copy of Reedtz's letter to Bille-Brahe (of the 26th of August). Bille-Brahe had given him the copy of the letter which stated that the Danish Government was willing to give

¹ Dispatches from Berlin.

² 18/9.

the Duke of Augustenborg "indemnities" if he gave "certain guarantees that he will remain quiet" [concerning the matter of the succession].¹ A week later Bloomfield mentioned the Duke's disinclination to agree to such a settlement.² On the 25th, when he asked Manteuffel how far the King would go to support the Duke, Manteuffel replied that the King wanted "a fair settlement of the claims effected:" if the Duke put forward unreasonable claims, the King would "withdraw his support from him and leave the case to be settled by the Diet."³ But, Bloomfield pointed out to Palmerston, those who want the matter settled want very much to avoid doing this, "for if it is brought again to Frankfort, the discussion of it may be indefinitely prolonged."

In the same dispatch Bloomfield gave a correct definition of the different views held by Denmark and Germany on the question of the settlement of the Monarchy. Denmark would not let Germany dictate to her and refused to give any promises respecting the administration of Slesvig apart from the promise that she would not incorporate it. But Germany maintained that if the members of the Slesvig Estates were summoned to take part in negotiations in the Danish Parliament, it would be "a virtual incorporation." Budberg shared this view, wrote Bloomfield, and Austria's, Prussia's, and Russia's opinions "are certainly identical as to the expediency of restricting to Denmark the working of the constitutional principle" and preventing its establishment in the Duchies. They found that in the Duchies the Provincial Estates are a form of representation "better adapted to the wants of the inhabitants, whilst it certainly would be more in harmony with their own views and wishes."

Bloomfield had asked Bille-Brahe what the Provincial Estates were.⁴ Bille-Brahe had explained that the Danish Constitution was rather too radical to be extended to Slesvig, where the Estates were more suitable. Furthermore Bille-Brahe had reassured Bloomfield that there was no need to fear that Russia would advise "a complete abolition of the Constitution."

Apart from the possibility that Palmerston's Britain would lend her support in rejecting such a demand if Russia put it

¹ Correspondence, p. 86 f.

² Correspondence, p. 90.

³ Correspondence, p. 94 f.

⁴ Bille-Brahe to Reedtz 23/9. Arvefølgesagen. 2.



CHRISTIAN ALBRECHT BLUHME

(1794–1866)

Drawing by I. V. Gertner.



CHRISTIAN HØYER BILLE

(1799–1853)

Danish Envoy to Britain.

forward, Denmark could not expect much help from Britain in the conflict with Germany. Denmark's Minister in St. Petersburg, Plessen, reported on the 7th of October¹ that Britain's Minister there had said that his Government agreed with Nesselrode that Denmark should put forward proposals acceptable to Austria and Prussia to prevent the matter being brought before the Federal Diet.

12. The Danish Government agrees to accept the United Monarchy programme

As mentioned above (see p. 172), Reedtz's resignation from the Cabinet and Bluhme's appointment aroused the decided displeasure of the German Great Powers. On the 20th of October Howard wrote from Berlin that the information which had arrived the previous day about the Cabinet changes had been received by the King and Manteuffel with deep regret.² Manteuffel said that the tendency of the Ministry was obvious by the appointment of Bluhme, "a Member of the Cabinet of the Month of March," and Austria and Prussia had now no alternative but to hand the matter over to Frankfurt. Howard advised Manteuffel emphatically against doing this, as it would probably "delay a settlement indefinitely," and Budberg did the same.

A few days later Howard wrote a letter giving further details about the matter to Westmorland at Vienna.³ He said that Manteuffel's course "will naturally be combined with that of the Austrian Cabinet," and that he would await further information from Copenhagen. Howard made some remarks on the changes in the Danish Cabinet, presumably on the basis of a letter from Wynn. He wrote that "the only good feature is that M. de Bille (Reedtz' friend) has agreed to assist Bluhme privately, for the present." In Berlin, he wrote, the only immediate consequence was that Manteuffel had, of course, "suspended the declaration of the Prussian Government on several points on which he was disposed to make concessions to Reedtz' views." Unfortunately, we do not hear what these points were.

¹ Plessen to Reedtz 7/10. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

² F.O. 97/126: 20/10, No. 69.

³ 23/10.

On the 28th of October Westmorland mentioned how displeased Schwarzenberg was with the Cabinet changes, and said that he (Schwarzenberg) relied on the advice which Palmerston would give the Danish Cabinet.¹ It was quite impossible for him to consent to Slesvig's incorporation in Denmark and he said that Palmerston himself on former occasions had pointed out that, if deputies from Slesvig assembled with the Danish Rigsdag, they would constitute such a minority that they would have no chance "to defend the interests they were entrusted with." Therefore the internal administration of the Duchy ought to have a representative assembly different from that of the Kingdom. Schwarzenberg maintained that on Palmerston's recommendation this principle had been accepted at the Peace negotiations in Berlin. He was, moreover, afraid that the Danish Government would propose an Election Act for Slesvig which would give too much influence to the farmer class who were in favour of incorporation. If it turned out that the Danish Government intended to do this, Schwarzenberg would withdraw his guarantee [for the integrity of the monarchy], hand the matter over to Frankfurt, order the Austrian troops in Holstein back home and have nothing more to do with the affairs of Denmark.

Palmerston received the most accurate information about the significance of the Cabinet changes from Hodges.² Hodges wrote on the 24th that he did not think that there was reason "to apprehend that the Danish Cabinet, as reconstructed, will be less disposed than it was as before constituted, to carry into effect the arrangements proposed by the Mediating Powers." The present Cabinet with Bluhme and Flensburg [the latter in place of Fibiger; see p. 172] cannot be regarded as Eider Danes. Bluhme "is known to possess very good administrative abilities, to be well read, and thoroughly acquainted with several foreign languages, and to be a man of calm and moderate political views." I know Flensburg and I am slightly acquainted with Sponeck, who is deeply distrusted by Germany, wrote Hodges. But I believe that he is "influenced far more by Aristocratic, than democratic opinions. He possesses unbounded ambition, and the chief object of that ambition is, I am inclined to think, to

¹ F.O. 97/127: 28/10, No. 12.

² F.O. 97/126: 24/10, No. 79.

arrive at the Presidency of the Ministry . . ." Hodges thought that would be a fortunate event.

The plan for the future arrangement of the Danish Monarchy which the reconstructed Cabinet – that is, including Bluhme – had agreed upon was entered in the minutes of the Council of State for the 23rd of October, five days after Bluhme's appointment.¹ It still contained (as Article V) the provision, opposed by the German Great Powers, respecting certain important matters where the Kingdom and Slesvig were to have a common administration and legislature and where the Slesvig Diet was to assemble with the Danish Rigsdag in Copenhagen. There is no reason to go into a detailed description of the plan here. However, I must mention that to meet the German demands Article VIII § 2 said that the Slesvig Provincial Estates would be summoned as soon as possible after writs had been issued for a new election, so that they could make recommendations respecting the establishment of a future Diet.

However, at the meeting of the Council of State on the 23rd, Bluhme gave an account of his first meeting the same day with the Ministers of the Foreign Powers, whom he had informed of the plan in confidence. Of these the British, Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Ministers had all definitely advised against it. However, they had promised to make efforts that Vienna and Berlin did not make hasty decisions. Bluhme said at the meeting of the Council of State that it was obvious that the Tsar "unreservedly, so to speak" had sided with the German Great Powers in the Danish affair "because he had been convinced that their object is a strong Monarchy."

In his dispatch of the 24th Wynn gave an account of the general impression the Diplomatic Corps had received of the new Foreign Minister at their first meeting with him.² Werther, who had just been accredited as Prussia's Minister in Copenhagen will, no doubt, Wynn wrote, try "to soften down" Berlin's attitude of hostility against Bluhme. "He [W] will have found his language as moderate and conservative as I – such opinions he has always advocated, and if he was called by Count Moltke to the Casino Cabinet, it was as a support against those of a

¹ Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 519 ff.

² F.O. 97/126: 24/10, No. 116.

different nature entertained by some of his radical Colleagues.”

Wynn sent his opinion of Bluhme to his colleague in Berlin, who informed Manteuffel of it in a confidential letter.¹ In his dispatch on the matter to Palmerston, Howard again stressed Manteuffel's dislike of the Danish plan for Slesvig and of the popular basis for its representation, which might weaken the German influence. If the Danish Government wanted to get rid of the foreign troops in Holstein, they would have to modify their plans in accordance with the wishes of Prussia and Austria.

On the 31st Howard was able to inform Palmerston as well as his colleague in Vienna that Bille-Brahe had told him that the Danish Government intended “to reconsider” the programme to meet the wishes of the German Great Powers.² Bille-Brahe had received this information in a letter from Bille. “Bille, I am told,” Howard wrote to Westmorland “is in good hopes as to the result of the deliberation of his Government on the subject.”

During the days following the 23rd, Bluhme had repeated conferences with the foreign diplomats, especially with the two whom Denmark considered to be the most important: Russia's and Austria's.³ The Danish wish for a closer connection between the Kingdom and Slesvig met with no support or response. As van Dockum, the Minister of Naval Affairs, said, this was the object Denmark had worked three years to obtain. On the other hand, Bluhme received a definite assurance from Ungern Sternberg that Russia would give her support to the plan he proposed: for the present to let the King reign sovereignly in the Duchies with the Provincial Estates as an advisory body and with a complete separation between Slesvig and Holstein as far as their administration, legislation, and legal matters were concerned. The majority of the Cabinet gradually assented to this plan, whose more distant object was a Constitutional United Monarchy. The dissenting Ministers resigned.

After the sad news of Count Reventlow's death, the Minister of Foreign Affairs directed Bielke to go from Berlin to London

¹ F.O. 97/126: 28/10, No. 81.

² F.O. 97/127: 31/10, No. 87. – Howard to Westmorland 31/10.

³ Concerning this see Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 527 ff. – Cf. Sternberg's dispatches.

to take over at the Legation as chargé d'affaires (cf. p. 163). He reached London on the 18th of October and on the 25th sent off his first dispatch. It concerned a talk he had had the previous evening with Palmerston in Lady Palmerston's drawing-room.¹

Palmerston had first stressed that Denmark ought to be magnanimous towards the Duke of Augustenborg and give him a handsome indemnity to prevent any future complications and difficulties. He said that he would write to Wynn about it, and he must have been thinking about his dispatch which was sent off the next day, the 25th, and which directed Wynn to make representations to the Danish Government to make the Duke of Augustenborg a handsome proposal and to offer him somewhat more than the real value of his estate.² This would also be of importance, the dispatch continued, for the Duke's frame of mind, with regard to the arrangements for the succession "to which, directly or indirectly, the Duke will have to be a party."

When Bielke and Palmerston spoke to one another, they were unaware of Reedtz's resignation (which had taken place on the 18th), but realized, no doubt, that a Cabinet crisis could be expected over the question of the summoning of the Slesvig Provincial Estates. Palmerston asked why they could not be summoned and asked to give their advice. Bielke pointed out that it would be a complete return to *status quo ante* and make it even more difficult for the King to join Slesvig more closely to Denmark, which the British Government had always acknowledged was the right policy for Denmark. Bielke said in his dispatch that Palmerston also admitted this to be true. If he actually did, it cannot be said that his convictions manifested themselves in any special way. Palmerston also asked in the course of conversation why the Danish Government did not give Slesvig a constitution to put an end to the state of uncertainty.

Politics are having a rest at the minute, wrote Bielke. News from France is awaited with excitement. All attention is fixed on the arrival of Kossuth, the hero of the Hungarian liberation, and as long as he is here Buol, the Austrian Minister, will stay away. Brunnow has not yet arrived back, either.

Bielke complained in his dispatch that he had received only incomplete information about the decisions of his Government.

¹ Ges ark. London. Drafts for dispatches.

² F.O. 97/126: 25/10, No. 101. – Correspondence, p. 109.

The simple reason for this was, as we have seen above, that no decisions had yet been taken. Before he ended his dispatch, however, he received news both from Reedtz and Bluhme about the Cabinet changes which had taken place.¹ These two letters were written on the 20th of October and Bluhme did not send his next dispatch to London until the 6th of December, when he was able to give Bielke information about the decisions which had been made.

The advice given by Palmerston on the 24th of October to Bielke: to give a constitution to Slesvig was also contained in the dispatches to the British Ministers in Vienna, Berlin, and Copenhagen. The dispatches were submitted to the Queen about this date and aroused her and Prince Albert's great displeasure. She denounced the whole of Palmerston's policy on the Danish question. When she returned the dispatches to Russell on the 28th of October,² she wrote, incorrectly, that it was Denmark's attempt to incorporate Slesvig which had started the war. Then Germany tried to incorporate both Duchies. What the two poor Duchies wanted was to remain together under the same constitution. "Now that *under the Mediation of England* everything has been settled to the advantage of Denmark, a Protocol has recognized the interest which the European Powers take in the maintenance of the integrity of the Monarchy, that the King Duke has been reinstated³ by the very arms, which had defended the Duchies against him and that the succession is being altered even at the risk of injustice to a part of the Princes of Holstein, to suit the interests of Denmark – Denmark is to be advised by a Coup d'État to complete the separation of the two Duchies." The Queen strongly deprecated the fact that the responsibility for *such* advice came from *her* Government.

Russell replied to the Queen the same day stating that he shared her opinion as to how the war started, but did not think that Her Majesty had taken into consideration the fact that Denmark and Germany had concluded a peace.⁴ The object of the dispatches in question was to induce Denmark "to carry into effect this arrangement, and thus prevent a renewal of the

¹ 20/10, Nos. 21 and 22.

² R.A.W. I 26/92.

³ This had at that time only been done in a very incomplete manner.

⁴ R.A.W. I 26/95. – Printed in Gooch. II, p. 41 f.

contest." After the fruitless war it was "highly desirable to close the door both to Danish and to German pretensions." Russell suggested that, "for some ulterior purpose," Austria wanted to keep her troops in Northern Germany. Britain's policy would have to be designed "to defeat these attempts at delay."

In her reply of the 29th the Queen admitted that the Peace had stipulated the separation of Holstein and Slesvig.¹ But as the mediating power, she continued, Britain was under a moral obligation to see to it that "the material interests of the Duchies are as much as possible consulted," during the execution of the Peace. To advise Denmark to solve the question by a coup d'état was therefore all the less justifiable. Permanent peace could not be obtained "by aggravating the injuries inflicted upon the Duchies."

On the evening of the 29th Russell sent his correspondence with the Queen to Palmerston: "Pray write me a letter I can forward to the Queen."² Furthermore, he wrote – and rightly so – that he did not know whether "the Drafts are of such value towards a practical Solution. – At all events the drafts must not be sent till the Queen has approved of them."

On the 30th Palmerston sent his remarks about the Queen's objections to Russell, who forwarded them to the Queen.³ From bygone events and documents one could draw nearly any conclusion one wanted respecting the internal relations between Slesvig, Holstein, and Denmark: the only way of settling these matters would be that the Parties should endeavour to come to some arrangement which would be sufficiently suited to present and future circumstances without too rigidly standing out for those former conditions of things . . . In her rôle as mediator, Britain had brought about an arrangement; and this should be abided by. Regarding the struggle of the Holsteiners against Denmark, he remarked that "the leading men and the best troops in that army were adventurers from different parts of Germany, in no way connected with the Duchies . . ." With reference to the Queen's statement about "the injuries inflicted upon the Duchies" he maintained that it was quite true that

¹ R.A.W. I 26/96.

² P.P.

³ R.A.W. I 26/97–98. Palmerston's letter is printed in Gooch. II, p. 42 ff.

“the Duchies have suffered great misery; but that misery has been occasioned not by Denmark but by the violent proceedings of a knot of agitators who got possession of power in Holstein, and who have half ruined the owners of property in Holstein by heavy contributions levied for carrying on the war . . .” He added that at one time Prussia had wanted “to make the relations between Norway and Sweden the model for the future relations between Sleswig and Denmark,” but asserted that “we argued, if you remember, strongly against the fancied analogy between the two cases . . .” (see *British Mediation*. II, p. 31 ff., 83 and 85). On the other hand, he admitted that the Queen was right in stating that Slesvig and Holstein had common material interests which ought to be taken into consideration.

The Queen wanted to have the last word. On the 4th of November, when she informed Russell that she had read Palmerston’s remarks, she fastened upon his mention of the “foreign Adventurers,” who had fought in Holstein.¹ She wrote that, while we all regard what took place in Hungary and Lombardy as national movements, Palmerston treated the whole Slesvig question as if it were a matter between Denmark and Germany where the rights and national feelings of the Duchies did not come into consideration. In a way he was right in saying that “the proposed Draft was in accordance with the policy we have pursued,” and the Queen admitted the difficulties involved in amending the policy now. She would, therefore, sanction the dispatches but Palmerston ought, however, to “recommend that in framing a Constitution for Slesvig due regard should be had for” the non-political common interests of the Duchies, “which cannot be the case without consulting the wishes and feelings of the people.”

On the 5th Russell informed Palmerston that the Queen had sanctioned the dispatches “with the insertion of some words” which took into consideration the common, non-political interests of the Duchies.²

On the 7th Palmerston sent Russell the amended dispatches.³ In the dispatch to Wynn, he wrote, he had altered “to counsel

¹ R.A.W. I 26/100.

² P.P.

³ R.A.W. I 26/104.

the Danish Government to grant and publish at once a Constitution for Slesvig” to “to counsel the Danish Government to settle without Delay the Details of a Constitution for Slesvig.” In this way we avoid being suspected of advising an arbitrary Mode of Proceeding and leave open the manner in which the Details should be settled.: if it is to be settled by a Constituent Assembly, which would be liable to many objections, or in concert with the Provincial States, or with any other Persons representing the opinions or feelings of the Sleswigers. I have added at the end that the non-political interests Slesvig may have in common with Holstein ought to be taken into consideration. I trust that these alterations may meet the Queen’s views.

The same day Russell sent the Queen the dispatches and Palmerston’s letter remarking that, with the amendments which had been made, they aimed “only at the fulfilment of the Treaty to which Prussia is a party.”¹

The dispatch to Howard was sent off on the 10th of November.² It referred to his above-mentioned dispatch of the 20th of October (see above p. 193), and mentioned that the demand made by the German Powers for a convocation of the Provincial Estates would, according to the opinion of the Danes – Palmerston was probably thinking of his talk with Bielke – greatly hinder the execution of the arrangement agreed upon by Denmark and Germany: that Slesvig should have a constitution separate from Denmark’s on the one hand, and from Holstein’s on the other. It therefore appeared to the British Government that “the speediest way of bringing these long pending differences to an end would be to persuade the King, Duke of Sleswig, to settle the details of such a Constitution for Sleswig without delay,” but taking into consideration the common, non-political interests of the Duchies. “Till this is done the Danish party at Copenhagen will be struggling to unite Sleswig with Denmark and the Germans will be endeavouring to unite Sleswig with Holstein.” Wynn, Palmerston added, would be “instructed to counsel the Danish Government to this effect.”

The same day Wynn was instructed to do so by sending him copies of Howard’s dispatch of the 20th October and of the

¹ R.A.W. I. 26/103.

² F.O. 97/127: 10/11, No. 44.

reply referred to above.¹ In a dispatch of the same date Palmerston asked Wynn to advise the Danish Government how they ought in some way or other to try to negotiate with the Duke of Augustenborg on an arrangement.²

Two days later a detailed dispatch was sent to Westmorland in reply to his account of the 28th of October (see p. 194) of Schwarzenberg's views on the question of the future position of Slesvig.³ The dispatch stated that the British Government "entirely concur in the opinions which have been expressed by Schwarzenberg;" they agreed entirely with Britain's proposal accepted by both parties at the Peace Preliminaries in 1849. Then mention was made of Prussia's assertion that the relations between Norway and Sweden were analogous to those between Slesvig and Denmark and Denmark's objection to this assertion, which Britain shared. As Prussia refused to withdraw her assertion, the matter was not solved, and Britain had then urged Denmark to solve the question of the succession first. Britain's proposal was to the general effect that there should be in Slesvig "a representative Legislature with Powers of Law-making, confined to the Duchy, but that the Army, Navy and the Foreign relations of the aggregate Danish Monarchy should be under the control of the responsible Ministers of the Crown at Copenhagen." Britain had requested the Danish Government several times to put forward proposals in agreement with the peace basis. Then a statement followed which removed the prospect of British support for the Danish programme. It would, it was asserted, be "inconsistent with that Basis to unite the legislative representation of Slesvig with that of Denmark just as it would be inconsistent with that Basis to unite the legislative representation of Slesvig with that of Holstein." After stressing Britain's strong desire to see a speedy settlement of the question of Slesvig's constitution, the dispatch ended by saying that, if this took place in harmony with the basis, there was no doubt that "many matters connected with the Social and commercial relations of Sleswig

¹ F.O. 97/127: 10/11, No. 105.

² Correspondence p. 113. It may be this dispatch the Queen referred to when she requested Russell on the 7/11 to judge whether Palmerston's advice to the Danish Government in the enclosed dispatch "really is as impartial as he represents it to be." R.A.W. I 26/101.

³ F.O. 97/127; 12/11, No. 35.

with Denmark – on the one hand, and with Holstein on the other – would be arranged without much difficulty.”

A few days after this dispatch was sent off, Bielke had another conversation with Palmerston. He received a less optimistic impression of his attitude on this occasion.¹ Bielke wrote that Palmerston’s ideas of what agrees with the existing conventions are “undoubtedly somewhat vague.” However, he did not think that Britain would give her “unconditional” support to the latest demand made by the three Eastern Powers. Palmerston just wanted the matter settled, and any way seemed welcome to him. Bielke thought that the British Ministers abroad must have misunderstood Palmerston’s views when they stated that it was his intention to place Britain’s influence in the *same* balance as that of the three powers.

In his dispatch Bielke reported what the French Minister had told him about a conversation he had had with Palmerston 8 or 10 days previously.² The most important point was Palmerston’s statement that he did approve of the proposal to summon the Provincial Estates, but only as a temporary measure to hear their advice on the question of a future organization. Furthermore he had told Walewski that he was not *au courant* with the latest phase of the matter.

On the 21st Walewski gave another account of his discussions with Palmerston about the Danish question.³ Palmerston believed that, thanks to Russia’s support, the old Provincial Estates would be re-established. Walewski pointed out that the German Powers wanted them to be re-established because the higher classes were pro-German, while the great majority of the population was Danish. Above all, Palmerston wanted the matter settled. If only Denmark’s existence was assured, he was almost indifferent to the rest. He said that both the question of the succession and the internal relations between Denmark and the Duchies had always seemed to him to be extremely complicated, and he had never considered it worth the bother to

¹ Bielke’s dispatch 17/11, No. 4.

² This is probably the conversation Walewski mentions in his dispatch 4/11, No. 39.

³ 21/11, No. 44. – Cf. dispatch 24/11, No. 9 to Dotezac which stated that Britain had associated herself with Russia regarding the question of a closer connection between Denmark and Slesvig, so Denmark ought, therefore, to face the facts. Guichen. II, p. 280 f.

make them the object of special and deep study (*l'objet d'une étude speciale et approfondie*). I think, Walewski wrote, that it is Palmerston's intention to reach a solution as quickly as possible in agreement with Russia, and that he is delighted that this affords him an opportunity to show a friendly attitude towards the Russian Cabinet without yielding his principles and sacrificing any of the interests of British politics, which are nearly all opposed to those of Russia. But if the Danish Constitution was at stake, it was Walewski's belief that Palmerston would use all his influence to maintain it, even if this meant differing from Russia.

Two days later Walewski reported another conversation he had had with Palmerston.¹ He again made it clear that Palmerston wanted to act in agreement with Russia, provided no direct attack was made on the Danish Constitution. Palmerston was waiting for Brunnow to return, when he would discuss the matter with him.

At last towards the end of the month, Brunnow returned to London and discussions could begin. Brunnow told Bielke that his conversations with Palmerston and Russell had shown him that they still entertained the same friendly feelings towards Denmark as they had done when he left.² It was his opinion that a settlement of the succession was the most important thing now, and during his visit to Berlin he had received the impression that Manteuffel was favourably disposed and that the King would no longer refuse to accede to the treaty whereby the Great Powers intended to settle the matter. However, it was Brunnow's opinion that it should be formed in such a way that no mention was made of Prussia's previous attitude towards it. Russell had told him that the alleged pretensions of the Duke of Augustenborg should be removed by means of an indemnity.

It was characteristic of Russia's attitude that Brunnow pointed out to Bielke that Palmerston had not used the word "constitution" when referring to Slesvig's "organization."³ Brunnow told Bielke that the Danish Government were aware of Nesselrode's

¹ 23/11, No. 45.

² Bielke's dispatch 28/11, No. 6.

³ It can hardly be concluded from this that P., as the out-and-out champion of the constitutional principle, did not wish Slesvig to have one. Thus, on the 21st of November, he wrote to Howard (F.O. 97/127: 21/11, No. 62) that it was to be

views and could not expect Russia to find that Denmark was rendering the Slesvigiers a service by allowing them to share the Danish Constitution. But for that matter, Russia had no intention of interfering in Denmark's internal affairs. In a conversation with Bielke a good week later Brunnow said – and rightly so – that the Russian and British Governments held the same views on the settlement of the affair: an “organization” for Slesvig which would not connect it to Holstein or incorporate it in Denmark.¹ Bielke mentioned in his dispatch that Russell had also pointed out to him that it was necessary to make a speedy arrangement with the Duke of Augustenborg.

The only point I shall mention in connection with Walewski's negotiations with Brunnow on Danish affairs is that Walewski stated that it was France's aim to give the greatest strength to the Danish Monarchy. This would, he found, be achieved in the best way by the complete incorporation of Slesvig in Denmark.² Brunnow did not deny this, but said that such a suggestion would give rise to difficulties with the German Powers and would prolong the solution “indéfiniment.”

About the middle of November Cowley reported from Frankfurt a proposal for the organization of the Duchies. This proposal was put forward by a man who was later to play a leading part in European politics.³ I shall mention the proposal briefly, although it did not come to anything. Bismarck was the originator of the plan. In the spring of 1851 he had been sent to Frankfurt as Prussian Envoy to the Confederation after Prussia had abandoned her plans for a Union. Both Budberg and Howard had recommended Bismarck to Cowley.⁴ Howard wrote that he was a friend of his: “You will find him clever, and agreeable in society.”

According to Cowley, Bismarck's proposal was to the effect that the landed aristocracy from both Duchies should constitute an upper chamber to discuss the many common interests, but yet have no political influence. This chamber would resemble

feared that the objections of the Eastern Powers to the Danish programme were due to “an unavowed dislike to the establishment of a free constitution with a local legislature in Sleswig.”

¹ Bielke's dispatch 5/12, No. 8.

² Dispatch 29/11, No. 46.

³ Cowley's dispatch 18/11, No. 329. F.O. 97/127.

⁴ F.O. 519/164: letters of 10/5 51.

the Provincial Estates in Prussia and he thought that the Duchies would be satisfied with the arrangement and German irritation would grow less. Under this "upper house" there were to be separate assemblies for Slesvig and Holstein, "in whose hands whatever political power might be granted, would be placed."

On the 2nd of December Palmerston considered Bismarck's proposal but flatly rejected it.¹ It was, he wrote in his dispatch to Cowley, quite at variance with the peace preliminaries (a separate constitution for Slesvig) and an undisguised attempt to draw Slesvig over towards Holstein. It was impossible that Bismarck really believed that the aristocracy of the two Duchies would assemble in an upper house "for the express purpose of shutting them out from all share in the Political Affairs of their respective Duchies," and leave all the legislative work etc. in the hands of the more democratic assemblies. And provided that the upper house were to exercise the same political power as the democratic assembly which party would constitute the majority? The answer was: the party from Holstein. Therefore the proposal would be "a final step towards setting aside the Principle of a Separate Constitution which has been formally agreed to for Sleswig, and to substitute for that Principle a virtual Annexation to Holstein." Palmerston said that the Danes, and he commended them for it, had never during the negotiations put forward a proposal "tending so directly and undisguisedly to carry their Views into effect."

This dispatch of Palmerston's sealed the fate of Bismarck's proposal. Nothing more was heard of it.²

It is easy to understand that Schwarzenberg was satisfied with Palmerston's dispatch of the 12th of November mentioned above.³ It is more surprising that Bluhme was satisfied with the dispatch of the 10th to Wynn and told him that he was in complete agreement with Palmerston's views.⁴ However, this agrees with Wynn's statement in his dispatch of the 13th that he had understood from Bluhme that he (Bluhme) was not "displeased"

¹ F.O. 97/127: 2/12, No. 172.

² On 9/12 Howard wrote that Manteuffel had never mentioned a plan like Bismarck's to him. F.O. 97/127: 9/12, No. 139. — See also Wynn's dispatch 12/12, No. 142. F.O. 97/127.

³ Cf. Westmorland's dispatch 26/11, No. 40. F.O. 97/127.

⁴ F.O. 97/127: 17/11, No. 128.

with the note which had been received from Russia two days previously and which stated that Denmark could not expect further support from her.¹ As I have mentioned elsewhere, it was imperative for Bluhme in order to persuade his colleagues in the Cabinet to support his United Monarchy plan to show them that it was necessary on account of the Great Powers.² On the other hand he used his colleagues' disapproval to secure the best possible terms from the representatives of the foreign powers for his programme, especially the rejection of all political Slesvig-Holsteinism.

The result was that at a new meeting of the Council of State on the 23rd, after prolonged discussions at the meetings on the 19th and 21st, the King sanctioned Bluhme's programme, which had been approved by the majority. A new era in Danish politics had begun, wrote Sternberg.³ The following day Madvig handed in his resignation and a few of the other Ministers including Bardenfleth said that they would resign. Wynn wrote that the King was "somewhat reluctant, as I find" to give his sanction.⁴ In his letter of the same date to Westmorland he stated that the King's consent was given "malgré bongré." He went on to say, not quite in accordance with facts, that the Provincial Estates would be "convocated as soon as it is distinctly ascertained that this concession will have the desired consequence, the withdrawal of the Commissioners and the evacuation of the Duchy including *Rendsbourg*."

Acting on provisional information about Bluhme's programme and the demands of the German Powers contained in a letter he received from Bille, Bielke had a conversation on the 8th of December with Palmerston and urged him to make a strong protest against "such intolerable and unjustified interference in our internal affairs."⁵ In his dispatch to Bluhme, Bielke mentioned that until he received details of the Government's plan he could not give a definite account of the points at issue between Denmark and the German Powers.

¹ F.O. 97/127: 13/11, No. 127. Statsrådets Forhandl. III, p. 560 ff.

² "Carl Moltke og dannelsen af helstatsministeriet i januar 1852". Hist. Tidsskr. 11. r. V, p. 245 ff.

³ Dispatch 22/11, No. 197, and 24/11, No. 198.

⁴ F.O. 97/127: 24/11, No. 132.

⁵ Dispatch 9/12, No. 9. — Cf. Walewski's dispatch 10/12, No. 48.

He received this information a few days later, on the 11th.¹ Bluhme wrote that, although the Danish Government did not recognize the views of the German Powers (respecting guarantees before the repeal of the Federal execution in Holstein), they had, however, decided to inform Vienna and Berlin in confidence about the new programme they had agreed on as this would make the reorganization of the Monarchy easier. This information was contained in the dispatches of the 6th of December with enclosures to the Danish Ministers in Vienna and Berlin. Copies were enclosed with the dispatch to Bielke. He was to communicate them to Palmerston and express his hope of support both from Britain and the signatory powers. The dispatch ended by saying that Wynn was aware of all the hindrances which he (Bluhme) had had to overcome to get so far. Wynn shared the views of the Danish Government and had promised to support them by all the means in his power.

On the 4th of December Bluhme had summoned the representatives of the foreign powers concerned and given them a detailed account of his programme and his replies to the notes that had been received from Vienna and Berlin in September.² The programme was the United Monarchy programme mentioned above, a condition of which was that the King should rule as an absolute monarch in the Duchies with the former Provincial Estates only as a consultative body until a constitutional United Monarchy was created. Furthermore, Slesvig was not to have a closer connection with Denmark than Holstein, and no political connection was to exist between the two Duchies, but they were to retain certain common material links.

On the 6th Wynn informed Palmerston of the meeting and later sent him translations of the dispatches concerned with the enclosures about the programme.³ He was of the opinion that Werther, his Prussian colleague, would "strongly recommend the acceptance of the Programme," and Vrints would probably do the same although he "complains that the institution of the Provincial States is not permanent – only convoked to consider

¹ Orders 6/12, No. 23.

² H.T. 11. r. V, p. 256 ff. The answers with enclosures are printed in *Actstykker ang. Forhandlingerne mellem Danmark og Tyskland i Aarene 1851–52'*. (Kbh. 1862).

³ F.O. 97/127: 6/12, No. 138, and 11/12, No. 141.

Change, and that there is not a sufficient Guarantee for the future, as to measures or men." When Wynn stressed to Vrints that foreign governments were not justified in interfering in the internal politics of another country to that degree, Vrints admitted that this might be true "in common cases," but Austria had a right to "demand an acquiescence with their wishes in return for the Guarantee of the Succession."

At Bluhme's request Wynn wrote to his colleagues in Berlin and Vienna asking for support for the Danish demand that no German troops were to remain in the fortress of Rendsborg when Holstein was evacuated. In his letter to Westmorland, Wynn said that the programme was the very most that Bluhme had been able to achieve.¹ If more were demanded, "the task of endeavouring to obtain it must fall on others, but I doubt whether any willing to undertake it will be found, and the King will then necessarily be thrown into the Hands of the extreme Danish Party by which European quiet will not much gain." Wynn also stated that the same day (6th December) Bille had set off on his mission to Berlin and Vienna to induce Prussia and Austria to accept the programme and give back Holstein to its Sovereign. He wrote that Bille had been chosen to take over Reventlow's post in London and added: "A better man could not be found."

On the 8th of December Bielke sent Palmerston a verbal note informing him that the Danish Government had now given up the idea of incorporating Slesvig in Denmark and intended to create a United Monarchy and would listen to the advice of Slesvig's Provincial Estates "before proceeding with the organisation of Slesvig."² But, wrote Bielke, it seemed as if the two German Powers, especially Prussia, did not find that these concessions were sufficient, but demanded consultative Estates in the Duchies as a permanent institution. This would be irreconcilable with the Danish Constitution and was the same as asking for its abolition in favour of consultative Estates. "Such is the intention of Prussia at home, and now she wants Denmark to try the same experiment."

Bielke continued by saying that no Danish Government would

¹ Wynn to Westmorland 6/12.

² F.O. 97/127. "Rd 25th Dec." is written on the back of the dispatch and it is to be found much later in the volume than Bielke's note of 12/12.

agree to this suggestion. "If it be not sufficient that Denmark enter on measures, that, it is evident to everybody, must eventually lead to a change of her fundamental law, but is she at once to be forced to adopt measures involving an immediate return to consultative provincial Estates for the entire Monarchy – then there is an end to everything . . ."

Bielke wrote that it also looked as if Prussia wished to retain a garrison at Rendsborg until the frontier had been finally drawn, but it was impossible for Denmark to agree to this. Denmark "hopes and trusts, that Lord Palmerston will energetically protest against such interference in the internal affairs and constitutional question." The Government's programme and the final answers to the notes received in September from the German Powers would show that the Danish Government had gone to the extreme limits as far as concessions were concerned and had done what the above-mentioned powers had so far declared was necessary for the evacuation of Holstein.

Four days later Bielke sent to Palmerston in confidence copies of the dispatch received by himself of the 6th as well as of the dispatches to Vienna and Berlin (and of enclosure 2 in these dispatches).¹ He was not successful in obtaining any negotiation on the matter with Palmerston. On the other hand, shortly before Christmas, he spoke to Lord Stanley of Alderley and asked him to persuade Palmerston to use his influence in Berlin and Vienna before it was too late.² Bielke had also previously asked Brunnow to influence Palmerston in this direction, which Brunnow had promised, although he was of the opinion, and rightly so, that Palmerston's recommendation would hardly be of much avail in Vienna.³

Neither Bielke nor Brunnow knew that Palmerston was definitely going to leave the Cabinet before Christmas. Before he left the Foreign Office, definitively as it turned out, Palmerston had another opportunity of showing his sympathies for Denmark and for the constitutional system. On the 26th he sent Wynn a copy of Bielke's verbal note of the 8th and stated that "the German Powers have no right to prescribe to the King Duke

¹ Bielke's dispatch 13/12, No. 10. – F.O. 97/127: 12/12.

² Dispatch 23/12, No. 12.

³ Bielke's dispatch 16/12, No. 11.

what shall be the form of constitution to be established for the Duchy of Sleswig, except so far as that shall be separate from Denmark on the one hand and from Holstein on the other.”¹

On the 8th Bille arrived in Berlin on his mission. He immediately applied to the Ministers of the Friendly Powers for assistance against the Prussian Government. Howard had already been informed about the situation and Bille told him that the plan was “the utmost concession” it was possible to carry through, and that the evacuation of the whole of Holstein, including Rendsborg, was “an indispensable condition.”² Thereupon Howard urged Manteuffel to accept Bluhme’s programme favourably. Otherwise Bluhme would have to retire, said Howard, who stressed the necessity of evacuating Rendsborg. Manteuffel thought that this would cause difficulties “unless the Danish Government were disposed to accept a proposal he had made that they should declare the whole of the Fortress to be German.” To this Howard replied that he definitely knew that the Danish Government would not accept such a proposal.

Two days later Howard reported that Budberg had given warm support to Denmark in his conversation the same day with Manteuffel, but Manteuffel found that the programme was “vague and contained no guarantees for the future.”³ Howard wrote that he himself had warned Le Coq against rejecting “terms which appeared so reasonable,” and emphasized how desirable it was to see an end of the intervention by the two German Powers “in these affairs.”

In spite of the warm support of Denmark given by Budberg and mentioned by Howard, it did not seem to have prevented him from writing to his colleague in Copenhagen requesting him to urge the Danish Government to make further concessions.⁴ But, as Wynn reported, Bluhme gave assurances at the weekly conference on the 12th, “in as strong terms as ever,” that this was impossible, “concession having gone to its extreme limits.” Bluhme told Wynn that it was obvious that the Eastern Powers wanted a Danish coup d’état, but he hoped for strong support from Britain. There was not much reality behind his hopes and,

¹ F.O. 97/127: 26/12, No. 124.

² F.O. 97/127: 9/12, No. 138.

³ F.O. 97/127: 11/12, No. 142.

⁴ Wynn’s dispatch 13/12, No. 143. F.O. 97/127.

furthermore, as we shall see in a moment, Palmerston's days as the leader of Britain's foreign policy were almost over.

After Howard had heard from Wynn of Bluhme's pessimistic view of Berlin's attitude, he spoke once more to Manteuffel.¹ Howard asked if Manteuffel had actually demanded that the Provincial Estates were to be a *permanent* institution. Manteuffel thought there must be "some mistake", but said that he had demanded a convocation of the Estates in Holstein, so that there could be "a legal organ through which to bring before the German Diet any complaints it might have to make of ill treatment by the Danish Authorities." For Slesvig, which was not a German Duchy, he could not "make demands but only offer the advice of Prussia as an Ally of Denmark." But, wrote Howard, "his language, however, on this point was reserved." He deplored the vagueness of the programme, but wanted to hear Austria's opinion first. He said that the King of Prussia wished the matter sent to the Diet, but he himself "did not agree in the expediency of such a course, to the inconveniences of which he was fully alive." Respecting the vagueness of the programme Howard mentioned that Bille, of course, was in Berlin to explain it. He repeated his hope that Prussia "would not put forward unreasonable demands." Several of Manteuffel's statements were, incidentally, of a friendly nature; thus he said that he was willing to allow time for new elections to the Holstein Estates.

As Howard reported on the 19th, Denmark's request that Rendsborg should be evacuated at the same time as Holstein received Russia's full support in a dispatch from Nesselrode to Budberg.² Seymour had reported from St. Petersburg that Nesselrode had stated that, as soon as the German Powers were satisfied with Bluhme's programme, Rendsborg must be handed over to Denmark.³ He said it would be absurd to make the presence of German troops in Rendsborg dependent on the demarcation of the frontier between Slesvig and Holstein (this was to be done according to Art. 5 of the Peace of the 2nd of July 1850. *British Mediation. II, p. 211*).

On the 22nd when Howard again spoke to Manteuffel he found

¹ F.O. 97/127: 16/12, No. 147.

² *Ibid.*: 19/12, No. 156.

³ *Ibid.* 10/12, No. 125.

him somewhat more in favour of Bluhme's programme, but, naturally, he first wanted to hear Austria's opinion.¹ During his negotiations in Berlin, Bille was supported not only by Howard and, as we have seen, by Budberg but also by the French and Swedish Ministers.²

As mentioned above, the strong support for which the Danish Government had appealed to Palmerston was not forthcoming. But, as Howard told Westmorland, he did receive "a short approval of my having urged Manteuffel to give his favorable consideration to Bluhme's proposals."³

On the 19th Bille and Bülow, who had travelled from Frankfurt to assist Bille, reached Vienna to conduct the crucial negotiations with Schwarzenberg.⁴ Of course, Bille went to see both Meyendorff and Westmorland to secure their support at the negotiations. On the 23rd Westmorland was told by Schwarzenberg that he wanted to know which persons were "in the first instance at least, to be charged with the Government of the Duchies, and without intending in any way to influence the choice the Government might think right to make yet he would not hesitate to say" that, if such men as Reventlow-Criminil and Carl Moltke "were either entrusted with the Government of the Duchies, or were called upon to form a part of the general administration of the Kingdom, it would go far towards securing the confidence of the allied Governments."

At the beginning of the month the Ministers of the German Powers in Copenhagen had confronted Bluhme with Austria's "demand" for Moltke as the Minister for Slesvig and Reventlow as the Minister for Holstein, although Schwarzenberg officially asserted that Austria would not influence the choice of the Danish Government!

On the 25th Schwarzenberg informed Bille of Austria's reply (dated the 26th) to the Danish note of the 6th.⁵ It contained Austria's support to the plan for the United Monarchy put forward in enclosure 2 of the note, provided that the King made

¹ F.O. 97/127: 22/12, No. 159.

² *Ibid.*: Wynn's dispatch 20/12, No. 146. – Dispatch 15/12, No. 28, to Lefebvre and Lefebvre's dispatch 21/12, No. 85.

³ Howard's letter 20/12.

⁴ F.O. 97/127: 23/12, No. 60.

⁵ Printed in "Actstykker ang. Forhandlingerne . . .", p. 24 ff.

a declaration concerning the execution of the programme and that a guarantee was received respecting the choice of Ministers for the Cabinet of the United Monarchy. On the 26th Westmorland wrote that Schwarzenberg had assured Bille that, if arrangements for the administration of the Duchies "were carried out in that spirit of conciliation, the character of which had been so clearly explained – he would then recommend" the evacuation of Holstein by the German troops and the re-establishment there of the King's authority.¹

During his stay in Berlin on his way home to Copenhagen, Bille saw the Prussian reply, dated the 30th.² It corresponded, of course, on the whole to Austria's, but he found it not quite so favourable. The enclosure with the reply says, for instance, that "the Electoral Law in force in Denmark will not be introduced into Schleswig and the German Duchies." On the 30th Howard wrote that he had said to Bille that "the terms now offered by the German Governments were much more favourable than any which Denmark would be likely to obtain were the whole question referred to the German Diet."³ In Copenhagen Wynn urged Bluhme to make the necessary concessions, so that the matter could be terminated. That this was also the opinion of Palmerston's successor can be taken for granted, even if Howard wrote in his letter of the 3rd of January to Westmorland that the dispatch he had received from London about the matter "is so obscure that I really do not know what arrangement I am to support." This did not prevent him in assuring the Foreign Office that he had acted in accordance with its instructions!⁴

The final arrangement between Denmark and the two German Powers was made during the first month of the New Year. But when Austria and Prussia sent their replies to Bluhme's programme, Palmerston was no longer Britain's Foreign Secretary.

As mentioned above (p. 197 and p. 202), Palmerston had both at the end of October and during November directed Wynn

¹ F.O. 97/127: 26/12, No. 66.

² "Actstykker ang. Forhandlingerne . . .", p. 35 ff. – Correspondence, p. 120 ff.

³ F.O. 97/128: 30/12, No. 6. – Cf. Howard's letter 3/1 52 to Westmorland.

⁴ F.O. 97/128: 5/1, No. 9.

to urge the Danish Government to try to come to an arrangement with the Duke of Augustenburg by making him a handsome offer. But the Danish Government refused to negotiate directly with the "traitor," whose rights of succession to any part of the Monarchy it, for that matter, did not recognize. However, the King of Prussia had, as will be remembered, promised to lend his support to an arrangement and Bismarck, Prussia's envoy to the Confederation, had begun negotiations with Bülow, his Danish colleague, and with the Duke. In his reports from Frankfurt Cowley repeatedly mentioned what he had learnt about these negotiations from his conversations with Bismarck and Bülow.¹ At the end of his dispatch of the 21st of October he remarked: "I must, however, add that it appears to be the impression of those with whom the Duke of Augustenburg has conversed on the state of his affairs, that his Highness is not acting with good faith, and that his real object is to retard by all the means in his power any settlement averse to his interests."

In the middle of November when Wynn submitted Palmerston's above-mentioned request of the 10th to Bluhme, the latter in reply merely gave him a copy of his dispatch of the 13th to Baron Plessen at St. Petersburg.² This dispatch gave detailed information as to the point of view Bluhme would adopt towards the Duke of Augustenburg after listening to Russia's advice. The Danish Government had, it is true, previously mentioned the approximate size of the indemnity, but, as Bluhme stressed in his dispatch, no real valuation of the Duke's estates had, unfortunately, as yet taken place. Until this had been done, the Danish Government could not make its offer. But now two commissioners had been appointed to carry out the valuation, and to ensure that this would be as unbiased as possible, it was to be supervised by two persons who had formerly been employed by the Duke to look after his accounts. The conditions for the payment of an indemnity were to be restricted to the following: that the estates in question became state property; that the Duke and his family took up residence outside the Kingdom; and that the Duke promised on behalf of his family and himself to do nothing which might disturb the peace of the Kingdom or hinder

¹ Correspondence, *passim*.

² Correspondence, p. 116 f.

the King's arrangements respecting the question of the succession and the organization of the Monarchy.

The dispatch stated that, over and above the indemnity, the Danish Government intended to give the Duke "un surplus convenable" to show their appreciation of Russia's wise counsel and Berlin's offer of "bons offices" in the matter. After the amount of the indemnity had been fixed and communicated to Bülow, the Danish Government, as evidence of their confidence in Prussia, would ask Bülow to confer with Bismarck, whose help so far had been much appreciated, before taking further steps.

A week after Wynn had given this information he reported that he had had another conversation with Bluhme as he wanted to learn "what excess above the real value will be offered" to the Duke.¹ He did not receive an answer to his enquiry until some time in the New Year. It was obvious that the greater "the excess" the more sympathetically the English Court and Government would regard a coming arrangement.

13. The Fall of Palmerston. Granville Foreign Secretary. (26th December 1851–27th February 1852)

In her letter of the 4th of November to John Russell, the Queen had touched on the sympathy shown by Britain for the nationalist (revolutionary) movements in Lombardy and Hungary and had upbraided Palmerston that he did not show similar sympathy for the Slesvig-Holstein movement (see p. 200). Britain gave practical proof of her sympathy for Hungary by bringing about – together with the United States – Kossuth's release from imprisonment in Turkey, where he had fled. In one of his dispatches Bunsen remarked that it was the first time that the United States had interfered in European affairs.²

After his release Kossuth went first to France and then to England, which he reached on the 23rd of October.³ Count Buol, the Austrian Minister, made sure he was absent all the time

¹ Correspondence, p. 119: 27/11.

² 31/10, No. 94.

³ Walpole. II, p. 132 ff. – Bunsen's dispatch 25/10, No. 93.

Kossuth was in England. It was to be expected that English radicals and revolutionary refugees would demonstrate in support of Hungary and against Austria.

The day after Kossuth arrived, the Queen wrote to Russell asking him to try to prevent Palmerston from receiving him: "The effect it will have abroad will do us immense harm."¹ Russell did this, though at first his attempts were unsuccessful. On the 30th, therefore, he wrote to Palmerston that he "must . . . positively request that you will not receive Kossuth."² Palmerston replied angrily that "there are limits to all things; that I do not choose to be dictated to as to whom I may or may not receive in my own house . . ." Russell must have resented the reply, for the next day he advised the Queen "to command Lord Palmerston not to receive M. Kossuth," which she proved extremely willing to do.³ On further consideration, however, he withdrew this piece of advice and wrote to Palmerston that he had summoned a Cabinet meeting for the 3rd of November to discuss the matter. He apologized in some measure for his letter of the 30th: "If my letter was too peremptory, yours was, I think, quite unjustifiable." But, he ended his letter, let us try "to come to a fair and impartial decision." When the Cabinet agreed with Russell, Palmerston gave in.

But on the 18th of November, after Kossuth had left England for the United States, Palmerston received a radical deputation from two of London's boroughs (Finsbury and Islington). He was handed addresses of thanks for the part he had played in setting Kossuth free. The addresses stigmatised the Emperor of Austria and the Tsar as "merciless tyrants and despots." Palmerston's speech on the occasion and the contents of the addresses were printed in the newspapers and, of course, caused a great sensation.⁴ "The Court and the Queen personally," Bunsen wrote on the 1st of December, "are extremely indignant over the whole event."⁵ Palmerston tried to defend himself by saying that he was not aware of the contents of the addresses before-

¹ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 392.

² Walpole. II, p. 133.

³ Concerning the following see The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 393 ff. and Walpole. II, p. 134 ff.

⁴ Walpole. II, p. 136 ff. - Bunsen's dispatch 20/11, No. 103.

⁵ Dispatch 1/12, No. 110.

hand and that his reply had been incorrectly reported in the papers.

The Queen vented her anger on Russell.¹ But on the 21st Russell replied that he had "more than once represented to Your Majesty, that the expulsion of Lord Palmerston would break up the Government." He referred to the fact that Palmerston had represented the foreign policy of the Whig party for fifteen years, when his periods of office were added together, "and has been approved not only by them but by a large portion of the country . . . the good will and affection of the people of England are retained, a great security in these times."

The Queen's reply was immediate and ungracious. She hoped, she wrote, that the Cabinet would make a careful enquiry into the justice of her complaint, which she was sorry to miss altogether in Russell's letter.

The matter was brought up at a Cabinet meeting on the 4th of December. However, the Cabinet did not go beyond regretting the fact that, before he consented to receive the addresses of thanks, Palmerston had not made himself acquainted with their contents and that he had "admitted unfaithful reporters to his room . . ."

If Palmerston had been forced to leave the Cabinet on this occasion, he would have been hailed by Liberal and Radical circles as a martyr in the cause of freedom. But what caused his fall a month later was the attitude he adopted to events in France on the 2nd of December – an attitude which was the complete reverse of his previous one. When the National Assembly refused to agree to Louis Napoleon's wish for an amendment to the constitution which would have allowed him to be re-elected president, he dissolved the Assembly by force, arrested his opponents and put down the scattered risings. On the other hand he promised to appeal to the people to elect him President for a ten-year period. The same day at 12 o'clock, Greville wrote: "the wonderful Electric Telegraph brought us word that two hours before the President had accomplished his Coup d'État . . ."²

While public opinion in Britain strongly disapproved of Napo-

¹ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 397 ff.

² Greville. III, p. 420.

leon's coup d'état, Walewski was able to inform Paris that Palmerston approved of the President's proceedings.¹ Of course this information pleased Napoleon very much.²

However, Palmerston had expressed his approval without receiving beforehand the consent of the Cabinet or the Queen.³ On the contrary, on the 4th, the Queen had written to Russell that she thought it was very important that Lord Normanby, the British Minister in Paris, was directed "to remain entirely passive, and should take no part whatever in what is passing. Any word from him might be misconstrued at such a moment." Russell answered the same day at 6 pm that the Queen's directions would be followed. Normanby had asked whether he was to suspend his diplomatic functions, but the Cabinet were unanimously of the opinion that he should not do so. The next day Palmerston sent him this information and told him that it was the Queen's wish that he was to do nothing "which could wear the appearance of an interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France."

When Normanby informed the French Foreign Minister of this and apologized that he had not done so earlier, he was told by Turgot that he had already been informed by Walewski that Palmerston entirely approved of the President's action. On the 13th, after receiving a copy of Normanby's dispatch from the Foreign Office, the Queen demanded an explanation from Russell and asked whether it was really true, as it was at variance with her own letter of the 4th and Russell's reply of the same date.⁴ Incidentally, the Queen was no doubt already well aware of this and of the conflicting views of the President of France held by Lord Normanby and by Palmerston through information she had received from Colonel Charles Beaumont Phipps, who was a Court official and a brother of Lord Normanby.

John Russell sent the Queen's letter to Palmerston and

¹ According to Ashley, I, p. 312, in a private letter from Walewski to Turgot. Dispatch 5[?]/12, No. 47.

² Dispatch 12/12, No. 67, to Walewski.

³ Concerning the following see *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. II, p. 404 ff.; Ashley, I, p. 286 ff.; Martin. II (1876), p. 411 ff.; Walpole. II, p. 138 ff.; Bell. II, p. 47 ff.

⁴ In the Queen's letter of the 13th Russell's reply is incorrectly given as being of the 6th. Perhaps because it was written at 6pm?

requested an explanation. Palmerston did not reply until the 16th. He justified his action in his letter, but Russell found his explanation unsatisfactory. Therefore on the 17th Russell informed him that he could not continue as Foreign Secretary, but offered him instead the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland. Palmerston refused this post, but stated that he was prepared to resign when a successor had been found.

On the 19th Russell, therefore, advised the Queen to dismiss Palmerston. A Cabinet meeting was to take place on the 22nd. Russell would continue in office, and as Palmerston's successor suggested Lord Granville as "the person best calculated for that post, but the Cabinet may be of opinion that more experience is required."

The Cabinet preferred Lord Clarendon, but the Queen protested. Lord Granville was then appointed. He was 37 years of age, had cooperated closely with Prince Albert as Vice President of the Royal Commission for the Great exhibition and had been appointed President of the Board of Trade in October. Bunsen commented on the new Foreign Secretary in his dispatch: "He [Granville] is extremely pleasant . . . at the same time he is completely devoted to the Queen and Prince Albert. He was never closely associated with Lord Palmerston; on the contrary he disapproved of his policy on many points . . ."¹

On the 23rd, when Russell informed Palmerston that Granville had accepted the post of Foreign Secretary and that he had sent his acceptance to the Queen, he added: "It has been a most disagreeable, indeed painful week – I will, however, say no more."² Granville took over officially on the 26th.

The removal of Palmerston from the Cabinet was described at the time as Russell's "coup d'état." He had not discussed the matter with the other members of the Cabinet, only with the Queen. The appointment of Granville was also done in compliance with the Queen's wishes, as a sort of offer to Clarendon seems to have been formed in such a way that he was to refuse.³ On the afternoon of the 22nd, after the Cabinet meeting, Greville was told by Granville that *Palmerston is out!* He wrote: "I nearly

¹ Dispatch 25/12, No. 123.

² P.P.

³ Greville. III, p. 426 ff.

dropped off my chair." Two days later Greville commented on Granville's surprising appointment. He expected that "he will do it very well, for he is quick and prudent, straightforward and conciliatory . . . The Palms are highly indignant, he very calm and gentlemanlike, as he was sure to be, and says nothing. She does all the rage and resentment part . . ."¹

The Queen and Prince Albert could not have received a better Christmas present than Palmerston's resignation. On the 23rd the Queen wrote to her uncle, King Leopold, about the change in the Cabinet, "which I know will give you as much satisfaction and relief as it does to us, and will do to the whole of the world."² She and Prince Albert had a very happy Christmas.³ At the beginning of January she wrote to the King of Prussia: "Your Majesty will have shared the universal grief of Europe at the news of Lord Palmerston's resignation from my Ministry. I only hope the public here will understand that his conduct of affairs was not a correct interpretation of England's national policy."⁴

On the 29th of December Prince Albert wrote to his brother, summing up the events of the past year. He mentioned the success of the Great Exhibition and wrote that the year had ended with the "for us, happy circumstance, that the man who embittered our whole life . . . cut his throat himself. Give a rogue a rope and he will hang himself is an old English saying with which we sometimes tried to console ourselves and which has become true again."⁵

It is strange that Bunsen, Prussia's Minister, who was in such close connection with the Court, mentioned in a letter of the 23rd that Palmerston was going to remain.⁶ However, before his letter reached Berlin, Bunsen had already sent a telegraphic dispatch on Christmas Eve with the great news. Victoria and Prince Albert had invited Bunsen to visit them on Christmas Eve

¹ The Letters of Charles Greville and Henry Reeve 1836-1865. Edited by A. H. Johnson (1924), p. 209 f.

² The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 417 f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 429.

⁴ R.A.W. I 27/30: 9/1. - The letter is printed in a different form in H. Bolitho: *Further Letters of Queen Victoria* (1938), p. 27 f. This is probably due to the fact that the English draft was translated into German and has been re-translated into English here.

⁵ H. Bolitho: *The Prince Consort and his Brother* (1933), p. 125 f.

⁶ Howard 27/12 to Westmorland.

at Windsor Castle.¹ There he had the opportunity, as he wrote to the King, of "not only learning the true facts of the case concerning Lord Palmerston's resignation before any of my colleagues, but also of being informed of the actions of the persons who were involved in Palmerston's downfall." Then he repeated what he had been told in the strictest confidence and he asked that the information be kept secret. When Bunsen mentioned that Palmerston's position had been undermined by the London Protocol and the Greek affair, he was, no doubt, thinking of Palmerston's relations with the Court. It is true, as Bunsen pointed out, that Palmerston's fall was due to circumstances which were very unfavourable for him, as public opinion in Britain was, on the whole, against the French coup d'état. His prophecy: "He has fallen and for ever; at 68 one doesn't take the helm of state again," was, however, not fulfilled.

Palmerston's resignation caused a definite improvement of the relations between the British Ministers in Berlin and Vienna and the respective Cabinets. On the 27th Howard wrote to Westmorland: "Everybody, excepting the Democrats, hailed this intelligence as the most acceptable of all Christmas presents." "Old Wrangel was so exuberant in his joy as to say that Revolutions were now at an end." "One feels again that one can breathe more freely and serve with less disgust."² Schwarzenberg gave a ball to celebrate the happy event.³

Bunsen's statement, mentioned above, that he was the first foreign representative to hear the great news was incorrect. Russell realized that Palmerston's dismissal, due to his sympathetic attitude towards the coup d'état, would certainly not be welcome news in France. On the 22nd he asked Walewski for an interview. This took place the following morning.⁴ Russell told Walewski that the Queen had dismissed Palmerston, but assured him that the policy towards France would continue

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 25/12, No. 123. — The information given in Bunsen. III, p. 198 ff., is taken word for word from Bunsen's above-mentioned dispatch and its postscript. Although Bunsen asserted that his account was "authentic", it is full of inaccuracies. According to Greville. III, p. 432, Bunsen received his account from Stockmar and it came "direct from the Court."

² Cf. Howard to Westmorland 3/1 52.

³ Bell. II, p. 57 f.

⁴ Walewski's dispatch 23/12, No. 53. — The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 421.

unchanged. He expressed a wish that the two countries would keep up their cordial relations and he hoped to see a stable and settled government in France. Further, on the 25th, although he did not officially take office until the next day, Granville paid Walewski a visit and said that he had been appointed on account of his well-known friendly feelings towards France.¹ When Walewski referred to the statement in *The Times* about the reason for Palmerston's resignation, Granville promised that he would arrange a sort of contradiction. This appeared in the *Globe* (27/12 and 1/1).²

During a visit to Broadlands at the beginning of January, Palmerston gave Walewski his own explanation of the course of the whole episode.³ You will be able to see, Walewski wrote in his dispatch, that the complaint against Palmerston which caused his resignation is only based on the use of words of slightly different meaning, and if Russell had not had other reasons, his dismissal would not have been easy to defend. Walewski asserted that Palmerston's attitude towards France was the same as the Cabinet's.

The fact that Lord Normanby was on bad terms with the President and that he had played a part in bringing about the fall of Palmerston meant that he had to retire from his post as British Minister in Paris.⁴ His successor was Lord Cowley, whose conduct and activities at Frankfurt had pleased the royal family. According to Bunsen, the Court was responsible for his appointment.⁵ When Walewski informed Paris of Cowley's appointment, he commended him highly,⁶ and during the long period he served there Cowley played an important part in maintaining good relations between the two countries.

In a dispatch of the 16th of February, Bunsen characterized

¹ Walewski's dispatch 26/12, No. 54.

² Dispatches 27/12, No. 55, and 3/1, No. 57. Concerning Granville's attempt to persuade *The Times* to adopt a less hostile attitude towards the President see "Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve" by John Knox Laughton. I (1898), p. 249 ff.

³ Walewski's dispatch 6/1 (confidential).

⁴ Already 28/12 Russell expressed a wish on this matter to Granville. Fitzmaurice. I, p. 54 f. – Cf. Walewski's dispatches 10–11/1, No. 59; 26/1 (confidential) and 28/1, No. 65.

⁵ Dispatches 1/2, No. 30, and 2/2, No. 33. – Th3 post was, however, offered first to two others. Fitzmaurice. I, p. 56.

⁶ Dispatch 28/1, No. 65.

the fall of Palmerston, brought about by the Court, as a constitutional exercise of the royal prerogative, which had not been put into use since the beginning of the century.¹ The Court obviously wanted to follow up their victory for, on the 28th of December, the Queen informed Russell that she wanted a re-consideration of the principles upon which Britain's foreign affairs had been conducted.² Russell replied that he would hand her letter to Granville, but he himself found it very difficult to lay down any general principles from which deviations might not be made.³ Granville's memorandum was couched in such general terms ("a series of commonplaces") that presumably both Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen could have accepted it.⁴ Incidentally, did the Court think that all future ministries were to be bound to the new programme for foreign affairs desired by the Court?

When Granville took office, one of the Under-Secretaries of State, Lord Stanley of Alderley, resigned. Many negotiations took place during the following weeks on the appointment of a successor,⁵ and the post was not filled until about the middle of February when Austen Henry Layard, the archaeologist noted for his excavations at Nineveh, was appointed.⁶ Bunsen wrote that his promotion was unprecedented.

As soon as Granville took office, he asked for advice from Lord Charles John Canning, who had been Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office during Peel's Ministry in 1841.⁷ Granville had mentioned the question of "communicating with the Clerks," and Canning admitted that this demanded "a little management but it is quite necessary to hold such communication in informing yourself upon long and complicated subjects." He gave good advice about paying consideration to the Under-Secretary's feelings. I shall not refer to his remarks on Addington,

¹ Dispatch 16/2, No. 49.

² The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 425 ff. — In a letter 22/1 52 to his brother, Prince Albert wrote that he was busy with a "revision of our foreign politics." H. Bolitho: *The Prince Consort and his Brother*, p. 129.

³ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 427 f.

⁴ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 428. — Fitzmaurice. I, p. 47 ff. — Greenville. III, p. 442.

⁵ P.R.O. 30. — 29. 20. Granville Papers. — Bunsen's dispatch 1/2, No. 29.

⁶ W. N. Bruce: *A. Henry Layard. Autobiography and Letters . . .* II (1903), p. 238 f. — Bunsen's dispatch 16/2, No. 46.

⁷ Canning's letter 26/12. P.R.O.30. — 29.20.

the Under-Secretary who remained in office, except to mention that he said he was "thoroughly honest and trustworthy."

On the 28th Granville had a talk lasting two hours with his predecessor in office, Palmerston. The following day he sent Palmerston a letter of thanks: "I should have thought it impossible to have learnt so much of our relations with the whole world" as he had done during this talk.¹

At the end of December or the beginning of January, Granville received from the clerks at the Foreign Office memoranda on Britain's relations with the various countries.² The memorandum concerning Denmark was dated the 27th of December and was drawn up by Mellish. It was in two parts: 1. The question of the reorganisation of the Duchies and 2. the question of the succession. The memorandum is printed in full in this volume as Appendix II.

It was over the question of the succession that the royal family enjoyed its first, although short-lived, triumph after Palmerston's fall, thanks to his successor, who was devoted to the Queen and Prince Albert. The memorandum ended by stating: "The answer from the Queen to the King of Denmark purporting that H.M. will be ready to fulfill the engagement of the Protocol of the fourth [should be the 2nd] of August 1850 on that final arrangement of the Matter is now before the Queen."

It is doubtful whether the form of this answer will ever come to light. For, on the 31st of December, the Queen informed Granville that the contents of the answer which had been submitted to her after Palmerston had tendered his resignation and Granville had been appointed, had been rejected by her in a letter to Russell of the 22nd of September (see p. 182). She enclosed a copy of this letter.³

There is a detailed memorandum, presumably drawn up by Mellish, dated the 1st of January 1852 (printed in Appendix III), whose contents may be said to state the reasons for the Queen's being "ready to fulfill the engagement of the Protocol."⁴

¹ Copy of letter 29/12 to Palmerston. P.R.O.30. - 29. 20. - Fitzmaurice. I, p. 46 f. - Greville. III, p. 433.

² P.R.O. 30. - 29. 20. File "State of Business Memoranda 1851-52."

³ R.A.W. I 27/19.

⁴ F.O. 97/128 where it is incorrectly placed later than the memorandum of the 8th.

It ends by saying that "England is the only Power which has made no reply." It must remain undecided whether it was the Queen's letter of the 31st of December to Granville which evoked the memorandum.

However, Granville disregarded this memorandum and on the 3rd of January sent the Queen "an altered draft" of the reply to the King of Denmark.¹ He had, he wrote, only a limited knowledge of the Slesvig-Holstein question, but he found the Queen's observations correct: with regard to a successor to the Duchy of Holstein, the King of Denmark "must come to an agreement with the German Confederation, and that before any European Acknowledgment can be given" the consent of the Confederation must be obtained. — Of course it was the Duke of Augustenborg's dearest wish to have the matter settled by the many-headed Diet at Frankfurt with its numerous members with pro-Slesvig-Holstein sympathies.

The day after Granville had accepted the post of Foreign Secretary without any hesitation, he wrote (on the 23rd of December) to Lord Lansdowne that the attacks on him would presumably concern his incompetency.² He went on to say that it would no doubt be asserted that Palmerston's fall was "the result of a Court intrigue to displace one who was too powerful to be influenced, and to replace him by one under the influence of the Court." Granville hoped that this assertion would prove to be incorrect. As has just been shown, it did not prove to be as far as this question was concerned.

The Queen was indeed extremely pleased that Granville's "view of the question coincided with her own."³ Her letter to Frederik VII was dated the 6th of January and was sent with Granville's dispatch of the 9th of January to Wynn.⁴

To justify the alteration in the letter a new memorandum of the 8th of January was drawn up at the Foreign Office.⁵ It is written in another hand than the former one. It maintains at the very beginning that there can be no doubt that the King

¹ R.A.W. I 27/20.

² Fitzmaurice, I, p. 45.

³ R.A.W. I 27/21–22.

⁴ Correspondence, p. 123 f. — The letter is to be found in Arvefølgesagen. 2. It is dated the 6th, but in R.A.W. I 27/21 the 4th. This date is also given in The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 433 f.

⁵ F.O. 97/128.

of Denmark must first come to an agreement with the German Confederation concerning the choice of an heir to the Duchy of Holstein. It is true that the memorandum then stated that, as Austria and Prussia had been authorized by the Confederation to act in these matters, it would seem that as soon as they had informed Britain "that they consent in the name of the Confederation, and their own" to the King's proposal, "every just requirement would be fulfilled." However, the memorandum goes on to state that a passage in the letter from the King of Prussia refers to a formal renunciation by the Duke of Augustenborg "of any rights real or supposed which he may put forward." The memorandum ended by saying that it was therefore obvious that before any European acknowledgment could be given to the arrangement for the succession, notification would have to be received of the consent of the Confederation, "and the Draft to the King of Denmark has been altered in accordance with that view."

In her letter to the King of Denmark, the Queen wrote, after a few introductory remarks: "I trust I need not assure Your Majesty of the sincere Friendship which I entertain for you, and of the deep interest which I feel in the welfare of the Danish Monarchy." She had shown this by taking on the task of mediator. In the question of the succession she had, it was true, declined to take any part in the settlement of that combination, but it would be "a source of great satisfaction to me to learn that an arrangement has been definitively determined upon, equally satisfactory to Your Majesty and to the Germanic Confederation, and whenever it shall have been notified to me that such an arrangement has been arrived at" she would be prepared, in harmony with the London Protocol of 1850, "to consider, in concert with my Allies, the expediency of giving the sanction of European acknowledgement" to the arrangement. She ended her letter: "Sir, My Brother, Your Majesty's Good Sister."

The dispatch to Wynn began by apologizing for the delay in replying: "It is solely to be attributed to accidental circumstances, for the occurrence of which Her Majesty's Government can only express their regret." But then it laid down – in agreement with Queen Victoria's letter – that by an arrangement which concerned "the succession to German as well as to Danish

States, the acquiescence of the Germanic Confederation would be necessary before third parties could consider that arrangement as settled." Wynn was to stress these points to Bluhme and induce the Danish Government to give the Duke of Augustenborg a handsome indemnity "for the renunciation of his real or supposed rights," so that an understanding might be reached. At the same time Britain would, however, request Austria and Prussia to persuade the Duke to listen to reasonable proposals, so that every objection on the part of the Confederation to the choice of Prince Christian could be removed. When this had been done, the British Government would "have great satisfaction" in giving European acknowledgement to Frederik VII's choice in concert with the other powers.

On the 13th a copy of this dispatch was sent to Howard, who was asked at the same time to request the Prussian Government to approach the Duke of Augustenborg.¹

Reventlow once wrote that, even if Palmerston was perhaps of no direct benefit to Denmark, he at least held his own against the Court and its pro-Slesvig-Holstein influence. This task now fell to the British Ministers in Copenhagen and Berlin when faced by the Queen's personal interference in the Danish-German conflict, which had been facilitated by the fall of Palmerston.

On the 16th of January, Wynn handed Bluhme a copy of the Queen's letter and read him Granville's dispatch of the 9th.² I regret to admit, wrote Wynn the next day to Granville, that it made a very unfavourable impression. The British declaration would completely alter the position of the Duke of Augustenborg [this, of course, was the Queen's intention!] as he, relying on support from Britain, "would pretend to the right of appearing on equal terms with his Sovereign before the German Confederation." The King would never recognize the competence of this tribunal. The Duke had the choice of accepting the liberal offer which he would receive or of being accused of high treason. This was also the view of the Tsar. In the last communications from Austria and Prussia there was no mention of the Duke's pretended rights and certainly no suggestion that the forthcoming settlement of the Danish-German differences ought to be submitted for discussion and the approbation of the Diet.

¹ Correspondence, p. 124.

² Correspondence, p. 124 f.

I had, Wynn ended his dispatch, great difficulty in reassuring Bluhme, but I told him that it was my decided opinion that he had interpreted your dispatch falsely. I said that the British Government would regard Austria's and Prussia's consent as "that of the Diet" and not insist on further notification before they joined a European acknowledgement of the arrangement for the Danish succession.

Wynn's way of disassociating himself from the Queen's political lead by calling Bluhme's correct interpretation "a false interpretation" was quite a masterpiece of diplomacy. And he had, of course, only said that it was his own "decided opinion."

As Sternberg informed his Government on the 20th, Wynn, by this dispatch, fulfilled his promise: to urge the British Government to support the Danish views. I refer to the information given above to correct Sternberg's opinion that Granville's dispatch was due to intrigues planned in London by the Duke of Augustenborg with Prince Albert and Bunsen.

On the 18th, Wynn was received in audience by Frederik VII and handed over the Queen's letter.¹ He accompanied it, as he wrote to Granville, "with explanations which were perfectly satisfactory to His Majesty." These explanations must have consisted in explaining away the Queen's insistence on the participation of the Federal Diet in settling the question of the succession.

The same day Granville received Wynn's dispatch of the 17th he received two long letters from Howard in Berlin.²

Howard had, of course, detected Prince Albert's influence when he received Granville's dispatch to Wynn.³ "This answer," he wrote on the 17th of January to Westmorland, "is much more unfavourable than that which has been obtained from this Government." However, when Howard spoke to Manteuffel in connection with Granville's dispatch, he refrained from making any mention of Granville's demand with regard to the acquiescence of the Federal Diet. He referred to Britain's wish to see the Duke of Augustenborg treated liberally by the Danish Government, and expressed the hope that Berlin would lend its support to induce the Duke to be reasonable. He also mentioned that, in reply to his question, Manteuffel had said that Prussia "did not

¹ F.O. 97/128: 19/1, No. 8.

² Correspondence, p. 125 ff.

³ Howard to Westmorland 17/1.

consider a communication to the German Diet" about the question of the succession or the demands of the Duke of Augustenborg as necessary. Furthermore, he referred to previous dispatches in connection with Prussia's attitude in the matter.

While Howard did not show Manteuffel Granville's dispatch, he showed it in confidence to his Danish colleague, Bille-Brahe. In his second letter to Granville he reported Bille-Brahe's comments.¹ It was, Bille-Brahe had said, as far as he knew, the first time the British Government "had put forward the necessity of the acquiescence of the Diet in the settlement of the Danish succession," which had been treated as a European question in the London Protocol of the 2nd of August 1850. He certainly hoped that if Austria and Prussia, who besides being European powers were the guardians of German interests, did not demand the intervention of the Diet, Britain would not do so, either. Furthermore, Bille-Brahe emphasized that neither Manteuffel in his reply to him of the 30th of September or the King of Prussia in his letter of the 24th of September to Frederik VII had made any reservation about the Federal Diet's sanction of the contemplated settlement of the succession.

Howard continued his dispatch by referring to his previous dispatch of the 29th of September in which he had mentioned Manteuffel's statement that Prussia would not bring the question of the Danish succession before the Federal Diet. As mentioned in his first letter, Manteuffel had just repeated this assurance.

Finally, Howard expressed his fears that, if the question were referred to the Federal Diet, it "may greatly tend to delay its settlement" and induce the Duke to raise his pretensions and spin out the affair, "hoping perhaps to enlist some of the smaller German States in his cause." Howard ended by saying that he was convinced that, if the British Government persisted in the wish they had stated to the Danish Government, "a cessation of that concert between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government, by means of which matters have been advanced to their point, might ensue."

Howard's views were based on information about Russia's attitude just given him by Budberg.² If Britain left the European

¹ Correspondence, p. 126 ff.

² Bille-Brahe 20/1 to Bille. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

path, the matter would have to be settled "by the family," by Denmark and Russia alone. It would be inexpedient to refer the matter to Frankfurt, as the Federal Act required decisions to be unanimous, and this could not be achieved. Budberg said that it was Prince Albert and Bunsen who had persuaded Britain to back out.

Granville's dispatch also caused displeasure in St. Petersburg. Brunnow received orders to remonstrate in London with Granville.¹ We do not think, the orders stated, that Britain, "qui a suivi une marche si sage et si correcte dans tout le cours de la complication danoise," will hesitate to give her sanction to an arrangement which she was one of the first to advocate.

France also directed her Ministers in London and Berlin to oppose the idea of the participation of the Confederation.² When Lefebvre talked to Manteuffel on the question³, Manteuffel made the following statement, to Lefebvre's surprise: "The negotiations in London have been carried on, as far as we are concerned, by Bunsen, who has always been an ardent supporter of the cause of the Duke of Augustenborg. It is an unfortunate fact." Lefebvre interpreted the statement (correctly) to mean that Manteuffel's views were at variance with those of the King of Prussia and that Bunsen, when together with Prince Albert he persuaded the Foreign Office to depart from the line adopted when the Warsaw Protocol was signed, flattered the King's secret inclinations much more than he obeyed Manteuffel's orders.

Brunnow hardly got an opportunity, or needed, to bring his influence to bear on the matter. By his dispatch of the 28th of January to Wynn,⁴ Granville disassociated himself from the somewhat grotesque point-of-view: Britain as the protector of the Federal Diet, an attitude the Court had persuaded its young, inexperienced Foreign Secretary to adopt. I am unable to state what discussions took place – between the 24th (when Howard's dispatches were received) and the 28th – or who took part in them. But on the 28th Granville chose the way out indicated by Wynn: that Bluhme had misunderstood the dispatch! The British

¹ Copy of dispatch to Brunnow, January 52. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

² Dispatch 2/2, No. 4 to Lefebvre.

³ Dispatch 7/2, No. 100.

⁴ Correspondence, p. 128.

Government he wrote, "do not require, or expect, that either the Diet or the Duke of Augustenborg" should participate in the settlement of the Danish succession. If Denmark could notify the approval of Austria and Prussia, "as holding the mandate of the Diet," the British Government, in concert with its allies, would give the arrangement European acknowledgement.¹ On the 2nd of February Wynn reported that it was with great satisfaction that Bluhme received the information that "a false interpretation had been given" to Granville's dispatch.² As Howard wrote on the 31st to Westmorland: "You will perceive that Lord Granville backs out in his Dispatch to Wynn . . . of the 28th inst. (as well as in one to myself) . . ."

Howard gave new proof of his friendly feelings towards Denmark by omitting to inform Manteuffel of Granville's dispatch.³ On the other hand, by his attitude he had long since incurred Bunsen's enmity. After the fall of Palmerston, Bunsen succeeded, with Prince Albert's cooperation, in having Howard removed from his post in Berlin. On the 15th of January he was triumphantly able to inform the King that Bloomfield, who was on leave in Italy on account of his wife's health, had been ordered to return to his post without delay.⁴ He added that it would not be long before Howard was definitively removed: "Er hat nie eine Gelegenheit unterlassen Preussen zu schaden."⁵

Bloomfield received Granville's orders in Rome. They were, wrote Lady Bloomfield, "a terrible blow and disappointment to us both."⁶ While she remained in Italy until the spring, her husband had to obey orders, and he arrived in Berlin at the end of February.

At the beginning of February, Howard was informed by Bloomfield himself that his leave in Italy had been interrupted, and he immediately formed the opinion – and it was correct –

¹ Walewski's dispatch 1/2 says that Britain's views on the necessity of the participation of the Diet have been misunderstood: "Granville vient d'écrire à Copenhague et à Berlin pour rectifier les choses . . ." As mentioned above, he had already done so.

² F.O. 22/184: 4/2, No. 15.

³ See Plessen's dispatch 1/2 to Bluhme. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

⁴ Dispatch 15/1, No. 18.

⁵ On the 3rd of May 1853 Howard was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Rio de Janeiro.

⁶ Georgiana Bloomfield: *op. cit.* II, p. 13.

that it was due to intrigues on the part of Bunsen.¹ "All that I know," he wrote to Westmorland, "is that Manteuffel tells me he has certainly not asked for it, but that Bunsen represents me in his despatches to be very hostile to Prussia and to exercise a prejudicial influence upon the relations of the two Governments. Manteuffel is greatly annoyed at this and does all he can to counteract Bunsen's intrigues against me." The fact of the matter was that Bunsen was also intriguing against – or at least was not acting in concert with – his Prime Minister. But Manteuffel was unable to have him removed, as King Friedrich Wilhelm protected him.² "I suspect," Howard wrote on the 31st to Westmorland, "there is a great deal too much intimacy between Bunsen and the Foreign Office now and Manteuffel was never more anxious than now to get rid of Bunsen, but his repeated lies do not seem to make any impression on the King."

One of these presumed lies was that John Russell was said to have "disapproved of the London Protocol."³ Bunsen had made this statement in a dispatch of the 8th of January, which Manteuffel read to Howard. The latter retorted that he had never heard that Russell held such views.⁴ When Howard reported the matter to Granville, he asked him not to mention it to Bunsen, as Manteuffel had spoken to him in confidence.

In his dispatch of the 16th of December, Bluhme had directed Bielke to try to secure for Denmark Palmerston's whole-hearted assistance in rejecting the demands made by the German Powers for concessions beyond those which Denmark had offered in Enclosure 2 of the dispatches of the 6th of December. This is the utmost we can offer, wrote Bluhme, and it excludes any form of bargaining or compromise.

When the dispatch was received in London on the 22nd, it was of no use to approach Palmerston (cf. p. 210). And what assistance could Denmark expect from his successor, Prince Albert's candidate?

On the 5th of January, Bielke had a talk with Granville about the Prussian demands.⁵ "He wished me to say," Granville

¹ Howard to Westmorland. 7/2.

² Cf. Howard's letters 10/1, 17/1, and 31/1 to Westmorland.

³ Howard to Westmorland 17/1.

⁴ F.O. 97/128: 11/1, No. 21.

⁵ Bielke's dispatch 5/1, No. 1. – P.R.O. 30. – 29.20.

wrote in his notes, "that I thought Denmark might neglect these wishes. I said I could only say I hoped that the Conditions would be accepted by the Danish Government and that the wishes would be found not to be a stumbling block to the negotiations."

As late as the 25th of December Palmerston had signed a dispatch to Howard approving his representations to the Prussian Government requesting them not to reject the Danish proposals urging the German Powers to restrict their intervention in the matter (cf. p. 212 f.).¹ Howard was instructed "to renew Your representations to the Prussian Government to the same effect."

But on the 30th, Granville wrote to Westmorland and told him that the British Ministers in Copenhagen and Berlin had been instructed to support Schwarzenberg's wish to have Carl Moltke and Reventlow-Criminil appointed as Ministers for Slesvig and Holstein.² On the 5th of January the Austrian Minister in Copenhagen wrote that the beneficial effect of Palmerston's fall was shown by Granville's recommendation to the Danish Cabinet to meet the wishes of the German Powers, while Palmerston's last sign of life was a protest against the competence of the German Powers respecting the constitution of Slesvig.³

Bunsen expressed similar satisfaction with "the new personality" in British foreign politics in his dispatches from London.⁴ When he asserted that Palmerston's fall was a deadly blow to Britain's friendly feelings towards Denmark, he was, no doubt, thinking especially of the Queen's (and Granville's) opposition to Palmerston's attitude to the question of the Danish succession, which has been mentioned above. Brunnow had, he wrote, the task of solving this definitely. Therefore Palmerston's resignation was displeasing to Brunnow. Bunsen was of opinion that Palmerston regarded the London Protocol as his own personal work, while Russell thought "more fairly" (viel billiger) about the matter. Bunsen presumably insinuated by his statement that Russell – like himself and the Court – was against it. Manteuffel found cause to draw Bunsen's attention to the fact that he (Bunsen), after reading the information which had been

¹ F.O. 97/127: 25/12, No. 78.

² F.O. 97/127: 30/12, No. 3. – However, it was this dispatch which Howard called obscure (cf. above).

³ Rantzau, p. 388.

⁴ Reports to the King 8/1, No. 8; 13/1, No. 12, and 30/1, No. 28.

sent him about the negotiations with Bille-Brahe, could not be unaware of the King's views on the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, and that all the powers seemed to be interested in reaching a speedy solution of the question of the succession.¹

On the 14th of January Granville requested Wynn once more to urge the Danish Government to meet Prussia's wishes with regard to Rendsborg; however, on condition that "their so doing shall in no manner prejudice the question of right."² Prussia wished Rendsborg to be occupied by the Holstein Federal contingent when the Federal troops were evacuated, and there was disagreement about the demarcation of the frontier between Slesvig and Holstein (the Kronværk). In his dispatch of the 20th to Wynn, Granville wrote that he was to "strongly urge the Danish Government not to make any unnecessary objections" to the proposals of the German Powers: "it will produce a very unfavourable impression on those Governments who, having already supported the rights of Denmark, are anxious that this question should be finally settled."³ Howard was able to send Granville Manteuffel's thanks for the advice which the Foreign Secretary had given Denmark.⁴

These instructions of Granville's agree with his statements to Bielke mentioned above. It is not likely that they have been of any significance for the developments which took place. Both Howard and Wynn were no doubt prepared in advance to advise Denmark to be compliant. Furthermore, some of the instructions arrived after a settlement had been reached. Thus, on the 3rd of January, Howard informed Westmorland that he had written to Wynn that "the question at issue appeared to me to be reduced to mere matters of form and therefore trusted the Danish Government would not allow themselves to be deterred by such mere forms from terminating the affair on the terms now offered by the two Courts which were infinitely better than any they would obtain if the matter were referred to the Diet."⁵ On the 31st of December Wynn had given an account of a talk

¹ Dispatch 16/1, No. 3.

² F.O. 97/128: 14/1, No. 8.

³ F.O. 97/128: 20/1, No. 16.

⁴ F.O. 97/128: 25/1, No. 56.

⁵ Cf. his dispatch 30/12, No. 6.

he had had with Bluhme about Schwarzenberg's wishes regarding the appointment of Carl Moltke and Reventlow-Criminil. He said that, although he agreed with Bluhme's attitude in rejecting the demand on principle, he hoped that "some means would be found to get over" it, "in which I perceive, the only difficulty lay, and, in respect to which some concession could not be compared to the danger of the two Powers resigning their Mandate."

I shall not go into detail here as to how Bluhme succeeded in January in finding "some means" and fulfilled Schwarzenberg's wishes by the formation of the United Monarchy Ministry on the 28th of January.¹ On the 22nd the King approved the re-establishment of the Privy Council with the Ministers for the Duchies which the German Powers had demanded. Wynn, who is said to have given whole-hearted support to Prussia's and Austria's demands when discussing the matter with the King,² was able to report the result to Granville on the 23rd.³ On the 29th Granville requested him to "take an early opportunity of expressing to M. de Bluhme the extreme satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have received this intelligence."⁴ The previous day the Privy Council had formally begun its work, and the King had issued a proclamation stating that the idea of a closer connection between Denmark and Slesvig had been abandoned in favour of the formation of a constitutional United Monarchy.⁵ The next day the proclamation was sent to the Danish Ministers in Berlin and Vienna to be passed on. These dispatches contained the fateful, but necessary, assurance of "Slesvig's non-incorporation in the Kingdom." Thereafter the Danish Government expected the Federal troops to evacuate Holstein and a total re-establishment of the King's authority in this duchy.

On the 3rd of February when the Queen opened Parliament, she was able to state that the Peace Treaty of 1850, between

¹ See my above-mentioned paper "Carl Moltke og dannelsen af helstatsministeriet i januar 1852".

² Sternberg's dispatch 19/1, No. 3.

³ F.O. 97/128: 23/1, No. 10.

⁴ F.O. 22/194: 29/1.

⁵ Actstykker ang. Forhandlingerne mellem Danmark og Tyskland i Aarene 1851-52. - Correspondence, enclosure: "Correspondence between Austria, Prussia, and Denmark. 1851-52."

Denmark and Germany would, no doubt "in a short time, be finally and completely executed."¹ During the night-sitting the same day, Russell explained at length the reasons for Palmerston's resignation from the Cabinet.² Greville wrote that there was no doubt that Russell's "great *coup*" was his quotation of the Queen's formal memorandum of the 12th of August 1850, to which Palmerston had yielded.³ "Some grave persons think," Greville continued, "the introduction of her [the Queen's] name was going too far . . ." Lord Malmesbury was also present and wrote: "Russell's speech was a good one – very eloquent – but his case against Lord Palmerston very insufficient. Lord Palmerston's defence feeble . . ."⁴ Palmerston's modern biographer, Herbert C. F. Bell, comments on the sitting: "Russell proved effective and once again disingenuous."⁵

For once Bielke and Bunsen seemed to be more or less in agreement – that is in their opinion of the sitting. Bielke believed that all prospects of Palmerston's returning to the Cabinet "were as good as lost."⁶ Bunsen, who looked even further into the future, believed that historians would establish the fact that Palmerston had become "a victim of his unbridled wilfulness."⁷ On the 6th, when *The Times* published Palmerston's "obituary notice," it was far ahead of events.

On the 7th of February Howard wrote from Berlin to Westmorland that Mensdorff had left that morning for Kiel, where the administration immediately afterwards would be handed over to Reventlow-Criminil.⁸ However, this did not take place until the 18th. The two commissioners were then for a few days the guests of the King in Copenhagen and were both, in spite of dislike of the Prussian Commissioner, decorated with the Grand Cross of the Order of the Dannebrog. In his dispatch Howard also mentioned that the Prussian Government was satisfied with the Danish manifesto and the contents of Bluhme's dispatch.

¹ Bielke's dispatch 3/2, No. 4.

² Cf. Martin. II, p. 425 f.; Ashley, I, p. 318 ff.; Stuart I. Reid: Lord John Russell (1895), p. 180 f.

³ Greville. III, p. 446 f.

⁴ Malmesbury. I, p. 301 f.

⁵ Bell. II, p. 54.

⁶ Dispatch 5(?)2, No. 5.

⁷ Dispatch 4/2, No. 31. Cf. 4/2, No. 38.

⁸ Cf. his dispatches 4/2, No. 71 and 6/2, No. 77. F.O. 97/128.

He thought that "a little more energy applied at Copenhagen at an earlier date would have finished it long ago."

Hodges, who was the nearest spectator of events in Holstein, took a pessimistic view of developments after the Duchy had been handed back to "the King-Duke."¹ He found that sympathy for Slesvig-Holsteinism had not decreased and that, as long as no final solution had been found to the question of the succession and no arrangement made with the Duke of Augustenborg, intrigues would continue and greatly weaken the authority of the Sovereign.

At the beginning of December, Christian Høyer Bille had been appointed Reventlow's successor as Danish Minister in London (from the 1st of February 1852). For the moment, as we have seen, he was occupied by his mission to Berlin and Vienna. But the day after the United Monarchy Ministry had been formed, he left Copenhagen to "make his way to his post in London by short daily stages," as Bluhme wrote on the 30th to Bielke. He reached London on the evening of the 11th and was received by Granville at the Foreign Office on the 15th.²

A few hours previously he had received Bluhme's dispatch of the 8th.³ This stated that on the 4th the King had decided that the price suggested by the Ministry of Finance for the purchase of the estates of the Duke of Augustenborg: 2,600,000 rix-dollars should be increased to 3,000,000 rix-dollars. In return the Duke was to hand over his estates to the Danish Crown, take up residence with his family abroad, renounce his rights of acquiring real property in Denmark and, in his own name and that of his family, promise to do nothing to disturb the peace of Denmark or the forthcoming settlement of the Danish succession. You can then, Bluhme wrote, inform Granville that we have followed the advice of the Friendly Powers: We cannot be more pliant than we have been.

When Bille spoke to Granville, the new Foreign Secretary congratulated him on the turn which the Danish affairs had now taken and expressed his own and the Government's satis-

¹ F.O. 97/128: 20/2, No. 6.

² Dispatch 16/2, No. 1.

³ Correspondence, p. 133 ff.

faction with the King's generous offer to the Duke of Augustenborg. Granville regretted the unrest to which his dispatch of the 9th had given rise, admitted that the sentence was not fortunate, but hoped that Bluhme was satisfied with the explanation given later by Wynn.

Bille had had several long talks with Brunnow after his arrival. He wrote that Brunnow had received him extremely kindly. Brunnow thought that the most suitable solution would be a convention or treaty by which the intentions of the London Protocol would be fulfilled without mentioning it. In this way it would be easier for Prussia to accede to the treaty, as she had not signed the London Protocol. The opposition which could be expected from Bunsen would have to be met either by dismissing him or by appointing an ad hoc plenipotentiary. As far as the Duke of Augustenborg was concerned, it would be reasonable to give him a time-limit, for instance of six months, in which to accept or reject the Danish offer.

Incidentally, these remarks of Brunnow's with regard to Prussia and Bunsen induced Ungern Sternberg at the end of January to suggest to Bluhme that it might be better to sign the forthcoming treaty about the settlement of the succession and the integrity of the Danish monarchy in Copenhagen instead of in London.¹

In her letter of the 29th of July 1850, the Queen had, as previously mentioned (see p. 12 f.), taken the opportunity, when replying to the King's letter of thanks, to ask him to hand back to the Duke of Augustenborg his estates in Slesvig. This request was impossible of fulfilment and no reply had been given to it. But in his dispatch of the 8th of February, Bluhme not only asked Bille to inform Granville of the generous offer to the Duke, but sent an answer, admittedly a delayed one (the 7th of February), from the King in reply to the Queen's request. The answer said that after the reorganisation of the Monarchy it had been one of his first actions to make a settlement with the Duke as much in conformity with the Queen's wishes as possible. The sum offered to the Duke showed that full consideration had been paid to the Queen's intercession. But in consideration of the misfortunes which the Duke had brought about in the country,

¹ Ungern Sternberg 26/1 52. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

it was impossible for the King to give him back his estates. It would be almost impossible for the Queen, who was "so good, so pure, and endowed with all the virtues which are an ornament of both her private life and the Throne," to understand the Duke's ungrateful behaviour.

Bille was to hand over this letter personally to the Queen and explain that the decisions made by the King with regard to the Duke were due in no small measure to the high regard in which he held the Queen and Prince Albert.

Granville presented Bille to the Queen, who was accompanied by Prince Albert.¹ Bille said that he was confident that the Queen would support a settlement of the question of the succession and the Queen replied: "Oui, certainement." According to Bille's account, when he handed her the King's letter she showed "some surprise or embarrassment." She seemed very willing to accept the explanations which Bille had been directed to give and ended the audience by saying: "Monsieur. Je Vous prie de bien remercier le Roi de ma part."

The Duke of Augustenborg had sent another long letter (on the 10th of February) to Albert, requesting him to ask the Queen to intervene in the question of his estates.² He referred to the gracious reply he had received to his application shortly after the conclusion of the Peace and the hopes he had therefore entertained of having his estates returned to him. But nothing had been done, and his later applications to Vienna, Berlin and the Diet had been in vain. It was true that he had accepted Friedrich Wilhelm's offer of mediation in the question of the succession, but on condition that his estates were returned to him. Berlin would not agree to this. He was afraid that both Berlin and Vienna would comply with Denmark's wishes. But you will understand, he continued in his letter, that I will not give up my estates for a sum of money arbitrarily fixed by Denmark and "which is thrown to my family as alms in order to buy the renunciation of my house as regards its rights of succession" in favour of a quite unqualified person (Prince Christian). The Duke described in detail the qualifications which, in his opinion, the Prince lacked.

¹ Bille's dispatch 20/2, No. 3.

² R.A.W. I 27/55.

However, on the 24th Bille was able to inform Bluhme that he had learnt "from a completely reliable source" that the King's letter and his own verbal comments had made an extremely favourable impression on the Queen and Prince Albert. They both found the offer extremely generous and would refrain from supporting or expressing a wish that the Duke should keep his estates or remain in the Kingdom. A reply to the Duke, drawn up by Granville and translated into German by Prince Albert, was sent off (on the 24th?). It stated that the question of the indemnity had already been handed over to the King of Prussia, who was to mediate, and therefore it was hardly possible for Prince Albert to intervene. But Frederik VII had assured the Queen that it would be generous.¹ Prince Albert was of the opinion that it was for Austria and Prussia to decide the question of the Duke's possible rights of succession, as the Federal Diet had authorized these two powers to terminate the conflict between the Confederation and Denmark.

Granville had informed Bille in confidence that Prince Albert would reply in this way.² At the Queen's levée on the 26th, Bille took his leave of Granville, of whom he had received a very good impression. Palmerston had caused the Government to be defeated on a Militia Bill. "I have had my tit-for-tat with John Russell," wrote Palmerston to his brother. The Queen left the formation of the new Cabinet to Lord Derby, the leader of the Protectionists. The new Ministers took up their duties on the 27th.

14. Lord Malmesbury Foreign Secretary in Lord Derby's Cabinet. Draft for a Treaty for the Settlement of the Danish Succession

During the Cabinet crisis in February 1851, which ended with the continuation of Russell's administration, John Russell had teased the Leader of the Opposition, Lord Derby (then Lord Stanley), by saying that he would be unable to produce a Foreign Secretary, if he were to form a Cabinet.³ Lord Derby had retorted: "Next time I shall have Lord Palmerston."

¹ R.A.W. I 27/62-63.

² Bille's dispatch 27/2, No. 7.

³ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 421.

Derby refrained from suggesting Palmerston as Foreign Secretary in his new Cabinet so soon after his dismissal on account of "the well-known personal feelings of the Queen."¹ Count Walewski also thought that it was most unlikely that Palmerston would return to the Foreign Office, when everyone knew how much the Queen and Prince Albert disliked him.² However, in spite of warnings from the Queen, Lord Derby offered Palmerston another post in the Cabinet, but he declined it.

The 45-year old Lord Malmesbury, a close friend of Lord Derby, was appointed Foreign Secretary. He had had no connection with the Foreign Office previously.³ However, Walewski thought that the fact that he had made a close study of history would compensate for his inexperience.⁴ In Walewski's opinion he was a man of the world, with a distinguished manner and eager to maintain good relations with France. The previous evening Aberdeen, Palmerston, Granville and Malmesbury had been Walewski's guests.

Granville's retirement after such a short time distressed Queen Victoria and Prince Albert greatly.⁵ The Queen requested both Derby and Malmesbury to see Granville and hear from him of "the state of all the critical questions now pending in Foreign Affairs. Lord Granville has made himself master in a very short time of all the very intricate subjects . . ."⁶ However, according to Granville's remarks to Prince Albert, the new Foreign Secretary seemed to be "inclined to be ambitious of acquiring the merit of being exclusively *English* in his policy; this was quite right, but might be carried too far; however, Lord Malmesbury was cautious and moderate."⁷ Prince Albert, who was deeply interested in the fate of Germany, the land of his birth, was far from being "exclusively English."

It is said that the new Ministry was "Lord Derby." It was also styled the "Who? Who?" Ministry, and Malmesbury himself said that "all kinds of jokes were made in respect of our being

¹ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 447 f.

² Walewski's dispatch 28/2, No. 83.

³ See "Memoirs of an Ex-Minister. An Autobiography. By . . . Malmesbury". I (1884).

⁴ Dispatch 25/2, No. 81.

⁵ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 450 f.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 451.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 454.

such novices in office.”¹ But it included, however, such an important politician as Disraeli. Both he and Lord Derby had, Bille wrote in his dispatch of the 24th of February, expressed a keen interest in Denmark’s affairs, whenever an opportunity presented itself. Brunnow, who knew Malmesbury well, told Bille that he could rest assured as far as Malmesbury was concerned: If we only made speed, we would find that conditions were extremely favourable to find a final solution to the question of the succession. A short time before, when he visited Palmerston to thank him for his services on behalf of Denmark, Bille had been reassured that every British Government would adhere to his policy: the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy.²

On the 1st of March, Malmesbury received the diplomatic corps. He told Bille that he had been informed by Bloomfield that the Duke had refused the Danish offer.³ But he added that the Duke could not have received Prince Albert’s important letter of the 25th (see above) before he refused the offer. He thought it was in the interests of Denmark to fix a certain term within which the Duke could still accept the offer. When Bille pointed out that, regardless of the attitude of the Duke of Augustenborg, the respective Cabinets ought to set about signing the document respecting the settlement of the succession, Malmesbury did not go into the matter, but assured Bille that both he and his colleagues were favourably disposed towards Denmark. Lord Derby expressed these feelings even more warmly when Bille spoke to him on the 3rd at the Queen’s levée.⁴ He quite agreed, too, with Bille that the signing of the treaty could not be postponed indefinitely out of consideration for the Duke of Augustenborg. Bille also mentioned that Malmesbury had told Wynn, who had arrived in London the day before on a long leave, that a time-limit of 6 weeks was more suitable than one of 6 months. – The Prince of Noer had sailed from Hamburg in the same steamer as Wynn. He made his home in Britain during the next few years.

Later, after he had spoken to Bismarck, Bloomfield corrected

¹ Malmesbury: *op. cit.*, pp. 312 and 316 f.

² Bille’s dispatch 23/2, No. 5.

³ Bille’s dispatch 1/3, No. 8, and letter of 1/3 with dispatch 3/3, No. 9.

⁴ Bille’s dispatch 3/3, No. 9.

his statement about the Duke's refusal. Bismarck had been given the task by his Government of inducing the Duke to accept the Danish offer,¹ and it was his opinion that the difficulties raised by the Duke were more "a hesitation than a positive refusal," and that the Danish Government "would be quite justified in fixing a certain term within which their proposal should be accepted . . ." Bülow, Denmark's Envoy at Frankfurt, informed Bille on the 6th of March that the Duke had not made a *definite* refusal, but was trying by all possible means to gain time in order to find a way out and harass the Danish Government.² "Only when there is no way of escape left, he will yield." In a letter written to Bloomfield at the end of March, Hodges gave his opinion of the Duke.³ "I am fully convinced," he wrote, "he will not yield while he has a shadow of support. He is leaning now on a fragile reed, some of the small states of Germany. Though clever, he is one of those obstinate-minded men, who will take all risks to do as much mischief as they possibly can, but in the end I am sure he will fail."

On the appointment of Malmesbury, Queen Victoria wrote to King Leopold that she could not say that he "inspires me with confidence."⁴ She had also expressed a wish that the drafts from the Foreign Office should be sent through Lord Derby to her.⁵ However, Malmesbury immediately entered into a private and confidential correspondence with Bloomfield, a correspondence which provides us with interesting information about the final stages in the settlement of the Danish succession.⁶

On the 1st of March he informed Bloomfield of the contents of Prince Albert's letter of the 25th to the Duke of Augustenborg and urged him, together with Manteuffel, to try to convince Friedrich Wilhelm that "the Duke had better take it whilst he can." Denmark might otherwise withdraw the offer. Malmesbury wrote, however, that in his talk with Bille the same day he had advised against such a step, which would make "their original intention suspicious." Bille agreed, but thought that

¹ Bloomfield's dispatch 4/3. Correspondence, p. 141 f.

² Akter vedr. successionen.

³ 25/3. F.O. 356/29.

⁴ The Letters of Queen Victoria. II, p. 450 f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 453.

⁶ F.O. 356/29.

“some term must be fixed for the Duke” within which he would have to come to a decision.

In his letter of the 1st of March to Bluhme, Bille had stressed how eager Brunnow was to hasten on the settlement of the succession. One of the reasons for this was that events might take place in France [the President might assume the title of Emperor] which would make it impossible for Russia to negotiate with that country. Bille earnestly requested that he should be sent a draft of the contemplated treaty or convention as soon as possible and detailed instructions, so that he could sign from one day to the next. Otherwise Denmark might be blamed for delaying the matter.

A week later Bille reported that it was Brunnow's opinion that the question of the succession could be terminated during the next five weeks.¹ Brunnow had said that, within a fortnight at the least, Bille ought to be able to submit a draft for a convention with a request to convene his diplomatic colleagues. The Prussian and Austrian Ministers would no doubt have to request instructions from Berlin and Vienna, but there would be three weeks left before Easter (Easter Sunday fell on the 11th of April) and negotiations could be terminated in that time. Bille wrote that Brunnow was convinced, on account of information he had received during his visit to Berlin and later, that Denmark would encounter no difficulties with Prussia on the matter. And Malmesbury seemed to be eager to sign the forthcoming treaty. But Bille implored Bluhme to send him a few words of instruction and the absolutely essential draft as soon as possible. With God's help, I hope, they will both arrive very soon, he wrote.

They did not arrive for some time. Three days later when Bille wrote another letter to Bluhme, he had received Bluhme's dispatch of the 6th telling him about the possible connection between the settlement of the succession and the indemnity to the Duke.² Bluhme pointed out that the first point was the main one, the second was considered by Denmark “as well as by the other powers (*expressly* by Russia whose opinion was un-

¹ Bille's dispatch 8/3, No. 11 and his private letter to Bluhme of the same date.

² Bille's dispatch 11/3, No. 12. – Bluhme's dispatch 6/3, No. 6. Akter vedr. successionssagen.

challenged by the others) as a secondary question, whose solution might well facilitate negotiations on the main question, but not take precedence of the recommencement and termination of these negotiations." Whether the Duke accepted or refused his generous offer, the King ventured to assume that his allies would proceed to settle the matter.

When Brunnow talked to Bille about the matter, he advised him that the Duke should be given a definite term and that the Danish Government should inform the Cabinets concerned about this time-limit when sending them the draft for a convention. He thought that Britain, Russia, France and Sweden would then be prepared to sign immediately. Direct negotiations with the two German Powers ought to be carried on in Berlin and Vienna, so as to avoid negotiations with their Ministers in London. Furthermore, Brunnow thought that Bunsen had resigned himself to the inevitable and would comply strictly with Berlin's orders. As long as Manteuffel was in office, these orders would be favourable for the succession. In order to make it easier for Prussia to sign, no mention should be made in the draft of the London Protocol. The present British Cabinet was in favour of a speedy settlement of the question of the succession. But how long would they remain in office? Besides, Brunnow was afraid of developments in France. The Danish nation, he said, had won undying glory. At the moment Denmark could only make one mistake – fail to use speed!

This was also the burden of Malmesbury's remarks when Bille spoke to him on the 19th.¹ Let us have a draft for a convention, "mais dépêchez-Vous," he repeated three times. I am ready to sign and so are Brunnow, Walewski and Rehausen. Buol will not give us much trouble, and I have written to Bloomfield to ask Manteuffel to give Bunsen definite orders to sign.

On the 10th, Bloomfield sent a private reply to Malmesbury's above-mentioned private letter of the 1st, and the next day two official dispatches about the prospects of coming to an arrangement with the Duke.² I give the contents of his letter of the 10th. Bloomfield had told Manteuffel in confidence of Prince Albert's reply to the Duke. Manteuffel thought it would serve

¹ Bille's dispatch 19/3, No. 15.

² F.O. 356/30. – Correspondence, p. 143.

some purpose, but believed that it would still be difficult to come to an arrangement. It was his opinion that the Duke would try "to postpone the formal relinquishment of his claims to the Succession in Denmark, in the hope that a serious complication of the peace of Europe might occur, in which case he calculated that something more to his advantage would be offered than was probable under present circumstances." Bloomfield thought that the King and Manteuffel were determined to press the Duke to accept the generous Danish offer.

During Wynn's leave, Mr. Browne was in charge at the British Legation in Copenhagen. His dispatches show that he was very kindly disposed towards Denmark. In a dispatch of the 11th of March he stated that, during a conversation he had had with Bluhme about the arrangement with the Duke, the Danish Foreign Minister had stressed how important it was that the Duke received no support from the Great Powers. Bluhme said that the Danish Government relied on Prussia not to give him any encouragement and hoped that Britain would adopt the same attitude. "It was quite evident that his Excellency in thus speaking to me, alluded to the general impression here that the Duke had the support of England, and that he was desirous, in consequence, to impress me with the conviction that were his Highness to imagine he was to enjoy England's support at all events, it would be extremely difficult to persuade him to accede to the conditions of the ultimatum alluded to." These conditions were, Browne assured Malmesbury in his dispatch, not only just, but highly generous. He had also told Bluhme that the British Government would not be likely to support unjust or exaggerated pretensions. He trusted that Malmesbury approved of his statements. Malmesbury certainly did. But what of the Court?

Malmesbury's letter of the 18th to Bloomfield, which he mentioned the next day to Bille, is proof of his whole-hearted support.¹ After cordial relations were re-established with Austria, he wrote, "the only very important point now is the speedy signature of the agreement for the Danish Succession." He hoped that Bloomfield would use his influence in Berlin to represent

¹ F.O. 356/31. — Malmesbury: *op. cit.*, p. 321 f.

to the King that the Duke of Augustenborg only hesitated in accepting the Danish offer "from a foolish hope that a *row* may take place somewhere and somehow among the 5 Powers, and that in this Scuffle he may get something more." The King of Prussia ought to let the Duke understand that, on the contrary, he ran the risk of missing the offer by further delays. Bloomfield was also to persuade Manteuffel to instruct Bunsen "to join us in signing the Agreement on the Danish succession." Brunnow had been authorized to do so and wanted the matter terminated at so favourable a moment. France also wanted to settle the question and Austria would presumably act in accordance with Prussia. If the Duke sees "we are in earnest and acting on this point, I have no doubt he will yield on the other."

On the 20th Bloomfield answered that he had spoken for a few minutes to Manteuffel on the matter: Bismarck was possibly going to tell the Duke that, if he did not accept the Danish offer, he would be "left to fight his own battle."¹ Bloomfield hoped "we may be able to keep the King of Prussia in the right way." Regarding the question of instructions to Bunsen, Manteuffel said that he dared not send Bunsen such orders. The King and the Government would first have to sanction the draft of the protocol "as he could not risk leaving Bunsen any latitude for negotiation in this Question." In his dispatch two days before, Bloomfield had expressed the same view in other words. He wrote that the discussion about the protocol "if any, that may take place will be carried on here" (in Berlin).² Malmesbury also found this "most desirable."³ The Danish draft was received in Berlin on the 23rd.⁴

As mentioned above, Browne found the Danish offer to the Duke of Augustenborg extremely generous. In a lengthy private letter of the 18th, Browne felt it was his duty to give Addington, the Under-Secretary of State, some information "which my long Residence in this Country, and Personal acquaintance with the Augustenborg Princes enables me to do."⁵ It was his definite

¹ F.O. 356/30.

² Correspondence, p. 148.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 149. Bunsen is a misprint for Brunnow.

⁴ Bloomfield's dispatch 25/3. Correspondence, p. 150 f.

⁵ F.O. 97/128: 18/3 (Private).

opinion that the Duke ought to accept the Danish offer with thanks and without a moment's hesitation. The offer was "*no doubt* mainly attributable to the Interference of our Court and it is neither just nor generous on His Part to recur to this same Influence." The King would be covered in shame if he were forced to install the Duke on Als, where he had previously conspired against the Danish Monarchy and where he would again be the central figure among persons of ill-will. "No, Government could be formed here to carry out such a Measure, nor could the present one retain its Power for a Week after thus arousing Popular Indignation."

Although Browne had been on friendly terms both with the Duke and the Prince of Noer and enjoyed great hospitality in their homes, he felt he was in duty bound to state "that without *any doubt*, all the Danish Blood and treasure expended for the last four years has been the result of their Intrigues. During those Periods I had the Honor of passing at Augustenburg I was forcibly struck by the Conversations I heard from these Princes, and their guests in all Matters where the Kingdom of Denmark was concerned – which was always such as led me to believe that the aristocracy, *influenced* and *headed* by *these Princes* were organized and leagued against the Monarchy of Denmark. So strongly was this my conviction, that the open defection of the Duke and His Brother which afterwards occurred, appeared to me but the Natural result of what I had witnessed."

Browne wrote that Bluhme had told him that the Danish Government would never go further than the offer they had made, "and *he* [Bluhme] will *certainly* keep his Word," Browne went on to say that the Duke had now left Frankfurt to continue his intrigues – he had gone to Gotha, to Prince Albert's brother – while the Prince of Noer had gone to the Isle of Wight to influence the English Court. Browne thought, incidentally, that the Prince of Noer ought to have some compensation as well "for the claims slight as they are, which He is called on to renounce."

It is easy to understand Brunnow's impatience at the delay shown by Denmark in submitting a draft for a convention. For before he left St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1851, he had had a draft drawn up for him by Baron von Sacken, the Russian

expert on the German Confederation.¹ Bille wrote that "only with much difficulty" was he allowed to take a copy of this [and send it to Copenhagen] and only on the condition that it remained "highly confidential" and that there would be no mention of a Russian draft but only of a Danish one.

It was this draft of Brunnow's which Bluhme read aloud at the meeting of the Council of State on the 17th of March as the one "on which the convention was to be based."²

The introduction to Brunnow's draft for a convention (see Appendix IV, 1) stressed how important the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy was for the balance of power in Europe and for peace. This integrity would be ensured in the best way by a combination which introduced male succession in all parts of the Monarchy, and, in order to give this greater stability, the contracting powers (the Great Powers together with Sweden-Norway) had decided to give it European acknowledgement by means of a convention. Four articles follow the introduction. Article 1 dealt with the "combination", namely the transfer of the succession on the extinction of the present male line to Prince Christian and his male descendants. Article 2 laid down that the existing relations between the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg and the German Confederation were to be retained. In Article 3 the contracting powers reserved the right of inviting other powers to accede to the convention and Article 4 dealt with the ratification of the convention.

At the above-mentioned meeting of the Council of State on the 17th of March, Bluhme gave an account of the progress which had been made in settling the succession and advised the Council to terminate the matter as soon as possible. "Every day that post arrives from London, I receive the most urgent requests to settle the matter." He mentioned the reasons given by Bille for arriving at a speedy settlement (p. 245 f.) and said that it was unnecessary to wait for a statement from the Duke of Augusten-

¹ Bille's letter 23/3 to Quaade with dispatch 23/3, No. 16. - Walewski's dispatch 23/4, No. 100, states incorrectly that Brunnow's draft for a convention was sent from St. Petersburg to Copenhagen. - Otto Plessen's dispatch 31/3 states that Brunnow's plan did not come "directly" from the Tsar's Cabinet and that Nesselrode was of the opinion that it had been worked out in concert with Bille and in accordance with the instructions Brunnow received last year in St. Petersburg.

² Statsrådets Forhandl. IV, p. 55 ff.

borg (cf. p. 246). Then Brunnow's draft was discussed and on the basis of the objections made to it the new draft was drawn up. Carl Moltke, who had played such an important part in the formation of the United Monarchy Cabinet, criticized the draft on one important point. He said that Brunnow's draft lacked an article guaranteeing the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. This was the main point and the transfer of the succession to Prince Christian only the means.

The same day the King signed a document giving full powers to Bille and the next day sanctioned the amended draft for a convention (see Appendix IV,2).¹ On the 19th Bluhme sent the document and the draft to Bille with a detailed explanation of the amendments which were desired.² Bille was to thank Brunnow and say that he would surely not fail to appreciate the reasons for the Danish modifications. A great responsibility rested with the Danish Government in making an arrangement "which is destined to form the final and – as so far as it is humanly possible to decide the future – also the unalterable basis of developments in the domestic and foreign affairs of our country."

I mention here only the more important modifications. In Article 1 the short form of the King's title, "Roi de Danemark," was to be used, and "Duc de Holstein et de Lauenburg" to be omitted. The short form was used in all agreements concerning international law and suited "the principle for the complete and continued unity of this Monarchy," the main object of the convention. Carl Moltke had made this suggestion during the discussion in the Council of State. Strictly speaking, it was considered unnecessary to mention the consent of the Tsar, as the Warsaw Protocol was generally known. But if it were to be mentioned, expressions must be chosen from which it did not appear that Denmark recognized any definite right of succession for the Tsar nor indeed for any of the Gottorp lines. The Russian draft mentioned Prince Christian's agnate descendants (that is to say descendants of a new marriage in the event of Princess Louise's death). The Danish Government wanted the right of succession to be restricted to the descendants of his marriage to Princess Louise (they had two sons).

¹ Arvefølgesagen. 2.

² Dispatch 19/3, No. 8. Akter vedr. successionsagen.

Article 2 in the Danish draft was an addition. It stipulated that in the event of the extinction of Prince Christian's and Princess Louise's male descendants, the contracting powers bound themselves to uphold the integrity of the Monarchy by means of a new convention. As has been mentioned, Carl Moltke actually wanted Article 1 to mention this as the main purpose of the convention. But as it might give rise to difficulties, wrote Bluhme, this provision had been mentioned later in the draft in a less prominent place. This provision, or a similar one, would have to be included in the convention. If this could not be achieved, Bille was to send a report before a decision was made. Bluhme said, furthermore, that it was not necessary for Bille to adhere strictly and only to the words used in the draft he had been sent.

In a dispatch of the same date Bluhme informed Bille that the King had given the Duke six weeks to accept the offer which had been made him.¹ This was of such a nature that it did not seem necessary to give him more time for reflection and, at any rate, the Duke's attitude to this offer must not be allowed to delay the arrangement. Bluhme was of the opinion that Bille's endeavours would be energetically supported by Brunnow's influence, "which is just as great as the trouble he has taken to further the interests of His Majesty the King."

As mentioned above, Bille had emphasized the importance of keeping Brunnow's draft "strictly confidential." But his warning came too late. Thus on the 22nd Lagerheim informed his Government that Brunnow's draft with amendments had been sent back to London and a few days later he sent an official copy of it.² Bluhme had, however, asked him not to mention that Brunnow was the originator of the draft. But on the 23rd Bluhme himself had informed Vrints about the two drafts: Brunnow's and that of the Danish Government with modifications.³ It is strange, incidentally, that Ungern Sternberg, who wrote in dispatches of the 17th and 23rd that Bluhme had told him about the draft for a convention he had received from London, did not mention Brunnow as the originator.⁴

¹ Dispatch 19/3, No. 9. Akter vedr. successionssagen.

² Dispatches 22/3, No. 30, and 25/3, No. 31.

³ Rantzau, p. 393 f.

⁴ Dispatches 17/3, No. 34, and 23/3, No. 38.

On the 24th and 25th after Bille had received the draft and his instructions, he had a discussion with Brunnow about the modifications which the Danish Government wanted.¹ Bille said that only Article 2 had given rise to serious discussions. As St. Petersburg had now officially informed Brunnow of the Russian draft, he felt bound to its version. However, he thought that this obstacle, too, could be overcome; but according to his instructions, any rights the Tsar had would have to be reserved.

On the 26th Bille submitted the Danish draft for a convention to Malmesbury, explaining in an accompanying note that it was to serve as the basis of the negotiations which were to be held pursuant to Article 4 of the London Protocol of the 2nd of August 1850.² The note requested the support of the British Cabinet in favour of the integrity of the Monarchy and left it entirely to Malmesbury to decide how the negotiations could be carried on as soon as possible.

The next afternoon Bille had a talk with Malmesbury,³ who said that he thought that the Danish Government would have obtained Berlin's sanction before they communicated the draft. When he had learnt something definite from Bloomfield about Berlin's course of action, he would discuss with Bille how the matter could be terminated speedily. He thought it would be contrary to the interests of Denmark to have any dealings with Bunsen before he received definite orders. Besides, he expected that Bunsen would be recalled, but supposed that Article 2 of the convention would meet opposition, especially from Prussia.

According to Walewski's dispatch of the same day, written after a talk with Malmesbury, the British Foreign Secretary was in complete agreement with France on the matter.⁴ Malmesbury believed that all the representatives, apart from Prussia's, were already provided with full powers and he reckoned on convening them to sign the convention as soon as possible. Therefore Walewski asked his Government to send him the necessary powers, which were immediately forwarded to him together with a few purely formal proposals for amendments.⁵

¹ Bille's dispatch 25/3, No. 17.

² Correspondence, p. 149 f.

³ Dispatch 27/3, No. 19.

⁴ Dispatch 27/3, No. 91.

⁵ Dispatch 29/3, No. 30, to Walewski.

It was expected that Prussia would raise objections to Article 2.¹ It was also expected that Austria's attitude to the Article would depend on whether Russia agreed to the Danish proposal.² But quite a new difficulty arose when Friedrich Wilhelm expressed a wish to bring the German Confederation into the negotiations. Bloomfield mentioned this in a dispatch of the 1st of April and Bülow had written about it on the 29th of March to Bille.³ However, as he said to Bille, Brunnow considered it impossible that a demand which was also inadmissible in other respects could be put forward in earnest by the Prussian Cabinet.⁴

This "inadmissible demand" was the one which the Queen had persuaded Granville to put forward earlier. It was, of course, withdrawn at the time, but was now put forward again by the Court.

According to an entry in Queen Victoria's diary, a discussion took place on the 4th of April "between us, but chiefly between him [Derby] and Albert, upon the Danish Succession," for which the draft for the convention had now been submitted. The next day she wrote to Lord Derby that she wanted a statement from the Law Advisers of the Crown as to whether the "Agnats [must be Cognates. Article 1 in the draft] appelés à la Succession par la Loi Royale de Danemarck" have any natural right of succeeding in Holstein.⁵ She then made the following strange statement that she had always understood that the integrity of the Danish Monarchy was to be ensured by the King's choosing "the lawful heir in Holstein [the Duke of Augustenborg?] as his successor in Denmark which would otherwise have gone in the female line." Finally Article 2 was criticized with the somewhat captious remark that, as the succession was to be arranged "according to the *present* [the italics are mine] interests of the European Powers," then in the event of there being no heir to the Throne, these interests would again have to be consulted, "which would be rendered impossible if they had bound themselves for all eventualities beforehand."

¹ Cf. Bloomfield's dispatches 29/3 (Article 1 in this must be Article 2) and 1/4. Correspondence, p. 152 f.

² Westmorland's dispatch 30/3. Correspondence, p. 153.

³ Akter vedr. successionssagen.

⁴ Bille's dispatch 3/4, No. 22.

⁵ R.A.W. I 27/84.

It is not known what Lord Derby answered. But five days later Malmesbury was criticized by the Queen in connection with Bloomfield's dispatch of the 1st of April.¹ In Bunsen's opinion Bloomfield had hardly behaved much better than Howard, whom Bunsen had been successful in having removed during Granville's short term at the Foreign Office.

In his dispatch Bloomfield stated that he had said to Mantuffel that he was certain that the British Government would deplore the delay that the participation of the Federal Diet would cause and "that further, I did not see how the Diet could be admitted to any participation in the matter; that it would be time enough to communicate with that Body when the affair was completed; and that if Austria and Prussia were agreed, it was not likely that any difficulties would afterwards be raised at Frankfurt."

It appears from this dispatch, the Queen wrote on the 10th to Malmesbury, that Bloomfield "is strongly urging Prussia to sign the Danish Protocol and then to force it by its influence upon the German Diet."² It was true that the Queen would make no objection to Austria's and Prussia's acting on behalf of the Confederation, but if they had scruples in that direction, "it would hardly do for us to insist on these being disregarded. The two parties interested are the King of Denmark, as present Sovereign over Holstein, and the German Confederation to which it belongs and which is presided over by the Diet. An arrangement brought about without the concurrence of *both* parties can neither be just nor in the end expedient."

Malmesbury's answer to the Queen's "observations" was not written in the same style as Granville's.³ He thought that as all parts had agreed that Austria and Prussia should represent "the interests and opinions of the Diet, there would be no advantage, but, on the contrary, great delay occasioned by any reference to that body in the present state of the Subject." Any improvement to the convention could be discussed by and decided much more effectively by the above-mentioned powers, "*who cannot be supposed capable of sacrificing German Interests.*"

¹ Correspondence, p. 153 f.

² R.A.W. I 27/92.

³ R.A.W. I 27/97.

Prince Albert, not Malmesbury, underlined the words in italics. Furthermore, he had put a large question mark at the end of the sentence. Albert thought he was more capable of assessing "German Interests" and was prepared to assert these, while Malmesbury's policy, as mentioned above (p. 242), was described as "exclusively *English*." On account of his origin it presumably never occurred to Prince Albert to consider "Danish Interests."

In his reply to the Queen, Malmesbury mentioned that Brunnow did not agree with Article 2 in the Danish draft, but had asked his Government for instructions. Britain would, therefore, have to wait "until we understand exactly, how Russia considers that Art., and how far her opinion and suggestions may influence the German Courts, but that Lord Bloomfield should discourage any reference to the Diet."

Russia's opinion of the modifications which Denmark wanted were communicated in Nesselrode's dispatch of the 2nd of April to Ungern Sternberg, and Brunnow received a copy.¹ Russia went far to meet Denmark's wishes and stated that she was prepared to allow the proposals which appeared to be in the interests of Denmark and which it would be possible to get the other powers to accept.

As far as Article 1 was concerned, Nesselrode pointed out that it was the Tsar's renunciation, provided Prince Christian was chosen as successor, that had made the suggested combination possible. On account of this objection, the final version included the phrase "de concert avec Sa Majesté L'Empereur de toutes les Russies, Chef de la Branche aînée de la Maison de Holstein-Gottorp." Nesselrode also mentioned that the Warsaw Protocol mentioned Prince Christian's male descendants not only in his marriage with Princess Louise and that this wording was the most advantageous for the integrity of the Monarchy.

Nesselrode had no objections on grounds of principle to Article 2, but thought that Britain would perhaps not commit herself, and Copenhagen ought at least to take the initiative. He proposed a slightly different version of the Article. Finally he stressed the necessity of retaining the possible rights of the Kiel line in the event of the extinction of Prince Christian's

¹ Correspondence, p. 159 ff.



JAMES HOWARD HARRIS

Earl of Malmesbury

(1807-1889)

National Portrait Gallery, London.



PRINCE CHRISTIAN OF GLÜCKSBURG
(Christian IX)

Painted by A. Schiott. 1853. Rosenborg Castle

male descendants. But this could be done by a note from Brunnow when the treaty was signed. There was no need to mention it in the treaty itself.

The Danish Government expressed their approval of these proposals of Russia's with the one exception that they insisted on limiting Prince Christian's male descendants to those of his marriage with Princess Louise.¹ This appeared to be necessary in view of the form and motives of the acts of renunciation which had been executed.

The amnesties for the Duchies, which were issued on the 29th of March and which, on the 4th of April, Browne sent to Malmesbury, must be regarded as evidence that Denmark was ready to meet Germany's wishes.² The number who had been excluded by the amnesty was considerably reduced by the new proclamation. Browne mentioned that among those still excluded was a man like Francke, who had had a confidential post in the Danish Administration, but who had endeavoured in Frankfurt, as the envoy of the Provisional Government, to bring about the incorporation of Slesvig in Germany.

On the 5th of April, Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Prime Minister, died suddenly, and Count Buol Schauenstein, the Austrian Minister in London, was called home to take over his post. Austria was thereafter represented in London by Kübeck, the *chargé d'affaires*. On the 7th Bloomfield wrote to Malmesbury that Schwarzenberg's death had not "caused any serious regret at Berlin," but he did not either believe that Buol's appointment was gratifying to the Prussian Government.³ When Bille wrote to Bluhme about Buol's appointment, he said that the new Austrian Prime Minister regarded the integrity of the Danish Monarchy both as an Austrian and a European interest, and that he had no objection to Article 2 of the Danish draft.⁴

About the end of the first week of April, Bille received information from Bille-Brahe in Berlin that Friedrich Wilhelm seemed to want to stick to the "inadmissible" idea (cf. above p. 254) about the participation of the Diet.⁵ Therefore he had

¹ Dispatch 12/4, No. XI, to Bille. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

² Correspondence, p. 155 f. — Bille's dispatch 8/4, No. 24.

³ F.O. 356/30.

⁴ Bille's dispatch 8/4, No. 24.

⁵ Bille's dispatch 10/4, No. 25.

new discussions on the matter with Brunnow, who greatly deplored the fact that the idea had been put forward and rejected it. The best way of inducing Prussia to sign the convention was, he believed, for Austria to declare that she would sign without Prussia. If Austria hesitated, instinct told him that the present British Cabinet would do the same. Therefore Austria's attitude was of exceptional importance.

If it had been up to Bunsen to decide Prussia's attitude, it would have been unresponsive. Therefore both in Berlin and in London he was, on the whole, excluded from participation in the negotiations. However, on the 1st of April he felt called upon to inform his King that, although Lord Derby certainly did not (*durchaus nicht*) regard the matter in the same way as Lord Palmerston, he did, however, want the matter terminated as soon as possible in the interests of the peace of Europe. On the 16th he wrote again and stated that Lord Derby had recently mentioned the question of the Danish succession again to him and drawn his attention to two things: first, the Cabinet would not go more deeply into the question than necessary, and secondly, that it was in the interest of Europe to strengthen Denmark, so that she could be less dependent on Russia. When Lord Derby asked about Prussia's attitude, Bunsen had to reply that he had so far received no further instructions on the matter. But, long-winded as always, he enlarged on his views that it was not Britain's task to strengthen Denmark, but Germany, and assert the "definite rights of a German princely house." In his letter to the King, Bunsen wrote that a convention like the one which had been proposed meant the severance of an important German country [Holstein] from the common fatherland.

On the 17th Brunnow negotiated with Malmesbury and gave him a copy of Nesselrode's above-mentioned dispatch to Ungern Sternberg of the 3rd.¹ Brunnow promised Malmesbury to send him further information about the proposed convention and the obligations it imposed on the contracting powers. He did this in a letter of the 19th and enclosed a memorandum.²

Brunnow wrote that the convention imposed no troublesome

¹ Correspondence, p. 159 ff. – Brunnow's note to Bille dated *Dimanche matin* [18/4]. Akter vedr. successionssagen. – Bille's dispatch 19/4, No. 26.

² Correspondence, p. 171 ff.

obligations on us. The relations between Holstein and Lauenborg and the German Confederation would remain the same. It simply stated that, in our opinion, it was important for the balance of power in Europe and in the interest of peace in general to maintain the Danish Monarchy intact, but we laid no claims to wish to force this principle on others who had a different opinion. Austria, France, Britain, Russia and Sweden had unanimously approved this principle in the Protocol of the 2nd (and 23rd) of August 1850. Prussia had done the same in a note of the 30th of September 1851. A decision should be reached as soon as possible.

Brunnow then mentioned at length the pretensions of the House of Augustenborg. He believed, for that matter, that the children of the Duke and the Prince of Noer would be excluded from succeeding on account of their fathers' marriages with wives of unequal birth. However, it was reasonable to give the Duke a certain sum in compensation and, in spite of his behaviour during the Revolution, Frederik VII had made him a generous offer. Whether the Duke accepted this offer or not, it ought not, at any rate, to have any influence on the negotiations concerning the convention. Brunnow suggested, however, that when the treaty was signed the Danish representative might be informed that it was expected that the offer to the Duke would still stand, even if he exceeded the time-limit.¹ He was all the more willing to put forward this suggestion, as he knew that the Queen was interested in the fate of the House of Augustenborg.

Finally Brunnow mentioned the idea put forward by Berlin for the participation of the Diet in the present negotiations. However, he did not think that Prussia would stick to this plan, which he considered impossible. It would mean that the two German Powers had two votes in a matter of European interest: first as European Powers, secondly as German.² Neither Britain, Russia nor France would allow this. Article 3 reserved the rights

¹ Brunnow had also informed Bunsen that he was going to put forward this proposal. He had said furthermore that he was instructed to negotiate with Prussia and Austria, but as European Powers. His instructions contained no mention of parallel representation from the Confederation. Bunsen's dispatch 21/4 to the King.

² In his dispatch of 23/4, No. 100, Walewski definitely dissociated himself from the idea of a representative for the Diet. Such a representative would, he wrote, only act according to directions from Prussia and Austria, who would therefore get three votes instead of two.

of the Confederation. This had satisfied Austria when she acceded to the Protocol in August 1850. "If Prussia demanded more, she demanded the impossible. She is too wise to do that."

In his accompanying memorandum Brunnow again stressed how little the convention committed the signatory powers, and that it was left to the discretion of the other powers to accede to it or reject it (Article 4). The convention was the result of a sound policy: the maintenance of peace. The signatories would have the moral satisfaction of knowing that they had not acted "par aucune vue d'agrandissement, ni d'ambition ni d'influence exclusive."

According to Bille's dispatch of the 19th, he had spoken the day before to Malmesbury, who had asked him why the Danish Government objected to the Russian wording: Prince Christian's male descendants, also of any later marriage. Bille explained the reason for this, but refused to commit himself until all the powers were ready to sign. In his dispatch the following day Bille said that Bunsen was said to have pronounced himself in favour of the Russian wording, which Bille thought was probably to create new difficulties for Denmark, if Hesse protested. Malmesbury had asked Bille to send him some genealogical tables of the various royal lines. Bille did this on the 19th and enclosed a memorandum on the pretensions of the House of Augustenborg to the Holstein succession.¹ However, Bille had warned Malmesbury against going too deeply into one of the most complicated legal questions of the times.

On the 21st Malmesbury sent Derby "some very clever papers" Brunnow had sent him together with Bille's and wrote: "I think the sooner we call together the Ministers in London the better and then ask Austria and Prussia their intentions."² Even if only Austria agreed: "I am for signing."

In spite of Bille's warning that Malmesbury should not go into details, Sir Charles Young, the Garter King of Arms, King Harold's College, was asked on the 22nd to submit a genealogical table for "the present King of Denmark and of his cognates and agnates interested in the succession to the Kingdom of Denmark and the Duchy of Holstein."³ However, on the 24th

¹ Correspondence, p. 165 ff.

² F.O. 97/129.

³ F.O. 97/129.

Sir Charles stated that he had no special sources to draw on and asked how far back the table was to go. The matter was then dropped.

At the Queen's levée on the 21st, Bille met Bunsen, who called the convention a matter which would not encounter further hindrances.¹ When Bille remarked to Malmesbury that Bunsen seemed "très doux" that day, Malmesbury retorted in a manner which made it clear what he thought of Bunsen: "Tant pis, car probablement il se cache quelque perfidie sous cette douceur."

In his dispatch of the 19th to Bille, Bluhme sanctioned Brunnow's proposed wording respecting Articles 1 and 2. However, Bille was to insist that only Prince Christian's male descendants of his marriage with Princess Louise were entitled to succeed. Furthermore, Bille was authorized to accept a note from Brunnow respecting the reservation of the possible rights of the oldest line of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, after the convention was signed. Bluhme was justified in writing that Brunnow deserved "our warmest thanks."

On the afternoon of Friday the 23rd, Bille spoke to Lord Derby, who promised that early the next week Malmesbury would convene the Ministers to sign the treaty. He expressed very friendly feelings for Denmark. When Bille had explained the reasons for restricting the rights of succession to the male descendants of Prince Christian and Princess Louise, Lord Derby exclaimed: "Oh, I understand now, You would not act fairly towards the family of Hesse, if you went further than their acts of renunciation."

On Saturday Bille submitted to Malmesbury the Danish version of the draft for a treaty (Appendix IV. 3).² At the same time Brunnow sent Malmesbury the Russian version, which retained the extended right of succession for Prince Christian's male descendants and included the suggestion about the note dealing with the offer to the Duke of Augustenborg, which was to be sent to the Danish Minister.³

On Monday the 26th Bille was summoned to the Foreign Office to a meeting with Malmesbury and Addington, the Under-Secretary of State.⁴ It was still the question of limiting the suc-

¹ Bille's dispatch 23/4, No. 28.

² Correspondence, p. 176.

³ Correspondence, p. 177 f.

⁴ Bille's dispatches 26/4, No. 29, and 27/4, No. 30.

cession to the male descendants of Prince Christian's present marriage to Princess Louise which raised doubts, but Malmesbury and Addington said that they were satisfied with Bille's information. Malmesbury suggested a conference of the representatives on the Wednesday – the sooner, the better, said Bille – and then the convention could be signed, with or without Bunsen.

The next day Malmesbury sent the Queen the draft for the convention.¹ Bille's draft, Malmesbury wrote, was altered by Russia, but "now again revised and agreed upon by all the Powers, excepting Prussia." He mentioned the divergence in opinion between Russia and Denmark respecting Prince Christian's male descendants and explained that, as the Prince of Hesse had renounced his rights in favour of his sister, he could not be asked to renounce in favour of children of another marriage. Malmesbury wrote that Bille "took the same view of the case," although it would have been more correct to say that Malmesbury took the same view of the case as Bille.

Malmesbury also enclosed the draft of the note to the Danish Minister proposed by Brunnow, which suggested that he should disregard the time-limit for the Duke to accept the Danish offer. He and Brunnow had thought this "both expedient and equitable" and it had been easy for them to secure the agreement of the other powers.

All the powers except Prussia, continued Malmesbury, had given their Ministers orders to sign the convention. The Queen would remember that Prussia, who had first hesitated, had since – by Manteuffel's note of the 30th of September 1851 – ranged herself alongside the signatory powers of the London Protocol. It might, therefore, be expected that Berlin "will not now keep aloof." The King of Prussia had recently wanted an invitation to be sent to the Diet, but Austria held other views and had sent Kübeck "peremptory instructions to sign the Convention as it stands." Both Her Majesty's last Cabinet and the present one thought it was extremely important to terminate the matter. In further support of this opinion Malmesbury mentioned that Napoleon's expected assumption of the title of Emperor might prevent the ambassadors of other powers [Russia's] from signing.

¹ R.A.W. I 27/101.

Malmesbury's rather optimistic views that Berlin "will not now keep aloof" was supposedly based on Bloomfield's two official dispatches of the 22nd, which were received at the Foreign Office on the 26th.¹ The first mentioned that Russia had strongly advised against Frankfurt's participation in the convention. Bloomfield thought that this "will probably have some weight" with the King. The second dispatch mentioned Nesselrode's dispatch of the 3rd April to Ungern Sternberg, which had been communicated to Friedrich Wilhelm. Manteuffel had said to Bloomfield that "he himself had no objection to make to it."

In his private letter of the same date to Malmesbury, Bloomfield explained in detail where the difficulties had arisen.² "I must," he wrote, "lay at the door of . . . Bunsen much of the King of Prussia's obstinacy and reluctance to proceed in the matter." He therefore wanted to be sent instructions which he could show Manteuffel, who could inform the King, "which will correct the erroneous impression produced on His Majesty's mind by Bunsen's reports." Manteuffel had just told Bloomfield that he did not doubt that everything would end well, but that Bunsen kept the King from making a decision and exerted an extremely unfortunate influence on the matter. Thus in a dispatch [of the 16th of April see p. 258] Bunsen had written that he did not find the British Government "so anxious on the subject of the proposed Convention" and, on the contrary, considered Lord Derby "well disposed towards the cause of the Duke of Augustenburg and then threw out hints which have induced the King to waver in His decision."

Bloomfield ended by making the following statement about Bunsen's relations with Friedrich Wilhelm: He, "as Your Lordship is aware, enjoys much of the King's confidence, he flatters His Majesty, knows his weak points and works cleverly and successfully upon them, but he is entirely opposed to the opinions of the present Government of Prussia, and is so distrusted by Manteuffel that he would willingly see him removed from his post in London."

On the 27th Malmesbury replied to Bloomfield and told him

¹ Correspondence, p. 178 ff. Either through a misprint or a slip of the pen the first dispatch mentions the King of Denmark instead of the King of Prussia.

² F.O. 356/30.

that his view of "our wishes" concerning the Danish convention was correct, "which (to prove Bunsen what you state him to be) I hope to get signed this week by all the Powers except Prussia."¹ Malmesbury asked Bloomfield to do his best "to remove any soreness this act may produce on the King" and tell him about the note it was proposed to send at the same time to Bille regarding the Duke of Augustenborg. Finally he added that "neither from Lord Derby nor me did M. Bunsen hear any language to justify his assertions to the King – but he himself has always spoken to me of the Subject as of one he ignored."

When Malmesbury wrote to Bloomfield he cannot have received the important news that, with a few stipulations, the Duke had accepted the Danish offer within the time-limit fixed. No news will be more welcome to Malmesbury, Bille wrote in his dispatch of the 27th, as it makes his relations much easier with the high-ranking persons who are interested in the Duke's fate. Bille had received his information from Bille-Brahe.

Malmesbury must have received the good news on the same day, for his letter informing the Queen was dated the 27th.² Presumably the Court received the news about the same time in a letter which Duke Ernst sent his brother on the 25th.³ Ernst enclosed a copy of the letter sent to him on the 25th by the Duke of Augustenborg informing him that he had decided to accept the Danish offer and in which he thanked Queen Victoria for her intervention in his favour in Copenhagen.

On the 28th the Queen expressed to Malmesbury her pleasure at the news, but at the same time asserted that, without the Duke's acceptance, the proposed convention would have been "an act of spoliation."⁴ She expected that the signing of the convention would now be "delayed so as to allow Prussia to sign it together with the other Powers." She continued, admittedly very logically: "It would be difficult to defend the exclusion of the German Diet from participation in a transaction deciding on the fate of one of its component parts, on the plea of its being represented by Austria and Prussia, if at the same time the Protocol is to be signed, without Prussia being a party to it."

¹ F.O. 356/31.

² R.A.W. I 27/102. – However, in a letter of the 28th of April to Bloomfield, he wrote that the news "reached me this morning."

³ *Ibid.* I 27/108–109.

⁴ R.A.W. I 27/103.

15. The Treaty of London of the 8th of May

The British Government were determined to terminate the matter in spite of opposition from the Court. On the 27th Malmesbury sent Bille two letters, the first of which was presumably sent before he learnt that the Duke had accepted the Danish offer, the second after.¹ The first letter said that Malmesbury would receive Bille at 5 o'clock on the 28th "for the purpose of considering the proposed Convention for regulating the Succession of the Crown of Denmark." The second letter requested Bille to send his secretary to the Foreign Office at 12 o'clock the next day to prepare the convention "for Signature at the Meeting of the Plenipotentiaries which is to take place at 6 o'clock tomorrow." Bille was also requested to send "his Titles and his Seal to be affixed to the Treaty."

On the 28th all the representatives concerned, including Bunsen, met at the Foreign Office.² Count Walewski wrote that Bunsen, who at first was unwilling to come at all, was already at the Foreign Office when the others arrived. He had had a talk with Malmesbury and had come to the conclusion that, although he had no instructions, he thought he might attend the meeting, as the Duke had now accepted the offer. Walewski wrote that the convention would be finally signed on the 1st of May. Kübeck expected to receive his full powers from Vienna on that day at the latest.

Bille hurried to inform Bluhme from the Foreign Office of the happy result that everyone, except Bunsen, had countersigned the treaty.³ Malmesbury had stated that, as he assumed that the King of Prussia would abandon the idea about the Diet now that the Duke had accepted the Danish offer, he would immediately inform Bloomfield by telegraph of the result of the conference and request a definite reply as to whether Prussia would sign or not. He told Bunsen, politely but firmly, that if Prussia did not make an unambiguous declaration, he would suggest that the others signed without Prussia. Bille wrote that

¹ Ges. ark. London. Korrespondance med Foreign Office. 1851-53.

² Correspondence, p. 180 f. - The Protocol was drawn up by Brunnow and Walewski. Walewski's dispatch 29/4, No. 103.

³ Bille to Bluhme 28/4. Arvefølgesagen. 2.

this suggestion met with unanimous approval, although the representatives agreed that it would be best if Prussia participated.

In lengthy dispatches of the 29th and 30th Bille stated which modifications had been included in the final version of the draft. Most of them are purely formal amendments. Count Walewski helped to frame the treaty in correct French and the Secretaries of Legation, who were to make the copies, also gave their assistance. A proposal from Austria (that Article 1 should merely state the approval of Prince Ferdinand, the Heir Presumptive), which Bluhme had been willing to agree to, was put forward too late to be considered.¹ Bille said that the Danish proposal in Article 3 "pour les Duchés de Holstein et Lauenburg" met with much opposition; "pour" was asserted to be an incorrect translation of the German "für" and was changed to "concernant les Duchés . . ."

All the negotiations about the final wording were carried out before the meeting on the 28th at the Foreign Office. Bille considered it imperative that all the representatives should be in agreement, so that there would be no discussion or controversy at the meeting in Bunsen's presence and for his edification.

After the conference on the 28th, Bunsen sent a telegraph dispatch to Manteuffel telling him that he had been present. He stated that the convention would not be signed until Berlin had answered the telegraphic dispatch which Malmesbury had sent Bloomfield the same evening. The conference was, therefore, postponed until the next Saturday. He said that the Austrian chargé d'affaires expected to receive full powers to sign the next morning.

The next day Bunsen sent Manteuffel a more detailed account of the meeting and explained why he had attended on Malmesbury's invitation, although he had no instructions. He had made it a condition that the convention did not mention the London Protocol of "1849" [! 1850] to which Prussia had not acceded. He had received information the same morning that the Duke of Augustenborg had accepted the Danish offer, and his participation did not commit Berlin in any way, but would, on the other hand, make it easier for the Government to accede, if they

¹ Correspondence, p. 185 f. Bloomfield's dispatch 2/5. — Rantzau, p. 406 f. and 410 ff.

wished to do so. "The good will which Britain had given proof of over the Neuchâtel question seemed to call for politeness on my part," said Bunsen.¹

Bunsen continued by saying that Malmesbury had stated that London would sign even without Prussia, but that he had expressed great respect for the King of Prussia and would wait to sign until a reply was received from Bloomfield. All the other participants were willing to wait and all had expressed a wish that Prussia in this way would help to safeguard the peace of Europe. In the evening Malmesbury had sent him for his signature the protocol which Brunnow had drafted. He had added his name to the others, but had informed Malmesbury that he had done it solely "in order to *testify his presence*."² If the King were willing to consent to the European treaty, it would be sufficient if he authorized Bunsen to state this on the following Saturday. It would be advisable to send him the full powers without delay.

As may be seen, the new invention of the telegraph was used more extensively to speed up matters. As has been mentioned, Malmesbury sent Bloomfield on the 28th news of the convention by telegraph. At the same time he sent off printed copies of the countersigned treaty to him and directed him to use every effort to induce Berlin to instruct Bunsen to sign: ". . . you will not fail to send a categorical answer by the telegraph on Friday" [the 30th].³

Bloomfield must have done this, for on the 30th he wrote to Malmesbury: Your telegraphic message of yesterday "has worked wonders," as you will already have learnt from my replies.⁴ I hope that you will be able to bring "this affair to a satisfactory conclusion" on Monday or Tuesday [the 3rd or 4th of May]. The orders to Bunsen "to sign go by the present opportunity." Yesterday morning when I had received your message by telegraph, I wrote immediately to Manteuffel, but

¹ It was a question of a possible declaration from the Great Powers in favour of the rights of the King of Prussia in the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel. Correspondence on the matter is to be found in F.O. 64/348, but this bears evidence that both Granville and Malmesbury were critical of the proposal rather than that they were well disposed towards it.

² See also Correspondence, p. 181.

³ Correspondence, p. 180.

⁴ F.O. 356/30.

did not see him until 8 pm. "He had then taken the King's orders and told me that all was settled, but he said it was not effected without a hard battle." He appeared "as much pleased as a Dane might have been." When you next see Bunsen, you must be prepared to receive a verbal message concerning the German Confederation, "to which body the King still clings with the greatest tenacity, and to which His Majesty wishes the allied Powers to communicate the Treaty." Bloomfield continued by saying that, in a confidential dispatch, he had sent an extract of the part of Bunsen's instructions "which relates to this point, so that you will be able to stop him if he goes beyond them."

Bloomfield thought that the affair had been concluded so quickly because the Tsar was expected in Berlin. Before his arrival Friedrich Wilhelm wanted "to finish all matters in which there was a serious difference between them." Bismarck was of opinion that it was the Prussian Crown Prince who had persuaded the Duke to accept the Danish offer.

The extract which Bloomfield sent with his dispatch of the 30th¹ said that the King recommended the representatives of the other signatory powers to communicate the convention to Frankfurt "pour lui fournir le moyen de la sanctionner de son côté, et de lui assurer par là à un plus haut degré encore le caractère d'une incontestable validité." Bloomfield wrote that Bunsen was "not directed to give in any written document on the occasion of signing the Treaty, but simply to make a verbal declaration on the subject."

At 8 pm on the 29th Manteuffel authorized Bunsen by telegraph to sign, and the next morning Bunsen informed Malmesbury that he had received instructions.² Malmesbury then summoned the representatives to a meeting on the 5th of May.³ However, this day was not the final one, either, as the full powers for Austria's representative had been delayed. On the 4th of May, Westmorland wrote to Bloomfield: "You have been very fortunate in getting the *full* powers sent to Bunsen."⁴ The Austrian

¹ Correspondence, p. 185.

² Bunsen's dispatch 30/4.

³ F.O. 97/129: 30/4. - Correspondence, p. 182.

⁴ F.O. 356/31. - Bloomfield's dispatch 2/5. Correspondence, p. 185. - Osten, p. 250, says that Manteuffel "zur Beruhigung des Königs" was very grateful for the two arguments which Vienna had put forward against the participation of the Diet.

full powers, he continued, were not sent off until yesterday, as the Emperor has been absent from Vienna. Bloomfield's information about Bunsen's orders "was the first which arrived here, Prokesch seems not to have known it. Buol was much pleased to learn it." Westmorland did not think that Bunsen, "the representative of the German Duchy of Sleswig Holstein," would be very pleased "to sign the present settlement. If a Trick to avoid it is possible he will find it out and adopt it."

As the full powers for Kübeck had not yet arrived, Malmesbury postponed the meeting from the 5th to Saturday the 8th.¹ However, Kübeck's full powers arrived on the morning of the 7th, and Bille immediately requested Malmesbury to call the representatives together that day.² At 4 o'clock in the afternoon they all arrived at the Foreign Office except Bunsen, who absented himself on the pretext that a change was being made in his seal, which would not be ready until the next day. It is understandable that this, together with the information he had received from Bloomfield, roused Malmesbury's suspicions that new difficulties might be encountered. According to Bille's account, he [Bille] made an agreement with the other representatives that, when Malmesbury asked them to sign, they would all take up their pens and state that they were willing to do so. The answers to every condition "which might be laid down by, or remark which might be expected from, Mr. Bunsen were also agreed upon." In addition Malmesbury promised to summon Bunsen and have a talk with him before the conference began.³

During this talk Bunsen informed Malmesbury that Friedrich Wilhelm would insist on the sanction of the Diet as a condition of his ratification.⁴ Malmesbury stated that, in that case, he would not accept his signature, but that the other representatives would sign without Prussia. When Malmesbury and Bunsen then joined the other representatives, Malmesbury requested them all to sign their names; everyone, including Bunsen, took up their pens and signed. Not a word was said during the ceremony, but after the convention had been signed Bille thanked them all. Thus, Bille wrote in his dispatch, ended this "work of

¹ Bille's dispatch 5/5, No. 34.

² Bille's dispatch 8/5, No. 35.

³ Malmesbury to Bunsen 7/5: would receive him at noon on the 8th.

⁴ For this plan see also Rantzau, p. 407 ff.

such importance for our Fatherland. It will be blessed by God Almighty, who held his hand over Denmark when our need was greatest.”

Bille stated that all the signatories apart from Bunsen had shown proof of their good will and had been eager to conclude the Treaty. The result was due in the main to Brunnow. Bille pointed out that Walewski and Rehausen had supported every wish put forward by Denmark, and Kübeck, too, had done us an important service. Finally, from the time of his appointment, Malmesbury had treated the matter “in a way which does him the greatest credit. Even if some of his predecessors have had more routine and more detailed knowledge of the affair, none of them has, however, hastened on its settlement with more zeal, and, above all, none of them has known how to handle and impress Mr. Bunsen as Lord Malmesbury.” Bille also expressed great appreciation of the help given him by the Danish Ministers in the respective capitals.

Walewski’s dispatches bear ample evidence of his assistance. When the treaty was safely signed, he wrote: “I consider myself very lucky to have had the honour of signing an agreement of such importance for one of France’s oldest and most faithful allies.”¹

It appears from Bloomfield’s above-mentioned remarks about Bunsen’s instructions that Bunsen had been directed to point out in confidence to the other Ministers that some consideration ought to be shown for the German Confederation. Bunsen received his instructions on the morning of the 3rd of May.² Just before the extract mentioned by Bloomfield, the instructions stated that the King had been very desirous of seeing the German Confederation participating directly in the signing of the convention.³ But he realized the difficulties which had already arisen in this connection, and which seemed to prevent the fulfilment of his hopes. Then the passage followed which was mentioned in the extract: Bunsen was to suggest that, when the treaty had been signed, it should be communicated to the German Confederation, who would then have an opportunity of sanctioning it.

¹ Dispatch 8/5, No. 105.

² Bunsen’s dispatch 8/5 to Manteuffel.

³ Manteuffel’s dispatch 30/4 and Bunsen’s dispatch 19/5 to M.

Bunsen sent dispatches to Manteuffel and the King on the 8th after the treaty had been signed and explained how he had carried out his instructions. He wrote to Manteuffel that he had had repeated negotiations with Derby and Malmesbury as well as with the Russian, Danish and French Ministers respecting the participation of the Confederation, but Russia and France had definitely stated that they were opposed to this and Britain had concurred in their view. He thought this was due to news from Frankfurt which said that the necessary unanimous decision of the Diet could not be expected. He had, therefore, had no alternative than to state that he was prepared to sign. However, he had, furthermore, asked Malmesbury to negotiate with him privately before the meeting. During this private conversation he had stressed the point concerning the German Confederation. Malmesbury had referred to the Article in the convention which stated that the other powers would be invited to accede, but he had also stated that he agreed with Russia and France that the Act of Federation did not give the Confederation any special European position. Malmesbury assured him, however, that Britain would never cease to feel "the greatest interest for the dignity and independence of the Confederation."

In his dispatch to the King, Bunsen stressed that Parliament and public opinion were definitely in favour of the convention and therefore the Government had made the Queen's consent a Cabinet question. In a postscript to the dispatch he described "the secret negotiations between the Queen and the Cabinet" – knowledge he must have received from the Court. He mentioned the Queen's proposal to put the matter before the law officers of the Crown (see p. 254), but her Ministers had stated that they were unable to put the necessary questions, as even in Germany there was great disagreement, even among the most learned publicists. The Queen had then declared that she would sign *only* if the German Confederation had acquiesced beforehand. Her Majesty's Ministers had told her that there was no prospect of this on account of the necessity of obtaining an unanimous resolution and that, in addition, Russia demanded that the form of the great European treaties after 1815 should be maintained. Austria and Prussia virtually represented the German Confederation. Then the Queen said that she would also assent, as it was

believed that Austria certainly would, but only when the King of Prussia had agreed, not before. The Cabinet would do all in its power to obtain his approval, but they would have to insist on the conclusion of the convention before the Parliamentary elections. Bunsen pointed out that it was not possible for the Queen to oppose the convention for very long, as it had not been possible to form a Cabinet on account of her continued opposition. John Russell, Palmerston and Aberdeen considered the conclusion of the convention as a European necessity. This is also how I view the matter, Bunsen wrote, but there is no doubt that Germany has been humiliated. But perhaps the fact that the German Confederation has not participated in the convention, even if at the moment it is a declaration of political bankruptcy for the Confederation, will be an advantage for Germany in the long run.

In a letter of the 20th of June to his brother, Palmerston expressed his genuine approval of the firm attitude adopted by the Government towards the Court.¹ He remembered the differences he had had himself with the royal family: "I am told that the Court does not like the present Government, and I can believe it." All royal persons like servility, "but Derby has an off-hand and sarcastic way about him, which is not the manner of a courtier, and has, I know, fought stoutly and successfully on the Danish question."

Malmesbury had certainly done the same. In his memoirs Greville mentioned a compliment paid by Mellish to Malmesbury.² Malmesbury had, Mellish said to Greville, "one very good quality, firmness," and it was this quality which had "brought about the settlement of the Danish question."

Malmesbury presumably stated in his letter of the 10th of May to Bloomfield how he induced Bunsen to yield at the last moment. This letter is, unfortunately, not extant. Bloomfield replied on the 13th.³ He wrote that Manteuffel had told him that the King still stuck to his plan for the participation of the Diet in the treaty. He was encouraged by Bunsen's assurances that the Queen would refuse to sanction the treaty, if Prussia did

¹ Ashley. I, p. 349.

² The Greville Memoirs (Second Part). III (1885), p. 472 f.

³ F.O. 356/30.

not sign. Bunsen had yielded at the last moment to prevent a Cabinet crisis.

Relations between Prussia and Britain, continued Bloomfield, are made difficult by the connection between the King and Bunsen, while Manteuffel suspects every act of Bunsen's. Bunsen "maintains his position by making the King believe that he enjoys the confidence of the Queen, the Prince and the Government, and as long as that state of things lasts his hold upon His Prussian Majesty will continue." Manteuffel had told Bloomfield that he had twice suggested recalling Bunsen, but the King had rejected the suggestion. In a later letter of the 18th of May, Bloomfield advised against attempting to remove Bunsen, as it might bring about Manteuffel's fall. For Bunsen had given the King the impression that "the existence of a good understanding with England is inseparable from Bunsen."

In spite of the instructions sent to Bunsen on the 30th of April, Manteuffel informed him on the 13th of May that the King would have liked his demand for the participation of the Confederation in the convention to have been stated in a special protocol when the convention was signed.¹ It was easy for Bunsen to reply that he had only been directed to speak *confidentially* to his colleagues about the matter, which he had done. And as the Treaty had to be signed, it appeared to him that a voluntary action was more dignified "in a situation which was recognized to be difficult." He was justified in pointing out that all the negotiations on the question from first to last were conducted in Berlin and not in London: "The latest European treaty has merely been concluded here." He thought it might be possible when the ratifications were exchanged to make a statement about the King's wish. However, three days later he had to state in a telegraphic dispatch that this could not be done; it was "theils unzulässig, theils bedenklich."

When he was reproached by Berlin, Bunsen approached Malmesbury. On the 22nd Malmesbury wrote to Bloomfield and said that Bunsen wanted Bloomfield to explain to the King that Manteuffel "was quite right in not pressing a reference of the Danish Convention to the Diet upon the six Powers at the

¹ Bunsen's dispatch 19/5.

time of their signing it.”¹ Bunsen had told Malmesbury that the King had directed Manteuffel “to instruct him [Bunsen] to make the demand and put it in the shape of a note,” but that Manteuffel had never given him such an order. “Be this as it may,” wrote Malmesbury, “it is certain that none of the Powers would have recognised the right of the Diet to interfere, and I told Bunsen that I was ready to argue this point, and that if he persisted we would sign without him.” If the King’s demand to have the convention referred to the Diet had been brought forward when the treaty was signed, it would have forced the powers “to vote against his opinion,” and Bunsen had therefore “served him well in not acting so indiscreetly as to do so.”

On the 28th Bloomfield reported his conversation on the matter with Manteuffel.² He was also able to state that the King had ratified the treaty. “I therefore hope that the Danish question may be considered as settled.”

As the Duke had accepted the Danish offer, the suggestion made by Brunnow to approach Bille and ask him to disregard the time-limit was dropped. On the other hand, on the 8th, Brunnow submitted the note which he had announced he would regarding the reservations made in Article 3 of the Warsaw Protocol respecting the rights of the Tsar and his family in the event of the extinction of Prince Christian’s male descendants.³ On orders from his Government, Bille replied on the 24th that the note had been placed in the Royal Archives and that he was authorized to state that the Treaty made no change in the nature of the reservations, “qui garderont ainsi, après la signature de ce Traité, la même force et valeur qu’elles avaient avant sa conclusion.”⁴

According to Article V of the Treaty the ratifications were to be exchanged in London within 6 weeks, or as soon as possible. The exchange took place at a conference held on the 19th of June at the Foreign Office. The Russian ratification, however,

¹ F.O. 356/31. — The letter is printed in Malmesbury: *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*. I (1884), p. 334.

² F.O. 356/30.

³ Correspondence, p. 187 f. — *Danske Tractater efter 1800*. First collection, p. 284 ff.

⁴ Correspondence, p. 188 f.

was received somewhat later, on the 2nd of July.¹ On the 19th of June, Bille and wife were Lord Derby's guests at dinner.

In connection with the statements made by Bille respecting the persons (and countries) which had been especially active in bringing the treaty to a conclusion, I shall mention that, on the 24th of May, Bluhme requested Bille to express to Malmesbury the indebtedness of the Danish Government to the British Government and to Lord Malmesbury personally, and to mention how much Denmark appreciated the work done by Britain's loyal and friendly representatives in Copenhagen, Wynn and Browne.² In his reply Malmesbury stated that the British Government had learnt with "lively satisfaction" that Denmark "appreciates their earnest and constant endeavours to bring about a settlement conformable to the Rights of the King of Denmark and the Interests of Europe at large of the Differences which have unfortunately disturbed His Danish Majesty's Dominions, as well as the manner in which the Instructions of Her Majesty have been carried out by the Servants of Her Majesty at Copenhagen."

On the 4th of June, Frederik VII sent effusive letters of thanks to the respective heads of states who had, by signing the Treaty, indicated that they regarded the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy as permanent, and safeguarded its integrity by the new arrangement for the succession.³ In the letter, written in Danish, to the King of Sweden-Norway, "permanent" is described as meaning "a principle which Europe will watch over to see that it is maintained for ever."

In May, after the treaty had been concluded, Prince Christian went on a visit of thanks to Berlin, where he met the Tsar and Tsarina and the King and Queen of Prussia.

On the 1st of July Parliament was dissolved. The Times was correct when it stated that its five-year existence "has been one of the most memorable periods in the annals, not only of this empire, but still more of Europe and of the whole world . . ." In her speech the Queen said that all the Foreign Powers were well disposed towards Britain. The London Protocol, which the

¹ Correspondence, p. 190. — Bille's dispatches 19/6, No. 44, and 3/7, No. 53.

² Dispatch 24/5, No. 16. Akter vedr. successionssagen. — Bille's dispatches 31/5, No. 39, and 7/6, No. 42.

³ Arvefølgesagen. 2.

Court had tried to prevent, was mentioned only indirectly and in the following phrases: "I rejoice that the final settlement of the affairs of Holstein and Sleswig, by the general concurrence of the Powers chiefly interested, has removed one cause of recent difference and of future anxiety."

After the conclusion of the Treaty, Denmark bestowed decorations in an open-handed manner on the respective statesmen and diplomats. On the 4th of June, La Hitte, Turgot and Walewski became Knights Grand Cross of the Order of the Dannebrog and on the same day Kübeck became a Commander of the same order. On the 11th, Prokesch von Osten, Budberg, Thun, Bismarck, Werther, Le Coq and Baron Werner, Austrian Under-Secretary of State, became Knights Grand Cross, while Manteuffel and Buol received the Order of the Elephant. Ungern Sternberg and Brunnow were already Commanders of the Order of the Dannebrog, having received their decorations in the autumn of 1848.

As evidence of the appreciation which was felt for Bille, I shall mention two statements. Brunnow mentioned Bille's "zeal, firmness and pertinacity in obtaining the result which we finally succeeded in obtaining by means of hard work and patience."¹ When Bluhme learnt that Bunsen had received orders to sign, he congratulated Bille "and myself and all of us others . . . You, my dear Bille, have written your name in Denmark's roll of honour in 1850, 1851 and 1852."² If in mentioning those who took an especially active part in concluding the treaty, I stick to those whose surnames began with B, I might mention Bülow, Bille-Brahe, Budberg and Bloomfield. But, of course, first of all, there were: Bille, Bluhme and Brunnow.

16. The Duke of Augustenborg's Act of Renunciation. – Article IV of the Treaty of London

Article 1 of Brunnow's draft for a convention contained the words: "et après avoir pris en sérieuse considération les vœux de Ses fidèles sujets." In the Danish draft these were altered to

¹ Brunnow's letter to Bille 18/6. Akter vedr. successionssagen.

² Bluhme to Bille 3/5. Ibid.

“après avoir pris en sérieuse considération les intérêts de Sa Monarchie.” In his dispatch of the 19th of March to Bille, Bluhme gave the correct reasons for this alteration: the King had actually not obtained information about the wishes of his subjects.

This was, it is true, unnecessary in the Duchies, where for the time being there were only consultative Provincial Estates, and the succession did not come within their province.¹ But after the introduction of the Constitution of June 1849 in the Kingdom, the consent of the Rigsdag would be required for the new arrangement for the succession and the abolition of the rules of succession in *Lex Regia*. A lengthy and bitter dispute took place in the Rigsdag before the King, with its approval, was able to promulgate the new law of succession (31st of July 1853).² I have treated this subject elsewhere (*Den danske Rigsdag 1849–1949*. I, p. 188 ff.) and shall not go into it here. Of course, the signatory powers were interested spectators of the internal dispute in Denmark, and in his fight against the opposition Bluhme was able to avail himself of statements made by foreign Governments.

As mentioned above, the Duke of Augustenborg's acceptance of the Danish offer had been of great importance for the conclusion of the Treaty of London. However, the Duke's acceptance was accompanied by a number of further claims for compensation. More than six months passed before the arrangement with the Duke was finally concluded. I shall not go into detail about the negotiations which took place and all the difficulties raised by the Duke. But it is reasonable to mention the Duke's attempt to have the negotiations transferred to London, so that he might obtain the support of the English Court, which was well disposed towards him.

On the 10th and 11th of June the Danish Council of State discussed the documents which the Duke was to sign and the form which the payment was to take.³ One of the intricate points was whether the obligations of the Duke's entailed estates could

¹ Cf. *Statsrådets Forhandl.* IV, p. 356.

² *Correspondence*, p. 284 f.

³ *Statsrådets Forhandl.* IV, p. 201 ff.

be released and transferred to the capital which was paid out. This was agreed upon, but had later to be abandoned.

On the 21st of June, Wynn, who had again returned to Copenhagen, reported that P. J. G. Garlieb, a Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, had gone to Frankfurt "to settle all the pecuniary claims of the Duke of Augustenburg."¹

On the evening of the 24th Garlieb reached Frankfurt.² The ducal family were in the nearby watering place of Homburg, but the Duke himself had left for London. On the 22nd of June, Bille reported that he had met him at Count Walewski's. Bille had reproached the Count that he had invited him together with the Duke. On the 19th Bille was invited to dinner at Lord Derby's. Lord Derby told him that he did not know the object of the Duke's visit and had refused to receive him. Bille was of the opinion that, before he made a final arrangement with Garlieb, the Duke wanted to find out what support he might be able to obtain in London, if he made reservations or proposed modifications in the Danish offer.

On the 27th Bille wrote to Bluhme that the Duke was still in London and would presumably meet Prince Albert before he left. Bille stated that the Duke could not reckon on any support from the British Government, but might receive "personal sympathy from the Queen and Prince Albert," especially from the latter, who was not at all satisfied with the Treaty of the 8th of May. He took every opportunity of expressing his opinion that the Duke's family had been wronged. "There is no doubt that it was the Danish question which more than any other aroused a dislike for Lord Palmerston on the part of the Queen and Prince Albert, which finally developed into passionate hatred." Bille believed that Prince Albert was still a supporter of the Gotha programme and hoped that his daughter, by the marriage which had been arranged for her with the son of the Prince of Prussia, would become the Empress [Victoria married the future Kaiser Friedrich III in 1858].

¹ Correspondence, p. 191.

² For an account of Garlieb's stay in Frankfurt see file Slesv. min. Sekretariatet. Akter ang. forhandlingerne om det ækvivalent, der skal gives hertugen af Augustenborg for de augustenborgske godser . . . 1850-53.

On the 29th Bille spoke to Malmesbury, who – on “urgings from higher quarters”, as Bille supposed – had granted the Duke an interview.¹ The Duke is said to have expressed his fears that, as a result of the conclusion of the Treaty, the Danish offer would no longer hold good. However, Bille thought that the Duke must be aware that Garlieb had been authorized to conclude the final arrangement with him and, as the King of Prussia was the mediator, it was strange that he approached other Governments.

On the 25th Garlieb paid a visit to the Duchess at Homburg. She said that her husband would not be back until the beginning of July at the earliest, but that she would write to him and urge him to return as soon as possible. According to the Duke’s own statement, he did not receive this message until the 29th.² On the 4th of July the Duchess informed Garlieb that she had now received a letter from the Duke – she did not show it to him – which said that he could not leave England for some weeks as the Queen wanted to see him [!]. He therefore suggested that Garlieb went to London where Bunsen could represent the mediating power. Although the Duchess urged him to do so, Garlieb would not agree to this, but made preparations for his return to Copenhagen instead.

In London on the 26th of June, Bunsen had told Lord Malmesbury of the Duke’s wish to be received in audience by the Queen.³ Bunsen wrote that he had no qualms in putting forward this request, as the Duke was only to be regarded now as “a German Prince” and had decided to make his home in Prussia. I am unable to decide how Bunsen’s statement that the Duke had “by the Agreement lately signed with the Crown of Denmark dissolved the relations which connected him with the same” is to be understood.

The Duke was received in audience on the 30th – against Malmesbury’s wishes, but on orders from the highest quarters, Bille wrote.⁴ The Duke was accompanied by Bunsen, who afterwards looked up Bille, but did not find him at home, to give him

¹ Bille’s dispatch 29/6, No. 51.

² Correspondence, p. 135 ff.: undated memorandum by the Duke of Augustenborg; cf. p. 194: Malmesbury’s letter 22/7.

³ Correspondence, p. 191. – Note: “Received July 5.”

⁴ Bille’s dispatch 1/7, No. 52.

an account of the audience. In her diary the Queen merely noted that she had seen him: he was "presented as a German Prince. He is very like the old Royal Family, and like the King of Hanover. He is the grandson of the unfortunate Queen Matilda."

The Duke's suggestion that Garlieb should go to London and that Bunsen should be the mediator was developed in more detail in his undated memorandum, presumably drawn up about the 1st of July in collaboration with Bunsen.¹ Or could he already have handed it to the Queen during his audience on the 30th of June? The memorandum said, hardly in accordance with the truth, that Garlieb is said to have stated that he had to be back in Copenhagen at the beginning of July. The Duke had then immediately suggested that, as he himself could not be back in Frankfurt for a week or ten days, Garlieb should travel home via London. If this did not suit him, the Duke suggested that Bille, whom he had known for many years, be authorized to "arrange the business." The Duke ended his memorandum with the hope that Her Majesty's Government, together with that of Prussia, would undertake to see to it that Bille was authorized to "negotiate and conclude the business in question with the Duke here in London."

Early in July, Bille had a talk with Malmesbury (Brunnow was also present) about the conduct of the Duke and he stated – highly irritated it seems – that the Danish Government would not meet the wishes of the Duke and Bunsen to have the negotiations on the indemnity transferred to London.² Malmesbury was placed in an unpleasant position, exposed as he was to sharp reproaches from the Court for agreeing to "a change in the succession which no one has the right to make" and to attacks from the press for his conduct as Foreign Secretary. However, he assured Bille that he would have nothing to do with the financial arrangement with the Duke, but, Bille wrote, on the other hand, he obviously lets the Queen and Prince Albert do what they will as far as their personal relations with the Duke are concerned.

On the 6th Bunsen informed Bille that if Garlieb did not come

¹ See p. 279 note 2.

² Bille's dispatches 3/7, No. 54, and 6/7, No. 55.

to London, the Duke would return immediately to Frankfurt. But if Garlieb came, would Bille agree to meet the Duke? Bille replied: No! He would have nothing to do with him unless he received express orders to do so, "which, God help me, I hope will never be the case."

The same day Berlin enquired at Frankfurt whether Garlieb was still waiting or whether he had gone home to Copenhagen – direct or via London. Garlieb's statement that he had thought of leaving for Copenhagen the same day had, however, aroused the Duchess's consternation. He was urged to postpone his journey and the Duke would be requested to return home.

Garlieb agreed to await the Duke's return until and including the 14th. On the 14th he was informed that the Duchess had received a letter the previous evening stating that the Duke would return at once, if Garlieb was still there.

On the 4th of July, Manteuffel had informed Bunsen that he had seen from Bunsen's report (of the 30th) that the Duke had gone to Britain in the belief that, during Bismarck's absence from Frankfurt, profitable negotiations could not be carried on with Garlieb, the Danish Commissioner, who had just arrived there. Manteuffel wrote that, although the Duke was presumably expected back any day, as the Duchess had informed him of Garlieb's arrival, Bunsen was to tell him, if he were still in London, that negotiations had reached the stage where Bismarck's confidential mediation was no longer appropriate. In other words: the Duke had to negotiate only with Garlieb.

Three days later Manteuffel sent Bunsen a communication by telegraph stating that Garlieb would remain in Frankfurt until the 14th, but was not authorized to go to London. He also said that Bismarck would be back in Frankfurt on the 9th. Bunsen was directed to induce the Duke to return.

Bunsen informed the Duke of the telegraphic dispatch. The Duke left London on the evening of the 8th, which he presumably had decided to do before receiving this information from Bunsen.¹ Two days later he reached Homburg and on the 11th he paid a call on Garlieb, telling him that he could not negotiate with him until he had consulted Bismarck. When

¹ Bunsen's dispatches 8/7 and 9/7. – Garlieb's letter 9/7; cf. letter 15/7 (see p. 278 note 2). – Bille's dispatch 9/7. No. 56.

Garlieb stated that Prussia's mediation was at an end, the Duke said that he would then request another power [Britain] to mediate. Then my mission is over, replied Garlieb. The result was that Bismarck was present at the following, extremely difficult, negotiations in a private capacity, but was presumably regarded by the Duke as an official mediator.

Nevertheless, the Duke did not abandon his idea of letting Britain interfere. On the 16th of July he submitted to Sir Alexander Malet, the British Envoy to the Federal Diet, a lengthy memorandum, full of insinuations against the Danish Government, and asked him to send it to Malmesbury.¹ In this memorandum he requested Her Majesty's Government to use its influence to persuade Denmark "pour effectuer que M. Garlieb recoive des instructions qui lui permettent de conclure des affaires du Duc d'Augustenbourg sous l'Intermédiaire du Roi de Prusse, dans le cas que le Duc trouve ceci nécessaire."

Bille heard from the Danish Envoy in Frankfurt that the Duke still had hopes of support from Britain, and he mentioned it to Malmesbury.² Malmesbury, however, assured him that he had told the Duke and Bunsen that the British Government would have nothing to do with the matter. The Duke might possibly approach Prussia, who had acted as mediator, but not Britain.

This was to all intents and purposes the answer which Malmesbury sent the Duke on the 22nd in reply to his two memoranda.³ There was nothing in the memoranda, he wrote, which appeared to indicate that the Danish Government would not act in accordance with the engagements which the King had entered into. If, however, the Duke received the opposite impression, Berlin was the correct place to which to transfer the negotiations. Whether the Prussian mediation was to continue after the Duke had accepted the offer, was for the Governments of Prussia and Denmark to decide. However, Malmesbury was willing to inform both Governments "that such a course would be expedient if any real necessity for friendly interference should actually arise."

¹ Correspondence, p. 192 ff.

² Bille's dispatch 21/7.

³ Correspondence, p. 194. – Bille's dispatch 23/7, No. 61.

Malmesbury's reply and, no doubt, also Sir Alexander Malet's talks with the Duke made him more willing to negotiate with Garlieb.¹ Malet commended Garlieb's "calmness and discretion" and said that some of the Duke's "notes" were "of a rather petulant character." At the end of the month Garlieb was able to return home via Berlin with the Duke's proposals for modifications, proposals which neither he nor Bülow believed would "prove serious obstacles to the desired final settlement."

On the 10th of August, in a long letter containing some unfriendly remarks about Denmark, the Duke gave Malmesbury an account of his additional claims, and expressed how much it would be appreciated if Malmesbury persuaded the Danish Government to accept these claims.² The British Government does not seem to have reacted. In a conversation he had at the end of November with Bille, Lord Derby, however, expressed a wish to see the Augustenburg matter brought to a conclusion as soon as possible.³ Bille replied, of course, that it was the Duke's fault that the matter was still not terminated.

Lord Derby's Ministry did not see the Augustenburg matter brought to a conclusion. On the 17th of December a vote in the House of Commons went against the Government and Lord Aberdeen was asked to form a new administration. On the 24th Mellish drew up an account of the "State of Affairs as regards" the countries with which his department dealt, among them Denmark.⁴ One would have believed, he wrote, that the Treaty concluded in May concerning the succession would have ended "this long agitated question. Nevertheless attempts have been made by the Duke of Augustenburg to reopen the matter in some degree, by urging Her M's Government to take part in the examination of his claims to a more effective compensation for the loss of his estates than that which, under the mediation of Prussia, had been offered to him, and by him accepted. Her M's Government have, however, uniformly declined to reopen any conference on the subject, and have referred His Highness to the Government of Prussia, under the mediation of which

¹ Correspondence, p. 194 ff.

² Correspondence, p. 197 f.

³ Bille's dispatch 26/11, No. 87.

⁴ Aberdeen Papers. Vol. CCX. Brit. Mus. Add. Ms. 43248.

the amount as well as the mode of indemnity was offered and accepted."

Wynn was not able to inform the new Cabinet until the 23rd of December that "the point at issue with the Duke" would now be arranged in a satisfactory manner.¹ The Duke's objections to the obligations on the amount of the indemnity were met by allowing his request for the release of the obligations of the entailed estates to go through the King of Prussia.

The Duke's act of renunciation was executed in Frankfurt on the 30th of December.² Article 1 enumerated his estates on Als and at Sundeved, which were given up to the King of Denmark. Article 2 contained the promise that he and his family would take up residence outside the Kingdom of Denmark and would not acquire real property in the Kingdom. Article 3, the most important, read: "Nous faisons vœu et promettons encore, sur notre parole et notre honneur de Duc, pour nous et notre famille, de ne rien entreprendre qui puisse troubler ou mettre en péril la tranquillité dans le Royaume de votre Majesté, et aussi de ne nous opposer en aucune manière aux mesures prise ou à prendre par votre Majesté Royale relativement à l'ordre de Succession pour tous les pays actuellement réunis sous son sceptre, ou à l'organisation éventuelle de la Monarchie Danoise." The following Articles dealt with the amount of the indemnity and other financial engagements which the King undertook in return.

It was not very long before the Duke's words and princely honour mentioned in Article 3 proved to be of no value whatever.³

Article IV of the Treaty of London read: "Les Hautes Parties se réservent de porter le present Traité à la connaissance des autres Puissances, en les invitant à y accéder." The execution of the Article gave rise to so many negotiations during the following months that Brunnow repeatedly expressed his regrets that the Article had ever been included in the Treaty!⁴

¹ Correspondence, p. 240. — Statsrådets Forhandl. IV, p. 500 ff.

² Correspondence, p. 241 ff.

³ See, for instance, Axel Heils's article on Christian August in "Dansk Biografisk Leksikon". V (1934), p. 168 ff.

⁴ Bille's dispatches 6/10, No. 68, and 10/12, No. 97.

At the meeting on the 19th of June the discussion on Article IV ended by Denmark's being given the task of taking the initiative in having it executed and in deciding which states should be invited to accede.¹ Of course, the embarrassing question as to whether the German Diet was to be one of these states was also touched on.²

For some time no action was taken, apart from internal Danish negotiations, especially on the last-mentioned question. Later in the year, when Brunnow angrily complained that the matter was dragging on so long, Bille admitted that after the conference on the 19th it had "perhaps been suspended a few weeks longer than was desirable."³ Incidentally, Bille himself had urged the execution of Article IV a few times during the latter half of July.⁴

The Danish Government's instructions to Bille were discussed at the meetings of the Council of State on the 11th and 13th of August.⁵ Bluhme informed Bille of the result on the 19th.⁶ The Council of State accepted the decision taken two months previously by the conference by which Denmark was to take the initiative. They put forward a draft for the invitation and suggested that this was sent out as far as possible at the same time by all the contracting powers. The King resolved that, if Switzerland were invited, the German Confederation would also have to be invited, but the form of the invitation might possibly exclude the idea of asking for the sanction of the Confederation. Bluhme asked Bille – surely unnecessarily – to ask Brunnow for his advice, but left much, for that matter, to Bille's own discretion.

After he received his instructions, Bille had two conferences with Malmesbury and negotiations with Brunnow and officials from the Foreign Office as to his line of procedure.⁷ He wrote that several of these officials asserted that the British Government

¹ Correspondence, p. 190. – Bille's dispatch 22/6, No. 46. – Bunsen's dispatch 19/6.

² Concerning Austria's and Prussia's attitude to the question during the following months see also Rantzau, p. 417 ff.

³ Bille to Bluhme 5/10. Arvefølgesagen 2.

⁴ Bille's dispatches 23/7, No. 60, and 30/7, No. 63.

⁵ Statsrådets Forhandl. IV, p. 260 ff. and 269 f.

⁶ Akter vedr. successionssagen.

⁷ Bille's dispatch 27/8, No. 65.

would never agree to take part in any step which implied the Diet's sanction of, or accession to, the Treaty. Anything beyond a simple notification was too much and might easily produce dangerous consequences.

The day after this dispatch Bille wrote to George Quaade that the draft which had been sent him for the invitations to accede had been found to be excellent.¹ He again urged speedy action and as the Government found best: "By delaying matters and asking and waiting for a new conference [we] will meet insurmountable difficulties."

On the 9th of September Bluhme sent Bille a list of the sovereigns (Kings, Grand Dukes and the Elector of Hesse) who were to be invited to accede.² He stressed how important it was that the invitation from Denmark should be followed immediately, or as soon as possible, by analogous invitations from the other contracting powers. Bille was to make representations to the British Government on the matter. Bluhme mentioned, moreover, that although the German Confederation was not on the enclosed list, the King would not refuse to send an invitation, if the two German Powers wanted one sent to the Confederation. Bülow was to negotiate with Austria's and Prussia's representatives at Frankfurt, and Britain would do Denmark the greatest service if she associated herself with any agreement between Denmark and Prussia-Austria to secure the accession of the Diet.

On the 20th, Bille informed Malmesbury of the contents of Bluhme's letter. On the 5th of October Malmesbury replied that, on his return to London, he would confer with Bille and his colleagues on the matter.³

Bille sought Brunnow's advice.⁴ It was given in a very irritated mood. "The more there is written and conferred on the matter, the further we get from the goal: its conclusion in a suitable manner." Article IV was absolutely unnecessary to safeguard Denmark; the Treaty was valid without it. The Article was only intended as a friendly gesture towards the powers who had not signed. If only Denmark would state the date she intended

¹ 28/8 to George Quaade. Arvefølgesagen 2.

² Correspondence, p. 204 f.

³ Correspondence, p. 206 f.

⁴ Bille's dispatch 6/10, No. 68. — Bille to Bluhme 5/10. Arvefølgesagen 2.

to send invitations to the Governments on her list, Russia, France, Britain and Sweden would immediately send off almost identical invitations. The question of the German Confederation could easily be left in abeyance until an agreement had been reached with Austria and Prussia as to the correct line of procedure. The urgent matter was to begin execution of Article IV by sending invitations to the Kings and Grand Dukes, otherwise rumours and lies of all sorts might be spread in the interests of Slesvig-Holsteinism and the Duke of Augustenborg. Brunnow ended by saying that this was the last piece of advice he would give on the matter.

After he had received new information from Copenhagen, Bille sent Malmesbury a note on the 15th October stating that Denmark would no longer insist on acts of accession to each of the signatory powers, and that one act was enough.¹ No mention was made of Britain's support in connection with the Diet, and the note stated that, for the time being, the Danish Government would not go beyond trying to come to an understanding with Prussia and Austria about a line of procedure which would exclude the possibility of a refusal from the Diet and, nevertheless, show due consideration for it [!]. Finally, the note stated that St. Petersburg and Stockholm had already directed their respective missions to support the invitation which the Danish Government was about to send off. Bille asked Malmesbury to give the British missions concerned similar instructions as soon as possible.

Malmesbury replied after he had conferred with Brunnow.² Naturally, the proposal for the form of accession was sanctioned, and Malmesbury promised to send instructions to the British missions "to support the invitation of the Danish Government when such shall have been made." With regard to the Diet, the British Government found that a simple notification of the Treaty would be sufficient. Malmesbury considered it necessary at the same time to repeat to Bille what he had already told him

¹ Correspondence, p. 210. – Bille to Bluhme 11/10. Arvefølgesagen. 2. – Bille's dispatch 15/10, No. 69. – Bluhme's dispatches 5/10, Nos. 29 and 30. Akter vedr. successionsagen. – Bunsen's dispatch 20/10.

² Correspondence, p. 210 f. – Bille's dispatches 20/10, No. 71, and 22/10, No. 72. – Bille to Bluhme 18/10 and 19/10. Arvefølgesagen. 2. – Bunsen's dispatch 27/10.

during a talk: that the British Government "under no circumstances would . . . consent to reopen Conferences on any point connected with the Treaty in question." Bloomfield in Berlin and Malet at Frankfurt were also informed of this concluding paragraph.¹ On the 22nd circulars were sent to the British representatives at "the Royal and Grand-Ducal Courts of Europe" requesting them to support the invitation of the Danish Government.²

On the 1st of November, Wynn was able to report that Bluhme was highly gratified with Malmesbury's note to Bille and "especially with the concluding paragraph," which stated that the British Government would under no circumstances "reopen the Conferences."³ Not until the 26th of November did Bille send Malmesbury a copy of Bluhme's dispatch of the 11th, informing him that circulars had been sent off that day to the respective Danish missions concerning the invitations.⁴ Malmesbury said that he was very pleased to hear the news.⁵

Bluhme's dispatch of the 11th requested Bille to express Denmark's great appreciation of the British Government's "co-operation loyale dans toute cette affaire." At the same time, however, Bluhme again aired the idea whether it would not still be possible for Britain to give Denmark some support if the Danish Government, in agreement with the two German Great Powers, sent an invitation to Frankfurt to accede to the Treaty.

As early as the 4th of November, Bluhme had directed Bille to ask Malmesbury whether Britain, in spite of her former refusal, was disposed to agree to a suggestion put forward by Austria. This proposal was to the effect that, if an invitation was sent to the Confederation, it might be supported by the signatory powers.⁶ However, after a conversation with Malmesbury, Bille had to disappoint Bluhme by telling him that Malmesbury had promised to consider the matter, but was not disposed to take part.⁷ Such a step would be at variance with the principles behind the attitude

¹ Correspondence, p. 211.

² *Ibid.*, p. 212. — Bille's dispatch 29/10, No. 74.

³ Correspondence, p. 216.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 220 f.

⁵ Bille's dispatch 2/12, No. 89.

⁶ Bluhme's dispatch 4/12, No. 39. Akter vedr. successionssagen.

⁷ Bille's dispatches 10/12, No. 97, and 16/12, No. 98.

which Britain had so far taken up towards the Confederation. Bille wrote that all the Foreign Office officials were also opposed to the idea.

As mentioned above, a vote in the House of Commons on the 17th of December brought about the fall of Derby's Ministry. Lord Aberdeen was given the task of forming the new Government, which took office on the 28th.¹ It was a coalition Government consisting of Peelites and Whigs. John Russell became a member as Leader of the House of Commons and held the Foreign Office for a short time. Lord Clarendon took over this post shortly afterwards, in February 1853, and Lord Wodehouse became Under-Secretary in place of Layard.² Palmerston, too, became a member of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry of All the Talents with the post of Home Secretary.

In his above-mentioned account of the 24th of December on the Danish question, Mellish stated with regard to the Danish invitation to accede to the Treaty that the British representatives "at the various Courts have been instructed to support this request." However, several German states had raised difficulties as they were of the opinion that the German Confederation, "as a body politic," should be invited to accede. The question was, of course, Mellish wrote, "considered at the time, and was decided in the negative. The Confederation as a body has only in one instance been called upon to take a part in European Settlements, and this was in the case of the Belgian Treaty, which involved an exchange of Territory which required its consent. Great objections were felt both by Russia and France against admitting the Diet to a position which it had hitherto not been called upon to fill . . ." This opinion was shared by the British Government, who had informed Denmark, Prussia and other German states that they considered it sufficient to notify the Treaty to the Diet after the various states had been requested to accede.

At the beginning of January, Nesselrode wrote to Brunnow, referred to discussions which had taken place in Vienna and Copenhagen, and asked Brunnow to ask the new British Foreign Secretary the following question. Would he, like his predecessor,

¹ Walpole: *op. cit.* II, p. 160 ff. — The Letters of Queen Victoria. II. p. 499 ff.

² Bille's dispatch 29/12, No. 106.

refuse to participate in approaching the Diet, even if it only concerned a simple notification of the Treaty?¹ Russia, at any rate, would not take part in more, and only this much, if Britain agreed to do so. On the 18th Russell replied that he adhered to Malmesbury's decision "and do not propose to take any part in communicating the Treaty to the Diet at Frankfort."²

A few days before Russell's reply, Bluhme had written to Bille telling him that the Government had given up the idea, at any rate for the time being, of approaching Frankfurt, as several German states (one of them being Bavaria) had refused to accede, and referred to the discussion about the Treaty in the Diet.³ Bluhme expected that the signatory powers would approve of this. He would, in addition, leave the question of notifying Frankfurt out of account, as all the sovereign German states had already had the Treaty communicated to them.

On the 26th of January, Bille informed Bluhme that Russell completely agreed with the remarks in Bluhme's dispatch. Russell was also of the opinion that the accession of the Diet was of secondary interest for Denmark, since the most important powers in Europe, both German and non-German, had acceded to the Treaty.⁴ He was also afraid of creating a dangerous precedent if Britain took part in approaching the Diet. Bille wrote that Brunnow and the French Minister shared Bluhme's views.

I shall mention only briefly the action taken by the Prince of Noer in protest against the Treaty, after his arrival in England. He began by asking the British Government for information about the Treaty – if it existed!⁵ He was told that he could buy it for a penny at Moore's Library. In April the Government was asked in the House of Commons whether the Prince had protested against the Treaty.⁶ At the beginning of June, Lord Beaumont asked a question on the same matter in the House of Lords,⁷ and was answered both by Lord Clarendon, the new Foreign

¹ Correspondence, p. 246 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 250. – Bille's dispatch 4/2, No. 11.

³ Bluhme's dispatch 16/1, No. 4.

⁴ For a list of these states see Correspondence, Accessions etc., p. 1.

⁵ Bille's dispatches 28/3, No. 30; 31/3, No. 31, and 9/4, No. 36.

⁶ Bille's dispatches 19/4, No. 39, and 30/4, No. 43. – Parliamentary records.

⁷ Bille's dispatches 16/5, No. 50; 27/5, No. 54; 4/6, No. 57, and 11/6, No. 61. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3. ser. Vol. CXXVII. 10/5-10/6 1853, p. 1079 ff.

Secretary, and by Lord Malmesbury. Malmesbury mentioned the acts of high treason committed by the Duke of Augustenborg and the Prince of Noer, and expressed his surprise (he was thinking of the Prince of Noer) "that the persons who had placed their descendants in such a position should come and find fault with the English Government, when, in fact, that Government had used its good offices to save them from a punishment, which they might or might not have deserved, but which they certainly would have undergone." He was still convinced, as he had been when the Treaty was signed, that it had done nobody an injustice.

To the great regret of the Danish Government, both Browne and Wynn were recalled from their posts, the former at the end of 1852, the latter at the beginning of 1853. Both diplomats were very sorry to leave Copenhagen.¹ However, Wynn was allowed to remain until the autumn of 1853. Bille regarded their recall as a manifestation of the Court's disapproval of the British diplomats who had been opposed to the movement towards German unity and been well disposed towards Denmark. Russell told him that the Government was putting into practice the principle of not letting diplomats "take root" in the country to which they had been sent. It must be admitted that both Wynn and Browne had been many years in Denmark, and Wynn was, in addition, 71 years of age.

On the 20th of June, Bille, who was only 54 years old, died in London. His last reports dealt with the Russo-Turkish crisis which resulted in the Crimean War, when the Western Powers fought against Russia and broke her political dominance, which had provoked Palmerston's statement that Britain was one of the pariahs whose opinion did not need to be asked.

17. Perspectives

In a dispatch to Bille, Bluhme described the perspectives which he thought seemed to emerge after the Treaty of London had been signed.² He congratulated Bille on "the accomplishment

¹ See Bille's dispatches 26/1, No. 9; 31/1, No. 10; 8/2, No. 13; 12/2, No. 16; 19/2, No. 19; 24/2, No. 23.

² 17/5, No. 14. Akter vedr. successionssagen.

of a work which is the best safeguard against a repetition of the unfortunate events of the past few years and which, just as it now forms a significant chapter in the history of our country, seems designed to decide her future for a very long time."

For the Danish politicians who were supporters of the United Monarchy, the London Convention was, above all else, a guarantee of the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. It was a direct continuance of the London Protocol of the 2nd of August 1850, although it made no mention of this in order to avoid offending Prussia. But, as we have seen, none of the Powers undertook any formal guarantee. Layard, who was the Under-Secretary of State when the Treaty was signed, was correct in stating in Parliament in 1864: "The treaty was not a treaty of guarantee."¹

On the same occasion Layard asserted that both Austria and Prussia signed the London Protocol of the 4th of July 1850 (this was changed to the Protocol of the 2nd of August), that was to say, they declared themselves in favour of the integrity of the Monarchy before the Danish Government had given her promises in January 1852 prior to the handing back of Holstein. As we have seen, only Austria, however, acceded to the Protocol and Schwarzenberg later declared that his accession to the arrangement for the Danish succession depended on the coming organisation of the Danish Monarchy. In Manteuffel's letter of the 30th of September 1851, Prussia expressed in principle her interest in the integrity of the Monarchy, but with a somewhat similar reservation. Both states took Russia's dominance into account before adopting this attitude. In consideration of the view generally accepted by statesmen that treaties are only concluded "*rebus sic stantibus*," what was to prevent Prussia, if things developed favourably, to follow her inherent desire to expand and satisfy "this very natural and deep-seated ambition," as Prince Albert's biographer calls it.²

Although Frederik VII was the fully lawful heir to his father, Christian VIII, this had not prevented the Slesvig-Holstein Revolution of March 1848 or hindered nationalistic Germany in supporting the Rebels and attempting to separate Slesvig from

¹ The Times 8/7 1864.

² Martin. II, p. 312.

the Danish Crown. Time was to show that Denmark was to be well served by that line of the House of Oldenburg which the Treaty laid down should succeed Frederik VII. But Prince Christian did not possess direct rights of succession, either in the Kingdom and Slesvig or in Holstein. He was to inherit the Throne by an arrangement which was brought about by acts of renunciation and European sanction. The German Confederation took no part in this, which Brunnow, it is true, considered to be of secondary importance for Denmark. This was correct as long as the two German Great Powers did not find it necessary, or in their own interest, to yield to, or follow, the German Nationalist policy of aggrandizement. This continued to exist as a latent menace to Denmark. The Danish policy of re-danization in Slesvig did not pour oil on troubled waters.

The Duke of Augustenborg, who had associated himself with the Insurrectionist programme: a "Slesvig-Holstein" state, accepted the generous offer of indemnity from the Danish Government and promised on behalf of his family and himself not to put obstacles in the way of the arrangement for the succession. After the Duke of Augustenborg had renounced his rights, Bille was asked by Lord Aberdeen, whose son was a friend of the son of the Prince of Noer, if this meant a reconciliation with the Duke.¹ Bille could only reply that this was not so. The Revolution in 1848 would always be associated with the name of Augustenborg! It is regrettable that the name was also to be connected with the crisis of 1863-64, which resulted in the dismemberment of the Danish Monarchy. The Duke's son, who called himself "Duke Friedrich VIII," the pretender to the state of "Slesvig-Holstein," paved the way for the incorporation of the Duchies in Prussia.

It was natural that the men who were responsible for the re-establishment of the United Monarchy and by whose efforts the Treaty of London was signed by all the Great Powers were proud of their work and regarded the future with a certain degree of optimism. But what national and political contrasts the United Monarchy had to keep together and what deep rifts the years of Revolution had made in the loyalty to the Throne and

¹ Bille's dispatch 14/1/53, No. 4.

feelings of unity! The clergymen and officers in the Duchies, who had normally been considered loyal to their Sovereign and country, had, with few exceptions, broken their oath of allegiance.

The Danish Government had failed to attain the end they had fought for in the Three Years' War: a closer connection between the Kingdom and Slesvig. However, some objects had been achieved: Slesvig-Holsteinism had been defeated politically, its administrative aspect substantially reduced and Slesvig was now being administered by a neutral or pro-Danish administration. But was this an advantage seen from the point of view of "the maintenance of the United Monarchy?"

Those men of Holstein origin who, during the troubled years of the Revolution, remained loyal subjects of the King and supporters of the Danish-German Monarchy deserve honorable mention. Among them were Carl Moltke, Friedrich von Pechlin, the Ministers in Berlin and St. Petersburg, Wulff Plessen and Otto von Plessen, and Reventlow-Criminil. But numerically they were few. According to Hodges's somewhat exaggerated view, which he tried to impress on Frederik VII when he was received in audience by him, nearly all the wealthy and intelligent people in the Duchies were "Slesvig-Holsteiners." If Denmark was to be "reconciled" with these, as Palmerston had repeatedly advised, not only should pre-1848 conditions presumably have been re-introduced, but furthermore Denmark would have had to extend the hand of friendship to the separatist "Slesvig-Holsteinism." The victory of Isted, where, as the Danish poet Grundtvig wrote, the Danes fought "for Denmark and the Danish tongue," would be better forgotten.

The Danish National Party were extremely disinclined to do this. In Slesvig, too, the administration continued to encourage everything Danish, which they had begun in 1850-51 with the introduction of the language decree in Central Slesvig, an unfortunate step seen from the political point of view. It aroused both strong opposition among the population and helped to form the basis of the nationalist propaganda in Germany, even if it was often false, about "the deserted kinsmen." If South Jutland was again to become what it had been when

the Eider was fixed as the frontier of Denmark, the great majority of the population would have to turn their thoughts northwards.

They would have to follow the example of the population in the Kingdom who, to an increasing extent, turned their eyes towards the Scandinavian peninsula. This was to be expected seen from a racial point of view, but also on account of the long-standing political connection with Norway, and Eastern Denmark's incorporation in Sweden. Denmark was unwilling to save the United Monarchy – and for how long? – by taking Persigny's advice and becoming Germany's (Prussia's) "Admiral state" or by "uniting" with the German Confederation, as Prokesch von Osten would have liked.¹

Tegoborski, the Russian chargé d'affaires, asserted in conversation with Tillisch that, if the United Monarchy were to survive, it would be necessary to meet Holstein's wishes for a connection with Slesvig, for otherwise Holstein would continually seek support from Germany.² One forgets, he wrote, or refuses to see, that "the German element has advanced very far not only in Slesvig, but even in the Kingdom itself. Customs, manners, Danish literature, everything is borrowed from German culture. A knowledge of German is usual here among all classes of society." Danish culture is far behind German culture. – It was difficult for a Dane to accept this statement about the period when Hans Christian Andersen, Grundtvig and Søren Kierkegaard were alive.

When Tegoborski stated that Holstein would be thrown into Germany's arms if she was not allowed to keep Slesvig, Tillisch retorted that Russia would never allow that! But was this an unchangeable feature of the future? When Frederik VII had proposed a toast to the Tsar he had said, and rightly so, that it was Russia's powerful support which had saved Denmark from all her enemies. There were possibly many reasons for this: the Tsar's abhorrence of the overt Revolution, the fact that the royal houses were related, interests of power politics. In one of his dispatches Ungern Sternberg pointed out³ that it seemed

¹ Osten, p. 315.

² Tegoborski's report 10/9/51, No. 148.

³ 3/12/51, No. 205.

important to him during those times of unrest in Europe not to alienate a country which, in spite of its small size, deserved notice, inhabited as it was by a brave and energetic people. Brunnow, too, had expressed his great admiration of the achievements of the Danes during the Three Years' War. He had also made some remarks – perhaps rather sarcastic ones – about the Danish aptitude for negotiating. Just over a decade later Denmark's physical and intellectual strength was to be put to a test which was beyond its powers.

APPENDICES I-IV

I

R. C. Mellish

(The present little monograph first appeared as a feature article in the Copenhagen evening paper 'Berlingske Aftenavis' for February 7th, 1966. It is translated by Lektor Peter Hassing).

In his well-known book 'Queen Victoria', Lytton Strachey refers to a statement made by Palmerston on the Slesvig-Holstein question, a statement, which has attracted considerable notice and been repeatedly quoted in later times. Lytton Strachey himself calls this question the most complicated in the entire diplomatic history of Europe. About this intricate problem Palmerston is said to have observed that only three persons had really understood it at any time, Albert, the Prince Consort, a German professor, who was in a lunatic asylum, and himself, who had, however, totally forgotten all about it.

As the source of this statement Strachey cites C. Grant Robertson's book from 1918 on Bismarck. Robertson has the statement right, but he fails to give any indication of where he may have found it himself.

In Palmerston's statement only one anonymous person appears: the German professor, whose strenuous exertions to master the Slesvig-Holstein problem – or maybe other causes – had landed him in the madhouse.

The realistic English statesmen and diplomatists certainly did not set much store by the theorizing German professors who acted as politicians in St. Paul's Church at Frankfurt in 1848. Still, in his statement Palmerston can hardly have been thinking of the abstract concept of 'a German professor'; he must have had a definite person in mind.

The name that suggests itself is that of *Bunsen*, Prussia's ambassador in London at the time of the Three Years' War. In interminable memoranda to Palmerston this diplomatist elaborated his entangled Slesvig-Holstein theories, on which he also published a pamphlet. In 1848 he regarded the coming Germany as the power that was going to dominate Europe. Germany was to push her frontiers forwards against France and Denmark. If Frederick VII or King Oscar would not come to heel – away with them. From the Danish point of view Bunsen was no doubt considered well qualified for bedlam; the subject, however, was never broached. He was not a professor either, and he died in 1860.

A different, and no doubt more correct, version of Palmerston's statement is, however, in existence. In Algernon Cecil's book 'Queen Victoria and Her Prime Ministers' (1953) where Palmerston's statement is also quoted, the anonymous German professor has been exchanged for a clerk in the Foreign Office.

We even learn his name: Mellish.

Richard Charles Mellish

was born in 1801 at Weimar. His father was an Englishman, but his mother a German, a Baroness of the Empire, von Stein.

No, she was not related to Goethe's Charlotte v. Stein, nor does the latter appear among the godparents at his christening. There, however, we find Geheimrat Wolfgang v. Goethe, and besides his two English Christian names the boy was given three German ones, Emil, Gottlob, Wolfgang. The officiating clergyman was J. G. Herder, who, it may be remembered, had become Superintendent General of Weimar at the suggestion of Goethe.

R. C. Mellish received a partly German education, but in 1820 he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where five years later he became a B.A. As early as 1824 he was appointed 'Assistant Junior Clerk' in the Foreign Office, where by and by he rose in the grades, from a fourth degree clerk to the third degree, then to the second, until at length in 1841 he became a first degree clerk. On January 1st, 1855 he left the service, having had to tender his resignation on account of the state of his health. When ten years later he died, it was given out that

for thirteen years he had suffered from 'paraplegia'. Whether this corporeal malady may have brought about any serious mental derangement, I have unfortunately been unable to elucidate.

From 1834 to 1849 he had besides some kind of government post at the court of King Vilhelm IV's queen, Adelaide (Adelheid von Sachsen Meiningen), a widow from 1837. The title of clerk does not, perhaps do full justice to Mellish's position. In a letter he describes the order of precedence in the Foreign Office as follows:

The Secretary of State (Palmerston), the Under Secretaries, and the 'humble clerks'.

Nevertheless his position must have been of no small importance. This, for one thing, is evident from his private or semi-official correspondence with the English envoy Lord Cowley at the central government at Frankfurt 1848-50. In a letter from Sept. 1848 to the latter he writes:

"I have to provide 15 missions (embassies) with information. I have reached a total of 3000 outgoing despatches this year, and we are working to the limit of our strength." He knew that modern malady, common among busily engaged people: stress.

Among the English diplomatists at that time attached to the German courts, Lord Cowley seems to have been the only one with a pro-German, or, more correctly, pro-Prussian outlook. Bunsen is loud in his praise, calling him a genuine Wellesley, evidently alluding to the fateful co-operation between the Duke of Wellington - a Wellesley by birth - and Blücher at Waterloo. Lord Cowley was a nephew of the Duke. Thanks to his attitude, he was in Prince Albert's good graces. The German friends of the latter, namely his secretary Dr. Meyer and the time-honoured adviser of the Coburg princely houses, Baron Stockmar, corresponded with Cowley. Prince Albert pursued his own private pro-German policy concurrently with Palmerston's officially English one. In spite of German friends and relations, his studies at Göttingen and a solid knowledge of Holstein affairs, Mellish's standpoint was indisputably pro-Danish. "In the Foreign Office from the top to the bottom we are all convinced of the injustice of Prussia's attack on Denmark," he writes in one of his letters. In another one he complains of

Stockmar and Meyer sneaking like vermin about 'our Court' to counteract Palmerston's policy.

When in 1848 Orla Lehmann carried on a controversy against Bunsen, his character sketch of the latter was certainly not flattering; Mellish, however, bids fair to surpass Lehmann; he calls Bunsen a Jesuitical scoundrel, and his circumstantial memoranda are described as vulgar, insulting, and mendacious.

When in the autumn of 1850 the power struggle between Prussia and Austria was enacted, Mellish's attitude to Austria was certainly one of criticism; but Prussia was to him the 'villain'. In July 1850, after the peace between Prussia and Denmark, Mellish was staying at the Kissingen spa. Here there were gathered a large number of more influential men than Palmerston's clerk: the Russian Chancellor Nesselrode, General Wrangel, the Prussian diplomatist Usedom, who had been the adversary of the Danish negotiators at the conclusion of the Berlin peace, besides numerous others. In a letter from Kissingen, Mellish writes that he had offended all his family by wishing that his relative on his mother's side, the Freecorps leader von der Tann, who fought for Slesvig-Holstein, would meet his fate. After the Danish victory at Isted, Mellish remarked that he hoped this would cool down the Slesvig-Holsteiners a bit. I shall mention yet a couple of things, which will illustrate how differently Lord Cowley and Mellish approached the Slesvig-Holstein problem.

In a despatch Cowley had declared that at Frankfurt the English diplomatists in Berlin and Copenhagen were regarded as far too pro-Danish, to which Mellish remarked that it was not Cowley's business to circulate German charges against his colleagues; for any such purpose Germany might employ her own diplomatists.

When Cowley exceeded his powers by infusing a pro-German spirit into a compromise proposal made by Palmerston, and by introducing contents of farther reaching import than intended by Palmerston, Mellish took him to task again, this time backed up by Palmerston himself. On the other hand Cowley was applauded by Mellish for his courage in asserting in a despatch that it would be a good thing if all the German petty princes were to disappear. The crux of the matter was, Mellish remarks, that the despatch was to be submitted to the Queen – and to

Prince Albert, who was descended from a petty German princely house himself!

It may not be a very patriotic action to exchange the anonymous German professor for the English pro-Danish clerk. It is, however, important to get at the truth. In Palmerston's statement, by the way, there is nothing to indicate that the supposed German professor lost his reason because of the intricacies of the Schleswig-Holstein problem.

And Mellish's letters leave no shadow of doubt that all the time he thought it self-evident that the Slesvig-Holsteiners were insurgents, and that nothing could justify Prussia's war against Denmark.

II

Mellish's memorandum to Granville concerning the position of the Danish Question. 27. Dec. 1851.

(Public Record Office. 30-29. 20. Granville Papers.)

Denmark

The present position of the Danish question may be divided into two Parts: first the question of the reorganization of the Duchies, and secondly the question of the succession to the Danish Crown. —

The question of the position which the Duchy of Schleswig was for the future to occupy with reference to the Duchy of Holstein and the Danish Crown was left in 1848 to the Mediation of Great Britain. The proposal then made was that the Duchy of Schleswig should receive as regards its legislature and internal administration, a constitution separate on the one hand from that of Denmark proper, and on the other from that of the Duchy of Holstein. After much discussion this principle was accepted by the Courts of Denmark, Austria and Prussia and by the Provisional Central Power of Germany and was recorded in the first article of the preliminaries of Peace signed at Berlin on the 18th [10th!] of July 1849. This article runs as follows:

“Le Duché de Sleswig aura une Constitution séparée pour ce qui regarde sa législation et son administration intérieure,

sans être uni au Duché de Holstein, et laissant intacte l'union politique qui rattache le Duché de Sleswig à la Couronne Danoise."

By article 2 of the same Convention it was agreed that "L'organization definitive du Duché de Schleswig resultant de cette base fera l'objet de négociations ultérieures auxquelles les Hautes Parties Contractantes inviteront la Grande Bretagne à prendre part en qualité de Puissance Mediatrice."

The ulterior negotiations here mentioned were however delayed, principally by the fault of the Prussian Govt. till January following & the first proposition submitted to the British Govt. by Denmark for the future Constitution of Schleswig was at once rejected as manifesting an evident intention to convert the "Union politique" into a substantial incorporation of the Duchy with the Danish Kingdom. —

It must not be forgotten that this attempt was the very one which on the accession of the present Sovereign in January 1848 had led to the outbreak, and it could not be expected that while the Danish Govt. continued to entertain such views, that the party in insurrection backed, for ulterior purposes, by the whole of Germany, any understanding could be arrived at at Berlin as to the manner in which the first and second articles of the preliminaries should be carried into effect. On the other hand the Prussian Govt. and the German party were as little disposed to adhere to a strict interpretation of the basis above quoted, & were equally desirous to further farther the separate objects which had induced Germany to back the insurrection. These objects evidently were the annexation of as great a portion of the Duchy of Schleswig as practicable to the Duchy of Holstein, and thus to the Germanic Confederation, and the acquisition thereby of the Ports of South Schleswig for Germany.

It was evident that with these divergent views the negotiation could not lead to the object proposed, but as it was indispensably necessary, owing to the position assumed by Russia and Sweden, with reference to this question that an final end should be put to the suspended hostilities, the negotiation for the reorganization of the Duchy of Schleswig was converted into a negotiation simply for Peace between Germany and Denmark, and the relations of Schleswig to Denmark & to Holstein were left as

unsettled as ever. The Treaty was signed at Berlin on the 2^d of July 1850. By the first article Peace was reestablished. By the second all Treaties former existing between Denmark and the Confederation were renewed, the third article contained a reservation of the rights possessed by each party previous to the war. By the fourth article the King of Denmark was authorized, in conformity with the federal law, to demand that the confederation should reestablish his authority in Holstein, on his declaring his intentions as to the future pacification of the Country, and H.M. was further authorized in case his application to the Diet should not be attended to or should not lead to a satisfactory result, to extend his military measures into the Duchy of Holstein. And by the 5th Article it was agreed that a military commission should be appointed within six months to define the boundaries of the States of His Danish Majesty belonging to the Confederation, and those that did not.

On the same day a Protocol was signed by which Prussia agreed to withdraw their troops from the southern portion of Schleswig and to the Prussian territories, and the Swedish troops which pending the negotiations had occupied the northern portion of Schleswig being simultaneously withdrawn. A secret Article was moreover signed by which it was agreed that the King of Denmark should take the initiative in regulating the succession, and that Prussia should take part in the negotiation.

It was a considerable time before the Diet and the other German States ratified this Treaty, Coburg being the last. Notwithstanding however the execution of its provisions by the withdrawal of the Prussian and Swedish forces, the Holsteiners not only remained in arms and advanced into Schleswig and fought many bloody engagements with the Danes in which however they were uniformly defeated, though the Danes did not improve their successes by advancing across the Eyder as such a step might have led to further complication with the Germanic Confederation. During this whole time the Holstein insurrectionary army was reinforced by officers and soldiers volunteers from the several German Armies, and more particularly from that of Prussia, from which Army it was at one time reported that nearly five thousand men were in the Holstein ranks. Ultimately the Danish Gov^t. applied to the Diet for its assistance

in restoring the authority of the King of Denmark in Holstein, although H. Majesty owing to the circumstances of the Country, had not been able to announce his intentions as to its future pacification. The Diet agreed to this demand & commissioned Austria & Prussia to carry their decree into execution, Austrian and Prussian Commissioners were appointed, and an Austrian Army of execution was deputed to advance into Holstein. It was thought better that no Prussian troops should be employed as these were too much compromised in favour of the Holsteiners. At first the insurrectionary Gov^t. of Holstein determined to resist, but being abandoned by their Prussian officers and by the other volunteers who had joined the Holstein ranks, they ultimately submitted & the whole of Holstein including that portion of the fortress of Rendsbourg which stands to the south of the River Eyder was occupied by Austrian Troops, the Holstein troops were reduced & reorganized, a provisional Gov^t. was established for the Duchy acting in the name of the King, & Baron Blome who had not been compromised in the insurrection and who had retained the confidence and respect of all parties was placed at the head of it.

It will be necessary now to revert to another transaction connected with this question which took place about the time of the signature of the Treaty of the 2^d of July 1850.

For some time previous to the signature of this Treaty the Danish Gov^t. had called upon the several Powers interested in this question to issue a declaration of their view of the rights of Denmark & of their wish for the integrity of the Danish dominions. As long as there was any hope that the negotiations at Berlin would lead to a definition of those rights, H.M. Gov^t. had declined to be a party to such declaration, but when it was evident from the direction taken by the negotiation that no understanding would be arrived at as regards the points in dispute & that the Treaty would be a simple Treaty of Peace, the proposition of a declaration such as that desired by Denmark was entertained, and a conference took place at the Foreign Office on the 4th of July 1850, at which were present the Chargé d'Affaires of Austria, the Danish Minister, the Ambassador of France, Viscount Palmerston, the Russian Minister and the Swedish Minister. The Prussian Minister having been invited

to attend, had declined on the ground that the questions to be treated of by the Conference were exclusively of the competence of the Confederation. The causes of the absence of the Chevalier Bunsen having been explained, Viscount Palmerston submitted to the Conference a Draft of a Protocol purporting that the Sovereigns whose Representatives were to sign it, considering it necessary to maintain the integrity of the Danish Dominions as an element in the balance of Power, declared

1st their desire that that integrity should be maintained.

2nd that they consequently recognized the wisdom of the King of Denmark to regulate the succession in such manner as to render this possible.

3rd that they would continue their good offices to bring the negotiations commenced at Berlin to an early conclusion, on the basis of the preliminaries, & lastly that when this should have been done, they would concert to give an European sanction to the result of the negotiations.

On this the Austrian Chargé d'affaires declared that not being furnished with instructions, he must refer the matter to his Court, the other Ministers stated their readiness to sign, and affixed their initials to the proposed Protocol. They likewise agreed to use their joint endeavours to induce Prussia not to adhere to the determination announced by the Chev. Bunsen.

The day after this Conference the intelligence of the signature of the simple Treaty of Peace at Berlin was received. As the conclusion of this peace rendered the 3rd paragraph of the proposed Protocol superfluous, it became necessary to amend it and accordingly a second Conference was summoned for August the 2nd. The Prussian Minister again declined to attend.

The project of a mended Protocol submitted expressed the desire of the several Powers for the integrity of the Danish dominions, their approval of the intention of the King of Denmark so to regulate the succession as to render this object attainable without changing the relations of Holstein to the Confederation; their satisfaction at the conclusion of Peace & their desire to manifest at once their intention to facilitate the arrangement of the succession by reserving to themselves the right to afford an additional guarantee for this arrangement by an

act of European sanction. The Austrian Chargé d'affaires having expressed his wish to refer this Protocol to his Government, the Protocol was signed in full by the other P.P. and kept open for the Austrian signature.

After some difficulty the Austrian Chargé d'affaires was authorized to sign the Protocol with the reservation that its stipulations should not prejudice the rights of the Germanic Confederation. It may be as well here to record what rights there were supposed to be to which reference was here and in so many other occasions made.

There had been for a very great length of time a certain community of institutions between Schleswig and Holstein founded on material interests. Among these was a common Court of Appeal, a common University, common foundations belonging to the orders of Nobles and Prelates, and such like more. The Manifestation of an intention on the part of Denmark to sever these by an ultimate intention to incorporate Schleswig had long before the events of 1848 led to dissatisfaction and remonstrance and had in the year 1846 been brought before the Diet. The Diet decided that these common rights should be supported by Germany as involving the interests of German subjects natives of Holstein and a Protocol to the effect was issued by the Diet on the 17th of Sept. 1846 to which constant reference is made in the documents relative to this question.

The Prussian signature has not to this day been affixed to the Protocol of the 2nd of August 1850.

When the Danish troops after the conclusion of the Treaty of the 2nd of July 1850 took possession of the Duchy of Schleswig a proclamation was issued by the King announcing his intention to convoke the notables of Denmark Schleswig and Holstein for the purpose of consulting as to the future organization of the Duchy of Schleswig. After considerable delay occasioned partly by the continuance of the hostilities on the part of the Holsteiners, partly by the necessary arrangements for the establishment of provisional Governments in the two Duchies, the Notables at last met at Frankfort¹. For some time all went on smoothly, the first six articles of an arrangement had been discussed and agreed upon when on the consideration of the 7th one of the

¹ Error for Flensburg.

Holstein Notables speaking in his own name and in that of his colleagues declared that they could not admit of any alteration whatever of the relations as they existed previous to the year 1848. On this the Danish and Schleswig Notables declared unanimous that they were ready to give up individual opinions for the promotion of the general good, that they had given ample proof of this disposition at the several meetings but that they could and would not consent to a return to a state of things so undefined and confused as that existing previous to the year 1848. These disputes increased instead of diminishing and the embarrassments resulting therefrom led to the modification of the Danish Cabinet which still further delayed the fulfilment of the promise of the Danish Govt. to settle their plans for the pacification of the Country. On this remonstrances were in the beginning of last summer addressed to the Danish Govt. by both Austria and Prussia against this delay. They stated their wish to put the King in possession of the Duchy of Holstein, to withdraw the Austrian troops and to resign the Commission entrusted to them by the Diet, if they could receive a distinct intimation as to the mode in which the administration of the Duchies was to be carried on. The Danish Government in reply referred to the manifest issued by the King on the 14th of July 1850 on taking possession of Schleswig as containing sufficient assurances on that head, represented the difficulties they had to contend with in Denmark proper, increased as those difficulties were by the support given by the Austrian & Prussian Commissioners to the disaffected, and stated that the definitive resolution with respect to the arrangements were under the anxious deliberation of the Council, but that the details of such an arrangement did not concern the Germanic Confederation.

In the meantime the dissension among the Notables increased; three projects of constitution were drawn up by the different parties, and it became evident that their deliberations would lead to nothing.

At the time when M. Wiese one of the Holstein deputies at the meeting made the declaration above referred to it[!], Sir Henry Wynn reported that it had been made at the instigation of Prussia through an Agent of the name of Forchhammer who was the "go between" between Prussia and the disaffected Hol-

steiners and who had at that very time arrived at Flensburg from Berlin. This suspicion was to a great degree confirmed by the despatches from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin. In the month of September last circumstances occurred which confirmed this suspicion. Notes were addressed on the 9th Sep. to the Danish Gov^t. by Austria and Prussia calling upon them to convoke the old provincial States of the three portions of the Kingdom as the condition under which they could alone consent to deliver the Duchy of Holstein to the King. This proposal amounted in fact to a complete revision of the Constitution of Denmark as reformed in January 1848, before the outbreak of the French revolution.

The Notes were couched in most peremptory language, and the Austrian one was particularly offensive. An amended note conceived in more courteous terms was substituted, but still the communication remained of a nature seldom made to an independent State.

Of course it was impossible for the Danish Ministers to propose this Step to the Chambers, and as the steps which they recommended with respect to this communication did not meet with the approbation of those States another Ministerial Crisis took place which ended in a complete change of the Ministry in favour of the Danish party. It was feared that this circumstance would tend further to embarrass affairs. Happily it has turned out quite the reverse, for M. Bluhme the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, a man of sense and moderation and of considerable influence with his party not being suspected of German tendencies was much more able to council conciliatory Measures, and after repeated discussions in the Danish States assembled in secret Committee, & anxious deliberation of the Council, M. Bluhme's proposal for the future organization of the Duchies, and his answer to the Austrian and Prussian communications received the approval of the States and the sanction of the King, & has been transmitted to the Governments of Austria and Prussia by the hands of M. de Bille, the newly appointed Danish Minister in London. These proposals are contained in the despatch from Sir Henry Wynn No. 141, already submitted to Earl Granville, but which is herewith returned to his Lordship.

The propositions of the Danish Gov^t. have not been favour-

ably received by the Govt. of Prussia, notwithstanding the declaration of M. Bluhme that if not accepted he would give up the task, and leave the matter in the hands of the more violent party. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, acting under the tenour of his former instructions, has done every thing to induce the Prussian Govt. to listen favourably to the Danish proposition, & has been approved for so doing, but the question will be decided at Vienna, to which Capital M. de Bille has already repaired.

The question of the Succession to the Danish Crown.

The only formal and overt act made by the King of Denmark to settle this portion of the question was made early in September last. A letter has been addressed by His Majesty to the Several Sovereigns announcing the selection of Prince Christian of Glücksburg. This letter was accompanied in this Country by a note from the Danish Minister stating the reasons for such selection, shewing why the branch of the Duke of Sonderburg Augustenburg is ineligible irrespective of his rebellion, recording the renunciation of their rights of Succession to the several portions of the Danish territory possessed by the Landgravine & Prince of Hesse, and the Duchess of Anhalt, and by the Emperor of Russia respectively and calling upon the Powers to afford the sanction of an European Act to the arrangement. These papers are herewith transmitted for Earl Granville's information.

Satisfactory replies have been received by the Danish Govt. from France Russia Sweden and likewise from Prussia. The King of Prussia however suggests in his letter that in order to secure the future tranquillity of the Danish dominions, it would be expedient to obtain a formal renunciation on the part of the Duke of Augustenburg of any rights real or supposed which he may put forward, and the King of Prussia offers to engage the Duke to accept a proper indemnity. The Danish Govt. are disposed to do this on the most liberal terms and Sir Henry Wynn has been instructed to encourage this resolution. It may however be added that negotiations on this subject which have already been opened with the Duke, do not hold out much prospect of an understanding & His Highness is generally believed by

the British Agents abroad to seek by procrastination & delay to retain a chance for the realization of more ambitious hopes and projects. —

The answer from the Queen to the King of Denmark purporting that H.M. will be ready to fulfill the engagement of the Protocol of the fourth¹ of August 1850 on the final arrangement of the Matter is now before the Queen.

Another point which has not as yet been settled is the question of the boundary between Schleswig & Holstein & more especially the right to the possession of the fortress of Rendsburg which the German powers are desirous to acquire for the Confederation, but which the Danes maintain belongs to the Duchy of Schleswig. The opinion of H.M. Gov^t. that it ought not to be made a federal fortress has been expressed.

III

Mem.

The question of reply to be given to the King of Denmark's letter rel. to Succession. F.O. Jan^y 1/52.

By a Protocol signed at the Foreign Office on the 2nd of August 1850 it was recorded.

1) That the signing Powers wished that the state of the possessions united under the dominion of His Danish Majesty should be maintained in its integrity.

2) That consequently they recognized the wisdom of the intentions of the King of Denmark to regulate the eventual order of the Succession in a manner to facilitate the arrangements by means of which such object could be attained without altering the relations of the Duchy of Holstein with the Germanic Confederation and lastly, the Powers wishing on their part at once to manifest their wish to facilitate, as far as they are able the conclusion of the arrangements mentioned under head 2 of the Protocol, agree to concert together with a view of giving to these arrangements an additional guarantee of stability by

¹ Error for 2nd.

an Act of European recognition. It was agreed that this deliberation should take place in London, and that the said Powers should furnish their Plenipotentiaries with the necessary full Powers.

This protocol was signed by the Danish Minister the French Ambassador, the British Secretary of State, the Russian Minister and the Swedish Minister.

The Austrian Minister being without instructions referred the Protocol to his Govt. On the 23rd of August 1850 the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires gave in the adhesion of his Govt. to the Protocol, on the understanding that its stipulations should in no wise prejudice the rights of the Germanic Confederation.

The Minister of Denmark in accepting this declaration, thought it necessary to place on record that the above mentioned federal rights could not apply to any portion of the Danish territory except to Holstein and Lauenburg.

The Prussian Minister declined to be a party to the Protocol, and the reasons for so doing will be best explained by quoting a passage from a despatch of Mr. Howard of the 29th of Sept. last (No. 34 Sep. 29 1851) in which Baron Manteuffel stated that the King of Prussia had approved the *object* which the Protocol of London of the 2nd. of August had in view, namely the preservation of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, but His Majesty had refused to become a Party to it because He did not consider that the Protocol was the proper means of arriving at that object, being calculated, as He thought, to prejudice the eventual claims of German Princes to the Succession.

On the 24th of August last (Sir H. Wynn's No. 89) the King of Denmark addressed letters to all the Sovereigns whose Representatives signed the Protocol and likewise to the King of Prussia, announcing the selection of Prince Christian of Glücksburg as his successor & H.M. Ministers at the Courts of those Sovereigns accompanied the presentation of those letters with Notes shewing that the family of the Duke of Augustenburg had no claims, and announcing the renunciation of the claims of the Landgravine and the Prince of Hesse, the Duchess of Anhalt, the Emperor of Russia.

On the 15th of September Sir H. Wynn reported that the King of Sweden had replied in the most friendly terms to H.

Danish Majesty's letter, expressing his high approbation of the choice of Prince Christian, & promising that immediate instructions should be sent to the Swedish Minister in London to give every assistance in His Majesty's Name to any transaction which might take place there in furtherance of this object.

On the 29th of September Sir Henry Wynn reported the arrival of the French and Prussian answers, the former was of as friendly a nature as that of Sweden. The President announces his complete approbation of the selection of Prince Christian of Glücksburg and his determination "de donner le caractère d'une Transaction Européenne aux arrangements projetés" and that the French Ambassador in London would be instructed to give his support to any negotiation which might take place on the subject.

The Prussian answer (Sir H. Wynn No. 102. Mr. Howard No. 35) expressed a wish for the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish dominions, and the King of Prussia's approval of the selection of Prince Christian as successor, and his earnest persuasion that all the Sovereigns interested in the question coincide with him in that approval, & that all join him in hoping for the success of the work which His Danish Majesty prepares to accomplish under the Auspices of the *Great Powers*.

The King of Prussia at the same time expresses the hope that the Act by which the Succession will be applicable to the German Duchies, will be surrounded by all the formalities which according to the principles in use among German reigning Houses are necessary to prevent future uncertainty.

The later part would appear from a subsequent part of the King's letter and from Sir H. Wynn's despatch to relate to the formal renunciation of the Duke of Augustenburg for an indemnity (Sir H. Wynn No. 95).

On the 10th of September the Austrian answer was received. The Emperor not only expressed his approbation of the step taken by His Danish Majesty and of the Choice of Prince Christian. No question is therein made of the right of the Agnates, but in an accompanying despatch Prince Schwarzenberg reserved the right of giving advice on the question.

On the 24th of Nov. Baron Brunnow communicated a despatch from Count Nesselrode in which he announces the ap-

proval by Emperor of Russia of the selection of Prince Christian and urges Great Britain to give effect to the provisions of the Protocol of the 2nd of August.

It is observed that although the rights of the Confederation are mentioned in the Austrian reserve to the Protocol, no mention is anywhere made of the necessity of the participation of the Diet as a Body in the negotiation, or in the Act of European Sanction to be given to the King of Denmark's Selection. Indeed the terms of under the Auspices of the *Great Powers* is used in the King of Prussia's letter. Austria and Prussia, who hold the mandat of the Diet have signified their approbation of the Selection of Prince Christian, and it is supposed that their decision must consequently be binding on the Diet.

As regards the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg to succeed it must be stated that they have been rejected by one set of lawyers to whom the King of Prussia referred them, and that he has since referred them to another set, whose report is not yet known, but as early as the 28[9!]th Sep. (Mr. Howard No. 34) Baron Manteuffel in conversation admitted to Mr. Howard that the sons of the Duke of Augustenburg could not inherit, and that it would be for the Duke of Augustenburgs interest to accept any equitable proposal from the Danish Govt. H.M.'s. Govt. have repeatedly urged the Danish Govt. to be liberal, and the Danish Govt. is perfectly inclined to be so.

England is the only Power which has made no reply.

F. O.

Jan^y 1/52.

IV

1. *Brunnow's original Draft of Convention.*

S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, le Président de la République Française, S.M. la Reine du Royaume Uni de la G^{de} Bretagne et d'Irlande, S.M. le Roi de Prusse, S.M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et S.M. le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, considérant que le maintien de l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise lié aux intérêts généraux de l'équilibre Européen, est d'une haute importance pour la conservation de la paix, et que cette intégrité ne saurait être mieux assurée qu'au moyen d'une combinaison

qui appelle à la succession, dans la totalité des Etats actuellement réunis sous le sceptre de S.M. le Roi de Danemark, la seule descendance mâle à l'exclusion des femmes, ont résolu, à l'invitation de Sa dite Majesté, de donner aux arrangements relatifs à cet ordre de succession un gage additionnel de Stabilité, par un acte de reconnaissance Européenne, et de conclure à cet effet une convention.

En conséquence les h. Parties contractantes ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires,

savoir :

lesquels

ont arrêté et signé les articles suivants ;

Art. I

S.M. le Roi de Danemark, Duc de Holstein et de Lauenbourg, ayant, avec l'assentiment des agnats et des cognats de Son aug. Maison, et après avoir pris en sérieuse considération les vœux de Ses fidèles sujets, réglé l'ordre de succession dans Ses Etats, de manière à ce qu'à défaut de descendance mâle, en ligne directe, sa couronne soit transmise à S.A. le P^{ce} Chrétien de Slesvig – Holstein – Sonderbourg – Glucksbourg et à ses descendants, par ordre de primogéniture, de mâle en mâle, les h. Parties contractantes, appréciant la sagesse des vues qui ont déterminé l'adoption éventuelle de cette combinaison, s'engagent d'un commun accord à reconnaître à S.A. le P^{ce} Chrétien de Slesvig – Holstein – Sonderbourg – Glucksbourg et à ses descendants mâles en ligne directe le droit de succéder, si l'éventualité prévue venait à se réaliser, dans la totalité des Etats actuellement réunis sous le sceptre de S.M. le Roi de Danemark.

Art. II.

Il est expressément entendu que les Duchés de Holstein et de Lauenbourg, faisant partie de la Confédération Germanique, seront maintenus envers elle dans les rapports établis par l'acte fédéral de 1815 et les transactions subséquentes, et que la présente convention n'y apportera aucune altération en ce qui concerne les droits de la Confédération et les obligations fédérales de ces duchés.

Art. III.

Les h. Parties contractantes se réservent de porter la présente convention à la connaissance des autres Puissances en les invitant à y accéder.

Art. IV.

La présente convention sera ratifiée etc.

2. Brunnow's Draft, modified by the Danish Government.

The introduction as that of Brunnow's draft.

Art. I.

S.M. le Roi de Danemark ayant, avec l'assentiment de S.A. Royale le Prince Héréditaire et de Ses plus proches cognats appelés à la succession par la loi Royale de Danemark, et après avoir pris en sérieuse considération les intérêts de Sa Monarchie déclaré vouloir régler l'ordre de succession dans Ses Etats de manière à ce qu'à défaut de descendance mâle en ligne directe du Roi Frédéric III de Danemark, Sa couronne soit transmise à S.A. le Prince Christian de Slesvig Holstein Sonderbourg Glucksbourg et à ses descendants issus de son mariage avec S.A. la Princesse Louise de Slesvic Holstein Sonderbourg Glucksbourg, née Princesse de Hesse, par ordre de primogéniture, de mâle en mâle, les hautes parties contractantes, appréciant la sagesse des vues qui ont déterminé l'adoption éventuelle de cette combinaison, s'engagent d'un commun accord à reconnaître à Son A. le Prince Christian de Slesvic Holstein Sonderbourg – Glücksbourg et à Ses descendants mâles issus en ligne directe de son mariage avec la dite Princesse le droit de succéder, si l'éventualité prévue venait à se réaliser, dans la totalité des états actuellement réunis sous le sceptre de S.M. le Roi de Danemark.

Art. II.

Pour le cas que la descendance mâle issue du mariage de S.A. le Prince Christian de Slesvic Holstein Sonderbourg Glücksbourg avec S.A. la Princesse Louise de Slesvic Holstein Sonderbourg Glucksbourg, née Princesse de Hesse, viendrait à

s'éteindre, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à pourvoir, par une convention ultérieure, au maintien de l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise.

Art. III.

Il est expressément entendu que les droits et les obligations réciproques de S.M. le Roi de Danemark, pour les duchés de Holstein et de Lauenbourg, et de la Confédération Germanique établis par l'acte fédéral de 1815, et par le droit Fédéral existant, ne seront pas altérés par la présente convention.

Art. IV.

Like Brunnow's art. 3.

Art. V.

Like Brunnow's art. 4.

3. Draft Treaty, communicated by Mr. Bille April 24th 1852 (Correspondence, p. 176).

À l'invitation de Sa Majesté le Roi de Danemark, Sa Majesté L'Empereur d'Autriche, le Prince Président de la République Française, Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, et Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège [Continued like 1] ont résolu de donner [Continued like 1] et de conclure à cet effet un Traité.

Art. I.

[Like 2 until Royale de Danemark] ainsi, que de concert avec le chef de la branche aînée de la Maison de Holstein-Gottorp, Sa Majesté L'Empereur de toutes les Russies et après avoir [the following like 2].

Art. II.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, en reconnaissant comme permanent le principe de l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise, s'engagent à prendre en considération les ouvertures ultérieures que Sa Majesté le Roi de Danemark jugerait à propos de leur adresser si (à ce que Dieu ne plaise) la descendance mâle de Son Altesse le Prince Christian de Slesvig – Holstein – Sonder-

bourg – Glücksbourg, issue de son mariage avec Son Altesse la Princesse Louise de Slesvig – Holstein – Sonderbourg – Glücksbourg, née Princesse de Hesse, allait s'éteindre.

Art. III.

As in 2 with the exception of the last three words which have been changed as follows: par le présent Traité.

In art. IV and V the word convention has been substituted with Traité.

4. *The Final Treaty*

(Correspondence, Accessions to Treaty . . . p. 2 f.).

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Prince Président de la République Française, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, considérant que le maintien de l'intégrité de la Monarchie Danoise, lié aux intérêts généraux de l'équilibre Européen, est d'une haute importance pour la conservation de la paix, et qu'une combinaison qui appellerai à succéder à la totalité des Etats actuellement réunis sous le sceptre de Sa Majesté le Roi de Danemark, la descendance mâle, à l'exclusion des femmes, serait le meilleur moyen d'assurer l'intégrité de cette Monarchie, ont résolu, à l'invitation de Sa Majesté Danoise, de conclure un Traité, afin de donner aux arrangements relatifs à cet ordre de Succession un gage additionel de stabilité par un acte de reconnaissance Européenne. En consequence, les Hautes Parties Contractantes ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

[The names and titles of the seven Ministers follow].

Art. I.

Après avoir pris en sérieuse considération les intérêts de sa Monarchie Sa Majesté le Roi de Danemark, de l'assentiment [continued as 3] . . . ainsi que de concert avec Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, Chef de la Branche aînée de la Maison de Holstein – Gottorp, ayant déclaré vouloir régler [continued as 3] . . . et aux descendants issus du mariage de

ce Prince avec . . . [continued as 3] commun accord, dans le cas où l'éventualité prévue viendrait à se réaliser, à reconnaître à Son Altesse le Prince Christian . . . , et aux descendants mâles, issus en ligne directe de son mariage avec la dite Princesse, le droit de succéder à la totalité des Etats actuellement réunis sous le sceptre de Sa Majesté le Roi de Danemark.

Art. II.

[Starting as 3 but using reconnaissant instead of et recon.] . . . adresser, si, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, l'extinction de la descendance mâle, en ligne directe, de Son Altesse le Prince Christian . . . issue de son mariage avec Son Altesse la Princesse Louise . . . devenait imminente.

Art. III.

[Starting as 3] . . . de Danemark et de la Confédération Germanique, concernant les Duchés de Holstein et de Lauenbourg, droits et obligations établis . . . [The following as 3].

Art. IV.

Like 3.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres dans le délai de six semaines, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le huit Mai, l'an de grâce mil huit cent cinquante deux.

Malmesbury	Bille
Kübeck	
A. Walewski	
Bunsen	
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Rehausen.	

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